1
 IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN INDIA 
2
TERRORISM A PROXY WAR

• OBJECTIVES
• intimidate the state and the civil population
• to demonstrate the inability of the State to
  protect its civilian population
• generate pressure on the State from its
  population to settle with the terrorists and
• create feelings of battle fatigue in the State as
  well as its population.

3
TERRORISM IN INDIA

• OLD OR CLASSICAL TERRORISM
• REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM
• SEPERATIST MOVEMENTS
• ETHNIC / RELIGIOUS TERRORISM

4
IMPACT OF TERRORISM

• ON HUMAN LIVES
• Toll on the casualties suffered more than the
  casualties in the four conventional wars fought
  by India.

5
IMPACT OF TERRORISM

• ON THE POLITICAL SCENE
• India has lost two leaders to terrorist
  attacks, in each case creating a leadership
  crisis
• Undermining of democratic values and
  democratic institutions.

6
IMPACT OF TERRORISM

• ON THE ECONOMY
• Cost extracted by acts of terrorism on the
  Indian exchequer estimated to be more than
  Rs.45,000 crores
• Increase in budget on agencies involved in
  fighting terrorism is 2600 per cent since 1980s
  
• Compounded by the loss to property and impact
  on business environment

7
IMPACT OF TERRORISM

• ON THE SOCIAL FABRIC
• The assassination of Prime Minister Indira
  Gandhi in 1984 by Sikh terrorists had terrible
  reprisal on the Sikh community
• The 1993 Mumbai blasts triggered communal
  onslaught on the Muslim population of the city

8
HAVE WE COPED?

• 19 years to bring the insurgency-cum-terrorism
  in Nagaland under control,
• 20 years to restore normalcy in Mizoram,
• 14 years to put an end to terrorism in Punjab. 
• JK complicated

9
POST-MODERN TERRORISM
10
ARE WE READY?
Now, here, you see, it takes all the running
you can do, to keep in the same place. If you
want to get somewhere else, you must run at least
twice as fast as that! The Queen
It was much pleasanter at home, when one
wasnt always growing larger and smaller, and
being ordered about by mice and rabbits.

Alice Excerpt from Alice
in Wonderland by Lewis Carroll
11
REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM
12
SEPERATIST MOVEMENTS
13
RELIGIOUS TERRORISM
14
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AND STRUCTURES
15
PREVIEW

• SOFT STATE
• STRATEGY. DO WE HAVE ANY OR DO WE NEED ONE?
• STRUCTURES
• ISSUES

16
NATIONAL APPROACH OF TOLERANCE
17
MULTI DIMENSIONAL TERROR THREATS
18
PAN INDIA STRIKES POST 2003
Pre 26/11 26/11 Post 26/11
19
INDIAS COUNTER TERRORISM APPROACH

• INADEQUATE RESPONSE
• SYSTEMIC FAILURE
• LACK OF COHERENT STRATEGY
• SOFT STATE

20
SYSTEMIC FAILURE

• LACK OF POLITICAL CONSENSUS
• MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES REPORTING TO
  DIFFERENT AUTHORITY _at_
• MULTIPLICITY OF POORLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED
  FORCES
• AMORPHOUS MARITIME COASTAL SECURITY
• NON COLLABORATIVE ATTITUDE AND TURF BATTLE

21
SYSTEMIC FAILURE

• AIR SPACE AND AVIATION SECURITY
• CYBER SECURITY
• NARCO TERRORISM
• MEDIA ANARCHY
• GLOBALISED TERROR NETWORKS
• ANTI TERROR LAWS AND ENFORCEMENT

22
INTELLIGENCE CONFUSION

• STATE CID AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES FOR LAW AND
  ORDER AND SOCIAL CRIMES
• IB, CBI AND INTELLIGENCE UNITS OF NSG AND PMF
  REPORTS TO HOME MINISTER FOR INTERNAL INT
• RAW, A WING OF CABINET SECRETARIAT REPORTS TO
  PRIME MINISTER THROUGH NSC.
• CBI REPORTS THROUGH CS.
• NSG AND NTRO TO PM THROUGH NSA.
• DIA WITH DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE OF THREE
  SERVICES REPORT TO MOD.
• DRI, NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU, ENFORCEMENT
  DIRECTORATE, CUSTOMS, AND DIRECTORATE OF INCOME
  TAX (INVESTIGATION). _at_

23
POORLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED FORCES

• LAW AND ORDER POLICE, ARMED POLICE AND SPECIAL
  POLICE AT STATE LEVEL.
• CRPF AS A CENTRAL RESERVE FORCE, THE LARGEST
  FORCE THAT HAS 207 BATTALIONS INCLUDING SPECIAL
  UNITS SUCH AS INDIAN RESERVE BATTALIONS.
• IRB, RAPID ACTION FORCE AND COBRA FORCE IS
  SUPPOSED TO BE REAL RESPONSE FOR ANTI TERROR AND
  INTERNAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES.
• CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE MEANT TO GUARD
  AIRPORTS AND OTHER HIGH-PROFILE TARGETS
• ASSAM RIFLES, BSF, ITBP AND SSB MANAGE THE
  BORDERS AND ASSIST THE POLICE WHEN NECESSARY.
• THE NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD UNDER NSA TO HANDLE
  ANTI-HIJACK OPERATIONS, RESCUE OPERATIONS, VIP
  PROTECTION DUTIES.

24
SOFT STATE
25
SOFT STATE
26
NATIONAL STRATEGY
DO WE NEED ONE?
NEXT TIME, DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF THREATS !
27
UN COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY

• ADDRESSING THE CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO THE SPREAD
  OF TERRORISM
• PREVENTING TERRORIST ACTS
• DEVELOPING STATE CAPACITY TO COUNTER TERRORISM
• DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS

28
UK COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY (CONTEST)

• THE AIM OF THE STRATEGY IS
• TO REDUCE THE RISK TO THE UK AND ITS INTERESTS
  OVERSEAS FROM INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, SO THAT
  PEOPLE CAN GO ABOUT THEIR LIVES FREELY AND WITH
  CONFIDENCE

29
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

• PURSUE TO STOP TERRORIST ATTACKS
• PREVENT TO STOP PEOPLE BECOMING TERRORISTS
  OR SUPPORTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
• PROTECT TO STRENGTHEN OUR PROTECTION AGAINST
  TERRORIST ATTACK
• PREPARE WHERE AN ATTACK CANNOT BE STOPPED,
  TO MITIGATE ITS IMPACT

30
PURSUE

• INCREASE DETECTION AND INVESTIGATION CAPABILITY
  AND CAPACITY.
• INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR PROSECUTION
  PROCESS, FROM EVIDENTIAL COLLECTION TO
  POST-PRISON SUPERVISION.
• DEVELOP MORE EFFECTIVE NONPROSECUTION ACTIONS.
• IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITY TO DISRUPT TERRORIST
  ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS.
• STRENGTHEN THE COHERENCE BETWEEN OUR
  COUNTER-TERRORISM WORK AND THE UKS
  COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND CAPACITY BUILDING WORK IN
  AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND ELSEWHERE.
• IMPROVE COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN
  PURSUE STAKEHOLDERS.

31
PREVENT
TO CHALLENGE THE IDEOLOGY BEHIND VIOLENT
EXTREMISM AND SUPPORT MAINSTREAM VOICES.
DISRUPT THOSE WHO PROMOTE VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND
SUPPORT THE PLACES WHERE THEY OPERATE. SUPPORT
INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE VULNERABLE TO RECRUITMENT, OR
HAVE ALREADY BEEN RECRUITED BY VIOLENT
EXTREMISTS INCREASE THE RESILIENCE OF
COMMUNITIES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM. TO ADDRESS
THE GRIEVANCES WHICH IDEOLOGUES ARE EXPLOITING.
32
PROTECT
THE CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE CROWDED
PLACES THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM BORDERS.
PROGRAMMES TO IMPROVE SECURITY OF HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS
33
PREPARE

• HAVE CAPABILITIES IN PLACE TO
• DEAL WITH A RANGE OF TERRORIST INCIDENT
• CONTINUITY OR SWIFT RECOVERY
• IN CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
• FOLLOWING A TERRORIST INCIDENT
• CENTRAL, REGIONAL AND LOCAL CRISIS
• MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES ARE
• APPROPRIATELY EQUIPPED, COMPETENT
• AND TRAINED.

34
RESPONSIBILITY

• CONTEST is overseen at Ministerial level by
  the Cabinet Committee on National Security,
  International Relations and Development (NSID),
  chaired by the Prime Minister.
• Home Secretary Is the lead Minister for
  counterterrorism, involving the heads of the
  security and intelligence agencies, the police,
  and Armed Forces.
• NSID may also receive external advice on
  counterterrorism, as on other national security
  issues, from the National Security Forum, an
  independent body of outside advisors with
  expertise on many aspects of
• national security.

35
US DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 2008
STRATEGIC PLAN

• PROTECT OUR NATION FROM DANGEROUS PEOPLE
• PROTECT OUR NATION FROM DANGEROUS GOODS
• PROTECT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
• STRENGTHEN OUR NATION'S PREPAREDNESS AND
  EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
• STRENGTHEN AND UNIFY DHS OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT

36
COMPONENTS OF US STRATEGY

• COUNTER TERRORISM
• BORDER SECURITY
• PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RECOVERY INCL FOR
• NATURAL DISASTER
• IMMIGRATION.
• CYBER SECURITY

37
SALIENT STRUCTURES

• NCTC REPORTING TO PRESIDENT , DNI AND DHS
• UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA
• PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS
• REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND
• OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT
• 2001/2005 (PATROIT ACT)
• FOREIGN INT SVL ACT ( FISA
• 1978/2008)
• JUSTICE DEPT CAN INVESTIGATE ALL CASES
• MIL COMMISSIONS ACT AGAINST ALIENS
• CYBER COMMAND

38
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
39
PROPOSED INDIAN COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY

• Prevent ( EQUALITY HEARTS AND MINDS ROOT CAUSE
  IDEA OF INDIA)
• Disrupt (CAPABILITY TO ANTICIPATE AND RESPOND AT
  HOME AND ABROAD)
• Secure ( TARGET HARDENING)
• Citizen as Stake Holder (PPP)
• Prepare ( FOR THE INEVITABLE)
• Unity of Approach ( PLURALISM,
• DIVERSITY NOTWITHSTANDING)

40
COMPREHENSIVE COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY ( SMART
POWER)

• HARD POWER
• PRO ACTIVE DEFENSE ( APPROPRIATE FORCE,
  STRUCTURES AND TOUGH DECISIONS)
• SURGICAL DISCRIMINATORY STRIKE CAPABILITY
• ABILITY TO WAGE WAR AND WIN IT
• ESPIONAGE/COVERT OPS
• SOFT POWER
• PEOPLE (MULTI CULTURE, MULTI RELIGION,
• MULTI ETHENIC, MULTI LINGUAL, RULE
• OF LAW -A NEW MELTING POT)
• INTERNATIONAL CLOUT AND COOPERATION
• KNOWLEDGE, MEDIA AND ICE
• TECHNOLOGY
• WPNS AND ARMAMENT
• SPACE, NUCLEAR AND CYBER

41
STRUCTURES
42
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 

• UAPA 2008
• NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY (NIA).
• NTRO
• NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM CENTRE (NCTC)
• THE MULTI-AGENCY CENTRE (MAC)
• NATIONAL INT GRID ( NATGRID).
• CRIME CRIMINAL TRACKING NETWK
• (CCTNS).
• OPERATIONS DIVISION
• STRENGHTEN COASTAL SECURITY
• OTHER MEASURES

43
CRITIQUE OF NEW STRUCTURES

• DE POLITICISE TERRORISM. APPLICABILITY OF LAWS.
• NCTC MAY NOT HAVE BEST OF TALENT. USA HAS EST IT
  UNDER AN ACT OF CONGRESS, Intelligence Reform and
  Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA)
• COMBAT ARM. CRPF REMAINS THE WEAKEST LINK AND
  LARGEST FORCE. LEADERSHIP IS THE KEY.
• CYBER SECURITY
• CBRN CAPABILITY IS SUSPECT

44
ISSUES
45
RESTRUCTURING/POLICY ISSUES

• MINISTER FOR INTERNAL SECURITY
• ROLE OF NSA/ CS. REQUIREMENT OF DNI. CAN A
  DIPLOMAT DO JUSTICE TO IS OR TWO NSAs?
• NIA AND CBI TO BE STAUTORY BODIES LIKE CEC AND
  CAG ETC. NEED FOR YOUNG TALENT AND NOT TO BE
  HEADED BY DUE TO RETIRE (SR) OFFRS.
• UNIFIED COMMAND IN STATES WITH MIL ADVISERS.

46
RESTRUCTURING/POLICY ISSUES

• COASTAL COMMANDS
• CYBER COMMAND
• DEDICATED OFFR CADRE FOR CRPF DELINK FROM IPS
• IMP CL B CITIES TO HAVE INF UNITS EARMK ,
  TRAINED EQUIPPED FOR URBAN TERRORISM TO SP
  LOCAL POLICE.

47
CONCLUSION

• BUILD CAPABILITY AND PREPARE FOR A LONG DRAWN
  CAMPAIGN FOR SUPERMACY
• SUN TZUS ADVICE, IN PEACE PREPARE FOR WAR.
  THE ART OF WAR IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE
  STATE. IT IS MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH, A ROAD
  EITHER TO SAFETY OR TO RUIN. HENCE UNDER NO
  CIRCUMSTANCES CAN IT BE NEGLECTED.
• INTERNAL SECURITY IS A NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
  THAT CAN NOT BE WISHED AWAY, DELEGATED OR OUT
  SOURCED
• ARUN SHOURIE ON MONEY WHEN HE SAID,
• FOR GODS SAKE, DONT KEEP RUNNING TO
  MUMMY.

48

COASTAL SECURITY
49
Mitigation Efforts taken by Government of India
Post 26/11

• Assigning responsibility for coastal security and
  maritime security.
• Designation of Coastal Command.
• Strengthening of marine police stations.
• Sanctioning of additional assets and manpower for
  the Coast Guard.
• Creation of Sagar Prahari Bal for the Navy.
• Automatic Identification System (AIS) for fishing
  vessels
• Chain of coastal radars.
• Joint Operations Centre (JOC).

50
COASTAL POLICE STATIONS
MUNDRA
VADINAR
OKHA
BHAVNAGAR
BEDI
10
HAZIRA
DAMAN
NAVIBANDAR
1
SATPATI
JAMBU
SOMNATH
NATE
KASHIA
06
NAVABANDAR
BANKOT
PIPAVAV
BALRAMGADI
MUMBAI
JAIGAD
ASTARANGA
NIVATI
05
VIJAYDURG
12
ARJIPALLI
ACHARU
MANDAVA
VISHAKHAPATNAM
DIGHI
MORU
NRI COMPLEX
VAKALAPUDI
SIOLIM
GILAKALADINDI
MARMUGOA
03
MOBOR
KALINGAPATNAM
06
SURYALANKA
DURGARAJUPATNAM
05
KEELAIYUR
NAGAPATTINAM
VEDARANNIYAM
KASARGOD
ADIRAMAPATTINAM
01
AZHIKAL
KARAIKKAL
SETHUBHAVACHATHIRAM
BEYPORE
MANAMELKUDI
PONNANI
THIRUPUNAVASA
08
FORT KOCHI
DEVIPATTINAM
NEENDAKARA
MANDAPAM
KODUNGALLOR
THALAIKULAM
12
VIZHINJAM
KOODARKULAM
COLACHAL
51
COASTAL SURVEILLANCE NETWORK
MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS

• AT 46 LOCATIONS
• INCORPORATES
• RADAR
• AIS
• ELECTRO-OPTIC SENSOR

DWARKA
GOPI NATH
SAGAR IS
PORBANDAR
HAZIRA PT

• Chain of Static Sensors in sensitive areas with
  dense traffic
• Installation on Lighthouses
• Information processing by ICG through ROC and
  ROS
• Aim real time surveillance from remote locations

PARADIP
DIU HEAD
TARA PUR
GOPAL PUR
KORALAI FORT
KALINGAPATNAM
TOLKESHWAR PT
VISAKHAPATNAM
VISAKHAPATNAM
DEVGARH
SACRAMENTO
MACHLIPATNAM
AGUADA
KRISHNAPATNAM
RAMAYAPATNAM
BHATKAL
EAST ISLAND
CHENNAI
NARCONDUM ISLAND
SURATKAL LT
NEIL IS
PONDICHERRY
MT DILLI
HUTBAY
KILTAN
KODI KARAI
CARNIC
PONNANI
AGATTI
TILLANCHANG ISLAND
KILLAKARAI
ANDROTH
KARDIP
KALPENI
KOCHI
PANDIYAN TIVU
SUEHLI PAR
CAMPBELL BAY
QUILON
MINICOY
MANAPPAD
KANYA KUMARI
52
Responsibilities for Various Maritime Stakeholders

• IN Overall Maritime Security including Coastal
  Security Offshore Security.
• CG Coastal Security in Territorial Waters
  including areas to be patrolled by Marine police.
• Director General Coast Guard Cdr Coastal
  Command.
• FOC-in-C C-in-C Coastal
  Defence.

53
No specific responsibility assigned to the IN

• Responsibilities of Various Agencies Prior 26/11

High Seas - Navy
EEZ (200 NM) Security Coast Guard
Offshore Security Navy/CG
Territorial Waters (12 NM)
Marine Police
54

• Responsibilities of Various Agencies Post 26/11

Overall Maritime Security - Navy
Offshore Security - Navy
Coastal Security Territorial Waters
Coast Guard
55
Limitations of New Security Apparatus

• Overlapping Responsibilities.
• Responsibilities without transfer of authority.
• Coastal Command a misnomer. Responsible for only
  co-ordination. No command control function.
• Replication of responsibility dilutes the
  accountability.
• Distinction between coastal security coastal
  defence.

56
Limitations of New Security Apparatus (Contd)

• Undue focus on shallow waters.
• Does not leverage expanse of sea.
• Coast Guard structured for EEZ Charter.
• IN back to brown water navy!

57
Limitations of New Security Apparatus (Contd)

• Unregulated nature of Indian fishing.
• Absence of legal regulatory mechanism.
• Fishing Community a political vote bank.
• Compulsions of fisheries being state subject.

58
Co-ordination

• Numerous maritime agencies like major minor
  ports, customs, fisheries, DG Shipping, ONGC, IB
  and Marine Police under various ministries.
• Each agency has specific charter but bearing on
  security.
• Co-ordination between centre state agencies.

59
Recommendations

• Clear demarcation of responsiblity,
  accountability jurisdiction for various
  agencies.

60
Recommendations (Contd)

• Legal regulatory mechanism for Indian fisheries
  permitting measures like
• Making crossing of IMBL illegal.
• No fishing corridor.
• Prohibited fishing zones around off shore
  platforms, VAs/VPs.
• All legal provisions with penalties.
• AIS/transponders for less than 20 mtrs.
• RFID for fishing boats. (Storage of GPS track).
• Centre to exercise powers of regulating fishing
  beyond 12 nm.

61
Recommendations (Contd)

• Maritime Domain Awareness.
• Networking of all concerned agencies.
• Integration of surveillance data of
• LRIT DG Shipping.
• PANS Port authorities.
• AIS - National AIS network (DGLL)
• Coastal Radar Chain ICG
• Tracking Devices Fishing boats DG shipping/
  Fisheries
• Data base of registration of fishing boats
• Data base of other stake holders, Int, marine
  police, ports etc.
• Maritime Security Advisor.

62

• Question!

63
ISSUE

• The current arrangement for Coastal Security
  suffers from shortcomings such as-
• Coast Guard (CG) made responsible to coordinate
  between various agencies without authority over
  them.
• Coastal Security responsibility of the CG has
  been limited to territorial waters (12NM) while
  it has the Statutory Charter capability to
  operate up to the EEZ (200NM).
• Indian Navy has been made overall responsible
  with the CG responsible for territorial waters
  leading to issues of Command and Control.
• How can the issue of Command and Control between
  various agencies be resolved to bring in better
  efficiency and accountability?