Title: Zoonotic Influenza
1Zoonotic Influenza Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza (HPAI) in Poultry
Photo Tim Uyeki, CDC
2Learning Objectives
- Describe inter-species transmission of avian
influenza virus - Describe characteristics of HPAI vs. LPAI
- List avian influenza control measures in poultry
populations - Describe measures to mitigate risk for poultry
and outbreak response workers
33 Categories of Influenza in Humans
- Seasonal (Human)
- Avian (Zoonotic)
- Pandemic
4Pandemic Potential
- Antigenic drift and shift
- Annual epidemics
- Large changes- rare sporadic pandemics
- Influenza A (H5N1)
- Not the only Influenza A with pandemic potential
5Many Species Affected by Influenza A
Genetic Reservoirs
H3, H7
H1, H2, H3
Intermixing
H5N1
Commercial, LBMs Others
H10
H1-12 H14-15
H1-2, 4-7, H9-13, 15-16
Other Aquatic Birds?
H1, H3, H4, H7, H13
H1, H3
6Two Groups of Influenza in Poultry
- Low pathogenic AI (LPAI)
- Most common influenza virus infection in birds
- Mild clinical and inapparent infections
- Any subtype (H1 to H16)
- Highly pathogenic AI (HPAI)
- Severe illness in poultry and often death
- Some H5 or H7 virus strains
- LPAI H5 or H7 can mutate into HPAI H5 or H7
subtypes - Most AI viruses are not a public health problem
7Avian Influenza in Other Species
- Domestic and wild birds
- Ducks, geese, sparrows, poultry, pets
- May be asymptomatic infect other birds
- Mammals
- Humans, cats, dogs, pigs, horses, marine mammals,
ferrets, minks, stone marten - Infection via exposure to infected birds
8Avian Influenza in Cats and Dogs
- Domestic cats, tigers, leopards, dogs
- H5N1 from ingesting infected poultry
- For HPAI H5N1 areas, FAO recommends
- Keep cats from infected birds
- Keep cats indoors on commercial poultry
- operations
- Monitor cats for infection
- Advises AGAINST killing cats to control virus
- Role in spreading H5N1 is unknown
9Avian H5 and H7 Subtypes Can Cause Human Infection
- Transmission
- Contact with infected sick or dead birds
- Contact with contaminated poultry or bird
products - Rare human-to-human transmission (HPAI H5N1)
- Human disease
- Usually due to infection with HPAI
- Severity varies by virus strain
- LPAI infections documented
- Usually mild symptoms
10LPAI Strains Can Mutate into HPAI
- Wild birds introduce LPAI to domestic flocks
- LPAI can rapidly evolve into HPAI
- Cause poultry epizootics
- Observed with some H5 and H7 subtypes
- Most H5 and H7 are LPAI
- Need rapid detection and aggressive intervention
- Can lead to pandemics
- May take years to clear from a geographic area
11Poultry Outbreaks Notifiable Avian Influenza
(NAI)
World Animal Health Organization
- Avian influenza in its notifiable form (NAI)
is defined as an infection in POULTRY caused by
any influenza A virus of the H5 or H7 subtypes or
by any AI virus with an intravenous pathogenicity
index (IVPI) greater than 1.2 (or as an
alternative at least 75 mortality) as described
below. NAI viruses can be divided into highly
pathogenic notifiable avian influenza (HPNAI) and
low pathogenicity notifiable avian influenza
(LPNAI)
12Signs of LPAI Infection in Birds
- Natural hosts waterfowl, gulls, shorebirds
- Usually exhibit no signs of illness
- Domesticated unvaccinated fowl easily infected
- LPAI in non-reservoir species
- No outward disease or only mild infection
- Non-specific signs (respiratory, ruffled
feathers, reduced egg production) - Easy to miss!
- Resembles other diseases
- Anticipated in some regions
13HPAI Symptoms in Birds
- Wild birds and waterfowl
- Usually asymptomatic
- Severe, fatal disease in some wild bird species
- Domestic ducks
- Can be infected but appear healthy
- In contact with humans and domestic poultry
- Transmit virus via feces respiratory secretions
14HPAI Symptoms in Poultry
- HPAI lethal in poultry
- Facial edema swollen cyanotic combs, wattles
drastic decline in egg production - Internal hemorrhaging in 48 hours
- Mortality nears 100
- Difficult to miss - severe disease sudden onset
15Transmission Between Birds
- Viral shedding main transmission routes
- Feces (most common in poultry)
- Respiratory secretions
- Contact between infected healthy birds
- Indirect contact
- Contamination
- Unwashed egg shells
- Airborne transmission
- Improper carcass disposal
16Geographic Spread of Virus
- Movement of birds
- Migratory free-ranging birds
- Legal poultry trade
- Illegal poultry trade
- Movement of equipment
- Vehicles, tractors, buckets
- Movement of people
- Hands, hair, clothing, shoes
- Investigators must practice biosecurity!
17Review Question 1
Is LPAI or HPAI more common among
poultry? Answer LPAI
18Review Question 2
Why is HPAI infection among poultry important to
public health? Answer HPAI has been transmitted
to humans and has the greatest know potential to
develop into a pandemic
19Avian Influenza on Poultry Farms
20Prevention and Control
- Increased disease surveillance in high risk areas
- Increased biosecurity on poultry farms
- Control of movement of birds and fomites
- Rapid, humane destruction of infected and at-risk
birds and proper disposal of carcasses - Vaccination of at-risk poultry in some
circumstances
21AI Surveillance Tools Active Surveillance
- Test at poultry slaughter/processing sites
- Trachael or cloacal swabs
- Serum, eggs
- Test birds at live bird markets
- Test exhibition, pet fighting birds
- Import and export testing
- Door-to-door interviews with poultry owners
22AI Surveillance Tools Passive Surveillance
- Increase sick and dead bird investigations
- Investigate poultry clinical case reports
- Investigate flocks with production drops
- Investigate flocks with respiratory disease
23Diagnosis of Avian Influenza in Poultry
- Detection
- Antibody, antigen, virus or RNA
- Rapid tests
- Screen for infection of flock
24Biosecurity Via Bioexclusion
- Keep poultry indoors
- Prevent new bird contact
- Clean/disinfect between flocks
- Control traffic onto farm
25FAO Sector Systems
- For analytical purposes four main production
systems (sectors) have been characterized by FAO
and OIE - Sector 1 Industrial Integrated System
- Sector 2 Commercial Production System
- Sector 3 Small-Scale Commercial Production
System - Sector 4 The Village or Backyard System
www.fao.org
26Biosecurity Sectors 1 2Large Commercial
Poultry Operations
- High level bio-security
- Birds/products marketed commercially
27Biosecurity Sector 3Small Commercial Poultry
Operations
- Birds/products may enter live bird markets
- Birds/products marketed commercially and/or
distributed locally - Low to minimal or moderate biosecurity
28Biosecurity Sector 4Backyard Poultry
- Birds/products consumed locally
- Minimal-to-nonexistent biosecurity
29Biocontainment on Infected Farms
- Depopulate
- Movement control
- On and off farm
- Test birds
- Close and disinfect bird markets and swap meets
30Destruction and Disposal of Birds in Affected Area
- Humanely kill birds within 24 hours of diagnosis
- Carbon dioxide, dislocate neck, other methods
- Keep accurate records
- Dispose per EPA guidelines
- Communication and security
- Clean disinfect
- 21 day hiatus after inspection
- Enhanced active/passive surveillance
31Compensation
- Reimbursement for loss of birds
- Encourages
- Voluntary reporting of sick/dead birds
- Stamping Out efforts
- Payment
- Monetary
- In-kind payment (restocking, supplies)
32Vaccination for Poultry
- Inactivated whole AI virus
- H5 subtype effectiveness
- Reduces viral shedding
- Possible subclinical infection
- Vaccinated poultry can still shed virus
- Administered by injection
- May limit exportation
- Veterinary authorities
- Recombinant vaccines under development
33Seasonal Influenza Vaccine for Humans
- Vaccinate poultry workers and health workers, but
keep in mind - In tropics and subtropics, human influenza
epidemic all year - Vaccine does not protect against H5N1, but
against reassortment - At least two week delay for protection
- www.who.int
34Occupational Exposure to Sick Poultry
- HPAI LPAI viruses spread to humans
- Rare, but preventive measures critical
- Biosafety measures
- Personal protective equipment
- Surveillance of exposed workers
- Annual seasonal influenza vaccination
- Co-infection with avian and human influenza A
viruses could lead to reassortment
35Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
- Impermeable gloves
- Goggles
- Respirators
- Fit testing
- Protective clothing
- Boots or protective foot covers
- Biosafety and biocontainment
36Public Health and Animal Health Integration
- Integrate surveillance networks
- Public health sector
- Domestic poultry and wild birds
- Joint participation
- AI surveillance, response and control group
- Development of guidelines and action plans
- Cross-notification of results
- Establish official channels of communication
37Review Question 3
Why has seasonal influenza vaccination been
recommended in poultry workers? Answer
Vaccination of poultry workers with seasonal
influenza vaccine may minimize the risk of
co-infection and genetic reassortment of human
and avian influenza viruses in humans.
38Review Question 4
What are the benefits and drawbacks of vaccines
in the prevention and control of HPAI in
poultry? Answer They can limit spread of
infection, but may also prevent the
implementation of control measures when needed.
39Limiting the Spread of Avian Influenza A (H5N1)
40Prevention of H5N1
- Limit animal infections
- Improve farm biosecurity
- Cull sick/exposed animals
- Disinfect premises
- Vaccinate poultry
- Limit human infections
- Use PPE around sick animals humans
- Antiviral prophylaxis in at-risk individuals
- Isolate and treat human cases
- Educate the public
41Public Health Responseto AI H5N1 in Birds
- Identify infection source
- Eliminate risky exposures
- Veterinary collaboration
- Identify contacts of human animal cases
- Monitor temperature illness for 7-10 days
- If ill, refer to physician
- Dont test for H5N1 unless ill
- Antiviral prophylaxis if indicated
42Antiviral Chemoprophylaxis for Human H5N1
Infections
- CDC recommendations
- Pre-exposure for persons involved in killing or
disposing of infected poultry - Post-exposure for persons in close contact to
infected birds within the previous 10 days
WHO. Rapid advance guidelines for pharmacological
management of H5N1. 2006
43Antiviral Chemoprophylaxis for H5N1 WHO
Recommendations
- Who is at low risk?
- Those who
- Cull non-infected or likely non-infected animals
- Handle sick animals while using appropriate PPE
- Decontaminate environments while using
appropriate PPE - Antiviral chemoprophylaxis is generally not
recommended for low-risk persons
44Antiviral Chemoprophylaxis for H5N1 WHO
Recommendations, continued
- Who is at moderate risk?
- Those who
- Handle sick animals or decontaminate without
appropriate PPE - Are unprotected have exposure to infected birds
or to birds implicated in human cases - Chemoprophylaxis for a week after last exposure
- WHO recommends oseltamivir for
- chemoprophylaxis of high-risk groups
45Antivirals Not Used in Animals
- Human use only
- Use in poultry threatens effectiveness for
treatment of human AI - WHO, FAO and OIE urge Member States not to
use antiviral drugs in animals in order to
preserve the efficacy of these drugs for the
treatment of influenza infections in humans. - http//www.who.int/foodsafety/micro/avian_antivira
l/en/index.html (November 2005)
46Summary
- Isolate domestic birds from wild birds
- Practice good biosecurity in all flocks
- Need adequate surveillance systems
- Early detection and rapid response
- Response is a joint effort between both animal
and public health authorities
47Resources
- Animal Health
- World Organization for Animal Health www.oie.int
- UN Food and Agriculture Organization www.fao.org
- USDA Avian Influenza website http//www.usda.gov/w
ps/portal/usdahome?navidAVIAN_INFLUENZAnavtypeS
U - Human Health
- World Health Organization www.who.int/en/
- Centers for Disease Control www.cdc.gov
48Glossary for Lectora
- pathogenicity
- highly-pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) versus
low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) - zoonotic
- mutagenic
- epizootic
- OIE
- Depopulation
- notifiable avian influenza
- IVPI
49Glossary, continued
- HPNAI
- LPNAI
- viral shedding
- fomites
- biosecurity
- PPE
- recombinant vaccines