Protection and Security

1
Protection and Security

• Sarah Diesburg
• Operating Systems
• COP 4610

2
Definitions

• Security policy of authorizing accesses
• Prevents intentional misuses of a system
• Protection the actual mechanisms implemented to
  enforce the specialized policy
• Prevents either accidental or intentional misuses

3
Security Goals

• Data confidentiality secret data remains secret
• Data integrity unauthorized users should not be
  able to modify data
• System availability nobody can make a system
  unusable

4
Security Components

• Authentication determines who the user is
• Authorization determines who is allowed to do
  what
• Enforcement makes it so people can do only what
  they are allowed to do

5
Authentication

• The most common approach passwords
• If I know the secret, the machine can assume that
  Im the user
• Problems
• 1. Password storage
• 2. Poor passwords

6
Password Storage

• Encryption
• Uses a key to transform the data
• Difficult to reverse without the key
• UNIX stores encrypted passwords in /etc/passwd
• Uses one-way transformations
• Encrypts a typed password and compares encrypted
  passwords

7
Poor Passwords

• Short passwords
• Easy to crack
• Long passwords
• Tend to be written down somewhere

8
Original UNIX

• Required only lower-case, 5-lettered passwords
• 265 or 1 million combinations
• In 1975, it would take one day to crack one
  password
• Today, we can go through all those combinations lt
  1 second

9
Partial Solutions

• Extend password with a unique number
• Require more complex passwords
• 6 letters of upper, lower cases, numbers, and
  special characters
• 706 or 100 billion combinations
• Unfortunately, people still pick common words

10
Partial Solutions

• Delay every login by 1 second
• Assign very long passwords
• Give everyone a password calculator (credit card)
• Requires a physical theft to steal the password

11
Authentication in Distributed Systems

• Private key encryption of data
• Encrypt(Key, Plaintext) Cipher text
• Decrypt(Key, Cipher text) Plaintext
• Hard to reverse without the key
• With the plaintext and the cipher text, one
  cannot derive the key
• Provides secrecy and authentication, as long as
  the key stays secret

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How to distribute the keys?

• Authentication server
• Keeps a list of keys

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Kerberos Protocol

• Keyxy is needed to talk between x and y

Server S
Client B
Client A
KeyBS
KeyAS
14
Kerberos Protocol

• Keyxy is needed to talk between x and y

Server S
Client B
Client A
KeyBS
KeyAS
15
Kerberos Protocol

• Keyxy is needed to talk between x and y

Server S
Client B
Client A
KeyBS
KeyAS
16
Additional Details

• Expiration timestamp for a key
• Prevents a machine from replaying messages (e.g.,
  deposit 100)
• Checksum for an encrypted message
• Prevents modifications to a message (e.g.,
  deposit 1000)
• KeyAS and KeyBS are renewed periodically to
  reduce their exposures

17
Public Key Encryption

• Separates authentication from secrecy
• Involves a public key and private key
• Encrypt(Keypublic, plaintext) cipher text
• Decrypt(Keyprivate, cipher text) plaintext
• Encrypt(Keyprivate, plaintext) cipher text
• Decrypt(Keypublic, cipher text) plaintext

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Public Key Encryption

• Idea
• Private key is kept secret
• Public key is advertised

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Public Key Encryption

• Encrypt(Keymy_public, Hi, Sarah)
• Anyone can create it, but only I can read it
  (secrecy)
• Encrypt(Keymy_private, Im Sarah)
• Everyone can read it, but only I can create it
  (authentication)

20
Public Key Encryption

• Encrypt(Keyyour_public, Encrypt(Keymy_private,
  
• I know your secret))
• Only I can create it, and only you can read it

21
Authorization

• Access matrix describes who can do what
• -The matrix tends to be sparse

File 1 Lisas diary File3
Bart read,write read
Lisa read, write
Maggie
22
Access Control List

• Stores all permissions for all users with each
  object
• Analogy a guard in front of a door
• Checks for a list of people allowed to enter
• UNIX permission of each file is specified
  according to its owner, group, and the world

23
Capability List

• Stores all objects a process can touch
• Analogy Keys
• A key owner has the right of entry
• Example page tables
• Each process has a list of pages that it can
  access

24
Access Control List vs. Capability List

• Access control list (commonly used)
• Easy to know who can access the object
• Hard to know which objects a user can access
• Capability list
• A user knows the list of objects to access
• Hard to know who can access an object
• More difficult to revoke capabilities

25
Enforcement

• Enforcer programs check passwords, access control
  lists, and so on
• In UNIX, enforcers are run as superuser
• If there is a bug, you are hosed!

26
The State of the World in Security

• Authentication
• Poor passwords
• Nobody encrypts emails
• Authorization
• Coarse-grained access control list
• Often turned off for sharing
• Enforcement
• Buggy operating systems

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Classes of Security Problems

• Eavesdropping is the listener approach
• Tap into the Ethernet and see everything
• Countermeasure pressurized cabled
• Abuse of privilege
• If the superuser is evil, there is nothing you
  can do

28
Classes of Security Problems

• Imposter breaks into the system by pretending to
  be someone else
• Recorded voice and facial image
• Countermeasure behavioral monitoring to look
  for suspicious activities
• Overwriting the boot block

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Classes of Security Problems

• A Trojan horse is a seemingly innocent program
  that performs an unexpected function
• Countermeasure integrity checking
• Periodically, check binaries against their
  checksums

30
Classes of Security Problems

• Salami attack builds up an attack, one-bit at a
  time
• Example send partial pennies to a bank account
• Countermeasure code reviews

31
Classes of Security Problems

• Logic bombs a programmer may secretly insert a
  piece of code into the production system
• A programmer feeds the system password
  periodically
• If the programmer is fired, the logic bomb goes
  off
• Countermeasure code reviews

32
Classes of Security Problems

• Denial-of-service attacks aim to reduce system
  availability
• A handful of machines can flood a victim machine
  to disrupt its normal use
• Countermeasure open

33
Pentagon Traffic Analysis

• Before the 1991 Persian Gulf War
• Foreign intelligence tried to predict the
  starting date of the war

34
Pentagon Traffic Analysis

• So much for the element of surprise

35
Tenex

• Used to be the most popular system at
  universities before UNIX
• Thought to be very secure

36
Tenex

• Source code for the password check
• for (j 0 j lt 8 j)
• if (inputj ! pwj)
• // go to error
• Need to go through 2568 combinations

37
Tenex

• Unfortunately, Tenex used virtual memory
• A fast password check means that the first
  character is wrong (error)
• A slow check means that the first character is
  correct (page fault)

password
in memory
on disk
38
Tenex

• 2568 checks to crack a password is reduced down
  to 256 8 checks

39
The Internet Worm

• In 1988, a Cornell graduate student, RTM,
  released a worm into the Internet
• The worm used three attacks
• rsh
• fingerd
• sendmail

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The Internet Worm

• Some machines trust other machines, the use of
  rsh was sufficient to get into a remote machine
  without authentication

41
The Internet Worm

• finger command did not check the input buffer
  size
• finger name_at_location
• Overflow the buffer
• Overwrite the return address of a procedure
• Jump and execute a shell (under root privilege)

42
The Internet Worm

• sendmail allowed the worm to mail a copy of the
  code and get it executed
• The worm was caught due to multiple infections
• People noticed the high CPU load