Iraq: Insurgencies and counterinsurgency policies

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Iraq Insurgencies and counterinsurgency policies

• What are the causes of violence in Iraq?
• Have some counterinsurgency policies worked
  better than others?

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Announcements

• Paper guidelines online.
• Paper due two weeks from today.
• Final Exam study guide next week.
• McChrystals Policy Assessment parts 1 and 2, pp
  1-30.

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Potential Causes of Violence

• Inevitable Grievances
• Foreign Occupation
• Democracy in Divided Society
• Recent history of ethnic/religious conflict
• Inevitable Security Challenges
• Anarchy after a transition
• Iraq a failed, Rentier state
• Regional opposition to U.S. presence

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Potential Causes of Violence

• Avoidable Grievances
• De-Baathification
• Heavy-handed insurgency operations
• Democracy pushed too quickly
• Avoidable Security Mistakes
• Disbanding Military
• Too few troops
• Wrong counter insurgency plan
• Failure to respond to looting, provide order

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Context of the Conflict

• Through a series of coups in 1968 Saddam
  Husseins Baathist party took control of the
  government.
• The Baathists did a great deal to modernize the
  Iraqi economy, but Baathists and Sunnis
  benefited more than Kurds and Shiites.

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The Groups and Geography of Iraq

• Shiia Arabs 60
• Sunni Arabs 15
• Kurds 15-20
• Turks, Christians, 5

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The Groups and Geography of Iraq

• Neighbors
• Oil is 95 of Iraqs exports (Rentier state)
• Distribution of oil

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The Outcome of the 1991 Gulf War

• As part of the 1991 cease-fire agreement, the
  U.S.
• Maintains a no-fly zone over Iraqi Kurdistan and
  Shiia south.
• Conducts WMD inspections in Iraq
• Maintains costly sanctions on Iraq.

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The Decision to Overthrow Saddam

• Neo-conservatives and Bush send a message about
  WMDs

• Believe autocratic, rogue states are the root
  cause of terrorism.

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The Occupation

• Quick victory with relatively small force

• U.S. was not prepared to fight an insurgency
• "I think it's driven in part by my own failures
  when I was there as a senior military leader
  contributing to Gen. Tommy Franks' plan that we
  never even considered an insurgency as a
  reasonable option." General Keane
• Plan was to turn control of to Iraqis quickly
• Avoid insurgency by not occupying

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Looting and Anarchy

• With Saddam in hiding, Iraq descends into
  anarchy
• Mass Looting
• Difficulty in establishing Order. (U.S. military
  does little).
• U.S. disbands Iraqi Army
• Provisional Coalition Authority gives
  de-Baathification order
• Local militias provide security

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The insurgency and counterinsurgency

• The insurgency emerges from this vacuum of
  authority.
• Phases of the insurgency
• 1. Ex-army and Iraqi-police attacks led by
  Baathists (organized locally to provide
  security), and sporadic suicide bombings.
• 2. Sunni insurgents and Al-Qaeda in Iraq and
  Al-Zarqawi intensify fighting with suicide
  bombings.
• 3. Elections and transition in power escalate
  Sunni-Shiite Tensions (Jan. 2005)
• 4. The bombings of Shiite shrine in (Jan. 2006)
  and the Shiite-led counterinsurgency.

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IV. Counterterrorism trends in Iraq
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Sectarian and Ethnic Conflict

• What is all the fighting about?
• 1. Turf wars in a security racket.
• Kurds happy with autonomy in the North
• 2/3 Baathists seek to prevent the transfer of
  power from being consolidated
• Sunnis outnumber in a democratic Iraqseek safety
  from U.S. forces, Shiia militias, and Iraqi
  police
• Shiites want to enjoy benefits of being a
  majority
• Shiites aligned with Iran (al-Sadr) want to make
  occupation costly for the U.S., want a place in
  politics.

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Sectarian and Ethnic Conflict

• What is all the fighting about?
• 4. Al Qaeda sees an opportunity to make war
  costly, fight the U.S. and Shiia Islam.

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U.S. counterinsurgency policy

• Initial Plan (2003-2004) light foot print, quick
  exit
• Why did it fail?
• Second plan (2004-2006) kill insurgents, train
  Iraqi forces.
• Why did it fail?

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Patreaus Counterinsurgency plan

• 2006 Congressional elections
• Rumsfield Gates
• Petraeus
• Patraeus exploits Lessons of Tal Afar
• Key feature of the surge in Iraq

• Use forces to protect civilian population,
  develop personal connections, and gather
  intelligence.

General David Petraeus
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Totals and Trends in the Conflict in Iraq
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The Lessons of Tal Afar

• What is the logic of Clear-Hold-Build?
• How is it differently tactically (what are U.S.
  troops doing)?

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Additional Policy Changes since Surge

• Expanded effort to identify moderate Sunni
  leaders.
• Cut deals with former insurgents
• Pay to put down arms identify extremists.
• Incorporate Militias into politics
• Diplomacy work with Iran and Syria to end tacit
  support for violence
• Shut down trafficking of bombs and extremists

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IV. Counterterrorism trends in Iraq
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Civilian Fatalities
2007
2005
2006
2004
2009
2008
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Perception of Local Conditions
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Perceptions by Group
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Legitimacy of Democracy in Iraq
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Alternative Explanations Implications?

• What else might explain recent changes?
• Is this a workable model for Afghanistan?

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Announcements

• Paper guidelines online.
• Paper due two weeks from today.
• Final Exam study guide next week.
• McChrystals Policy Assessment parts 1 and 2, pp
  1-30.