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IPI: A

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... Iran wants $7.2/milBTU, India willing to pay $4 ... east: Bangladesh ... security Acquire leverage in relations with India and Iran Block land ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: IPI: A


1
IPI A Road to Peace? The Promise and Pitfalls
of Deep Interdependence
2
The Problemposed by IPI
  • 3 Regional Powers, with
  • Differing, Often Conflicting, Objectives
  • Yet Substantial Coincidence of Needs ?
    Gains to Interaction
  • Beneficial Interaction Requires Deep Mutual
    Interdependence
  • ? Costs of Interdependence
  • Substantially raising both the Costs and Benefits
    of (Strategic) Policy Decisions

3
The Region
4
Fundamental Interestsof each power
  • Sustained Economic Growth, requiring
  • Energy (NG as Fuel of the 21st Century)
  • Investment
  • Technology
  • International Power and Influence
  • A Seat at the Table in all world issues
  • Regional Preeminence over Rivals
  • Leverage in dealing with non-regional powers
  • Internal Stability Cohesion
  • Relationship (/-) with U.S./ West

5
The Route
6
Particular Concerns - Iran
  • Political Strategic Objectives Paramount
  • Overcome Western constraints breakout to the
    east, South Asia China
  • Develop leverage against the U.S. an
    India-Iran counterforce, breaking U.S.-proxy
    encirclement
  • Through becoming an irreplaceable partner,
  • as only sufficient supplier for India
  • Financing growing import needs, technology
    acquisition, social subsidies, and investment
  • Through extracting maximum rents from energy
    sales
  • While securing long run demand ? stable
    (growing) income
  • But, apparent ambivalence about selling its
    natural endowment

7
Particular Concerns - Pakistan
  • Growing energy deficit NG is 60 of use
  • Fully absorbing internal supply ? need for import
  • 1 bcf deficit after 2015 expected
  • Growing Internal Unrest e.g. Baluchistan
  • on-going threats to energy infrastructure
  • struggles over internal control
  • Vast Investment Needs in face of seriously uneven
    development (esp. tribal areas)
  • ? maximize transit fees, minimize cost at entry
    border
  • Fear of strengthening key rival India
  • Stayed on sidelines, avoiding negotiation

8
Particular Concerns - India
  • Primary Concerns are Economic
  • need secure and growing supply of energy
  • 8 pa growth ? 4-fold increase on primary, and
    5-7-fold increase in electric, energy over next
    25 years
  • NG a small but increasingly vital component
  • NG use expected to rise 2.6-fold, from 15 to 20
    of energy use
  • Pricing only viable in power production at
    3-3.50/mBTU LNG world market prices are 7-10
    /mBTU
  • Subject to Security Constraints
  • Deep Distrust of Pakistani Motives, Objectives
  • Fear of Iranian Unreliability, non-economic
    objectives ?
  • Desire for diversified sources

9
Capabilities and Constraints - 1
  • Iran Underdeveloped economy, functioning well
    below potential
  • Substantial Energy Reserves
  • 2nd Largest NG Supply Potential in World
  • Substantial oil reserves using gas injection to
    maintain output
  • Location between Europe, Middle East, Central
    Asia, and South Asia Hub between largest
    suppliers and largest users
  • Cash Starved despite oil revenues ? investment
    technology constrained, as is ability to
    maintain social subsidies
  • Pakistan Underdeveloped economy, with wide
    disparities in development level
  • Energy reserves fully domestically committed
  • Limited effective demand for energy imports
  • Land Bridge Middle East - Central Asia and
    South Asia
  • Politically unstable with weak internal security
  • Kashmir Issue with India
  • Bearing substantial military costs

10
Capabilities and Constraints - 2
  • India Rapidly growing (emerging market) economy
    facing substantial internal institutional
    barriers
  • Potentially worlds 2nd largest consumer of NG
    and LNG
  • Located far from adequate supplies
  • China major competitor for supplies
  • Rapidly growing energy demand, exacerbated by
    domestic pricing, regulation, inefficiency
  • Substantial ability to finance investment,
    attract and use advanced technologies
  • Potential (insufficient) supply from east
    Bangladesh, Myanmar
  • Middle-East, Central Asian supplies by pipeline
    must pass through Pakistan, or under ocean (up to
    3000m depths)
  • Issue of Kashmir with Pakistan
  • Developing Partnership with the US

11
NG Pipelines Actual and Proposed
12
Strategic Alternatives Iran
  • Export for revenue to break isolation, through
  • IPI vs.
  • Export to Europe through ( to) Turkey
    politically constrained
  • I I pipeline under sea to India extremely
    costly, technologically complex
  • LNG to world market requires substantial
    investment as well as political opening
  • Currently lacks necessary technology sanctions
    complicate acquiring it
  • Reserve for the (Islamic) future
  • Domestic use
  • Limited export to Pakistan and/or Islamic clients

13
Strategic Alternatives Pakistan
  • IPI Provide Transit for Gas to India
  • Generate substantial transit revenues
  • Acquire needed energy input at low cost
  • Requires investment in Infrastructure security
  • Acquire leverage in relations with India and Iran
  • Block land route to India
  • Restrain growth of Indian power
  • Look to Qatar, Iran, or TAP for needed increase
    in gas supply

14
Strategic Alternatives India
  • IPI Meets new energy need Iran via Pakistan
  • Lowest cost alternative
  • Subject to Pakistani interruption or internal
    turmoil
  • Dependent on Iranian reliability
  • Undersea Pipelines from Iran and/or Qatar
  • Extremely expensive and technologically risky
  • Iranian reliability issue
  • LNG from Qatar (world market)
  • Requires substantial domestic infrastructure
    development
  • Market still underdeveloped, if promising
  • (Partial) Supply Alternatives Diversification of
    sources
  • Bangladesh Myanmar Pipelines
  • Turkmen gas (TAPI), also through Pakistan 70
    bcf/yr (1.98bcm)?
  • Develop Nuclear Energy Industry (French model)
    with U.S. Assistance currently only 3 of power
    generation

15
IPI as Equilibrium Outcome
  • Why? Economic Win-Win if all cooperate
  • Low cost alternative for NG supply
  • Allows range for flexible pricing agreement
  • Satisfies India Pakistan NG needs over 25 year
    horizon, and Pakistani (Iranian?) revenue needs
  • Satisfies key Iranian strategic objective
  • Raises economic costs of political conflict
    confidence building measure between competitors
  • Why Not? Constrains Strategic Autonomy
  • Puts powerful levers in hands of competitors
  • Raises costs of pursuing other objectives
  • May require internationalization of guarantees
  • Opposed by powerful outside interests, U.S.
    policy
  • Only used by parties as instrument toward other
    (strategic) ends?

16
Road to Peace?
  • Raises both the costs and benefits of
    interaction, particularly at the margin
  • Creates substantial economic surplus for
    negotiated division
  • Natural Monopoly structure of pipeline
  • Creates mutual dependencies for realization of
    value
  • Creates incentives for extension of system
  • Empowers mutual, asymmetric threats, with impact
    beyond loss of economic value
  • withhold gas supply (captive demand)
  • withhold payments (captive supply)
  • Interdependence raises costs of conflict ability
    to inflict/suffer pain
  • Increases vulnerability to domestic shocks
    within partners
  • Beneficial cooperation inspires extension to
    other areas (confidence building)
  • Creates (relatively) closed, self-sustaining
    energy-revenue system, implying
  • Buffer against outside pressures, shocks
  • Reduced incentive to pursue diversification of
    sources, users

17
Likelihood of Realization - 1
  • Obstacles
  • Vast up-front costs (if less than alternatives)
  • Negotiation difficult, fraught with moral hazard
  • Exploited for other purposes, e.g.
  • Iran break U.S.-proxy encirclement, tie others
    to own fate
  • India pry concessions from U.S.
  • Pakistan resolve internal political difficulties
  • Pricing negotiations as a rent-sharing exercise
  • Implementation subject to shocks
  • Hold-up (extortion) by partners
  • impact minimized by maintaining costly
    alternatives
  • Domestic disruption within partners
  • Outside interventions blocking realization
  • Failure to resolve/put aside deep political
    differences
  • Pakistani political turmoil
  • U.S. opposition Principled or Strategic?
  • Nuclear assistance to India to hold up Indian
    participation?

18
Likelihood of Realization - 2
  • Progress
  • Growing realization of the technological
    difficulties and vast costs, or unreality, of
    alternatives ?
  • Indian acceptance of Pakistani (arms length)
    participation
  • Pakistani acceptance of separation of economic
    and political issues
  • Serious negotiations over pricing mechanism
    (India-Pakistan vs. Iran
  • Iranian acceptance of insurance responsibility
    guaranteed pricing of alternate supply
  • Discussions of 3rd party (Consortium)
    participation
  • Iran-Pakistan negotiations on truncated
    pipeline
  • Indicates commitment to land route energy
    relationship
  • Increases pressure on India to buy in
  • Growing world demand pressure China may lock
    up supply?
  • Apparent weakening of U.S. opposition?
  • Possibility of India grand deal get IPI for
    no-nuke Iran?
  • Would imply easier IPI access to financing and
    technology

19
Can the Peace Pipeline Really be a Road to Peace?
  • As a hypothetical Yes, anything is possible
  • In Fact Perhaps
  • The prior analysis would indicate that IPI is
    likely, if not certain, to be built
  • Provided fundamentals of a game theoretic
    formulation
  • If players rational, and understand each others
    rationality, IPI is a Nash Equilibrium outcome
  • IPI impact on potential conflict/war
  • Increases potential for friction/conflict new
    objects and levers
  • Raises the economic stakes ability to suffer,
    inflict losses
  • Reduces the likelihood, as ultimate stakes must
    be bigger to justify
  • Alters the world balance of power in (often)
    unpredictable ways
  • But, in and of itself, is unlikely to make
    peace less possible
  • Passions, as much as economic interests, will
    decide!

20
The End?
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