The Menu for Choice

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The Menu for Choice

• How do States Make Decisions?

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I. The state as unitary actor?

• Unitary Actors?
• Realism and the National Interest
• What is the national interest?
• Why does regime type matter?

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B. As If Assumption

1. Support Power politics models, situations of
   constrained choice
2. Problem Internal differences matter in
   unexpected ways as if assumption generates
   incorrect predictions

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C. The Puzzle How does a State Select From the
Menu?
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II. Arrows Theorem and the National Interest

• Focus How to aggregate individual interests into
  social or national interest
• Setting and question
• Three or more citizens
• Three or more outcomes or objectives they must
  rank Example economic growth, human rights, and
  military security.
• Is there a reasonable way for society as a whole
  to rank the outcomes? Could be anything
  voting, polling, mind-reading, etc. Is there any
  system at all that would be reasonable?

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C. Notation

• Choices or outcomes are indicated by capital
  letters A, B, C, etc.
• Preferences indicated by use of letters p, i, or
  r
• Strong preference If someone prefers one option
  to another we write A p B
• Indifference If someone thinks A and B are about
  equal, we write A i B
• Weak preference If A p B or A i B then A r B.
  So A r B means A is at least as good as B

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2. A minimal definition of rationality

1. Preferences are connected Given any pair of
   options, someone can relate them with p, i, or r.
2. Preferences are transitive If A r B and B r C
   then A r C.

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D. Characteristics of a desirable aggregation
technique

1. Universality Our technique should apply to any
   group of rational people, regardless of their
   specific preferences about A, B, or C.

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2. Non-Dictatorship

• If Bob says A p B
• But everyone else says B p A
• then
• We should not conclude that for society, A p B

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3. Unanimity

• If everyone agrees that A p B
• then
• We should conclude that for society, A p B

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4. Collective Rationality

• If individuals are rational, our technique should
  create social preferences that are rational
• Remember what this means connected and
  transitive preferences

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5. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives

• Suppose I have the options A, B, and C. I can
  rank these however I want. One example A p B p
  C
• Now suppose a new option is available D.
• I must not change the order of A, B, and C
  relative to each other.
• Starting with above example
• D p A p B p C ? OK
• A p D p B p C ? OK
• A p B p D p C ? OK
• A p B p C p D ? OK
• D p B p A p C ? Not OK (B and A swapped places)
• Restaurant analogy Waiter offers chicken or
  fish. I like chicken better. Waiter comes back
  and explains there is also beef. I now decide I
  want the fish. (Not OK)

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D. Characteristics of a desirable aggregation
technique (revisited)

1. Universality Applies to people with different
   values or beliefs
2. Non-Dictatorship No one persons preference
   outweighs everyone else together
3. Unanimity If everyone prefers one option to
   another, then so should society as a whole
4. Collective Rationality Should produce a
   transitive ranking of options
5. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives New
   options dont change the relative ranks of
   earlier options

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E. Conclusion and Implications

• Arrow proved these conditions cannot all be true!
• Implications
• There are times when there is no single national
  interest, general will or will of the people
• Rational individuals may not make a rational
  collectivity
• Preference cycles and the power of agenda-setting
• Voter 1 A p B p C
• Voter 2 B p C p A
• Voter 3 C p A p B
• SOCIETY
• A p B
• B p C
• C p A!

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III. Beyond National Interest Opportunity and
Willingness Revisited

• Reminder First lecture of class outlined the
  menu for choice approach
• What affects states opportunities?
• System Position in hierarchies
• Region Neighborhood effects of regime, trade,
  and conflict
• Dyad Trade dependence, relative power
• State Power projection capability, stage of
  development
• What about willingness? Need to move BELOW state
  level of analysis!

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IV. Selectorate Theory A Framework for
Understanding Willingness

• Division of society
• Leader Decides public policy
• Selectorate set of people with legal right to
  participate in selection of the government
• Democracies Adult citizens
• Monarchies Royalty or nobles
• Some autocracies have large selectorates
  (single-party states, rigged elections, etc.)
  Why?
• Winning Coalition Number of selectorate actually
  needed to gain/retain power
• Democracies About half of S
• Autocracies Military leaders, key nobles, etc.
• Disenfranchised Powerless

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Selectorate Theorys Division

• Societys Disenfranchised
• Selectorate
• Winning Coalition
• Leader

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B. Regime Types Three combinations

• W Size of winning coalition
• S Size of selectorate
• W/S Regime Type

Typical Regimes Typical Regimes Winning Coalition Size Winning Coalition Size
Typical Regimes Typical Regimes Small Large
Selectorate Size Small Monarchy/ Junta N/A
Selectorate Size Large Autocracy Democracy
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C. Policy Tools

• Allocation of resources
• Public Goods National security, prosperity, etc.
• Benefit the entire selectorate (S) both
  supporters and opponents/defectors
• Collective in nature joint and nonexcludable
  (economic growth, safety, clean air, etc.)
• Private Goods Benefit supporters only (W)
• Leaders prefer to use private goods to remain in
  power (punish defection)

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D. The loyalty norm effects of S and W

1. W/S is Large Chance of selector being needed in
   next coalition is high ? defect if private goods
   at less than maximum

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Large W/S Democracy and Monarchy/ Junta (Chance
of being needed is high)
Selectorate Winning Coalition


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D. The loyalty norm effects of S and W

1. W/S is Large Chance of selector being needed in
   next coalition is high ? defect if private goods
   at less than maximum
2. W/S is Small Chance of selector being needed in
   next coalition is low ? defection offers little
   prospect of increased private goods

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Small W/S Autocracy (Chance of being needed is
low)
Selectorate Winning Coalition

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D. The loyalty norm effects of S and W

1. W/S is Large Chance of selector being needed in
   next coalition is high ? defect if private goods
   at less than maximum
2. W/S is Small Chance of selector being needed in
   next coalition is low ? defection offers little
   prospect of increased private goods
3. Small W Easy to reward/punish defectors
4. Large W Hard to reward/punish defectors

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5. Institutions and Incentives

1. Leader wants Small W (easy to bribe if desired)
   and large S (very small W/S means defection is
   unattractive). Result Corruption possible but
   not required
2. Winning coalition wants Small W (more private
   goods) and small S (large W/S means leader must
   devote most resources to bribes). Result
   Corruption required.
3. Selectorate wants Large W (focus on public
   goods) ? implies Large S. Result Corruption
   difficult.

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E. Evidence for Selectorate Theory

• Development Explains many previous failures
  (modernization, dependency)
• Agrarian elite coalitions reduced productivity
  (large estates, agricultural protectionism) but
• Urban elite coalitions also reduced productivity
  (food subsidies, the Iron Triangle)
• State control ? patronage and kickbacks (mere
  cosmetic differences between socialist or
  capitalist autocracies)
• Autocracy forces corruption on the leader!
  Leaders who emphasize public goods are rejected ?
  explains post-colonial development

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3. Foreign Policy

1. Democracies less likely to fight leaders
   punished for public policy mistakes
2. Democracies more free-trade general benefits of
   free trade gt damage to specific groups

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Evidence for Selectorate Theory Democracy and
Public Goods

Economic Growth Trade Policy
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4. Other findings of selectorate theory

1. Economic/Political freedom associated with
   greater prosperity (weakly) and life expectancy
   (moderately)
2. Leaders in autocracies (Large S/Small W) last
   longer than those in democracies
3. Historical move away from monarchies, infrequency
   of juntas

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5. Limits of selectorate theory

1. Few useful policy recommendations Pursue
   public goods so people re-elect you is vague
2. Growth is only one public good government may
   opt for social insurance, education, social
   welfare programs, etc in lieu of economic growth
3. National security vs. growth? Model has
   difficulty predicting both at once

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V. Interest Groups in International Politics

• The people matter (selectorate theory says
  leaders emphasize public goods in democracies)
• But politics is messy (national interest may
  not exist, which means public goods only go so
  far)
• So how do interest groups affect leaders choices?

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A. Interest Group Models

• Pluralism Competing groups represented
  according to numbers and issue salience
• Collective Action Group goal as public good
• Free-Rider Dilemma Must use selective incentives
  to overcome
• Implication Organization necessary for success
• Winning Coalition Many theories argue that
  leaders are most concerned preserving their
  coalition (listen to allies before enemies).
  Example Bush and Republican support.

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B. A Framework for Comparison Who has influence?
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1. Individuals
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1. Individuals
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1. Individuals -- Powerless alone
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2. Unorganized Groups
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2. Unorganized Groups -- Must be considered, but
cannot set agenda
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3. Organized groups
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3. Organized groups -- Set agenda and affect
public opinion
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4. Benefits of Organization
a. Credible Commitment -- Conditional support b.
Outreach -- Publicity, Money, Media Access c.
Persuasion -- Information to representatives
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C. How do interest groups affect international
relations?

1. Collective action model is strongest Discrete,
   organized, funded groups have the most influence
2. Which groups qualify in the US?

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a. Funding Which groups give the most money?

• i. Foreign and Defense Policy Groups
  Surprisingly little (lt .1 of total funds raised)

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ii. Industries

• Defense More but still behind most industries
• Agriculture and Energy Much more
• Labor Even more
• Conclusion Banks gt Manufacturing gt Labor gt
  Energy and Farm Interests gt Defense gt Foreign
  Policy Groups

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b. Other forms of influence?

• Ethnic interest groups Additional influence in
  proportion to demographic size (Latinos, Jews,
  Armenians, etc.)
• INGOs Publicity, but usually limited direct
  political participation (legal restrictions)

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c. Dont forget Salience!

• Explains why foreign policy groups have influence
  beyond funding and numbers small, intensely
  interested groups get more than large but
  distracted groups.
• Most influential Well-funded groups with foreign
  policy focus (salience) and domestic ethnic base
  (e.g. AIPAC)

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VI. Public opinion

• Follow the Leader
• Rally Round the Flag

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VI. Public opinion

• Follow the Leader
• Rally Round the Flag
• Trust in President
• Long-term consistency on major issues
• Military Operations
• Visible costs Casualties, Money
• Perceived National Interest

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Battle-Deaths and Support for Wars
Iraq (sketch)
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D. Ideologies in Foreign Policy

1. Liberal vs. Conservative Limited Use US
   foreign policy shows remarkable continuity, many
   important issues dont fall on liberal-conservativ
   e spectrum.

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2. Isolationism vs. Internationalism Incomplete

1. Isolationism Avoid foreign commitments, stay at
   home
2. Internationalism Active role in world affairs
3. Problem What kind of internationalism?

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D. Public vs. Power Elites Forms of
Internationalism
Cooperative Internationalism Cooperative Internationalism
Low High
Militant Internationalism Low
Militant Internationalism High
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D. Public vs. Power Elites Forms of
Internationalism
Cooperative Internationalism Cooperative Internationalism
Low High
Militant Internationalism Low Isolationist Accomodationist
Militant Internationalism High Hardliner Internationalist
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D. Public vs. Power Elites Forms of
Internationalism
1996 Data 1996 Data Cooperative Internationalism Cooperative Internationalism
1996 Data 1996 Data Low High
Militant Internationalism Low Isolationist Public 25 Accomodationist Public 25
Militant Internationalism High Hardliner Public 25 Internationalist Public 25
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D. Public vs. Power Elites Forms of
Internationalism
1996 Data 1996 Data Cooperative Internationalism Cooperative Internationalism
1996 Data 1996 Data Low High
Militant Internationalism Low Isolationist Public 25 Political Elites 10 Accomodationist Public 25 Political Elites 50
Militant Internationalism High Hardliner Public 25 Political Elites 10 Internationalist Public 25 Political Elites 30
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D. Public vs. Power Elites Forms of
Internationalism
Cooperative Internationalism Cooperative Internationalism
Low High
Militant Internationalism Low Isolationist Public 25 Political Elites 10 YOU Accomodationist Public 25 Political Elites 50 YOU
Militant Internationalism High Hardliner Public 25 Political Elites 10 YOU Internationalist Public 25 Political Elites 30 YOU
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