NERC Blackout Recommendations - A Focus on Transmission Planning -

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NERC Blackout Recommendations- A Focus on
Transmission Planning -

• Brian F. Thumm, P.E.
• Supervisor Transmission Planning
• Entergy Transmission Planning Summit
• July 8, 2004

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On August 14, 2003

• over 50 million people, in 8 states and two
  Canadian provinces, were directly affected by a
  cascading failure of the transmission grid
• a blackout, in which nearly 65,000 MW of load
  was interrupted.
• On August 15, 2003, President George W. Bush and
  Prime-Minister Jean Chrétien established a joint
  U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force.
• Investigate the causes
• Reduce the possibility of future outages
• NERC commissioned an independent study of the
  Blackout.

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NERC Investigation Conclusions

• Entities violated NERC operating policies and
  planning standards
• Existing process for monitoring and ensuring
  compliance with NERC and regional reliability
  standards inadequate
• Reliability coordinators and control areas
  adopted differing interpretations of functions,
  responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities
• Problems identified in studies of prior blackouts
  repeated
• Vegetation management
• Operator training
• Tools to help operators properly visualize system
  conditions.

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NERC Investigation Conclusions

• Data used to model loads and generators
  inaccurate
• Lack of verification with actual system data and
  field-testing
• Planning studies, design assumptions, and
  facilities ratings not consistently shared / not
  subject to adequate peer review
• Available system protection technologies not
  consistently applied to optimize the ability to
  slow or stop an uncontrolled cascading failure
• Communications between system operators were not
  effective

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NERC Resolutions

• Receive specific information on all violations of
  NERC standards, including the identities of the
  parties involved
• Take firm actions to improve compliance with NERC
  reliability standards
• Provide greater transparency to violations of
  standards, while respecting the confidential
  nature of information and need for a fair and
  deliberate due process
• Inform and work closely with the Federal Energy
  Regulatory Commission and other applicable
  federal, state, and provincial regulatory
  authorities in the United States, Canada, and
  Mexico as needed to ensure public interests are
  met with respect to compliance with reliability
  standards.

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Blackout Recommendations

• NERC Board of Trustees approved 14
  recommendations
• near term actions actions that FirstEnergy,
  PJM, and MISO must take to remedy deficiencies
  before this summer (Recommendation 1)
• strategic initiatives actions to strengthen
  compliance with existing reliability standards
  and to track the implementation of
  recommendations from this and other outage
  investigations (Recommendations 2-5)
• technical initiatives actions to prevent or
  mitigate the impact of future cascading
  blackouts. (Recommendations 6-14)

NERC Board Recommendations issued prior to
release of NERC Blackout Report
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Recommendation 1 Correct the direct causes of
the August 14, 2003 Blackout

• 1a. The companies implicated in the blackout are
  directed to complete specified remedial actions
  and certify that these actions have been
  completed.
• 1b. NERC will assign experts to help these
  companies develop plans that adequately address
  the issues identified in this report, and for any
  other remedial actions for which they require
  technical assistance.

Near-Term Action
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Recommendation 2Strengthen NERCs Compliance
Enforcement Program
Entergy Status NERC formed a Compliance Template
Task Force, and revised several compliance
templates. Many of these revision were a
crisping of the existing standards, to make the
wording less ambiguous. The new compliance
templates were disseminated to the industry. The
SERC Region adopted the new templates, and
incorporated them into the current years
Compliance and Enforcement Plan.

• 2a. Each Region will report all violations of
  NERC operating policies, planning standards and
  regional standards, whether verified or pending
  investigation.
• 2b. If presented with evidence of a significant
  violation, the offending organization must
  correct the violation within a specified time. If
  an organization is determined to be
  non-responsive and presents a reliability risk,
  NERC will request assistance of the appropriate
  regulatory authorities.
• 2c. NERC will review and update all compliance
  templates applicable to current NERC reliability
  standards.
• 2d. NERC and ECAR will evaluate violations of
  NERC and regional standards and develop
  recommendations to improve compliance with
  reliability standards.

Strategic Initiative
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Recommendation 3 Initiate Control Area and
Reliability CoordinatorReliability Readiness
Audits
Entergy Status Entergy made its personnel and
facilities available for a NERC Control Area
Readiness Audit from May 12 - 13, 2004 at the
System Operations Center. A draft report with
recommendations has been issued, and Entergy is
incorporating suggestions made by the Audit Team.
Entergy personnel have also been participating
on the readiness audits of other Control Areas.

• 3a. NERC and the Regions will establish a program
  to audit all reliability coordinators and control
  areas, with immediate attention given to
  addressing the deficiencies identified in the
  blackout investigation. These audits shall be
  completed within three years, with the 20 highest
  priority audits to be completed by June 30, 2004.
• 3b. NERC will establish a set of baseline audit
  criteria that will include evaluation of
  reliability plans, procedures, processes, tools,
  personnel qualifications, and training.
• 3c. The Regions, with input from NERC, will audit
  each control areas and reliability coordinators
  readiness to meet these audit criteria.

Strategic Initiative
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Recommendation 4Evaluate Vegetation Management
Procedures and Results
Entergy Status September, 2003 Entergy staff
drafted a Transmission Vegetation Work Management
Process. The new process is in the review
stage. June, 2004 Entergy submitted a
Transmission Vegetation Management Report to
FERC, NERC, SERC, States. Another report is being
prepared in response to an APSC order for all
Transmission and Distribution lines and Rights of
Way in Arkansas (due July 16, 2004). July,
2004 Entergy will begin monthly reporting of
vegetation-related outages to SERC. Entergy has
actively participated in the development of a new
NERC vegetation standard through comments on the
SAR individually and through EEI and has
nominated a volunteer to serve on the NERC
standard drafting team.

• 4a. NERC and the Regions will initiate a program
  to report all transmission line trips resulting
  from vegetation contact.
• 4b. Each transmission operator will submit an
  annual report of all vegetation-related high
  voltage line trips to its Region.
• 4c. Each transmission owner shall make its
  vegetation management procedures and
  documentation of work completed available for
  review and verification.

Strategic Initiative
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Recommendation 5Establish a Program to
TrackImplementation of Recommendations
Entergy Status Entergy participates in SERC at
the Regional level on committees and
subcommittees which are developing the types of
programmatic controls required by Recommendations
5a and 5b. Compliance Oversight
Group Compliance Review Steering Committee
(EC) Compliance Subcommittee (OC)

• 5a. NERC and the Regions will establish a program
  to document the completion of recommendations
  resulting from the August 14 blackout
  investigation and investigations of other
  historical outages, reports of violations of
  reliability standards, results of compliance
  audits, and lessons learned from system
  disturbances.
• 5b. NERC will establish a program to evaluate and
  report on bulk electric system reliability
  performance.

Strategic Initiative
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Recommendation 6 Improve Operator and
Reliability Coordinator Training

• 6. All reliability coordinators, control areas,
  and transmission operators shall provide at least
  five days per year of training and drills in
  system emergencies for each staff person with
  responsibility for the real-time operation or
  reliability monitoring of the bulk electric
  system.

Technical Initiative
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Recommendation 7 Evaluate Reactive Power and
Voltage Control Practices
Entergy Status The Entergy Transmission
Planning Technical Studies group is scoping
studies on reactive power planning and voltage
stability.

• 7a. NERC will reevaluate the effectiveness of the
  existing reactive power and voltage control
  standards and how they are being implemented in
  practice, and develop recommendations to ensure
  voltage control and stability issues are
  adequately addressed.
• 7b. ECAR will review its reactive power and
  voltage criteria and procedures and verify that
  its criteria and procedures are being fully
  implemented in regional and member studies and
  operations.

Technical Initiative
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Recommendation 8 Improve System Protection to
Slow or Limitthe Spread of Future Cascading
Outages
Entergy Status As of the week ending June 25,
over one-third of the Zone 3 settings have been
reviewed and tested. This review is expected to
be completed by the second week of
August. Entergy identified two areas in its
system that have the potential for developing
voltage stability problems and has implemented
undervoltage load shed programs to address these
extreme contingencies.

• 8a. All transmission owners will evaluate the
  zone 3 relay settings on all transmission lines
  operating at 230 kV and above for the purpose of
  verifying that each zone 3 relay is not set to
  trip on load under extreme emergency conditions.
  NERC will review any proposed exceptions to
  ensure they do not increase the risk of widening
  a cascading failure of the power system.
• 8b. Each Region will evaluate the feasibility and
  benefits of installing under-voltage load
  shedding capability in load centers that could
  become unstable as a result of being deficient in
  reactive power following multiple-contingency
  events. The Regions are to promote the
  installation of under-voltage load shedding
  capabilities within critical areas that would
  help to prevent an uncontrolled cascade of the
  power system.
• 8c. Evaluate Planning Standard III System
  Protection and Control and propose revisions to
  adequately address the issue of slowing or
  limiting the propagation of a cascading failure.
  Evaluate the lessons from August 14 regarding
  relay protection design and application and offer
  additional recommendations for improvement.

Technical Initiative
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Recommendation 9 Clarify Reliability Coordinator
and Control Area Functions, Responsibilities,
Capabilities

• 9. The NERC Operating Committee shall perform the
  following
• More clearly define the characteristics and
  capabilities necessary to enable prompt
  recognition and effective response to system
  emergencies.
• Ensure the accurate and timely sharing of outage
  data necessary to support real-time operating
  tools such as state estimators, real-time
  contingency analysis, and other system monitoring
  tools.
• Establish the consistent application of effective
  communications protocols, particularly during
  emergencies.
• The operating policies must be clarified to
  remove ambiguities concerning the
  responsibilities and actions appropriate to
  reliability coordinators and control areas.

Technical Initiative
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Recommendation 10 Establish Guidelines for
Real-Time Operating Tools

• 10. Evaluate the real-time operating tools
  necessary for reliable operation and reliability
  coordination, including backup capabilities and
  report both minimum acceptable capabilities for
  critical reliability functions and a guide of
  best practices.

Technical Initiative
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Recommendation 11 Evaluate Lessons Learned
During System Restoration

• 11a. Evaluate the black start and system
  restoration performance following the outage of
  August 14 and develop recommendations for
  improvement.
• 11b. All Regions will reevaluate their procedures
  and plans to assure an effective blackstart and
  restoration capability within their region.

Entergy Status Entergy is represented on the
SERC Operations Planning Subcommittee and
participated in the April 13, SERC OPS annual
review of blackstart plans. An effort is underway
to determine the status of synchronization
capability between the companies in SERC. The OC
OPS committee expects to present a new SERC
Blackstart Plan Appendix for approval at an OC
meeting listing availability of control area to
control area synchronization points in the near
future. Internally, Entergy's blackstart team
performs a thorough annual review of all aspects
of the plans for each Transmission Operation
Center, and, on a seasonal basis updates and
refreshes information such as emergency and
operations contacts, document owners, team
members, feeder priority lists, testing schedules
and synchronization.
Technical Initiative
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Recommendation 12 Install Additional
Time-SynchronizedRecording Devices as Needed
Entergy Status Entergy is in its third year of
a six-year program of modernizing and replacing
DFRs with new technology units that will
synchronize using satellite clocks. Presently, 43
of Entergys 70 DFRs are synchronized. Of the
twenty-seven DFRs that are not time synchronized,
ten are installed at nine substations that tie to
other companies. Entergy is implementing new
technologies to facilitate a good understanding
of the dynamic behavior of eastern
interconnection, such as the EIPP and the the
WAMS programs. The expected completion date is
Fall 2004 eleven total installations are planned
by October 2004.

• 12a. Define regional criteria for the application
  of synchronized recording devices in power plants
  and substations and facilitate the installation
  of the devices to allow accurate recording of
  system disturbances and to facilitate
  benchmarking of simulation studies.
• 12b. Facility owners will upgrade existing
  dynamic recorders to include GPS time
  synchronization and, as necessary, install
  additional dynamic recorders.

Technical Initiative
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Recommendation 13 Reevaluate System Design,
Planning and Operating Criteria
Entergy Status Entergy participates at in SERC
at the Regional level on committees and
subcommittees which are developing the follow-up
reports on blackout lessons learned. Entergy
will continue to participate at the Regional
level to have input into the process. Reliability
Review Subcommittee Operations Plannng
Subcommittee Security Coordinators Subcommittee

• 13a. Evaluate operations planning and operating
  criteria and recommend revisions.
• 13b. ECAR will reevaluate its planning and study
  procedures and practices to ensure they are in
  compliance with NERC standards, ECAR Document
  No.1, and other relevant criteria and that ECAR
  and its members studies are being implemented as
  required.
• 13c.Reevaluate the criteria, methods and
  practices used for system design, planning and
  analysis. This review shall include an evaluation
  of transmission facility ratings methods and
  practices, and the sharing of consistent ratings
  information.

Technical Initiative
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Recommendation 14 Improve System Modeling Data
and Data Exchange Practices
Entergy Status The SERC Region has commissioned
a Model Validation Task Force to implement
Recommendation 14. Entergy will be represented
on the task force by members of the VAST and VST
study groups. Entergy also participates in the
SERC Regional modeling efforts by remaining
active in the VST, which is responsible for the
development of the base case models that will
ultimately be validated.

• 14. Establish and implement criteria and
  procedures for validating data used in power flow
  models and dynamic simulations by benchmarking
  model data with actual system performance.
  Validated modeling data shall be exchanged on an
  inter-regional basis to support reliable system
  planning and operation.

Technical Initiative
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Questions