NORM Management System

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NORM Management System (Shell Group HSE MS) Gert
Jonkers Engineering Analytical - GSEA/4
Problem Solving (Shell EP Ionising
Radiation/NORM HSE Expert CHP) location Shell
Research Technology Centre, Amsterdam P.O.
38000 NL-1030 BN Amsterdam the Netherlands
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EXPLOIT ALL a priori KNOWLEDGE ON EP NORM
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Effective Radiation Protection Programme IAEA,
Operational Radiation Protection - Safety Guides,
Safety Series 101 1990 IAEA, Recommendations for
the Safe Use and Regulation of Radiation Sources
in Industry, Medicine, Research and Teaching,
Safety Series 102, 1990
Organisation Management committed to Safety
ALARP
Successful Personnel Selection Training
Effective Occupational Radiation Control
Effective Public Radiation Control
Effective Emergency Planning Preparedness
Implementation Quality Assurance

1. Effective Management Structure
2. Clearly Documented Authorities, Responsibilities,
   Job descriptions
3. Adequate resources
4. Commitment to Safety ALARP from all Employees

1. Appropriate Selection Criteria
2. Complete Post-Appointment Training

1. Identification of Potential Sources of Public
   Exposure
2. Adequately Derived and Documented Criteria to
   Limit Public Exposure

1. Identification of Components Requiring Formal
   Quality Assurance
2. Identification of Applicable Standards
3. Adequate Appraisal Regimes

1. Effective Control of Doses and Intakes
2. Adequate Control Standards
3. Effective Surveillance

1. Identification Potential Accident Situations
2. Evaluation Unidentified Accident Situations
3. Preparation Contingency Plans
4. Exercise Contingency Plans
5. Periodic Review Emergency Plans

ad 1) documented qualification requirements for
all levels, minimum age requirements, identified
and documented medical requirements ad 2) formal
review training requirements, documented training
objectives, adequate scope of training programme,
induction training to rectify deficiencies
ad 1) adequate control of source, provision of
physical barriers, provision of administrative
controls ad 2) adequately derived standards,
adequately documented standards, pre-determined
reference and action levels ad 3) adequate
monitoring of workplace, appropriate personal
dosimetry, assessment of results and data of
occupational radiation control
ad 1) adequate control of public doses due to gt
accident situations, gt routine releases, gt
transport of radioactive materials, gt
radioactive waste ad 2) individual and collective
doses
ad 1) equipment / procedure oriented ad 2)
satisfy self-determined / external / national
standards ad 3) defined appraisal committee /
frequency of appraisals / scope of appraisals
ad 1) location, cause ad 2) evaluation of
non-radiological conseq./ hazard /
personnel-at-risk / consequences ad 3) statements
potential situations identifiable hazards,
provision of adequate communicat., recommended
course of action, availability emergency
equipment, notifications outside organisation,
plans for exposed personnel ad 4) degree of
involvement, frequency ad 5) scope/frequency
review
ad 1) adequate corporate/site structure,
seniority safety management, safety independent
of production ad 2) production/safety publish
policies, clear organisation chart ad 3)
production/safety competent staff, adequate
facilities ad 4) training, appraisal ratings
include safety performance
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Evolution of HSE Management Systems
Assurance
Safety
Safety (HSE) Management System
Line Management Focus
Human Error Focus
equipment focus
1970
1980
1990
2000
1960
Past Present
TRENDS Safety engineers / officers
Line management responsibility supported by
safety (HSE) advisers Reaction to
accidents Prevention of accidents Accidents
accepted Accidents can severely erode the
reputation/results of the Company Prescriptive
rules Goal setting rules risk based Safety was
a side issue HSE is a core issue
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HSE Management System Structure
Leadership and Commitment
Policy and Strategic Objectives
Organisation, Responsi-bilities, Resources,
Standards and Documents
Hazards and Effects Management
Corrective Action
Planning and Procedures
FEEDBACK
Monitoring
Implementation
Corrective Action and Improvement
Audit
Corrective Action and Improvement
Management Review
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Leadership Commitment

• Specific requirements for (EP) NORM (draft)
• Company Management shall ensure that extracted
  natural resources (e.g. Oil, Gas, Tar sands,
  Coal) are evaluated on NORM contents and that
  methods to reduce production are considered.
• All persons that can potentially be exposed to
  NORM shall be informed.
• Site owner shall assess the risk of NORM
  contained in feedstock or purchased materials
  based on extracted natural resources and minimize
  the quantities imported.
• Site owner shall check and have an inventory of
  accumulations of NORM in company and contractor
  equipment.
• Management to make sure that a qualified person
  is assigned to advice on dealing with the NORM.
  Accountability for managing NORM rests with site
  management.
• Receivers of products and waste streams from
  contaminated installations shall be made aware of
  the NORM contents.
• Company and contractor organisations maintaining
  or demolishing the installations shall be made
  aware of contaminations and the correct disposal
  route.
• Emergency response plans shall deal with the
  reputation aspects of inadvertent handover or
  disposal of NORM containing product, equipment or
  waste

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Potential Embedment of NORM (IR Protection) Know
How
Company Managing Director/Board
Radiation (NORM) Advisory Committee Chair HSE
Manager Members Managers of NORM-affected
operations (incl. contractors) Company Radiation
Focal Point
External Radiation Protection Advisor
Operations Radiation Focal Point Field/Asset
Radiation Focal Points
Field/Asset HSE advisors (Radiation Protection
Technicians) (HSE critical activities)
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Hazard and Effects Management Process (HEMP)
Are people, environment or assets exposed to
potential harm?
Identify
What are the causes and consequences? How likely
is loss of control? What is the risk and is it
ALARP?
Assess
Can the causes be eliminated? What controls are
needed? How effective are the controls?
Control
Can potential consequences or effects be
mitigated? What recovery measures are needed? Are
recovery capabilities suitable and sufficient?
Recover
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MODES OF (NATURAL) DECAY
222Rn 218Po a
emission of mono-energetic, fast (MeV) He nuclei
214Pb 214Bi b
emission of poly-energetic, fast (keVlt gtMeV)
electrons
hn
234mPa 234Pa g
emission of mono-energetic, penetrative (keVlt
gtMeV) photons
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RADIATION PENETRATION CHARACTERISTICS
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POTENTIAL EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT
Inhalation (Bq/m3) airborne radon contaminates
body (lungs)
Intake (Bq) DCCinh (Sv/Bq) internal dose (Sv)
Ingestion (Bq/L, Bq/g) contaminates body (stomach)
Intake (Bq) DCCing (Bq/Sv) internal dose (Sv)
Irradiation by g-photons from outside the body
Dose rate (mSv/h) / exp. Time (h) external dose
(Sv)
surface dose rate (mSv/h per Bq/cm2) / exp. time
(h) skin dose (Sv)
Contamination (Bq/cm2) of the outside body (skin)
Dose Conversion Coefficient (Bq/Sv, ex ICRP
72) Radionuclide Specific
Sum ? whole body dose (Sv)
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The Bow Tie model
CONSE QUENCE
HAZARD
SCENARIO
TopEvent
CONSE QUENCE
THREAT
RECOVERY PREPAREDNESS MEASURES
CONSE QUENCE
BARRIERS
Control (keep within control limits)
Prepare for emergencies
Objective reduce likelihood (pro-active/preventat
ive)
Objective mitigate consequences and re-instate
(reactive)
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Possible End Consequences from a Top Event
People NORM no acute effects chronic exposure
Environment discharges to air water waste
Reputation
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HSE Commitment and Risk Management
HSE Commitment
Target
tasks responsibilities competencies
procedures
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FROM DOSE TO RISK LEVELS

• Hazard Identification
• NORM exposure within in stochastic (chronic) dose
  regime, i.c. no deterministic (acute) effects
• Epidemiological data shown conclusively that
  ionising radiation can cause cancer in human
  beings.
• Dose-Response Relationship
• Absorbed dose in tissue is the physical
  fundamental quantity, that determines the
  response, NOT the source of radiation
• Estimates stem from special groups exposed well
  above natural levels, like Japanese bomb
  survivors, uranium miners, radium dial painters
• Linear function of dose without a threshold
  (LNT-model UNSCEAR 5 per Sv).
• Exposure Assessment
• Similar for (naturally occurring) radionuclides
  and other hazardous chemicals except that
  external exposure to penetrating radiation is an
  important pathway.
• Risk Characterisation
• Relatively straightforward, and generally focuses
  on fatal cancers as the endpoint of concern
  (LNT-model UNSCEAR 5 per Sv adopted by ICRP).

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Quantified Risk Assessment Levels (QRA)
Fundamental improve-ments needed. Only to be
considered if there are no alternatives and
people are well informed.
Intolerable
Too high, significant effort required to improve.
natural background dose
The ALARP or Tolerable Risk Region (Risk is
tolerated only and risks have to be managed to
ALARP)
High, investigate alternatives
public dose limit
NORM source constraint
Low, consider cost effective alternatives
Broadly acceptable region.
Negligible, maintain normal precautions
practice source constraint
No need for detailed working to demonstrate ALARP
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Operations - External Radiation Hazard
TARGET Minimisation of Exposure to Penetrative
Radiation Emitted by NORM Deposits TIME Minimise
the time spent in proximity of NORM affected
facility parts. DISTANCE Maximise the distance
to NORM affected facility parts. SHIELDING Maximi
se the shielding between personnel and NORM
affected facility parts.
Barriers Separation (Time Distance) Administrati
ve (Training, Warning) Procedural
g
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Maintenance - Internal External Radiation Hazard
TARGET Prevention of Internal Contamination by
Naturally Occurring Radionuclides in Deposits
(NORM) Ingestion Avoid direct skin contact with
LSA deposits. No eating, drinking etc. at the
workplace. Use PPE (e.g. gloves). Inhalation Avoi
d dust generating operations. Use PPE (e.g.
respiratory protection). External Time
(Distance/Shielding) applies as well.
j
b
a
a
b
Barriers Separation (Time Distance) Administrati
ve (Training, Warning) Procedural Repressive
(ventilation, dust filtration)
a
b
g
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ABANDONMENT - Internal External Radiation Hazard
TARGET Reducing both External and Internal Dose
by Naturally Occurring Radionuclides in Deposits
(NORM ) from former Gas/Oil Production Activities
to an Acceptable Level for Future Inhabitants
Ingestion Determine amount of radioactivity
entering food chain. Inhalation Potential
(topsoil) dust activity levels extremely
low. External (Sub)soil activity levels
sufficient low.
Barriers Administrative (Training,
Warning) Procedural Preventative (area cover,
collection) Repressive (ventilation, dust
filtration) Recovery Preparedness Curative
(cleanup, remediation) Compensatory
a
b
g
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Review Corrective Actions
Dose records and/or dose assessments, NORM
surveys, NORM analysis results, NORM production
(notification licensing?) should be reviewed
regularly by the Radiation Advisory Committee
defining Corrective Actions for Improvement
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SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO PROTECTION AGAINST NORM
OPERATIONS NORM (external/contamination)
radiation survey dose readings gt 0.5
mSv/h NORM contaminated or contamination readings
gt 50 ? bg signpost areas 0.1 mSv/h lt
dose readings lt 0.5 mSv/h NORM suspect or 5 ? bg
lt contamination readings lt 50 ? bg dose
readings lt 0.1 mSv/h no NORM restrictions and
contamination readings lt 5 ? bg
MAINTENANCE NORM (external/contamination)
readings ad hoc NORM contaminated take external
and contamination readings for open
tanks/vessels, working hours, asses dose, Waste
Storage NORM suspect take external
and contamination readings for open
tanks/vessels, record working times, take
representative sample Analyse for
final classification of waste normal / NORM
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Risk of Radiation Doses Compare with Natural
Background Dose