Operational Risk Management - The Air Force Way

1
Operational Risk Management - The Air Force Way
Headquarters Air Force Safety Center Lt Col Denny
Peeples Ms. Karen Kinkle
2
Who, Why , What ?

• Who
• Denny F-15, 10 yrs safety experience, CSP
• Karen ORM manager for USAF
• Why are we here ?
• MG McFann believes in Military / Civilian cross
  talk
• Lessons learned for both take something home
• What are we going to cover ?
• Background
• How does the AF teach / use ORM ?
• How can you integrate ORM into your organization
  ?

3
Rules of Engagement

• Call us Denny or Peeps and Karen
• Lots of material, 5 day class, in 90 minutes but
  
• Ask questions as we go along
• We will answer them directly, quickly or
• Well follow-up with emails, calls
• Exchange our increase mission effectiveness for
  your civilian world make more, save more money
• Make sure you leave with handouts, cards,
  websites
• Call , email us with follow-ups, well do same
• The question left UNASKED is the dumb question

4
Background info on AF Safety

• 1947 USAF started from US Army Air Corps of WWII
• Traditionally more people killed in training than
  war, recently off duty vs. on duty
• Grouped into flight, ground, weapons
• s have generally plateaued the past decade
• Sec Def Rumsfield initiative to reduce mishaps by
  50 in two years

5
Air Force mishap rate history
6
Wheres your office ? What is your risk ?
7
Note to Peeps slide

• 8/6/04 Update the following 2 slides with the
  latest information prior to NSC 9/13/04

8
ORM at home 101 Critical Days Fatality Summary
Week 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15
Total Fatals 19 65
PMV
Through Current Week
FY 04 to Date
MC
PMV
2004
MC
PMV
MC
MC
PMV
PMV

PMV
MC
MC
PMV
PMV
S/R
MC
MC
PMV
PMV
PMV
Total Fatals 21 63
S/R
2003
FY 03 thru 4 Aug 03
PMV
PMV
Through Current Week
MC
S/R
PMV
PMV
PMV
PMV
MC
MC
MC
MC
MC
MC
MC
PMV
MC
PMV
PMV
MC
MC
ON
PMV
PMV
PMV
PMV
MC
MC
PMV
MC
PMV
MC
PMV
PMV
Total Fatals 19
78
PMV
PMV
Through Current Week
FY 02 thru 4 Aug 02
2002
PMV
MC
PMV
PMV
MC
PMV
MC
PMV
S/R
ON
MC
PMV
PMV
MC
PMV
S/R
MC
PMV
PMV
S/R
PMV
PMV
S/R
ON
PMV
MC
On-Duty
ON
Off-Duty
Alcohol
Vehicle
Motorcycle
Sports/Rec
Misc.
MC
S/R
PMV
As of 4 Aug 04
9
Our biggest Threat .
10
Lost Workday Injury Rates USAF vs Alcoa
USAF data as of 4 Aug 04 ALCOA data as of 4 Aug
04
LWI Rate/100 employees
FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04
MIL 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.12
Civ 0.92 0.83 0.80 0.91 0.74 0.74 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.59 0.50 0.38 0.31 0.33
USAF 0.41 0.35 0.31 0.35 0.29 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.18
ALCOA 0.99 0.81 0.77 0.75 0.46 0.49 0.46 0.36 0.23 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.07
USAF mil civ injuries are on-duty, ground only
(aviation excluded).2002 includes USAF
occupational illness data
UNCLASSIFIED
11
Overview

• What is ORM? Why ORM?
• ORM - The Key Principles
• How the USAF teaches ORM The 6-step process
• USAF ORM Maturation
• How to integrate ORM into your company
• ORM Process example

12
What is ORM ?
ORM The Air Forces six-stepdecision-making
processwith specific tools designed
tosystematically identifyrisks and benefitsand
determine the best course of actionfor any
given situation
Fundamental GoalEnhance mission effectiveness
by optimizing risk
13
What is ORM?(Informal Definition)

• Simply applying common sense on- and off-duty
• Dont Do Stupid Things!
• Rubber Meets the Road Language
• What can go wrong?
• How bad can it be?
• What can we do about it?

14
Achieving the Goal . . .
Requires A Cultural Shift

• Traditional Safety
• Reactive
• Evaluates compliance
• Focuses on performance
• Inspections/evaluations

• Risk Management
• Proactive
• Evaluates risk
• Focuses on mission
• Everyone involved

15
What are the goals of ORM ?

• Enhance mission effectiveness at all levels.
• Integrate ORM into mission processes.
• Create an Air Force in which every leader,
  airman, and employee is trained and motivated to
  manage risk in all their on- and off-duty
  activities.
• Identify opportunities to increase USAF
  warfighting effectiveness.

16
MISHAP RATE VS ANNUAL COSTCLASS A FLIGHT
ONLY(Why do we need ORM?)
17
Why ORM - Know The Threats
The Safety Pyramid
1 Fatality
30 Lost-Time Injuries
300 Recordable Injuries
1,000 to 1
30,000 Near Misses
300,000 At-Risk Behaviors
18
KC-135 Overpressurization(Tinker AFB - Depot)
19
Note Where Aft Hatch Landed
20
Overview

• What is ORM?, Why ORM?
• ORM - The Key Principles
• How the AF teaches ORM The 6-step process
• USAF ORM Maturation
• How to integrate ORM into your company
• ORM Process example

21
4, (no 5) Key ORM Principles

• 1. Accept no unnecessary risks.
• 2. Make risk decisions at the appropriate level.
• 3. Accept risks when benefits outweigh costs.
• Integrate ORM into planning, operations and
  education at all levels.
• Make it second nature, on duty and off

22
Overview

• What is ORM?, Why ORM?
• ORM - The Key Principles
• How the AF teaches ORM The 6-step process
• USAF ORM Maturation
• How to integrate ORM into your company
• ORM Process example

23
Man your cheat sheet !!!
AF ORM Cheat Sheet
1
6
2
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Ms Karen Kinkle 505 246 1386
karen.kinkle_at_kirtland.af.mil Lt Col Denny Peeples
505 246 0714 denny.peeples_at_kirtland.af.mil
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HAZARD SEVERITY CATEGORIES I
Catastrophic - Complete mission failure, death,
or system loss. II Critical - Major mission
impact, severe injury, or major system
damage. III Moderate - Minor mission impact,
injury, or system damage. IV Negligible - Little
mission impact, injury, or damage.
HAZARD PROBABILITY CATEGORIES A Frequent -
Item occurs often. Fleet continuous.
Individual occurs often. All
continuous. B Likely - Item occurs
several times. Fleet frequently.
Individual occurs several times. All
frequently. C Occasional - Item will occur.
Fleet several times.
Individual will occur. All sporadic. D Seldom
- Item could occur. Fleet will occur.
Individual could occur.
All seldom. E Unlikely - Item will not
occur. Fleet could occur.
Individual will not occur. All very rarely.
Event Probability
Frequent
Likely
Occasional
Seldom
Unlikely
A
B
C
D
E
6
12
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SEVERITY
I
Catastrophic
4
7
11
15
II
Critical
10
14
9
16
5
III
Moderate
17
18
19
20
13
IV
Negligible
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The ORM 6-Step Process
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Step 1 Identify the Hazards
Process Emphasize hazard ID tools. Adds rigor
and early detection. Output Significant
improvement in the detection of hazards (50) .
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Step 1 Identify the Hazards

• Operation/task analysis provides basis for
  systematic approach
• Sequence of events
• Hazards identified in each step

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Step 1 Identify the Hazards

• Hazard - Any real or potential condition that can
  cause mission degradation, injury, illness, or
  death to personnel or damage to or loss of
  equipment or property
• Hazard ID tools Over 25 Available
• What-Ifs, Scenarios, 5Ms, etc
• Early detection leads to significant
  improvement

What Bad Things Can Happen?
28
Identify the Hazard, all the Hazards
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Dont Jockey Throttles With Engines Running
30
Flight 357, Now Arriving at Gate 114
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Step 2 Assess the Risks

• Process All hazards evaluated for mission or
  activity impact. Root causes determined and risk
  levels assigned.
• Output Personnel know the priority risk issues
  of the organization and of their function.

32
Assess the Risk

• Associates hazards with level of risk

33
What is the worse alternative ?Can you accept
the risk ?
34
What is the worse alternative ?Can you accept
the risk ?
35
Step 3 Analyze Control Measures

• Process Comprehensive risk control options
  developed on a worst-first basis.
• Output A full range of cost effective, mission
  supportive, risk controls for the decision-maker.

36
Macro Options
Step 3 Analyze Control Measures

• Reject Risk outweighs the benefit, so dont do
  it
• Avoid Go Around the Risk/Do it a Different
  Way
• Delay New technology/need may no longer exist
• Transfer UAV/contract the operation
• Spread Make a bigger target/reduce exposure
• Compensate Create redundancies
• Reduce Use the control options matrix
• to suggest reduce options

37
Step 3 Analyze Control Measures
Action 1 Identify Control Options
Action 3 Prioritize Risk Control Measures
Action 2 Determine Control Effects
38
Note Position of Jack Pads
39
Just Missed a Parked Jet
40
Step 4 Make Control Decisions

• Process Gets risk decisions to the right person,
  at the right time, with the right support.
• Output Personnel know their decision-making
  authority and limitations.

41
Step 4 Make Control Decisions
42
KC -10 Towing Accident
43
OOPS! That Isnt Gonna Buff Out
44
Step 5 Implement Risk Controls

• Process Leaders lead, operators involved,
  accountability known.
• Output Controls approved by decision-maker are
  implemented.

45
Step 5 Implement Risk Controls
Action 1 Make Implementation Clear
Action 3 Provide Support
Action 2 Establish Accountability
46
Is your risk control effective ?
47
Step 6 Supervise and Review

• Process Measures mission effectiveness and
  direct indicators of risk.
• Output Real time status. Proactive, not
  reactive.

48
Step 6 Supervise and Review
49
Review Measures to Avoid This!
Example of Aircraft Foreign Objects Found
during periodic inspections
50
In the end have an honest assessment
51
Using the 6-Step Process THE RISK MANAGEMENT
CONTINUUM
52
Using the 6-Step Process LEVELS OF EFFORT
53
F-15 Fuel Purge Requirements

• AF required fuel purge during certain F-15
  maintenance
• ORM assessment revealed
• Airflow required for worker evacuates fuel
  vapors
• Residual atmosphere too lean for explosion
• Results
• Eliminated fuel purge requirement
• Significant cost savings
• AF-wide applicability--potentially other systems
  too
• Previously Depot work may be done locally

54
Do you practice RM at home ?
55
Overview

• What is ORM?, Why ORM?
• ORM - The Key Principles
• How the AF teaches ORM The 6-step process
• USAF ORM Maturation
• How to integrate ORM into your company
• ORM Process example

56
USAF ORM Maturation

• USAF Approach, Vision
• Background
• Strategy
• The leaders role will be a decisive factor in
  the success or failure of ORM

57
USAF Approach

• Top-Down Approach
• Strong Senior Leader Backing
• Decentralized Implementation
• Moderate Implementation Tempo
• Safety Lead Role for Cross-Functional
  Implementation

58
Vision

• Macro Every Leader, Airman, Employee Manages
  Risk in All They Do... On- Off-Duty
• Micro
• On-Duty - Every Organization Manages
  Normal Operational Risk Profile
• - Unique Operations Identified
  Assessed
• Off-Duty - Every Individual Applies Risk
  Management Process to Activities

59
Background

• CSAF Formally Approved ORM Implementation,
• 2 Sep 96
• AFI 91-213, Operational Risk Management Program
  (ORM), 1 Nov 96
• Initial Implementation Plan
• CSAF Memo, 1 Jul 97
• ORM Moved From 91 Series (Safety) to 90 Series
  (Command Policy), Apr 00

60
Strategy

• Education and Training
• Tools and Information
• Continuously improve ORM support
• Synthesize into loss control functions
• Integrate into all USAF operations - -
• on- and off-duty
• Provide Oversight and Sustainment

61
ORM Strategy Education and Training

• Short Term
• Executive Level - Senior Leaders
• Applications Integration - Focal
  Points/Planners
• Essentials - Mid-level Managers/Supervisors
• Fundamentals - Working Level
• Introduction - All
• (Available at http//afsafety.af.mil)
• Long Term
• Institutionalized into all Training Education

62
AF Risk Management CBT

http//afsafety.af.mil/AFSC/RDBMS/Training/SEME_h
ome.htm
63
Overview

• What is ORM?, Why ORM?
• ORM - The Key Principles
• How the AF teaches ORM The 6-step process
• USAF ORM Maturation
• How to integrate ORM into your company
• ORM Process example

64
Its Just Common Sense Why Do We Need ORM?

• You know what you're doing, its what you've been
  trained to do your whole life.
• You've carefully thought out all the angles.
• You've done it a thousand times.
• It comes naturally to you.
• Nothing could possibly go wrong right?

65
Think Again!
66
Roadblocks during integration Culture of
Assumptions?

• Potential Individual Assumptions
• Actions Briefed Actions Accomplished
• Missions Executed as Planned
• Issued Equipment is Suitable for Mission
• Supervisors Know all the Facts
• Potential Corporate Assumptions
• Requirements are Valid and Resources are
  Sufficient
• Individuals are Appropriately Trained
• Information Flow is Adequate
• Procedures Work and are Followed
• Lower Level Supervisors are Effectively
  Managing
• Individuals Will Speak Up

67
ORM Integration
68
Integrating the ORM Process

• Why integration is critical?
• 12 Strategies for ORM integration.
• The importance of pace.

69
Why Integration is Critical ?

• Integration
• Forces balancing of loss control and other
  mission needs
• Captures more of the knowledge and experience of
  large numbers of operators
• Reduces the number and diversity of references
  needed to do the job right
• Eliminates redundancy and gaps between loss
  control functions
• Strengthens accountability
• Reduces costs and workloads (in plans, materiel
  development cycles, etc.)

70
The Twelve Strategies for Integration into your
Company

• Accountability
• Teaming
• Partnership
• Integrate in Training
• Risk Decision Points
• Organization Policy Structure

• Employee Activities
• Process Integration
• Direct Change
• Gain a Champion
• Integrate in Strategic Planning
• Integrate into Measurement

71
The Importance of Pace

• Dont use the shotgun
• Dont get out in front of the organization - too
  far
• Dont inspect-in ORM
• Do focus on targets
• Do expect crawl, walk, run
• Patience, patience, patience

72
The Way Ahead

• Make ORM a Core Competency for all Air Force
  personnel
• Meet the Challenges
• Cell Phonesdistractions
• Generation X - The Risk Takers

73
Who-would-a-thunk ?(Policeman on a cell phone)
74
Questions/Comments
Its time to move forward in making ORM
the natural way for our people to conduct their
professional and personal activities. --General
John P. Jumper, Chief of Staff
75
Note to Peeps slide

• 8/12/04
• See how the time and questions and answers go
  with the previous slides
• Present the JSAT process brief as an advanced
  example of Step 2, Assess the risk, in the 6 step
  ORM model

76
Overview

• What is ORM?, Why ORM?
• ORM - The Key Principles
• How the AF teaches ORM The 6-step process
• USAF ORM Maturation
• How to integrate ORM into your company
• ORM Process example

77
Joint Services Analysis Team Process Example
Maj Bob Baker Col Donald Pitts
78
SECDEF Challenge

• SECDEF Memo Dated 19 May 03
• Cut number of mishaps accident rates 50
• Accomplish 50 goal in next two years
• DoD wide effort managed by USD (PR)
• Defense Safety Oversight Council (DSOC)

79
ORM Steps In A Nutshell

• Identify Hazards
• Analysis, What-Ifs, Scenarios, 5Ms
• Assess Risks
• Severity and Probability
• Analyze Control Measures
• Avoid, Delay, Transfer, Spread, Compensate,
  Reduce
• Make Control Decisions
• Accept, Reject, Modify, Elevate
• Implement Controls
• Clear, Accountability, Support
• Supervise and Review
• Effective, Feedback

80
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• Step 1 Individually review the mishap

81
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• Step 2 Identify the hazards or, in other words,
  what happened that was hazardous
• Hazard Any real or potential condition that can
  cause mission degradation, injury, illness, or
  death to personnel or damage to or loss of
  equipment or property.

82
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• Step 2 Identify the hazards or, in other words,
  what happened that was hazardous

83
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• Step 2 Identify the hazards or, in other words,
  what happened that was hazardous
• Solely watching wingman for spatial orientation
  (man)
• Solely relying on aural warnings for altitude
  reference (man)
• Commencing maneuvering near the floor / hard deck
  (man)
• Tactical maneuvering in degraded / limited visual
  conditions (media)
• Too complex a mission after a long layoff
  (mission)
• Failure to identify and correct weaknesses in
  performance among aircrew (management)

84
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• Step 3 Assign a Power (P1) and Applicability (A)
  value to each hazard (discuss as group but assign
  own, will average)
• P1 Hazard Importance Rated 0-6
• 0 - No Influence 3 - Moderate
  Influence 6 - Completely Influential
• 1 - Little Influence 4 - Quite
  Influential
• 2 - Slight Influence 5 - Highly
  Influential
• Hazard
• Solely relying on aural warnings for altitude
  reference (man)

85
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• Step 3 Assign a Power (P1) and Applicability (A)
  value to each hazard (discuss as group but assign
  own, will average)
• P1 Hazard Importance Rated 0-6
• 0 - No Influence 3 - Moderate
  Influence 6 - Completely Influential
• 1 - Little Influence 4 - Quite
  Influential
• 2 - Slight Influence 5 - Highly
  Influential
• Hazard
• Solely relying on aural warnings for altitude
  reference (man)
• P1 6

86
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• Step 3 Assign a Power (P1) and Applicability (A)
  value to each hazard (discuss as group but assign
  own, will average)
• P1 Hazard Importance Rated 0-6
• 0 - No Influence 3 - Moderate
  Influence 6 - Completely Influential
• 1 - Little Influence 4 - Quite
  Influential
• 2 - Slight Influence 5 - Highly
  Influential
• P1 6
• Applicability based on Risk Assessment Matrix
• Using professional judgment (absent historical
  data) how applicable will this hazard be in
  future mishaps without mitigation

87
Risk Assessment Matrix
Probability
Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable
Catastrophic 6.0 5.7 5.1 4.8 3.9
Critical 5.4 4.2 3.3 2.7 2.1
Marginal 4.5 3.0 1.8 1.5 0.9
Negligible 3.6 2.4 1.2 0.6 0.0
Severity
Values here are used to help score hazards
Table derived from DoDI 6055.1 E7, Mil-Std 882,
and Joint MTTP on Risk Management
88
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• Mishap severity categories
• CATASTROPHIC - Complete mission failure, death,
  or loss of system
• CRITICAL - Major mission degradation, severe
  injury, occupational illness, or major system
  damage
• MARGINAL - Minor mission degradation, injury,
  minor occupational illness, or minor system
  damage
• NEGLIGIBLE - Less than minor mission degradation,
  injury, occupational illness or minor system
  damage

89
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• Mishap probability categories
• FREQUENT
• Individual item - Occurs often in the life of the
  system
• Fleet or inventory - Continuously experienced
• Individual Airman - Occurs often in career
• All Airmen exposed - continuously experienced
• PROBABLE
• Individual item - Occurs several times in the
  life of the system
• Fleet or Inventory - Occurs often
• Individual Airman - Occurs several times in a
  career
• All Airmen exposed - Occurs often
• OCCASIONAL
• Individual item - Will occur in the life of the
  system
• Fleet or Inventory - Occurs several times in the
  life of the system
• Individual Airman - Will occur in a career
• All Airmen exposed - Occurs sporadically

90
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• Mishap probability categories
• REMOTE
• Individual item - Could occur in the life of the
  system.
• Fleet or Inventory - Can be expected to occur in
  the life of the system.
• Individual Airman - Could occur in a career.
• All Airmen exposed - Seldom occurs.
• IMPROBABLE
• Individual item - So unlikely you can assume it
  will not occur in the life of the system.
• Fleet or Inventory - Unlikely but could occur in
  the life of the system.
• Individual Airman - So unlikely you can assume it
  will not occur in a career.
• All Airmen exposed - Occurs very rarely.

91
Risk Assessment Matrix
Probability
Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable
Catastrophic 6.0 5.7 5.1 4.8 3.9
Critical 5.4 4.2 3.3 2.7 2.1
Marginal 4.5 3.0 1.8 1.5 0.9
Negligible 3.6 2.4 1.2 0.6 0.0
Severity
92
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• Step 3 Assign a Power (P1) and Applicability (A)
  value to each hazard (discuss as group but assign
  own, will average)
• P1 Hazard Importance Rated 0-6
• 0 - No Influence 3 - Moderate
  Influence 6 - Completely Influential
• 1 - Little Influence 4 - Quite
  Influential
• 2 - Slight Influence 5 - Highly
  Influential
• P1 6
• Applicability based on Risk Assessment Matrix
• A 5.2

93
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• Step 4 Assign / develop a control measure for
  each hazard considering the control measure
  options
• Note There may be multiple control measures for
  each hazard
• Hazard
• Solely relying on aural warnings for altitude
  reference (man)

94
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• Step 4 Assign / develop a control measure for
  each hazard considering the control measure
  options
• Note There may be multiple control measures for
  each hazard
• Hazard
• Solely relying on aural warnings for altitude
  reference (man)
• Control measure
• Allow PGCAS to get pilot attention in another way
  such as a stick
• bump

95
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• Step 5 Assign a Power (P2) and Confidence (C)
  value to each control measure (discuss as group
  but assign own, will average)
• P2 Control measures ability to mitigate hazard
  Rated 0-6
• 0 - No ability 3 - Moderate
  ability 6 - Completely able
• 1 - Little ability 4 - Quite able
• 2 - Slight ability 5 - Highly able
• C Confidence that implementation measure will
  perform as expected Rated 0-6
• 0 - No Confidence 3 - Moderate
  Confidence 6 - Completely Confident
• 1 - Little Confidence 4 - Quite Confident
  
• 2 - Slight Confidence 5 - Highly Confident

96
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• Step 5 Assign a Power (P2) and Confidence (C)
  value to each control measure (discuss as group
  but assign own, will average)
• P2 Control measures ability to mitigate hazard
  Rated 0-6
• 0 - No ability 3 - Moderate
  ability 6 - Completely able
• 1 - Little ability 4 - Quite able
• 2 - Slight ability 5 - Highly able
• P2 5.5
• C Confidence that implementation measure will
  perform as expected Rated 0-6
• 0 - No Confidence 3 - Moderate
  Confidence 6 - Completely Confident
• 1 - Little Confidence 4 - Quite Confident
  
• 2 - Slight Confidence 5 - Highly Confident
• C 4.2

97
CFIT JSAT ProcessControlled Flight Into Terrain
Joint Service Analysis Team

• What we do with the numbers
• Results of example
• P1 6, A 5.4, P2 5.5, C 4.2
• Power 5.7 Overall Effectiveness 3.6
• Results evaluated, sorted and sent to JSIT for
  further evaluation

98
This is what we strive to avoidQuestions ??
99
Operational Risk Management - The Air Force Way
Headquarters Air Force Safety Center Lt Col Denny
Peeples Ms. Karen Kinkle