Part 2: Systems Thinking in Design and Campaign Planning

1
Part 2 Systems Thinking in Design and Campaign
Planning
Systems ThinkingLesson 5
2
Many have tried . . . .
3
Lesson Objectives

• Comprehend key concepts of systems thinking.
• Integrate concepts of systems thinking as they
  apply to the practice of the strategic art.
• Assess the value of systems thinking as a means
  of gaining insights for
• coordinating instruments
• of national power to secure
• national security objectives.

4
What good is systems thinking?

• Most of us will not be meritoriously promoted to
  lieutenant general upon completion of Academic
  Year 12. In the meantime, I have to do real
  work.
• The vast majority of ill-structured problem
  solutions fail to achieve intended synergies and
  generate unintended consequences. Anything I do
  is likely to fit this pattern.
• Metrics result in more reports and administrative
  burdens, and I am likely to be the one stuck with
  the requirement to handle them.
• Alexander had it easyhe was a prince, after all.

5
Globalization / Information Revolution Impacts in
2012

• Science of War (planning and execution)
• Collaboration and information sharing parallel
  and integrated planning
• New tools and capabilities for connectivity and
  precision attack.
• Need for Discipline
• Managing information may be as important as
  maneuvering forces
• Making the right decisions at the right times is
  crucial to mission success.
• Implications
• Moving from Mil-on-Mil to DIME-on-PMESII
• Information technology enables interdependence,
  vice mere deconfliction
• Artful decisions (art vs. science the commander
  must add value).

6
What does design do?

• It is an approach to planning, not a
  fundamentally new method of warfighting.
• It supplements, rather than supplants,
  established planning methodologies (like JOPP and
  MDMP).
• It tends to use systems-oriented, conceptual, but
  logical lines of operations for operational
  design.
• It has most applicability for planning at the
  strategic and operational (theater and JTF)
  levels.
• It is not fully integrated into Army tactical
  doctrineyet.

7
The design methodology
Framing the operational environmentwhat is the
context in which design will be applied? Framing
the problemwhat problem is the design intended
to solve? Considering operational approacheswhat
broad, general approach will solve the problem?
8
Supplementation, Not Supplantation

• The primary distinction between the campaign
  design based approaches and traditional JOPP or
  MDMP is one of relative focus.
• Campaign design focuses on What is to be done?
• JOPP and MDMP focuses on How are we going to do
  it? or Who is going to do what tasks by when?
• Both of these perspectives are needed to solve
  military problems, but their relative emphasis
  shifts between the strategic, operational, and
  tactical levels of war.

9
Points to consider . . . .

• How do systems-thinking concepts apply to current
  joint and Army doctrine on design and campaign
  analysis?
• What are the systems-related deliverables that a
  strategic- or operational-level commander may be
  uniquely required to generate?

10
Campaign Phasing Old vs. New
11
Campaign Phasing Old vs. New
12
Systems Definitions

• Effect 1. The physical and/or behavioral state
  of a system that results from an action, a set of
  actions, or another effect. 2. A change to a
  condition, behavior, or degree of freedom.
• System A functionally, physically, or
  behaviorally related group of regularly
  interacting or interdependent elements that
  group of elements forming a unified whole.
  Systems associated with national security
• DIME Friendly systems Diplomatic,
  Informational, Military, Economic
• PMESII Enemy systems Political, Military,
  Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure

13
The Language Using Effects in the Planning
Process
An effect is a physical and / or behavioral state
of a system that results from an action, a set of
actions, or another effect. A desired effect
can also be thought of as a condition that can
support achieving an associated objective, while
an undesired effect is a condition that can
inhibit progress toward an objective. In
applying unified action, a JFC synchronizes the
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
power of the US to affect an adversarys
political, military, economic, social,
information, and infrastructure systems.
Joint Pub 5-0 Review Draft, 2011, p. III-20
14
Still, actions do have effects . . . .

• Al Fathah Bridge across Tigris near Baiji.

• Army MPs guard Iraqi gas stations.

15
The Human Dimensions of Systems

• Need to achieve balance in a complex operating
  environment simplicity is still a principle of
  war.
• Precision is required for both lethal and
  nonlethal targeting...but the fog of war has not
  dissipated.
• Overmatched combat power may lead to a short
  combat operations phase...after which the enemy
  may not understand hes been defeated!
• Need for understanding the difference between
  targeting and effects, between technical and
  human.

SPEED of operations and PRECISION of weapons have
not altered the psychology of changing peoples
THINKING and BEHAVIORS.
16
System Analysis
Systems a functionally, physically, and/or
behaviorally related groups of regularly
interacting or interdependent elements
Key Definitions
Military
Economic
Infrastructure
17
Center of Gravity Critical Factors
Iraqi Political System
Critical capabilities (CCs) nodes and links that
are crucial enablers for a Center of Gravity to
function
Critical requirements (CRs) resources and/or
means (which also can be identified as nodes and
links) that enable a critical capability to
become fully operational.

• Critical vulnerabilities (CVs) elements of
  critical capabilities that are deficient or
  vulnerable to influence, interdiction, or attack.
  Action against these vulnerabilities can produce
  decisive results.

18
Comprehensive approach
Strategic Objectives
Conditions
Tasks
Natl and Intl Objectives
Conditions
Country Team(s) Objectives
Favorable Outcomes
Complex Operational Environment (PMESII)
Comprehensive Approach (DIME) Actions
Guidance / Intent
Combatant Commander Theater Objectives
Joint Force Commander Objectives
Commander issues guidance and intent to his
staff, components, and supporting agencies to
accomplish fused and synchronized tasks which act
on PMESII systems within the operational
environment to attain desired effects and achieve
objectives (mission-type orders).
Commanders and staffs translate what they see,
hear, and feel from national / international
dialogue into solid, logical campaign objectives
from the regional Combatant Commanders
perspective.
Staff and components analyze the mission to
determine what conditions they want to change
accomplish within the operational environment to
achieve theater and strategic objectives.
DIME Diplomatic, Informational, Military,
Economic PMESII Political, Military, Economic,
Social, Information, Infrastructure
19
Design and Planning Continuum
Commanders Intent
Design Planning
Commanders Guidance

• Problem-setting
• Conceptual blank sheet
• Questions assumptions and methods
• Develops understanding
• Paradigm-setting
• Complements planning, preparation, execution, and
  assessment
• Commander-driven dialogue

• Problem-solving
• Physical and Detailed
• Procedural
• Develops Products
• Paradigm-accepting
• Patterns and templates activity
• Commander-driven process

Where planning focuses on generating a plan--a
series of executable actions-- design focuses on
learning about the nature of an unfamiliar
problem.
Source FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency
15 Dec 2006 (modified)
19
20
Systems-related deliverables

• Framing the environment framing the problem
• Problem statement
• Initial commander's intent
• Commander's initial planning guidance
• Mission narrative
• Other products created during design (such as
  CCIRs risk assessments, that sort of thing).
• These deliverables link design and detailed
  planning. The intent here is to promote mutual
  understanding and unity of effort.

21
A point to consider . . . .

• How can we apply systems thinking and design to
  understanding the Fort Hood shootings and in
  deriving future preventive measures?

22
(No Transcript)
23
A point to consider . . . .

• Considering the complexity of counterinsurgency
  operations, how can systems thinking and design
  be applied in prolonged war or to countering
  ideological support for terrorist groups?

24
Framing the Afghanistan counterinsurgency
environment
25
US Perspectives on Commanders Intent
Joint - A concise expression of the purpose of
operation and the desired end state. (JP 3-0)

• US Army
• Clear, concise statement of what the force must
  do and conditions the force must establish WRT
  the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that
  represent the operations desired endstate.
• FM 3-0 (Feb 08)

US Navy Conveys the end state, the desired result
of action. Reflects commanders vision and
conveys his thinking through mission-type orders,
in which subordinates are encouraged to exercise
initiative and are given the freedom to act
independently. NDP-1 (Mar 94)

• US Marine Corps
• The commanders personal expression of the
  purpose of the operation. It must be clear,
  concise and easily understood. It
• may also include how the commander envisions
  achieving a decision as well as the end state,
  conditions, or effects, that when satisfied or
  achieved, accomplish the purpose. MCDP 1.0 (Sep
  01)

US Air Force Clear, concise expression of the
purpose of the operation, its broad method of
accomplishment, and the intended end state. It
may also include the commanders assessment of
the enemy commanders intent and assessment of
where and how much risk is acceptable during the
operation. AFDD-2 (Apr 07)

• All address purpose and end state.
• All empower subordinates to operate.

26
An International Perspective on Commanders Intent
NATO / ABCA The glue that binds a coalition
operation together is the commanders ability to
understand each nations capabilities and
integrate into a cohesive force. This requires
the commander to clearly articulate his intent,
so that each nation forms the same picture of the
end state and the rules governing engagements.
Given the language difficulties found in many
coalitions, the commanders intent must be
clearly and simply stated. NATO
Handbook Feb 2004 ABCA Coalition
Operations Handbook Nov 2001
27
Our enemies have intent, too!
On that basis, and in compliance with God's
order, we issue the following fatwa to all
Muslims The ruling to kill the Americans and
their allies -- civilians and military -- is an
individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in
any country in which it is possible to do it, in
order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque (Jerusalem)
and the holy mosque (Mecca) from their grip, and
in order for their armies to move out of all the
lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten
any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words
of Almighty God, "and fight the pagans all
together as they fight you all together," and
"fight them until there is no more tumult or
oppression, and there prevail justice and faith
in God. Osama Bin-Ladin Al-Quds al-
'Arabi --- 23 Feb 98
28
(No Transcript)