Network Security Continued

1
Network Security Continued
2
Authentication

• If someone claims he is A and wants to have a
  conversation with you, how do you verify?
• He should present something to you which you can
  check and which he can have if and only if he is
  A.
• We can all think of certain things for our real
  friends, but does such thing exist in the
  electronic world?

3
Simple Protocol

• Will this work suppose A and B knows each
  others public key If A wants to communicate
  with B, A sends E_pkBD_skA(P), where P is the
  plain text message.
• Because of the digital signature scheme, B knows
  that this message is originally from A.
• But a message that is originally from A does not
  mean that it is from A the replay attack. What
  the adversary can do is first play the message
  with you, after you are tricked to believe it is
  A, then ask for transferring 10000.

4
The solution

• Recall that everyone has a public key and a
  private key.
• Suppose Alice and Bob knows each others public
  key.
• If Alice wants to setup a session with Bob, she
  sends Bob a message E_pkBAlice, R_a, meaning
  that I am Alice and I want to talk to you, where
  R_a is a number picked at random.
• Bob replies E_pkAR_a, R_b, K_s, where R_b is a
  number picked at random and K_s is the session
  key.
• Alice replies AES_K_sR_b.
• (not exactly the same as Skypes protocol, but
  the idea is the same)

5
Explanations

• Message 2. When Alice gets E_pkAR_a, R_b, K_s,
  she can decrypt it and can get R_a, R_b, K_s.
  When she sees R_a, she knows that this is the
  response she is waiting for and the sender must
  be Bob. Why?
• Because no one except Bob knows how to decode
  E_pkBAlice, R_a to get R_a and R_a is totally
  random and it is impossible for one to guess it
  right.

6
Explainations

• Message 3. When Bob gets AES_K_sR_b, he can use
  K_s to decode it to get R_b. Then he knows that
  this must be the message he is waiting for and
  the one who sent the first message must be Alice.
  Why?
• Because no one except Alice knows how to decode
  E_pkAR_a, R_b, K_s to get R_b and K_s to get
  AES_K_sR_b.

7
Explanations

• The key is, we can make sure that every message
  must be the response of the previous message.
• After the session key is exchanged, the
  conversation can begin.

8
SSL -- Secure Sockets Layer and HTTPS

• Build a secure connection between two sockets.
• It is a layer between the application layer and
  the transportation layer.
• When HTTP is run over SSL, it is HTTPS.

9
SSL

• Twp protocols, one for establishing a secure
  connection, the other for using it.
• Fig. 8-51. Establishing connection.
• A-gtB. SSL version, Preferences, R_A.
• B-gtA. SSL version, Choices, R_B. Certificate.
  Done.
• A-gtB. E_pkBpremaster key. Change cipher.
  Finished.
• B-gtA. Change cipher. Finished.
• R_A, R_B, premaster key used to get the session
  key.
• A is sure that she is talking to B. B use
  passwords to make sure that he is talking to A.

10
PGP Pretty Good Privacy

• Used in E-mails.

EB
RSA
K_M
DA
zip
MD5
RSA
IDEA
P
11
Attacks SYN Flood

• SYN Flood
• TCP establishes the connection by three-way
  handshake. Client sends SYN, server receives SYN,
  sends SYN ACK, at the same time allocating memory
  for this connection.
• If the client just send SYN, but not respond to
  the SYN ACK, the server will wait for a while and
  release the memory.
• What if people use spoofed source IP addresses to
  send SYN packets?

12
Attacks Reflection

• Reflection.
• What if people use the a lot of computers sending
  SYN to server with a victims IP address as the
  source address?

13
Attacks

• http//www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/technology/inter
  net/10attacks.html
• http//www.scmagazine.com/asia/news/article/419816
  /a-next-generation-dos-attack-distributed-reflecti
  on/

14
DDoS

• DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
• Why would any one want to do this?
• In some cases, for bringing down service of
  competitors, or for extortion money.

15
Application Layer Attack

• There is a particular type of attack simply ask
  bots to send requests to the victim for large
  files.
• Now, the victim, the server, has to send large
  files therefore the bandwidth is saturated and no
  more requests can be satisfied.

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CAPTCHA

• One way is to see if we can distinguish human
  from bots.
• CAPTCHA -- Completely Automated Public Turing
  test to tell Computers and Humans Apart
• Below is a picture from wiki

17
CAPTCHA

• Was proposed by Luis von Ahn, Manuel Blum,
  Nicholas J. Hopper, and John Langford.
• http//www.captcha.net/captcha_crypt.pdf

18
Other things you can do

• With the CAPTCHA idea, they actually did
  something else scan an old book, and show a
  word in the book along with one from CAPTCHA.
• You dont know which one is from where.
• So while you login, you help the library to
  recognize words.

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Problem with CAPTCHA

• The problem is that you do not want to answer a
  CAPTCHA problem every 30 mins if you are watching
  a movie.

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The other solution

• Ask the client to solve a puzzle, basically
  asking the client to spend some resource before
  getting service.
• Can you design some puzzles?

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Puzzles

• Some puzzles include
• Finding a string such that the first k bits of
  its SHA-1 hash are 0.
• By controlling k, you control the difficulty of
  the puzzle.
• A problem is that this puzzle is biased toward
  clients with fast machines.

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Memory-bound puzzles are better

• Memory speed varies less significantly than CPU
  speed.
• Forcing the client to do a lot of random read
  from main memory.
• How?

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One memory bound puzzle

• There is a one-to-one function F() that cannot be
  reversed.
• Server started from x_0. x_i F(x_i-1).
• Server sends x_k to the client. Ask him to return
  x_0.
• It is to the best interest of the client to build
  a table, because table lookup is much faster than
  calculating the function, then search which input
  results in x_k, to get x_k-1, and so on.

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Other solutions

• Speak-up When system is in trouble, instead
  waiting to drown, you should speak up!
• Meaning that you should also send a lot of
  requests.
• The server serves the one with loudest voice.
• From their 2006 sigcomm paper

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Speak-up

• Actually, every client has to pay the server some
  currency in the form of bandwidth.
• The hope is that the clients have spare
  bandwidths but the attackers already have used up
  their bandwidths.
• These dummy byes are a waste of resource.

26
What we are working on

• Introducing p2p to DDoS defense.

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A useful link

• http//staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/ddos/