Popkin: The Rational Peasant.

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Popkin The Rational Peasant.

• Some representations of preindustrial society
  idealize life in peasant villages(xi) (Popkin
  contests Scotts theses)
• Moral economists see the passage from
  precapitalist corporate villages to capitalism
  and contractual ties as harming peasant welfare.
• Popkin argues moral economists are wrong (myth
  of the village).

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Popkin

• Fieldwork in Vietnam from 1966 to 1970.
• Popkin advances a view of the peasant as a
  rational problem-solver, with a sense both of his
  own interests and of the need to bargain with
  others to achieve mutually acceptable outcomes.
  (ix)

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Popkin

• I argue that peasants are continuously striving
  not merely to protect but to raise their
  subsistence level through long- and short-term
  investments, both public and private (4)
• Ex children, animals, land (private)
• Village improvements (public)

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Popkin

• The investment logic applies to both market and
  non-market exchanges.

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Popkin

• Given the uncertainties of the life in the
  village, I predict that peasants will rely on
  private, family investments for their long-run
  security and that they will be interested in
  short-term gain vis-a-vis the village. (23)

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Popkin

• There is no harmonious relationship between
  landlords and peasants. The peasants negotiate
  their conditions with different groups (State,
  parties, churches, etc.) seeking to improve their
  conditions of living.

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Lane

• The debate between Popkin and Scott fostered the
  shift towards institutions. Yet, their positions
  are not that different both of them argue for
  the peasants rationality, although they are
  focusing on different situations.
• In any case, it contributed to highlight the
  complexity of strategic behavior and rationality
  in different contexts.

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March and Olsen

• Politics creates identity and materializes
  institutions.
• Institutions frame identities and interests.
• History is encoded into rules and institutions
  embody such a history.
• Individuals belong to different institutions at
  the same time, and all of them contend to shape
  their political life.

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Thelen Steinmo Rational Choice vs. Historical
Institutionalism

• RC
• -Institutions define the strategic context of
  choice and solve problems of collective action
• -Actors rational maximizers
• -Universal toolkit (deductive logical system
  with highly restrictive assumptions)

• HI
• -Institutions shape politics, identities, and
  goals. Patterned relations.
• -Actors rule followers satisficers.
• -Middle-range theoretical models based on
  induction

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Examples

• RC
• Ostroms comparative study on the commons (small
  groups may overcome the problem of the free
  rider)
• Douglas North (on property rights)

• HI
• Migdals study on strategies of survival
  (state/society, determinations/contingency)
• -Steinmos study on tax policy in the US, the UK,
  and Sweden

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Focus on intermediate-level institutions

• Allows us to understand how general patterns
  (capitalism, liberal democracy) developed in
  different specific forms in different counties.
  Different Policies (taxes, education, health).
• Contingency and path dependency

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The Institutional Model

1. Individual actors have many goals
2. People create institutions (historical)
3. Every human act is conditioned by institutions
4. Actors are political
5. Search for theoretical models with explanatory
   (and predictive) reach.

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Our Journey
Neo-Institutionalism (Institutionsreal people
theory) RC HI
Traditional Political Science Old
Institutionalism (Historico-Normative
approach) Descriptive
Behavioral Revolution Between Behavior Beliefs
(Descriptive) and Grand-Theorizing (flat)
The Return of the State
Development Theory (Modernization)
Dependency Theory (Center/Periphery)
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Hernando De Soto Dead Capital and the Poor.
Economic Reforms in less developed countries
(LDCs) and former communist nations (FCNs)
attempt to create a market economy. Problem
Economic Reforms do not benefit the majority. De
Sotos explanation Lack of Property Rights. The
solution lies in the assets most of the people
already own informally. But Property Rights are
needed to transform that dead capital into
live capital.
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Before blaming culture for the magnitude of
apparent lawlessness among the poor and the
disorder it brings, it is essential to examine
the legal institutions and the role they play in
the informal-formal divide.
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Similar Things, Different Uses.

• Dead Capital
• Most assets in developing countries are used only
  for primary purposes (use values)
• Ex houses provide shelter

• Live Capital
• In the West, houses, land, and merchandise also
  secure credit. Use of assets in the marketplace.
• Ex houses provide shelter and allow people to
  get loans to develop their business.

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Dead Capital, Ownership, and Legal Steps.
Philippines Perú Haiti Egypt
Dead Capital 132,9 Billion 74,2 Billion 5,2 Billion 241,2 Billion
Urban 72,1 36,5 2,0 195,2
Rural 60,8 37,7 3,2 3,2
Owned by 65 population 65 population 82 population 85 population
Legal Steps 168 steps 728 steps (Lima) 111 steps 77 steps 31 entities
Source De Soto, Hernando, The Mystery of Capital
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Total Informal Property in the WorldUs 9,34
trillion
Valor Informal Urban Dwellings Valor Informal Rural Area
Asia 1,75 (trillion us) 0.59 (trillion us)
Africa 0.58 (trillion us) 0.39(trillion us)
Middle East South Africa 0.74(trillion us) 0.25 (trillion us)
South America 0.89(trillion us) 0.24 (trillion us)
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean 0.36(trillion us) 0.09 (trillion us)
China, NIS, and Eastern Europe 6.48(trillion us) 2.36 (trillion us)
Source De Soto, Hernando, The Mystery of Capital
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Formal Property

• Formal property is a recent phenomenon (no more
  than 200 years old)
• Widespread in the West in the last 100 years.
• In Japan (less than 50 years ago)
• LAG Property is a non-clearly visible
  institution, which has been taken as a given in
  the West, and consequently it remains naturalized
  and non-theorized.

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Because ownership cannot be readily traced and
validated, and exchanges cannot be governed by a
legally recognized set of rules, their assets
cannot be used in efficient and legally secured
market transactions. The property of the poor is,
in effect, dead capital.
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The development of formal property could
therefore be considered one of the most
remarkable achievements of the West. It made
possible to create the network of switches and
connections needed for a market economy.
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Formalizing property removes the perception of
things from their physical space to a mental
space... What Western formal property
representation systems did was increase the range
of conceivable uses and operations of assets.
PROPERTY IS A CONCEPT
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The Formalization Process
Determining ownership is not enough. The
formalization process must also include
mechanisms to increase the productivity of
informal sector assets by linking them to
contracts and legal instruments that allow their
owners to relate to government and private
business.