Demographic Radicalization

1
Demographic Radicalization

• The Religiosity-Fertility Nexus and Politics

2
Demographic Radicalization

• The demographic increase of the conservative
  religious population at the expense of moderate
  or secular groups
• Why radical? Enlarges the pool of suppliers of,
  or recruits to, religious violence unless
  totally quietist (ie Amish)
• May alter alliance behaviour and foreign policy

3
Demography and Ethnic Conflict Northern Ireland

• "The basic fear of Protestants in Northern
  Ireland is that they will be outbred by the Roman
  Catholics. It is as simple as that." - Terence
  O Neill, Unionist PM of Northern Ireland after
  resigning, 1969

4
Religious Demographic Advantage
Fertility Gap, Women Aged 40-60 (Children Ever Born) in GSS 1972-2006 Fertility Gap, Women Aged 40-60 (Children Ever Born) in GSS 1972-2006 Fertility Gap, Women Aged 40-60 (Children Ever Born) in GSS 1972-2006 Fertility Gap, Women Aged 40-60 (Children Ever Born) in GSS 1972-2006
  Biblical Literalist Homosexuality Abortion
1972-85 1.15 1.11 1.22
1986-96 1.21 1.16 1.28
1997-2006 1.25 1.21 1.38

• USA religious restructuring more intense have
  higher fertility (Hackett 2008)
• Europe Religious have stable or increasing
  fertility advantage (Adsera 2004 Regnier-Loilier
  2008, etc)
• Conservative Muslim and Christian immigration to
  Europe

5
Source The Moment of Truth, Haaretz, 8
February 2007
6
Israel Ultra-Orthodox Jewish Growth

• TFR of 6.49 in 1980-82 increasing to 7.61 in
  1990-96 Other Israeli Jews decline 2.61 to 2.27
• Proportion set to more than double, to 17 by
  2020
• No indication of major outflows
• Majority of Israeli Jews after 2050?

7

• UK A Tale of Two Cities Salford v Leeds
• US
• American Jews have TFR of 1.43. In 2000-6 alone,
  Haredim increase from 7.2 to 9.4 pc of total.
• Kiryas Joel, in Orange Co., New York, nearly
  triples in population to 18000 between 1990 and
  2006

8
Decline of Liberal Protestants
9
Source WVS 1999-2000. N 2796 respondents in
towns under 10,000 and 1561 respondents in cities
over 100,000. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.
10
European Islam A Reflection of Things to Come?
Source Westoff and Frejka 2007
11
Religion and Extremist Politics

• Amish or jihadis?
• Israel
• Haredi quietism and pragmatism
• Growing split between Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv
• Haredi settlers/battalions, religious zionism,
  Yigal Amir

12
USA

• Mainly individualistic and focused on domestic
  policy
• Support Republican Party
• Christian Zionism
• Messianic foreign policy (rapture, end times)
• Anti-abortion violence
• From quietism to activism

13
Muslim World

• Most are quietist
• No connection between orthodoxy and violence in
  surveys
• Yet religion is least quietist
• Jihadism and Saudi-funded pan-Islamism
• Ambiguity of caliphatist groups like
  Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Salafis
• Violent element is a minority, is selective and
  reactive, but a small slice of a growing pie will
  enlarge pool of suppliers
• All jihadis are fundamentalist, though recruits
  may be religiously illiterate

14
A More Violent World?

• Rise in religious civil wars as proportion of
  total
• Only a quarter are intra-faith, 9/10 Islamic
• More conservative religious societies will
  probably produce more religious-type violence,
  less secular violence
• Conflict sacralized, harder to reach settlements
  and agree common interests