Implementation of Network Centric Systems

1
Implementation of Network Centric Systems

• Success, Challenges, and Lessons Learned

2
Main objective is to develop insights regarding
the implementation of Network Centric Warfare
systems and technologies by examining three
discrete case studies

• One case study focusing on a system that was
  canceled
• One case study focusing on a qualified success
• One case study on a more
• robust success

3
Agenda

• Network Centric Evolution Overview
• Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown
• Network Centric Program Challenges
• Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems
• Network Centric Program Successes
• Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential
• Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions

4
It is very difficult to progress at equal speed
on development for all equipment necessary to
achieve a fully network centric system

• American Soldier Evolution Example

1914
1944
1965
World War I
World War II
Vietnam
Source webs.lansnet.com
Equipment Evolution
Equipment Evolution
Equipment Evolution
Source army.mil
Source americanhistory.si.edu
Source www.army.mil
Source bllklly.com
Source 101.abn.com
2003
2007
?
Wearable Computers
Gulf War II
Land Warrior
Future Network Centric Soldier
Full integration of communications and
situational awareness systems
Source Aimpoint
Source Sistemi Compositi
Equipment Evolution
Equipment Leap
Source army-technology.com
Source US Army
Source digitalbattle.com
Source militaryfactory.com
Source Thales
Source Empics
Source news.bbc.co.uk
Network Centric evolutions pace is increasing
with the leaps in capability becoming more
dramatic with each generation
5
Agenda

• Network Centric Evolution Overview
• Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown
• Network Centric Program Failures
• Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems
• Network Centric Program Successes
• Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential
• Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions

6
Network Centricity is a continuously developing
cycle that takes careful planning if militaries
are to maximize potential benefits to address
strategic objectives

• Network Centric Cycle

Con. Ops Mission Capabilities
Strategic Objectives
Network Centric Elements
Force Multiplication
International Interoperability
Blue Force Tracking
Situational Awareness
National Defense
Communication Connectivity
Command and Control
Defense Industry Response
Defense Industrial Development and Sustainment
Government Requirements
Integration Systems
Rapid Response
Precision Capabilities
Homeland Security
Interoperability
Joint Operations
Force Transformation
Battle Management Systems
Flexible Response
Sustainability
Maintaining the proper order of approach on
network centric development is critical to ensure
programs remain on schedule and within budget
7
Agenda

• Network Centric Evolution Overview
• Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown
• Network Centric Program Challenges Land Warrior
• Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems
• Network Centric Program Successes
• Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential
• Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions

8
Land Warrior is a 1st generation, modular,
integrated fighting system for all types of
individual infantrymen

• For all forms of infantry Ranger, Airborne,
  Light, Mechanized, Air Assault
• Latest, cutting edge Soldier System
• Includes everything a dismounted soldier wears
  and carries integrated into a close combat
  fighting system that
• Enhances tactical awareness, lethality and
  survivability
• Connects individual soldiers into the broader
  battlefield Network

9
Land Warrior incorporates 5 integrated sub-systems

• Land Warrior Components and System Architecture
  Overview

Weapon Subsystem
Protective Clothing Individual Equipment

• Built around the M-4 Carbine

• Consisted of a frame designed on automotive
  racing technologies and bends to soldiers natural
  movements

Source fas.org

• The Weapon Sub-system includes video-camera and
  laser range-finder / digital compass (LRF/DC)
• When LRF / DC is coupled with GPS, soldier can
  call in accurate indirect fire
• In conjunction with camera, soldier can fire
  around corners

• The LW body armor is supposed to provide
  improved ballistic protection at a reduced weight
• Includes a modular upgrade plate to protect
  soldiers against small arms threat

Spin off efforts of the Land Warrior concept
included the XM-8, a cancelled assault rifle, and
the earlier OCIW integrated weapon, another
cancelled network centric effort
10
Land Warrior incorporates 5 integrated sub-systems

• Land Warrior Components and System Architecture
  Overview

Integrated Helmet System
Computer / Radio Sub-system

• Was designed to provide ballistic protection at
  less weight

• Attached to soldiers load-bearing frame, 400 Mhz

• Helmet-mounted display allows soldier to view
  computer generated graphical data, maps,
  intelligence, troop locations and imagery from
  weapon-mounted thermal weapon sight (TWS) and
  video camera

• A hand-grip wired to the pack and attached to
  the chest acts as a computer mouse and allows
  wearer to change screens, key on the radio,
  change frequencies and send digital information.
• Two types of sub-system
• Leader two radios and a flat panel display
• Soldiers one radio

11
Land Warrior incorporates 5 integrated sub-systems

• Land Warrior Components and System Architecture
  Overview

Software Subsystem
Highlights
Heads up display facilitates Blue Force
Tracking Radio-headsets and noise-canceling,
over-the-ear headphones that fit into each
helmet Body armor contains a transmitter for
wireless network, capable of transmitting
encrypted data for up to a KM Also includes a
lithium-ion battery pack and a GPS transponder
System operated from a gun-grip shaped controller
or buttons on the M-4

• Addresses the soldiers core battlefield
  functions, display management, and mission
  equipment and supply

• Includes tactical and mission support modules,
  maps and tactical overlays, and the ability to
  capture and display video images
• Also contains a power management module

12
Land Warrior was initially envisioned to provide
a transformational leap ahead system that would
dramatically enhance infantry capabilities

• Land Warrior Program History Development

• Program Origins
• Requirement stated in August 1994
• Contract awarded to Hughes Aircraft Company
  (later Raytheon)
• Plans formed to develop two blocs
• IOC LW Block 1
• Stryker Interoperable LW Block 2
• Program Troubles
• Program costs soared to 85,000 / unit
• System weight reached 40 lbs / unit)
• Intense program to replace military equipment
  with COTS technologies in order to lower cost and
  weight
• System found too fragile in testing in early
  2000s

13
Land Warrior has struggled to deliver optimal
results that match the level of investment the US
Army has committed to the program

• Land Warrior Program History Development

• New Leadership
• In June 2002, Program Executive Office (PEO)
  established to provide centralized management
  for equipping the soldier as system rather than
  a piecemeal approach
• February 2003 General Dynamics awarded a 60
  million contract to enhance Block 1 capability
• late 2002 2003, program re-scoped to focus
  on providing some level of enhanced capability to
  Stryker brigades either training for or deployed
  to Iraq
• Elements of the system provided to commanders
  individually
• Field Trials and Deployment
• 2006 2007 extensive field trials at Ft. Lewis,
  WA
• 2006 Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP)
• 2007 230 of the 440 produced systems are
  deployed with 4-9 infantry in Iraq
• Full systems provided only to squad commanders
• Sgts, Lts, Cpts have full systems while Pvts and
  Cpls have
• blue force tracking beacons to relay positions to
  commanders
• Program Troubles
• Program costs soared to 85,000 / unit
• System weight reached 40 lbs / unit)
• Intense program to replace military equipment
  with COTS technologies in order to lower cost and
  weight
• System found too fragile in testing in early
  2000s

14
Mixed Reviews for Land Warrior

• Response to Land Warrior

Insights
Negative

• Land Warrior was seeking to provide revolutionary
  capabilities when the soldiers really needed
  evolutionary capabilities that will work on the
  battlefield
• Key concerns
• Weight Some reports have weight down to 7 10
  lbs
• Unclear how much capability it retain
• Cost between 85K USD and 101K USD per system
• Power sources Can power up in vehicles, but
  soldiers need to carry several replacement
  batteries into battle

We see (Land Warrior) as a plus, but we also
know that weve got to lighten the load on the
soldier --Gen. Richard Cody, Army Vice Chief of
Staff Its just a bunch of stuff we dont use,
taking the place of useful stuff, like guns . . .
It makes you a slower, heavier target. --Sgt.
James Young, M-240 gunner training with LW at Ft.
Lewis We have pretty much removed most of the
funding for the Land Warrior program. Land
Warrior along the way, really had some problems
--Lt. Gen. David Melcher, Deputy Chief of Staff
for Army G-8
15
Mixed reviews for Land Warrior

• Response to Land Warrior

Insights
Positive

• Certain elements of Land Warriors suite of
  technologies have been well-received
• Scaling back of Land Warrior and distributing the
  entirety of the system only to squad leaders
  appears to have increased the effectiveness of
  the system

If given the choice I would not go outside the
wire without it (Land Warrior --US Army
Sergeant Daniel Garza, 4-9 Infantry Stryker
Battalion It provides a sense of comfort in
reducing the fratricide potential Everyone
knows where everyone else is on the battlefield
and everyone knows where everyone elses direct
fire is --US Army Capt. Mike Williams, Company A
Commander, 4-9 Infantry Stryker Battalion (Land
Warrior) has preformed above my expectations over
here Now is the time to actually reinforce
success so we dont drag this out again -- Lt.
Col. Brian Cummings, Land Warrior Product
Manager Lets not start over Lets build on
our successes with Land Warrior -- Col. Richard
Hansen, Land Warrior Project Manager arguing for
the continuation of the program
16
Despite multiple setbacks and challenges within
the Land Warrior development the program did
yield some successful technologies and some
beneficial insights about soldier systems and NCW

• Enhanced Soldier Situational Awareness
• Enhanced Soldier lethality from concealment
• Provide increased communications
• Access to Boomerang anti-sniper system
• Allowed for improved unit cohesion in cluttered
  urban environments

• System remains too heavy despite significant
  weight savings
• Development of the system failed to lower system
  cost to acceptable levels
• Despite spending 2 billion on RD only 13 of
  the 19 identified capabilities gaps
  were addressed

• Land Warrior Benefits, Drawbacks, and Paths
  Forward

Drawbacks
Benefits

• Gather what information can be extracted from the
  cancelled Land Warrior system
• Continue the Rapid Fielding Initiatives to
  provide troops in the field solutions
• Wait for Future Combat Systems maturity in 2013
  (?) before attempting a second Future Soldier
  System

Paths Forward

• Field a small number of units, less than 500, to
  forces in Iraq to continue gaining battlefield
  insights

Early combat reports validated that there is
merit in the Land Warrior network centric concept
even if the program overreached current
capabilities
17
Land Warrior will act as a springboard for future
efforts in network centric soldier systems but
the program failed to achieve its highly
ambitious goals that were laid out in 1996

• Land Warrior Conclusions for Network Centric
  Evolution

• Land Warriors goals were ambitious and had to be
  scaled back
• Future Network Centric efforts need to keep
  budget in mind as well as capability enhancement
• Budget needs to be considered comprehensively for
  research and development, procurement, and
  sustainment making life cycle cost assessments
  critical for appropriate planning
• Balancing desire for revolutionary systems and
  capabilities with the need for immediately
  effective and field-able evolutionary
  enhancements of capabilities
• Capable technology does not ensure that a
  military is well positioned to adapt that
  technology
• Land Warrior, a program that, despite offering
  potential benefits, did not provide enough of a
  network centric advantage to justify its
  spiraling cost
• Does every soldier need to be wired?

18
Agenda

• Network Centric Evolution Overview
• Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown
• Network Centric Program Challenges Land Warrior
• Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems Bowman
• Network Centric Program Successes
• Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential
• Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions

19
Bowman is a radio and communications system
linking vehicles throughout the UK militaryland,
sea and air

• Bowman Components and System Architecture Overview

Principle Capability Categories
Bowman Component Pieces

• Secure Voice

• Messaging and data transfer

Source ITT

• Situational Awareness

• Battlefield Applications

Source armedfroces.co.uk
System Architecture

• Bowman is an open architecture system design to
  utilize software growth to adapt hardware
  solutions
• The software design is intend to be backwards
  compatible and completely network scalable

Source National Audit Office
Source CD
Once completed Bowman with create a network
centric system that incorporates a maximum of
30,000 platforms including ships, aircraft, and
land vehicles
20
The critical need for Bowman is evident when
considering it was created to replace the
Clansman radios that were fielded in the 1970s
with expected 15 year life and were in service
well into the late 1990s

• Land Warrior Program History Development

• Program Origins
• Requirement stated in 1989 General Staff
  Requirement seeking a replacement to ageing
  Clansman radio system
• GSR later modified to incorporate the changing
  post-Cold War security environment
• Contract awarded to Archer
• Program Troubles
• Original contract resulted in failure in 2000
• Archer failed to deliver the requirement within
  budget and time
• MoD cessation of contract

21
Bowman System is a fundamental part of the UK
digitalization process

• Land Warrior Program History Development

• New Leadership
• Re-bidding process won by CDC Systems UK Ltd, now
  General Dynamics UK
• New contracts involves 48,000 radios, 30,000
  computers being installed on more than 30,000
  platforms as well as training
• Field Trials and Deployment
• March 2003, initial technical field trials with
  40 Land-Rover-borne installations
• July 2003, training for the initial battalion
  begins
• March 2004, first Brigade operational field
  trial conducted using two mechanized battle
  groups and a brigade HQ (245 vehicles and over
  2000 personnel)
• Declared in service on 26 March 2004
• By January 2007, 7000 vehicles had been converted
  (all services)

22
Bowman has had a number of key successes and is
still a key element of the UK MoDs
communications and NWC plan

• Bowman Program History Development

• Key Successes
• Bowman signals an improvement over Clansman,
  particularly by
• Providing secure communications over greater
  ranges
• Enhanced situational awareness, though not down
  to individual platform level
• But it has been plagued by a series of
  significant technological, training and
  deployment issues

23
Still, Bowmans development and deployment has
been a very difficult process and is still
troubled by a range of types of key concerns

• Bowman Program History Development

• Key Issues and Concerns
• Concerns over the software applications (ComBAT
  Infrastructure and Platform software) BCIP
• Planning for data transmission involves
  unacceptably lengthy processes intolerant to even
  trivial errors and may only be undertaken by
  experts.
• Sustainability / power supply
• UK National Audit Office Report in Mid-2006
• A number of key functions, including the
  systems ability to transmit data, to handle
  large quantities of data in headquarters, the
  ability of system managers to manage the network
  effectively, and the ability to interchange data
  with other nations forces and with other UK
  communications systems were rated as having very
  limited capability at this stage.

24

• Bowman Program History Development

• Key Issues and Concerns
• Training System is hard to use
• 2004 radiation burns
• Weight System is too heavy in nearly all
  configurations
• Expectations Set by military specifiers denied
  hands-on experience of battlefield digitization
  systems
• Mid-2005 Program Re-cast
• Increased funding allocation (GBP 121 million)
  and extended timescale to late-2007 have been
  granted in order to achieve expected capability
• Also a decision to triple training facilities
  (from 21 to 71)
• Add another 24 million GBP of cost and an
  estimated 204 million GBP in operating costs over
  25 years
• Total funding now over 2.5 billion GBP
• A 3rd operational field trial will be conducted
  at the end of 2007.

25
Bowman began as a program to replace the outdated
Clansman radio and was evolved to become a fully
network centric solution to address the
operational requirements of the 21st century
battle space

• Bowman Program History

Development
Bowman 6 years overdue
New Bowman contract for supply and support
Expected development and initial manufacturing
period
1988
1993
2000
1996
1997
1998
1999
1994
1995
Termination of Original Bowman program
Bowman feasibility studies launched
Initial Planned Service Entry Date
Continuing challenges prompt the decision to
field Bowman in increments and recompete the
contract
General Dynamics UK selected as Prime Contractor
1st unit begins Bowman conversion
1st Field Trials
Air, Land, and Sea systems conversion continuing
Bowman deployed to Iraq
2001
2007
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Bowman without CIP declared In Service
Bowman expanded to a full ComBAT management
system known as CIP
CIP declared In Service
Production
Unforeseen challenges in bridging the legacy
fleet and integrating force wide communications
were the principle reasons for the long delays
and budget creep of the Bowman program
26
Bowman has not lived up to its billing, however
it has provided the capability enhancements that
the British military required

• Response to Bowman

Positive
Negative
Were delighted to have delivered the 10,000th
vehicle --Navy Commodore Jay Hart, commenting
on Bowman instillation at General Dynamics UK
facility Bowman is providing more robust
tactical Internet, greater ability to
interconnect in the field, planning tools and
additional hardware such as the Tactical
Network-level Gateway (TNG)." --David Jarrett,
prime contractor General Dynamics Vehicle User
Data Terminals are being returned at a rate of 90
a month compared to our predictions of 25 a
month -- Ministry of Defence response over
concerns of Bowman repair rates and reflective of
the overall improvements in the program
Bowman equipment is under a three year warranty
which means our troops cannot fix it if something
breaks -- Gen. Sir Richard Dannatt, Head of the
Army, British Military MPs recently criticized
the MoD for spending 2.4 billion on Bowman
radios that soldiers said were too heavy to carry
and could not communicate with the radios of
their allies in Iraq --Reports out of London
carried in the The Times, on September 25,
2007 Bowman was better than Clansman, but was
too heavy and so complicated that it required a
substantial amount of training --Soldiers
reviews out of Basra and operations in
Iraq (MOD) seriously under-estimated the
challenges involved in both delivering it and
sustaining it --Public Accounts Committee
27
Bowman has overcome a large number of challenges
to reach fielding and is continuing to undergo
adjustments

• Not currently synchronized with international
  allied systems
• Does not currently satisfy soldier demands for a
  lighter system
• Program remains significantly behind schedule
  despite improvements in the delivery timetable

• Currently providing improved battlefield
  co-ordination in Iraq
• Provides encrypted communications capable of both
  data and voice transmissions
• Provides full spectrum joint interoperability

• Fielding of Bowman is proceeding despite soldier
  concerns due to the age of the legacy system and
  the requirement to field a new solution
  immediately
• Though not perfect the Bowman system has met
  enough of the Ministry of Defenses network
  centric requirements that it is being applied to
  all land vehicles
• Further refinements of the system are expected to
  continue, especially in regards to man packs
  where technology evolution should improve the
  system over time

• Bowman Benefits, Drawbacks, and Paths Forward

Benefits
Drawbacks
Paths Forward
Determination to succeed and effective program
re-scoping allowed the British military to save
the Bowman program from failure and provide a
network centric bridge to future systems
28
Bowman, despite its shortcomings, is a success in
bridging the legacy system of the British
military with the digital network centric
solutions of the future

• Bowman Conclusions for Network Centric Evolution

• As understandings of the challenges facing a
  bridge system became clearer the Bowman program
  was re-aligned to provide technology increments
  in order to address gaps in legacy systems
• Re-alignment took time and money but allowed the
  program to remain within feasibility and still
  provide a network centric capability that had not
  been present before
• Fielding an imperfect solution does not
  necessarily mean that a program was a failure
• Do not sacrifice good solutions in pursuit of
  perfect solutions that may not be realistic
• Re-scoping programs in mid development should not
  be seen as a failure of understanding the Network
  Centric process, but rather as a necessary step
  to contain program creep and meet requirements
• Bowman illustrates how critical initial planning
  can be and how important firmly limiting the
  goals of a program are in regards to the
  programs ability to succeed

The Ministry of Defenses flexibility and
understanding of the critical nature of Bowman
provided the program the long term support
necessary for success
29
Agenda

• Network Centric Evolution Overview
• Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown
• Network Centric Program Challenges Land Warrior
• Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems Bowman
• Network Centric Program Successes Infanterist
  der Zukunft
• Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential
• Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions

30
IdZ is one of the more robust soldier systems in
development and has been successfully deployed in
a limited scope to German troops in both Kosovo
and Afghanistan

• IdZ Overview

• The System
• The IdZ equipment is designed to enhance soldier
  mobility, protection and performance
  significantly, particularly during night
  operations
• Being developed by EADS. Follow-up system being
  developed by Rheinmetall
• It also enables individual combat troops to
  connect with network-based operational command
  and control systems
• Kits focused on squad capability rather than
  individual capability

.
31

• IdZ Overview

• The System (cont)
• The systems included two sets of ten kits for
  each squad commander plus nine squad members.
• Each kit comprises
• A Heckler Koch G36 5.56 mm rifle
• A NavICom, C4I system developed by Thales
• A Thales Angenieux Lucie image intensifying
  helmet-mounted night vision goggles
• An Oerlikon Contraves weapon mounted laser
  system together with eye protection glasses and
  an ear protection sub-system
• NBC Protection subsystem
• A ballistic and stab protection vest
• And a load-carrying vest.
• Kits also include mini / micro UAVs, MP7 PDW,
  Anti-tank rocket launcher, MG4 light machine gun,
  KM2000 knife

.
32
Germany intends to incorporate a helmet mounted
heads up display in the next generation of the
Infanterist der Zukunft

• Infanterist der Zukunft (IdZ) Components and
  System Architecture Overview

Principle Components

• Protective Clothing and Individual Equip.

• Computer/Radio Sub system

Source EADS
Source danmil.de
Source HK

• Weapon Subsystem

System Architecture

• IdZ was never intended to replace all systems in
  the military and as such was created with an open
  architecture that facilitated integration
• Two tier approach with commanders and critical
  forces equipped with the IdZ system and less
  critical ones with the reduced Soldat im Einsatz

Germanys two tiered approach kept both budgets
and technology in mind during planning, allowing
the military to take network centric steps while
still modernizing other equipment
33

• IdZ Overview

• The System (cont)

.
34

• IdZ Overview

• The Program
• December 2004, EADS awarded contract to deliver
  196 kits (69.7 million Euros), which would
  service 2,000 soldiers
• ESB prototype trialed in Kosovo in 2002
• EADS awarded a follow-up contract (10 million
  Euros) to produce 150 systems to meet an urgent
  operational requirement in Afghanistan
• IdZ Version 1 delivered to Special Operations
  Unit between 2005 and 2007
• IdZ Version 2 prototype to be delivered in Q2 of
  2008

35
Though perhaps not the most robust network
centric solution, the German approach has
provided both near term capability and a
springboard for future system integration
Infanterist der Zukunft (IdZ) Program History
Development
Initial concept trials conducted at Prizren in
Kosovo
Two IdZ-ES (version two) demonstrators are to be
handed over for testing
1,600 version one models order for delivery and
testing
2002
2003
2009
2006
2007
2004
2005
2008
Rheinmetall Defence issued a contract to begin
development of the second version of IdZ
Initial production of version two IdZ
1st system handed over to the Army inspectorate
at Hammelburg Infantry School
Production
Germanys IdZ program has relied heavily on COTS
solutions allowing the Bundeswher to limit budget
risk in early stages of the program
36
Performance by the German military utilizing IdZ
has been positive with plans in the works to
proceed on a second generation

• Response to IDz

Positive
Negative
It is well ahead of any other European project
in terms of maturity --US Army, Electronic
Warfare and Sensors Directorate The
infantryman of the future is an integrated
system-oriented approach to the aspects of
self-protection, communication, guidance,
navigation, and armaments.IDZ demonstrates the
performance gains of new technology in networked
operations for the protection of
soldiers --Bernhard Gerwert, Head of EADS
Defense Electronics Were convinced that the
Future Soldier system (IdZ) order lays the
groundwork for long-term, intensive cooperation
in equipping the hard-hitting, fast moving forces
that are going to play a key role in future
crisis -- Klaus Eberhardt, Chairman of the
Executive Board of Rheinmetall AG
They had too many (electronic/software devices).
You cant force the soldier to do things he
doesnt think are important, because hes going
to turn it right off -- Statement by Arne
Lamberth Coordinator for the Swedish Markus
program, in reference to tests on the IdZ
system The main problem is weight, as you
increase capability you add both power and weight
problems --Dr. Karl-Heinz Rippert, IdZ Project
Manageer for the German Federal Office for
Defence Technology and Procurement
37
German forces are currently using the mountain
version of the IdZ to improve capabilities in
Afghanistan

• Approached the program as a group of soldiers and
  did not overburden every soldier
• Elite forces can be equipped with more advanced
  solutions that can be spiraled out as these
  systems mature
• Provides systems immediately as opposed an
  indefinite time in the future

• Germany is continuing development work on the
  successful IdZ system
• Gradual fielding has allowed Germany to
  appropriately tailor its systems to soldier
  requirements that are arising from the modern
  battlefield
• To address challenges of weight and power,
  Germany has chosen to scale back the system and
  wait for technology developments to catch up to
  military requirements

• IDz Benefits, Drawbacks, and Paths Forward

• Does not provide a network centric evolution for
  the entire force
• May cause interoperability challenges that are
  not currently present for the legacy systems

Benefits
Drawbacks
Paths Forward
For the capabilities provided the IdZ program has
experienced very few drawbacks reflecting how
beneficial the network centric process can be
when properly managed
38
Though small in scale the IdZ provides a solid
example of how the Network Centric process can be
managed to produce both near and long term
benefits

• IDz Conclusions for Network Centric Evolution

• Network Centric capabilities can be achieved in
  the most critical areas without creating an
  entirely network centric force
• Basing Network Centric solutions around a group
  of platforms (soldiers in this case) may be a
  more efficient means of creating sustainable
  networks
• In the case of the IdZ, by utilizing a ten man
  team as opposed to a soldier as a system
  concept the Germans are able to limit the
  negative aspects of the system, such as weight
• By limiting the scope on initial efforts the
  German military was able to confirm which COTS
  systems were most beneficial, which systems
  needed improvement, and which should be removed
  without expending inordinate amounts of resources
• The IdZ program also forms an excellent test bed
  for doctrine evolution as it approached change in
  steps instead of leaps
• Finally, the IdZ program was envisioned in
  spirals that would allow improvement on the
  system without forcing the German military to
  commit to a long term program whose rewards are
  not yet clear

Adaptation of a gradual approach to Network
Centric warfare allows for both incorporation of
current technologies and appropriate positioning
for long term applications
39
Agenda

• Network Centric Evolution Overview
• Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown
• Network Centric Program Failures
• Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems
• Network Centric Program Successes
• Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential
• Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions

40
Malaysia entered its 9th Defense Plan 2006-2010
with developing network centric capability as a
key component of overall modernization efforts
prior communications were handled by an outdated
phone system

• Malaysian Network Centric Activities PX2000

PX2000 Background
Principle Components

• PX2000 integrates all Services, the Joint HQ and
  Intelligence Agencies at the Strategic level
• System linked all air stations, capital ships and
  battalion CPs into the network
• Implementation occurred during 2001 to 2004 and
  enhancements will continue in the future
• To date the PX2000 has network Malaysias Joint
  Force structure, Early Warning System, Air
  Defense System, and Air Mission Planning and
  Management System
• PX2000 linked not only terrestrial systems but
  also integrated satellite solutions into the
  network
• Continuing work will begin to integrate low level
  commanders, non-military security agencies, and
  potentially friendly militaries (within security
  limitations)

Satellite Terminals
Radio Systems
Bizsat.jp
SINCGARS
System still in development
Software based operator interfaces
Battle Management System
Key Features

• Based on COTS and Windows OS
• Real-time system alerts
• Integrated browsing for remote access

• Integrated Geographical Information System (GIS)
• Automatic Data escalation and dissemination
• Designed to be locally supportable

PX2000 was envisioned, from the beginning, as a
component of the broader Malaysian strategic
network that would grow to encompass tactical
requirements to create a network centric force
41
Malaysias success implementing the PX2000 system
was what facilitated the planning for the next
step

• Malaysian Network Centric Activities PX2000

PX2000 System Architecture -Future
PX2000 System Architecture - Present
Joint HQ
Joint HQ
Navy HQ
Air Force HQ
Army HQ
Intelligence HQ
Air Ops Center
Navy HQ
Air Force HQ
Army HQ
Intelligence HQ
?
Fleet Ops Command
4 Divisions
Air Ops Center
Airbases
3 HQ Areas
13 Brigades
?
Fleet Ops Command
4 Divisions
Aircraft
Bases/Ships
Battalion Command Posts
Airbases
3 HQ Areas
13 Brigades
Company Command Cars
Mid-Small Vessels
Bases/Ships
Battalion Command Posts
Platoon Commanders
Battle Management System
Rapidly evolving from a strategic concept, to a
strategic application, to a tactical widespread
network reflects the benefits of properly
approaching the network centric process
42
While not prefect, and still under continuing
refinement, the PX2000 undertaking helped
Malaysia significantly advance into the network
centric era

• Network Centric Leap Ahead Conclusions
  Malaysian Example

Malaysian Market Driver
Lesson Learned
Malaysia remained focused on achieving the
strategic objectives of the their Network Centric
efforts
By keeping objectives constrained by good
planning, the process of converting to a network
centric force has faced fewer delays and
challenges
1
Strategically, Malaysia views joint capabilities
as the most critical and has centered efforts on
these systems
Prioritizing network centric capabilities has
ensured that critical programs are not undermined
by nice to have systems
2
By utilizing COTS solutions Malaysia has been
able to rapidly leap forward without bankrupting
their budget
For nations to skip steps in the Network Centric
process it becomes critical to customize existing
solutions rather than develop unique alternatives
3
Once planning had been completed Malaysia relied
on industry to provide the leap ahead technologies
At times it may be necessary to scale back the
initial presence of domestic firms until these
firms are truly ready support a nations network
centric efforts
4
By approaching the entire process with a well
developed plan Malaysia was able to avoid the
pitfalls usually associated with efforts to skip
generational developments
43
Agenda

• Network Centric Evolution Overview
• Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown
• Network Centric Program Failures
• Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems
• Network Centric Program Successes
• Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential
• Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions

44
Conclusions