J

1

• Jürgen Habermas
• The Theory of Communicative Action (1981)
• Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action
  (1983/ tr 1995)
• Postmetaphysical Thinking (1988)
• Dialektik der Säkularisierung. Über Vernunft und
  Religion (with Joseph Ratzinger (2005) English
  The Dialectics of Secularization On Reason and
  Religion)

2

• General characteristics
• Continues and reconstructs Enlightenment ideals
  (of political emancipation and democracy)
• vs relativism
• practical, pragmatic, procedural, formal 100
  find solutions to normative problems in discourse
  / communication
• An analysis of communicative structures
• We need to identify and reconstruct the universal
  conditions of possible understanding
• communicative action, the process of giving and
  criticizing reasons for holding or rejecting
  particular claims
• language cannot be comprehended unless an
  understanding is achieved in it
• - not settling the issue of the good life
  (impossible with pluralism), but justice 101
• there is an irreducible plurality of 'goods'
  this conditions and limits moral conversation
• So a non-moral sense of ethics.

3

• General characteristics
• What do we have?
• A development and reformulation of Kants
  insights a deontological ethics 101
• a 'dialogical form of practical reason'
• validity of a norm is justified only
  intersubjectively in processes of argumentation
  between individuals in a dialectic.
• in search of a rational founding (Begrundung) of
  propositions
• Needs a life-world of a specific social group
  100
• attempt to bridge the gap between "is" and "ought"

4

• assumptions
• 1. - rationality is a characteristic of all human
  beings
• 2. - freedom is a characteristic of all human
  beings leads to autonomy
• this is the basis of reciprocity (why others
  count) and its emanicipatory character (as being
  critical of established authority)
• 3, - equality
• 4. - therefore, all issues (incl. moral problems)
  are capable of being solved in a rational and
  cognitive way
• 5. - the existence of some universal claims and
  therefore the importance of universal norms
• leads to democracy, based on consent
• 6. rationality capable, through discourse, of
  arriving at universal norms.
• 7. - (from 3) We need to take into consideration
  the viewpoints of all who would be affected by
  the adoption of normative claims

5

• the principle of discourse ethics (D) stipulates
  
• a moral norm may claim validity to be
  justified only if all who might be affected by
  it reach (or would reach) in their capacity as
  participants in a practical discourse, agreement
  that this norm is valid (J. Habermas,
  "Discourse Ethics Notes on a Program of
  Philosophical Justification," Cambridge, MIT
  Press 1990, p. 71).
• the principle of universalization (U)
• A norm is valid only if "all concerned affected
  can accept the consequences and the side affects
  its universal observance can be anticipated to
  have for the satisfaction for everyone's
  interests (and that these consequences are
  preferred to those of known alternative
  possibilities for regulation)." (p. 71)
• "unless all affected can freely accept the
  consequences and the side effects that the
  general observance of a controversial norm can be
  expected to have for the satisfaction of the
  interests of each individual" (see p. ___ Moral
  Consciousness and Communicative Action, p. 93).

6

• Why universality?
• Every person who accepts the universal and
  necessary communicative presuppositions of
  argumentative speech and who knows what I means
  to justify a norm of action implicitly
  presupposes as valid the principle of
  universalisation,
• - Habermas, Moral Consciousness and
  Communicative Action, MIT Press, 1995, p. 86.

7

• Specific normative assumptions / rules of the
  game
• Habermas (1990) / Robert Alexy
• Level 1 logical-semantic rules of argumentation
  (no ethical content) p. 84
• Understandability
• Non-contradiction (1.1) No speaker may contradict
  himself.
• Consistency (1.2) Every speaker who applies
  predicate F to object A must be prepared to apply
  F to all other objects resembling A in all
  relevant aspects.
• No Equivocation (1.3) Different speakers may not
  use the same expression with different meanings
  (p. 87).

8

• Specific normative assumptions / rules of the
  game
• Habermas (1990) / Alexy
• Level 2 the rules of jurisdiction and relevance
  (have ethical import and content) p. 85
• Sincerity / Seriousness / Authenticity
  Ernsthaftigkeit,
• (2.1) Every speaker may assert only what he
  really believes.
• Legitimacy
• (2.2) A person who disputes a proposition or norm
  not under discussion must provide a reason for
  wanting to do so (p.88).

9

• Specific normative assumptions / rules of the
  game
• Habermas (1990) / Alexy
• Level 3 Ideal Speech Situation p. 86
• Openness / Freedom from Constraint and Coercion
• (3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak
  and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.
• (3.2) a. Everyone is allowed to question any
  assertion whatever.
• b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion
  whatever into the discourse.
• c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes,
  desires and needs.
• (3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or
  external coercion, from exercising his rights as
  laid down in (3.1) and (3.2) (p. 88).

10

• Consensus all affected can freely accept the
  consequences and the side effects that the
  general observance of a controversial norm can be
  expected to have for the satisfaction of the
  interests of each individual.

11

• Discourse Ethics and Solidarity
• these procedural rules must be complemented by a
  sense of solidarity among participants (i.e.,
  concern for the well-being of both one's fellow
  human beings and of the community at large)
• "Justice conceived in postconventional terms a
  Kohlbergian reference can converge with
  solidarity, as its other side, only when
  solidarity has been transformed in the light of
  the idea of a general, discursive formation of
  will."
• Discourse Ethics and Democracy
• the general conditions of the ideal speech
  situation and the rules of reason, coupled with
  this sense of solidarity, describe the necessary
  conditions of democratic polity.
• these conditions and rules establish the
  legitimacy of pluralism.

12

• There can be rightness and wrongness
• I hold the view that normative rightness must be
  regarded as a claim to validity that is analogous
  to a truth claim. This notion is captured by the
  term cognitivist ethics . A cognitivist ethics
  must answer the question of how to justify
  normative statements.. Only those norms may
  claim to be valid that could meet with the
  consent of all affected in their role as
  participants in a practical discourse.. For a
  norm to be valid, the consequences and side
  effects of its general observance for the
  satisfaction of each person's particular
  interests must be acceptable to all. (Morality
  and Ethical Life, in MCCA, p. 197)

13

• Advantages
• Useful provides a (communicative) framework in
  which political and (some) moral conflicts can be
  resolved
• Presence of rationality, freedom, equality
• Non-relativistic (right wrong)
• Universalizable
• Consistent with solidarity and democracy

14

• Limited in extent
• self-understanding and self-determination not
  included in moral theory
• Limited in scope
• Does not give norms for every moral conflict that
  might arise
• Individualistic
• individual participants
• tries to avoid this through generalization Is
  this possible?
• Naively idealistic
• assumes that human beings have capacities that
  they dont have people are incapable of being
  objective and rational in dialogue

15

• Inconsistent
• Too vague
• rightness defined in terms of worthiness
• Too narrow
• applies in some situations with a practical
  resolution (e.g., conflict resolution)
• Too much or too little Kantianism
• has Habermas adequately defended universalization
  as necessary/required for argumentation?
• do we need universalization?
• Does it apply to all discourses?
• No not comprehensive doctrines / religious ones
  
• Question-begging or too narrow?
• assumes that some reasons (public reasons) are
  superior to others