NIST Research on UOCAVA Voting

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NIST Research on UOCAVA Voting

• Andrew Regenscheid
• National Institute of Standards and Technology
• http//vote.nist.gov

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Overview

• EAC/NIST Involvement in UOCAVA voting
• Overview of UOCAVA Threats Report
• Current Work

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EAC/NIST Involvement in UOCAVA voting -1

• Help America Vote Act - EAC to study electronic
  transmission of ballots
• National Defense Authorization Act FY2005 - EAC
  guidelines on electronic absentee voting
• Military and Overseas Voting Empowerment Act-
  Pilot Project

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EAC/NIST Involvement in UOCAVA voting -2

• NIST conducting research to support EACs efforts
  on UOCAVA voting
• Scope of current NIST research focused on
  security
• New security issues introduced by UOCAVA voting
• Past NIST research on usability, accessibility,
  reliability, software assurance, etc., would
  apply to UOCAVA voting systems

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EAC/NIST Involvement in UOCAVA voting -3

• Past Work
• A Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting Systems
• Current Work
• IT Security Best Practices for UOCAVA Voting
  Systems
• Best Practices for Securing the Electronic
  Transmission of Election Materials
• Security Considerations for Remote Electronic
  UOCAVA Voting

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UOCAVA Report Overview -1

• NISTIR 7551 A Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting
  Systems
• Report looks at using different technologies for
  all aspects of UOCAVA voting
• Splits voting process into three stages
• Voter Registration/Ballot Request (e.g, FPCA)
• Ballot Delivery
• Ballot Return

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UOCAVA Report Overview -2

• Five transmission methods considered for each
  stage
• Postal Mail
• Telephone
• Fax
• Electronic Mail
• Web-based (e.g., web sites)

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UOCAVA Report Overview -3

• Threat analysis performed for each transmission
  option at each stage
• Analysis based on NIST SP 800-30 Risk Management
  Guide for Information Technology Systems
• Identified mitigating security controls, where
  possible
• Both technical and procedural controls
• Security controls taken from NIST SP 800-53
  Recommended Security Controls for Federal
  Information Systems

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Initial Conclusions -1

• Registration and Ballot Request
• Main concern handling/transmitting sensitive
  voter information
• Threats to electronic transmission can be
  mitigated through technical controls and
  procedures
• Threats to e-mail and web-based systems pose
  greater security challenges

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Initial Conclusions -2

• Blank Ballot Delivery
• Main concerns reliable delivery, integrity of
  ballots
• Threats to electronic transmission can be
  mitigated through technical controls and
  procedures
• Electronic ballot accounting more difficult than
  with physical ballots

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Initial Conclusions -3

• Voted Ballot Return
• Main concerns reliable delivery, privacy,
  integrity of voter selections
• Electronic methods pose significant challenges
• Fax presents fewer challenges, but limited
  privacy protection
• Threats to telephone, e-mail, and web voting are
  more serious and challenging to overcome

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Current Work -1

• IT Security Best Practices for UOCAVA Voting
  Systems
• Minimal set of best practices applicable to all
  UOCAVA election system components
• Intended to help jurisdictions and manufacturers
  develop better systems and supporting procedures
• Based on NIST guidelines for federal IT systems
• Will include best practices on user
  authentication, cryptography, system hardening,
  and network security
• Expected draft for public comment 1st quarter of
  2010

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Current Work -2

• Best Practices for Securing the Electronic
  Transmission of Election Materials
• Collected UOCAVA election procedures from
  multiple jurisdictions
• Will document security best practices for using
  e-mail and web sites for ballot requests and
  ballot delivery
• Augments EACs existing best practices for UOCAVA
  voting
• Expected draft for public comment 2nd quarter of
  2010

Page 13
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Current Work -3

• Security Considerations for Remote Electronic
  UOCAVA Voting
• Research document that will define security
  objectives for remote electronic voting
• Will identify security issues that can or cannot
  be solved with current technology
• Purpose to inform future work on remote
  electronic voting
• Expected release 2nd quarter of 2010

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UOCAVA Report

• NISTIR 7551 A Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting
  Systems
• available at
• http//vote.nist.gov