SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 1918-1941 (PART III)

1
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY1918-1941(PART III)
2
THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT 1939

• Stalin knew that USSR was too weak to defeat
  Germany
• Still building up USSRs industries
• Did not want to risk war unless he could win
• Since he could not trust Britain and France, the
  alternative was to come to terms with Germany
• Signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact in Aug 1939
• Agreed to divide Poland among themselves
• USSR would remain neutral in the imminent war
  along Germanys eastern frontier with Poland
• Germany would not stop USSR from taking over the
  eastern part of Poland as well as Estonia and
  Latvia
• Germany agreed later not to oppose USSR taking
  over Lithuania as well

3
THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT 1939
4
THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT 1939
5
WHY STALIN SIGNED THE PACT

• Recovery of lost USSR territories
• Gained time for Stalin
• Stalins worry about fighting a war on two fronts
• Loss of confidence in Britain and France

6

• Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov signs the
  Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact while German
  Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop and Soviet leader
  Stalin look on under a portrait of Lenin, August
  23, 1939.

7

• Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov signs the
  Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact while German
  Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop and Soviet leader
  Stalin look on under a portrait of Lenin, August
  23, 1939.

8

• NAZI LEADERS AFTER SIGNING THE PACT WITH USSR
• Upon signing the mutual non-aggression pact,
  German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop (center)
  boasted that he could "fill a chest with all the
  treaties that he had violated." (Germany violated
  this treaty after twenty-two months.)

9
WHY STALIN SIGNED THE PACT

• Recovery of lost USSR territories
• Land lost in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty
• Estonia, Latvia Lithuania
• Secret agreement that Russia could recover
  territory lost to Poland during the Russian civil
  war period
• Advantage of moving USSRs western frontier
  further away from the main cities and industries
• In the event of war with Germany, German forces
  would have to fight through all these territories
  before getting to USSR ie creation of a buffer
  zone

10
(No Transcript)
11
WHY STALIN SIGNED THE PACT

• 2. Gained time for Stalin
• More time to build up his armed forces
• Why?
• USSR would be in a better position to fight
  Germany then
• Probably one reason why the USSR defeated Germany
  later in WWII

12
WHY STALIN SIGNED THE PACT

• 3. Stalins worry about fighting a war on two
  fronts
• West Against Germany
• East Against Japan
• Limit German expansion to the east by redirecting
  it to the West towards France
• Front seat to watch the Western powers slug it
  out with Germany

13
WHY STALIN SIGNED THE PACT

• 3. Stalins worry about fighting a war on two
  fronts
• 1937 China at war with Japan
• USSR supported China
• Stalin feared a Japanese attack on Soviet
  territories in East Asia
• Did not want to fight a war there and in Europe
• This war between Japan and USSR never
  materialized but it seemed very likely at that
  time

14
WORLD WAR II

• WWII started in Sep 1939 with Hitlers invasion
  of Poland on 1 Sep 1939
• As agreed in the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Stalin moved
  into eastern Poland, Estonia, Latvia Lithuania
  at the same time
• Less than 2 years later, in June 1941, Germany
  attacked USSR
• There was no declaration of war by Germany
• 3,000,000 German troops poured into USSR in one
  of the biggest invasions in world history
• The Soviet army was swept before it
• Thus began what the Russians call The Great
  Patriot War

15
WORLD WAR II
German attack on USSR 1941
16
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

• Information and image sources
• Moreira J., World in Transition Perspectives on
  Modern World History, Singapore SNP Education
  Pte Ltd, 2000.
• Kelly N. and Shuter J., As It Was Lived A
  History of the Modern World, Singapore Pearson
  Education Asia Pte Ltd, 2000.
• Lim S H, Tham Y P, Wang Z and Yeo L, Inroads
  Modern World History, Singapore Oxford
  University Press, 2000.
• Tate N., A History of the Modern World, Singapore
  Federal Publications, 1995.