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Database Integrity The issue for making RNAV a real success

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Title: Database Integrity The issue for making RNAV a real success


1
Database IntegrityThe issue for making RNAV a
real success
  • Capt. Jürgen SchadtChief Technical Pilot
  • Capt. A-320
  • Lufthansa German Airlines
  • Chief Technical Pilot Office, FRA OY

2
Motivation
  • GPS/FMS equipment with accuracies better then0,3
    nm is standard today
  • GPS/FMS-RNAV SIDs and STARs have positive impact
    in TMA-Ops in all aspects
  • GPS-NPAs are the primary NPA-procedures over
    outdated (offset) NDB/VOR approaches
  • Conventional Procedures are flown on regular
    basis with use of FMS/GPS (managed modes - VNAV)

3
Motivation
  • GPS is the system for ermerging airports with
    "problematic" infrastructure---gt CIS see Samara
    - UWWW AFI see Addis Abbeba
  • Operators experience every AIRAC - Cycle
    Nav-database problems

4
Motivation
  • The primary motivation for any
  • "Database controlled approach"
  • is - enhanced flight safety
  • - economic benefits
  • - positive environmental impact

5
Definition Database Integrity
Database Integrity describes the probability for
source data to be stored "correct" inside the
FMC ---gt after it ran through the process of
final database- generation.
6
Database quality management
Future Goal Zero Reports
X
7
Problems of Database Integrity
RTCA DO-200A "The end-user is responsible for the
integrity of the data"
Section 1.4 - Application of Standard
  • Navigational data are generated today and in
    short to medium future by unsecure/uncertified
    processes
  • no "usable" standards exists for generation of
    databases with guranteed integrity---gt RTCA
    DO-200A cannot be implemented today (even if
    JAA TGL-9 is regulating implementation)

8
Problems of Database Integrity
  • there will be no fully implementable procedures
    for database integrity available for the next
    years by any non airline organisation.
  • Even a mandate will not change the situation due
    to non complianceNegative example
    Implementation of WGS-84

9
Problems of Database Integrity
  • there will be no fully implementable procedures
    for the implementation of GPS/FMS-RNAV procedures
    (or conventional procedures used with RNAV -
    equipment), which depend on the availabilty of
    procedures to ensure database integrity

---gt the use of RNAV - equipment is the business
case of the future
10
Database process plus DbIT
  • Database generation
  • 1. AIP
  • 2.Databse supplier
  • 3. Database packer
  • 3. User ---gt Airline
  • "UNSECURE" PROCESS

Databaseintegrity check DbITnon RTCA-178
SoftwareNEW "UNSECURE" PROCESS
TogetherSecure Process
11
Database Integrity for Operators
  • To ensure a high level of database integrity
    ---gt GPS - NPA, GPS/FMS-RNAV - ( Overlay -)
    procedures.---gt 5 level integrity concept
    ("multilayered system")
  • 1. Training for all pilots Tool simulator,
    aircraft, training handouts Time permanent ---gt
    all fleets
  • 2. Check of NavDatabase prior effectivity to
    detect changes of Ops - critical" data incl.
    an immediate reaction scheme Tool DbIT
    (Database Integrity Tool) ---gt inservice
    08/2000 Time 2 - 5 days prior database
    effectivity

12
Database Integrity for Operators
  • 3. Check of "critical" data prior starting the
    procedure (e.g. GPS-approach) by the
    flightcrew Tool charts, crew operating
    procedures Time 10 - 15 minutes prior starting
    approach
  • 4. Plausibilty check during approach Tool charts
    , crew ops. procs., training Time during
    approach
  • 5. Administrative seperation of database
    integrity- checks and data handling ---gt
    Flightops Tool internal organisation Time perm
    anent ---gt all fleets

13
JAA TGL - 3 ---gt GPS Procs.
  • "Notification of certification and operations of
    GPS - receivers"
  • ---gt primary certification document for LBA
  • I.6.2 Use of GPS for NPABullets (a) to (g)
    describe the requirements for GPS-NPA
  • Database integrity ---gt (h)"The approach
    procedures has to be used as stored inside the
    navdatabase. The database must contain the
    offical published procedure"

14
JAA TGL - 10 ---gt PRNAV
  • 10.6. Database Integrity10.6.1 Database has to
    be obtained by RTCA DO-200A certified database
    supplier
  • 10.6.2 If supplier not certified additional
    checks have to be carried out through software
    or approved manual means (for all procedures
    below MOCA) by the operator
  • 10.6.4 Operators should consider additional
    checks even if database is obtained by
    certified supplier ---gt JAR Ops 1.035 Quality
    System
  • 10.6.5 See Annex B for specification of database
    integrity software

15
RNAV(GPS) - Procedures
Speciman
also to be used in general with conventional
procedures flown database controlled
16
Implementing Database Integrity
1. Flight Crew Procedures ---gt
Databaserequirement according TGL-3, I.6.2
(h) 2. Additional Integritychecks ---gt
Softwaretool ---gt Databasesintegritysoftware
DbIT
TGL-10, Section 10.6.2 ... the operator must
implement navigation database integrity checks
using appropriate software tools or approved
manual procedures to verify data relating to
waypoints below the applicable minimum obstacle
clearance altitude...
17
DbIT- (Database Integrity Tool)
  • Goal Ensure database integrity in regard of Ops
    critical" data prior database effectivity
    (applicable to RNAV and non RNAV procedures)
  • Way Implementation and maintenance of a
    reference- database, which will be run by
    flightops. All changes in comparison to the
    referencedatabase will rated as "critical" or
    "non critical".
  • "Philosophy" Detected data changes of critical
    data will lead to immediate disauthorization
    of the applicable procedures. Parallel
    the database supplier will be informed and
    required to present a solution.

18
DbIT- Main Screen
www.database-integrity.com
19
DbIT- Input Database
Input Database Screenshot Lufthansa
Proprietary Website www.database-integrity.co
m
20
DbIT- Reference Database
Input Database Screenshot Lufthansa
Proprietary Website www.database-integrity.co
m
21
DbIT- Edit Ref Waypoint
Input Database Screenshot Lufthansa
Proprietary Website www.database-integrity.co
m
22
DbIT- Critical Data Report
  • Critical Data Report ---gt CDR

23
Sum up ---gt DbIT
  • automated check of any database against a
    reference database ---gt database quality index
  • reference database contains "flight critical"
    data
  • check of RNAV and non RNAV procedures possible
  • automated generation of "Critical Data Report"
  • action scheme in terms of checklist augments
    DbIT
  • full encrypted log file for reference data control

DbIT is available for any operator
24
Conclusion
  • - Operators are forced to act due to the
    increasing number of published RNAV Overlay
    Procedures and insufficient database integrity
    processes
  • - Operators even have to apply higher
    standards in respect of less experience with
    RNAV procedures and database integrity issues
  • - Training in all respects for all involved
    personel is vital for the success of RNAV
  • - One incident or accident stops the whole
    RNAV Movement

25
Point of contact
  • Lufthansa German Airlines
  • Jürgen Schadt Chief Technical Pilot, Capt.
    A-320 Chief Technical Pilot Office, FRA
    OY Lufthansa German Airlines Phone 49-69-696
    -2360 Fax 49-69-696-7070 E-Mail Juergen.Sch
    adt_at_dlh.de DbIT - Infos www.database-integrity
    .com TGL - Infos www.ecacnav.com ---gt
    document library
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