Office of

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• Office of
• Export Control Policy and Cooperation
• NA-242

Adam M. Scheinman Director [phone]
June 2002
ECCO Seminar
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OFFICE OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION (NA-20)
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Linton
Brooks Deputy Administrator
Nonproliferation Research Engineering Robert
Waldron Assistant Deputy Administrator NA-22
Nonproliferation International
Security Stephen Black, Acting Assistant Deputy
Administrator NA-24
Nonproliferation Policy Trisha Dedik,
Director NA-241
Export Control Policy and Cooperation Adam
Scheinman, Director NA-242
International Nuclear Safety Cooperation James
Turner Assistant Deputy Administrator NA-23
Materials Protection Emergency Management Jack
Caravelli Assistant Deputy Administrator NA-25
International Safeguards Ron Cherry,
Director NA-243
Fissile Materials Disposition Ed Siskin,
Acting Assistant Deputy Administrator NA-26
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NA-242 Technical Lead on Nuclear Technology for
USG
Functional Overview
Domestic Controls
International Controls
DOE Complex
Industry
Multilateral
INECP

• Sensitive Subjects/
• Countries Lists
• Foreign Travel
• Foreign Visits
• Assignments
• CRADAs
• NCI/IPP

• Part 810
• Authorizations
• Munitions
• Dual-Use
• Iraq - Oil-for-Food

• NSG
• Zangger Cmtee
• Wassenaar Arrgmt.
• Iraq Action Team
• Addl Protocol
• MTCR/AG

• Russia/NIS
• Middle East/SAsia
• East Asia
• Latin America
• Southern Europe

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OVERVIEW

• Licensing
• DECATS
• Export Controlled Information
• Technology Transfer
• Surplus Material
• Industry Export Control
• Iraq Oil for Food

• Multilateral
• Purpose, Strategies Mission
• Nuclear Supplies Group
• Non-Proliferation Treaty
• Technical Projects
• International NuclearExport Control Program
  (INECP)

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Licensing
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Licensing Team Areas of Responsibility

• DOE Complex
• Sensitive Subjects/Countries Lists
• Foreign travel by DOE scientists and engineers
• Foreign national visits and assignments
• International agreements (IPP, NCI, MPCA, etc.)
• Nuclear software
• Transfer of surplus property
• Deemed exports
• DOE publications
• Pit-out reviews

• Industry
• Part 810 authorizations
• Dual-use export licensing
• Nuclear-related munitions licensing
• Assurance requests for NRC exports
• Nuclear safety
• Export Controlled Information
• Iraq - Oil for Food
• Foreign national visas

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DOE Export Control Awareness Training (DECAT)
System (Under Development)

• Purpose
• Counter spread of weapons of mass destruction
• Serve domestic and international export control
  and nonproliferation training needs
• Provide an on-site awareness training of export
  control requirements
• Test users knowledge of export control
• Serve as early warning proliferation indicator

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DOE Export Control Awareness Training (DECAT)
System

• System Requirements
• Secure web-based client-server system
• Online documentation and help
• Usable at multiple DOE sites
• Incorporate site-specific data into the system
• contacts list
• procedures
• policies
• test modules
• manuals on-line
• Ability to edit core content without programming
  skills

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DOE Export Control Awareness Training (DECAT)
System

• Reporting Requirements
• Individual user information
• Site statistics
• Tool access and usage reports
• Training completion reports
• Annual reminders for refresher training
• Access to employee information for update of site
  training records
• DOE compliance reports
• Number of sites participating in Awareness
  Training
• Percent of employees who have completed training
• Percent of employees who failed training

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DOE Export Control Awareness Training (DECAT)
System

• Favorable Features
• Consistent information to all sites
• Eliminates duplication of effort
• Allows easy dissemination of latest information
  and features
• Enhances sites that lack own training
  capabilities
• Compliance reporting capability
• Training scheduled to users convenience reaches
  a wider audience
• Documentation of material presented
• Leverages infrastructure resources

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DOE Export Control Awareness Training (DECAT)
System

• Current Status
• Preparing for implementation
• Pending cyber security approval

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Export Controlled Information (ECI)

• Export Controlled Information (ECI) - Technical
  information whose export requires a license
• ECI should be protected if uncontrolled
  dissemination would adversely affect U.S.
  national security or nonproliferation objectives
• DOE policy on dissemination of ECI must balance
  commitments to
• U.S. nonproliferation and national security goals
• Scientific and technological advance
• Benefit to U.S. industry
• Benefit to U.S. taxpayer
• Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements

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Export Controlled Information (ECI)

• ECI (continued)
• DOE reviews technical documents to identify ECI
  whose release must be controlled
• ECI review may require
• For publications
• Edit sensitive data
• Limit distribution
• For presentations
• Edit sensitive data
• Limit audience

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Export Controlled Information (ECI)

• ECI (continued)
• NA-242 initiatives to control release of ECI
  under FOIA
• Proposed legislation similar to DODs enacted in
  1984
• DOE would gain authority to withhold ECI
• But even now DOE may require FOIA requestor of
  ECI to disclose citizenship and, if foreign, to
  obtain export license
• And if FOIA requester is U.S. citizen, DOE should
  advise of export licensing requirements for ECI
  transfer out of the country

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Technology Transfer Control

• Objectives
• To identify materials, equipment, and technology
  of proliferation concern
• To prevent transfers to proliferants
• To protect against inadvertent transfers
• To weigh proliferation and security concerns
  against value of scholarship, technology advance,
  and economic benefit
• To implement U.S. Government policy on transfers

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Technology Transfer Control

• Mechanisms of Transfer
• Sales, donations, loans, leases, exports
• Technical exchanges and communications
• Work-for-others, Cooperative Agreements, patent
  assignments
• Publications and presentations
• Visits and assignments to DOE sites
• Foreign travel by DOE personnel

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Technology Transfer Control

• Transfer Control Principle
• Whatever the transfer mechanism, export control
  review is a must
• Control Measures
• Export control review of all proposed transfers,
  exchanges, publications, presentations, visits
  and assignments, and foreign travel
• Export control requirements placed in all
  transfer agreements
• DOE/NNSA approval required for retransfers

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Technology Transfer Control

• Tools for Export Control Review
• Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) lists Trigger and
  Dual-Use
• Export control regulations Departments of
  Energy, Commerce, and State, and Nuclear
  Regulatory Commission
• DOE/NNSA
• Guidelines on Export Control and Nonproliferation
• Sensitive Countries List
• Sensitive Subjects List
• Technology experts and export control personnel

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Surplus Property

• Transfer of Surplus Property
• Equipment and materials must be made useless for
  nuclear purposes
• Transfer agreement must include strict
  nonproliferation conditions
• There is a presumption of destruction for NSG
  Trigger list items and for weapons components
• For items deemed too valuable to destroy
• Request exception from DOE/NNSA Deputy
  Administrator for Defense Nuclear
  Nonproliferation
• May require modifying equipment to render it
  useless for nuclear purposes
• Must get DOE/NNSA approval for retransfer or
  export

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Industry Export Control

• Dual-Use Export Licensing
• Export Administration Act of 1979 gives Commerce
  the lead
• Export Administration Regulations (EAR) implement
• EAR sections of note
• 15 CFR Part 738, Special country policies
• 15 CFR Part 742, Control Policy CCL-based
  controls
• 15 CFR Part 744, Control Policy Catch-all
  controls based on end-user and end-use
• 15 CFR Part 752, Special Comprehensive Licenses
• 15 CFR Part 774, Commerce Control List (includes
  Nuclear Referral List of items requiring DOE/NNSA
  review)

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Industry Export Control

• Munitions Licensing
• Under jurisdiction of the Department of State,
  Office of Defense Trade Controls
• Authority
• Arms Export Control Act 1976
• International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR
  Part 121
• DOE reviews nuclear-related cases
• Category V - Explosives, Propellants, Incendiary
  Agents
• Category XVI - Nuclear Weapons Design and Test
  Equipment
• Review process similar to dual-use cases, except
  without time limits or escalation

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Industry Export Control

• NRC Exports
• Special or general licenses required for nuclear
  facilities, components, fuel, and source or
  byproduct materials
• Authority
• Atomic Energy Act of 1954
• 10 CFR Part 110 implementing regulations
• DOE/NNSA participates in Executive Branch review
  of NRC export licenses and obtains foreign
  government peaceful use assurances
• DOE provides general license request confirmations

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Iraq - Oil for Food

• NA-242 reviews about 4,000 applications annually
  for exports to Iraq from various countries under
  the UN Oil for Food program
• Cases referred to DOE/NNSA from US UN Mission in
  New York
• Review responsibility shifted to the IAEA Action
  Team as of June 1, 2002
• LLNL performs reviews NA-242 recommends to
  approve, deny, or hold

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U.S. Export Controls Activities

• Maintain DOE/NNSA Guidelines on Export Control
  and Nonproliferation
• Export control training seminars for industry,
  academia, and federal government agencies
• Maintenance of Proliferation Information Network
  System (PINS)
• Review and approval of deemed exports,
  dual-use, and nuclear-related munitions cases
• Individual validation licensing for overseas
  activities
• DOE Export Control Awareness Training (DECAT)
  System through NA-242 web site coming soon

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U.S. Export Controls Activities

• continued
• Review technology transfer cases referred to
  DOE/NNSA by the Departments of Commerce and
  State.
• Participation in the DOC Bureau of Industrial
  Security Operating Committee on export policy and
  the Assistant Secretary-level Advisory Committee
  for Export Policy (ACEP)
• Review of Foreign Access Tracking System database
  (foreign visitors to DOE/NNSA and contractors)
• Review of Foreign Travel Management System
  (foreign travel by DOE and contractor personnel)
• Participation in Export Control Coordinators
  Organization (ECCO) seminars

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AREAS FOR ASSISTANCE

• Continue to maintain existing and develop new
  expertise necessary to support NA-242 initiatives
• Incorporate export licensing and nonproliferation
  awareness into security briefings for new
  personnel
• In the interim, ensure that deemed exports and
  ECI applicability review are done for all foreign
  national visits and assignments and foreign
  travel by federal and contractor personnel
• Target professional societies and groups of
  industry for nonproliferation awareness training
• Actively participate in Nuclear Nonproliferation
  Workshops and Seminars

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Multilateral
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Multilateral Team Areas of Responsibility

• Multilateral Regime Support
• Nuclear Suppliers Group
• NPT Export Committee (Zangger)
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
• Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in FY03
• NPT Review Conference 2005
• Working Groups
• Other Issues
• Export Control Workshops
• Bilaterals
• IAEA Action Team
• IAEA Additional Protocol

• Technical Projects
• Stockpile Stewardship
• Economic Globalization
• Characterization of DOE Complex
• Nuclear Propulsion
• Machine Tools
• SNET List Review
• Technical Review Group
• Commercialization of DOE lab technology (CRADAs)
• Plutonium Isotope Separation

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Multilateral

• Purpose
• International export control regimes prevent
  nuclear proliferation by
• delaying a nuclear program and allowing other
  means, such as diplomacy, to help
• causing proliferants to accept less capable and
  more costly options and
• Establishing international guidelines and
  principles for nuclear suppliers with the
  objective of averting the proliferation of
  nuclear weapons.

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Strategies
Multilateral

• Promote adherence to multilateral nuclear
  supplier arrangements in support of USG
  nonproliferation policy

• Strengthen the multilateral supplier regimes
  through continued U.S. technical leadership

Strategies

• Cooperate with the U.S. interagency, DOE and NNSA
  offices, and like-minded multilateral partners to
  promote peaceful nuclear trade and
  nonproliferation objectives

• Ensure that DOE and NNSA program offices and
  contractors are fully apprised of all
  multilateral commitments and obligations

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Mission
Multilateral

• Initiate studies on rapidly developing
  technologies and initiatives before problems
  arise
• Technical studies Accelerator Production of
  Tritium Naval Reactor Technologies
• Multilateral negotiations Conversion
  technologies Plutonium Isotope Separation
• Policy studies Globalization study
• Pursue an active role in preventing
  proliferation.
• Protect U.S. national security interests and
  peaceful nuclear trade.
• Conceptual change from export control to
  supplier policy.

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Multilateral

• Role of NA-242
• Multilateral Regime Support
• Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
• NPT Export Committee (Zangger)
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
• Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in FY03
• Technical Team Projects
• Stockpile Stewardship, Globalization,
  Characterization of the Complex, etc.
• Other Issues
• Export Control Workshops
• Bilaterals
• IAEA Action Team

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Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

• NA-242 Participation
• Consultative Group (working to revise the NSG
  Guidelines and improve the structure and
  effectiveness of the regime)
• U.S. Chair (Richard Goorevich, NA-242) to chair
  the Consultative Group during the 2002-2003
  term.

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INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL SUPPORT Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG)

• Membership (40 countries)
• Argentina Germany Portugal
• Australia Greece Romania
• Austria Hungary Russia
• Belarus Ireland Slovakia
• Belgium Italy Slovenia
• Brazil Japan South Africa
• Bulgaria Kazakhstan (new) Spain
• Canada Korea, Republic of Sweden
• Cyprus Latvia Switzerland
• Czech Republic Luxembourg Turkey
• Denmark Netherlands Ukraine
• Finland New Zealand United Kingdom
• France Norway United States
• Poland

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NTP Exporters (Zangger) Committee

• Conversion Technology
• successfully completed
• led by NA-242
• Plutonium Isotope Separation
• on going
• NA-242 provides technical lead
• Full Scope Safeguards
• U.S. member of Friends of Chair Committee to
  examine issue
• Next NPT Revcon 2005 international outreach
• U.S. member of Friends of Chair Committee to
  examine issue

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Team Projects

• Examples of NA-242 / Multilateral Team Projects
• Technical Review Group (TRG) Phase II
• Stockpile Stewardship
• Collaboration with the UK on Machine Tools,
  Technical Review Group (TRG) Peer Review, and
  SNET List Review
• Economic Globalization and Nuclear Technology
  Supply
• Nuclear Propulsion
• Characterization of the DOE Complex

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Team Projects

• Other
• Hosted the 2001 NSG Plenary - Aspen, Colorado
• Implementation of NSG Information Sharing System
  (NISS) upgrade.
• Bilateral discussions on technical supplier
  issues and export controls (e.g. Russia, Ukraine,
  Kazakhstan, Baltic States)
• Promote broader international adherence to the
  IAEA Additional Protocol
• Focus on export/import reporting requirements

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International Nuclear Export Control Program
(INECP)
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International Export Control Program (INECP)
Team Areas of Responsibility
Provide training and assistance to Russia, FSU
and others by

• Developing effective export control licensing
  processes
• Developing industry compliance by ensuring
  exporters of controlled equipment, materials, and
  technology are aware of national and
  international requirements

• Helping customs officials to recognize
  nuclear-related dual-use commodities
• Providing tools of export control
• Information technology
• Publications and handbooks
• Communication systems
• Dual-use material analyzers
• Remote inspection systems

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International Nuclear Export Control Program
(INECP)

• Mission
• Provide training and assistance to develop
  national systems of nuclear export control
  worldwide.
• Approach
• Three tiered approach
• U.S. Interagency (State Department lead)
• Government-to-Government
• Technical interactions

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INECP Promoting Effective Nuclear Export
Controls Worldwide
Transparent and standardized national licensing
system
Industry awareness and outreach
Ability to detect and prevent illicit shipments
Maturing Cooperation
Expanding Assistance
Future Priorities
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INECP Export Control Licensing Process

• Leverage off Department of Commerce Export
  Control Assistance Program
• Assist with implementation of nuclear-related
  legal and parliamentary requirements
• Provide training to government and industry in
  U.S. and international nuclear export control and
  nonproliferation processes and norms
• Provide tools
• Automated information systems for licensing and
  exports
• Publications, handbooks, and technical guides
• Communication systems

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INECP Export Control Licensing Process

• (continued)
• Assist in strengthening controls on transfer of
• Surplus/decommissioned equipment especially NSG
  Trigger List and Dual-Use List items
• Technology

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INECP Internal Compliance/Industry Outreach

• Industry Outreach
• Partner with Department of Commerce
• Assist in identifying potential exporters of
  controlled equipment, materials, and technology
• Provide training to exporters in national and
  international export control laws, policies,
  regulations, norms
• Internal Compliance
• Encourage nuclear exporter compliance through
  training and assistance
• Assist exporters in establishing internal
  compliance programs

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INECP - Enforcement

• Partner with U.S. Customs international
  assistance programs and export control and border
  security program
• Assist in the prevention of illicit exports of
  nuclear materials, equipment, and technology
• Provide and sponsor training to recognize
  nuclear-related dual-use commodities
• Provide tools and equipment
• Remote inspection systems, handbooks, and
  publications
• Dual-use material analyzers
• Communication systems and databases

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Looking Ahead
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Looking Ahead

• Following 9/11, nonproliferation of weapons of
  mass destruction (WMD) has moved to the fore of
  the U.S. national security agenda
• NA-242 funding will rise in FY03
• New program areas
• Add missile technology dual-use export reviews in
  FY03
• Add CBW in FY04
• Broaden reach of INECP South Asia, Middle East,
  East and Central Asia, the Caucasus, major
  transshipment states
• Proliferation Research and Analysis Project
  anticipate emerging proliferation threats and
  identify chokepoints
• Support U.S. Customs role in enforcing domestic
  export controls

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Looking Ahead Other Ideas

• Continue to work toward ECI exemption from FOIA
• Propose mandatory check-off block in FACTS to
  ensure that visited offices conduct deemed
  export review
• Propose mandatory check-off block in FTMS to
  ensure DOE and contractor travelers conduct
  export control review
• Develop an unclassified database of questions and
  responding NA-242 guidance
• Develop introductory export licensing and
  nonproliferation awareness material for new DOE
  and contractor employees as part of security
  briefing
• Expand outreach to scientific and technical
  communities to raise export licensing and
  nonproliferation awareness