Briefing Contents

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Briefing Contents

1. Evaluation of US global missile defence area in
   Europe deployment plans
2. Information on current situation and development
   plans of missile defence in Russia

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Missile Threat Evaluation

• Iran and North Korea possess missiles with a
  maximum range of up to 1200 km
• The prospects of missile programs development
  until 2015 creation of missiles with a maximum
  range of up to 3500 km
• Cause the lack of
• technologies
• new missile development is based on SCUD-type
  BM modernization
• testing grounds
• trajectory measurement and data processing
  systems

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Missile threat in the Middle East

• There is no present no long-term
• missile threat for USA
• 2. There could be a threat for Europe
• from small and medium range BMs.
• To fight them operation theater
• AMD measures could be used

Shihab -4 2000 km (potential)
Shihab -5 3500 km (potential)
Shihab-3 1200 km
Missile weapon possessors Iran Israel Saudi
Arabia India Pakistan
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Ballistic Missile Testing Standard Pattern
Midcourse phase target measurements
Terminal phase target measurements
Ground-supported trajectory measurement and
radiotelemetering means
Target separation zone
Warhead analysis after drop
Maximum BM range testing track
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1. Iran doesnt potentially have BM testing
tracks on its territory 2. There is a lack of
necessary test results registration
infrastructure, including for launches toward
offshore waters
2000 km
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Russian BM possible trajectories
ABM site defence zone
Radar station in the Czech Republic
Kozelsk
Tatischevo
BM launch sector from the Iranian territory
against Europe
The Missile Defence Area in Poland doesnt
provide equal protection for all NATO states but
is capable of threatening Russias BM launched
towards north-west
Irans BM Russias BM
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The Russian Federation Comments

• ABM site does not provide for the defense of all
  European states
• The aim of providing equal protection for all
  US NATO allies will require further ABM site
  capabilities buildup
• Conclusion. Present configuration of ABM theatre
  is not final. Russian concern will only grow

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Missile Defence Area Optimal Location

• Missile defence site approximation to possible BM
  launch area will enhance system efficiency
• The choice of the area in Poland is reasonable if
  it is meant for countering Russian BMs
• ABM sites location on the territories of Turkey,
  France, Italy would be more reasonable if an aim
  of countering BM from the south was pursued
• In addition, such a location wouldnt pose such
  evident threat for Russias deterrent forces

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US missile defence area possible location not
aimed against Russias deterrent potential while
providing protection for Europe
Kozelsk
Tatischevo
Irans BM Russias BM
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Thesis the information support of ABM site
(radar station in Czech and frontline radars)
arent directed against Russian Federation
Varde
Thule
Fylingsdales
Shemya
The Czech Republic
Integration of AMD radar stations in Czech
with modified radar stations in Thule,
Fylingsdales, Varde, Shemya
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The Russian Federation Comments

• The United States have an extensive network of
  radars upgraded for missile defence tasks outside
  the national territory
• The integration of existing radars with
  interceptor missiles in Poland will provide early
  detection and interception of Russian BMs
• The radar in the Czech Republic has a circle
  coverage area and can be rapidly reoriented from
  the southern to the eastern direction
• To provide target indication for the radar in the
  Czech Republic a transportable forward-deployed
  radar positioning is provided close to the
  Russian border
• Forward-deployed radars will detect both short
  and medium-range BM launched from the Middle
  East and Russias BM

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10 GBI missiles do not pose a threat for Russias
deterrent forces

• Russian evaluations are based not on declared
  intentions, but on potential possibilities of
  capability enhancement
• ABM site potential can be promptly enhanced by
  means of
• Increasing the number of interceptor missiles
• Increasing interceptor missile velocity
• Using separating warheads for BM destruction

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Conclusions

• The real aims of creating a missile defence
  deployment area in Europe do not conform with the
  declared and are focused on changing the existing
  security system in Europe
• The US missile defence in Europe is intended to
  counter BMs equipped with penetration aids,
  neither Iran nor North Korea have them
• The use of silo-launchers in the ABM site is
  intended to increase ABM site sustainability to
  nuclear weapons effects in case of response
  strike
• The number of interceptor missiles is not of
  fundamental importance, the most important is the
  fact of missile defence infrastructure
  development (radar facilities, command and
  control systems etc.)
• Missile defence ABM site in Europe will influence
  the deterrent potential
• The deployment of the ABM site wont have
  catastrophic consequences because we know how to
  repulse them
• Russia will have to take adequate measures in
  order to sustain defence capabilities that, in
  essence, will mean the transition to stalemate
  which we left after Cold War perid
• Missile defence ABM site in Europe is a
  global-scale destabilizing factor
• Other states can be involved in seeking
  counter-measures
• E.g. satellite interception performed by China
• Potentially long-term ecological mine will be
  created in Europe
• Use of Missile Defence System will make up
  conditions for littering near-Earth space

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Current Situation and Development Plans of
Missile Defence in Russia
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Russias Missile Defence Development Outlook

• Political prospects we suppose that the ABM
  Treaty principles were rational
• we do not have plans of rushing into a missile
  defence competition
• Technical prospects non-strategic TMD
  modernization, upgrading and new systems
  development
• counters real threats
• does not disturb regional stability and the
  existing balance since it does not threaten
  strategic deterrent forces
• does not encourage missile arms race
• does not have space defence potential
• is significantly less expensive
• may be deployed in any region if necessary

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TMD Systems

• The S-300 air defence missile system is designed
  to provide highly efficient defence against
  aeroballistic, tactical and theater BM attacks
  (with ranges up to 1500 km) in an intense ECM
  environment
• The S-400 air defence missile system is
  designed to provide protection of vital
  facilities from attacks of existing and
  prospective air weapons and BMs with a range of
  up to 3500 km
• missiles of various types with different
  engagement areas are used allowing to create a
  multi-layered TMD

S-300
S-400
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The purpose of Russian proposal
is creation of

• preconditions for wide discussion of the issues
  related to the
• development and deployment of missile
  defense systems in Europe
• basis for revising US unilateral decisions on
  deployment of global
• missile defense system components in Europe
• practical mechanism to estimate missile attack
  risks and threats for
• Europe up to 2020
• pool of states interested in development of
  concept architecture of
• MD system in Europe
• terms for equal security of all MD participants
• terms for minimizing the negative ecological
  consequences of US
• strategic MD components deployment in Europe
• the preconditions for reducing MD programs
  expenses

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Radar data allows

• to determine the certain fact of conducting the
  test, time and place of missile launch and
  estimate the time and area of missile warhead
  impact
• to identify the type of launched missile and
  determine whether
• it is a launch vehicle or a ballistic missile
• to identify the propulsion type (solid or liquid)
  and technological
• development level basing on indirect parameters
• to measure missile trajectory parameters and to
  record warhead
• or construction parts separation
• to conduct comparative analysis of launches and
  specify the
• accuracy of delivering the payload to the target

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Combined Centre for Missile
Launches Data Analysis

• Could be created in Europe on the basis of
  existing
• NATO data processing centers (for example
• CJFACC, CAOC) or the new one
• Main purpose acquiring and processing real-time
• data on detected missile launches in South and
  South-
• East (for Europe) directions
• The obtained data will be used for impartial
  monitoring
• of missile programs in the region to develop
• recommendations on adequate response

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Features

• Open for all interested European states
• Can be operated by combined crew
• Basic data source Russian radars in Gabala and
  Armavir
• The connection of additional data sources is not
  excluded
• Interaction with Russian-US Joint Data Exchange
  Centre
• (for exchange the data from missile warning
  systems) is
• not excluded
• Later the use of the Centre data for information
  support of European MD tasks solution is possible

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Operational Radar in Gabala

• In service from c 1985
• The task - detection of BM launches from Indian
  ocean and seas areas and medium range BMs and
  operational-tactic missile launches from Middle
  East.
• Main radar's performance
• - Operating range - up to 6000 km
• - Detection area
• Angle of elevation - 2 to 45
  degree
• Azimuth - 104
  degree.
• - In service with MOD of Russia
• The status of the radar is determined by
  Russia-Azerbaijan agreement of January 25, 2002)
• - No controversial questions
• The radar is subject to upgrade and modernization
• - In case of making a decision on
  modernization

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Building radar in Armavir

• Started in 2006
• The radar will consist of 2 sector stations
• - South-West sector - directed to the
  Mediterranean
• Sea
• - South-East sector - directed to the Middle
  East
• South-West sector radar station is being
  completed.
• In 2006 the radar was operating on the air
• Main performance
• - range - 4200 km
• - Angle of elevation - 1 -60 degree
• - Azimuth - 120 degree
• The radars in Gabala and Armavir can operate
• together. It practically gives the control over
• almost all the regions of the Northern hemisphere
• where the missile threat can appear from

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