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Environmental Services

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Title: Non Regulatory Solutions to Isolated wetlands Author: David Zilberman Last modified by: Amor Nolan Created Date: 10/20/2002 4:59:54 PM Document presentation format – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Environmental Services


1
Environmental Services
  • David Zilberman
  • University of California Berkeley

2
Categories of Environmental Services (ES)
  • Pollution Prevention. Farmers may be paid to
    modify environmental damaging activities and
    engage in sustainable practices(farmers may have
    implicit historical rights to pollute that have
    to be bought).
  • Conservation. of natural resources, life styles,
    ecosystems etc. Including forest resources and
    wetland, agricultural communities ( slow urban
    sprawl), traditional varieties and species, etc.
  • Amenity creation-restoration and built up of
    natural resources Include clean up activities,
    planting of forests, restoration of wetlands etc.

3
Environmental Services Land Use
  • Most ES are embodied in land use and management
  • In situ conservation of crop bio-diversity
  • Soil carbon sequestration through no tillage
  • Provision of habitat in wetlands
  • ES can be attained by
  • Working land programs-promoting green practices
  • Transition to IPM
  • Conversion of lands to greener use
  • From farming to forest
  • prevention of land use conversions
  • Controlling development

4
The Multidimensionality of ES
  • The same land may provide a multitude of ES
  • No tillage sequesters carbon and reduced soil
    erosion
  • A wetland may purify water and support wild life
  • ES may be complementary or substitutes
  • Growing Wetland acreage may areas with native
    plants
  • Reduction in runoff may be accompanied in less
    wind erosion
  • ES may provide regional, national global
    benefits
  • Benefits of ES vary across individuals groups
  • Bird watchers hunters benefit from better bird
    habitat
  • All citizens gain from flood control-but the risk
    reduction vary by location

5
The Dimensions of Wetland Services
Local National International
Wildlife habitat Public Private Public Public
Flood control Public Private Public Private Public Private
Water purification Private Public Public Private
Aesthetic value Public Private Public Public
Recreation Private Private Private
Existence Public Public Public
6
Public Private Sectors Wetland Management
  • Responsibility and finance of wetland should
    correspond to nature of their benefits
  • Government should concentrate on providing
    public good aspects- utilized by many
  • No exclusion - e.g Existence value
  • Private agencies have important role in
    financing wetland aspects that benefit their
    members-wildlife habitat.
  • Private action is indication of willingness to
    pay for wetland services- it may be understated
    because of public good aspects
  • There is a role for public-private cooperation
  • Matching fund
  • Tax credit

7
Mechanism to Obtain ES
  • Aggregate targets of ES with Tradable permits
  • No reduction target led to wetlands banking in
    U.S.
  • Kyoto targets may be attained by CO2
    Sequestration
  • Purchasing Funds-target buy assets or pay for
    ES
  • Nature conservancy buys lands development right
  • USCRP pays for farmland use modification for a
    period
  • Utilities pay for carbon sequestration in Costa
    Rica Iowa
  • Incentives-payments for ES, penalties for damages
  • Direct controls
  • Zoning restricting land use to certain
    activities
  • Permittingconditional approval of development
    activities

8
Institutional Setup to Create ES
  • Private parties may invest in excludable amenity
    creating ES (habitat to birds or fish,recreation
    area)
  • NGOs may finance and control specialized ES
  • National Local governments may
  • Pay directly for or subsidize private provision
    of amenity creating ES
  • Establish legal framework to require generation
    of resource conserving or pollution preventing
    ES
  • Global ES may be generated controlled by
  • International agreements (Kyoto, Debt for nature)
  • Voluntary agreements initiated by NGOs

9
Management of Purchasing Fund
  • Heterogeneity -ES benefit cost per acre vary
  • Consider first the case with the No Scale
    effects-
  • Suppose there are N locations, identified by
    n1,N .
  • An Land of location n,
  • Bn Benefits per acre of location n.
  • Cn Costs per acre( value of land in
    alternative use)
  • Targeting criteria
  • Acreage maximization Buy the lands with the
    lowest Cn (regardless of benefits) given the
    budget
  • Benefits targeting Purchase the highest quality
    lands (lands with highest Bn) within budget
  • Benefit /cost Targeting Purchase lands with the
    highest Bn/Cn (highest benefit cost ratio) given
    the budget

10
Alternative Forms of Targeting
benefit targeting
Benefit per acre
Cost targeting
benefit cost targeting
Cost per acre
11
Implication of Targeting Schemes
  • Benefit cost targeting are optima,Maximizing ES
    for budget
  • Cost targeting maximize acreage preferred by
    land owners.
  • Benefit maximizing result in lowest acreage
    reduction
  • The importance of correlation when low cost
    lands has high ES (negative correlation of Bn and
    Cn) the welfare loss of cost targeting is small.
    It is big in case of positive correlation.
  • The Importance of variability Benefit targeting
    is optimal when benefits are positively
    correlated to costs variability of benefit is
    much larger than of costs

Cn 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Budget 21 Bn1 1 3 5 7 9 12 15 18 20 24
28 Optimal policy-Buy Highest Q Bn2 1 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 Optimum
-Maximize Acreage (in particular n 6 )
12
Scale Effects
  • When ES/acre increases with size targeting may
    radically change with budget

When Budget is 8 Buy 2 units type 2
Benefits 12 When Budget is 10 Buy 2
units type 2 1type1 Benefits 14 When Budget is
12 Buy 1 unit type 3 Benefits
24 When budget is 15 buy 1 unit type 3 1
type 1 Benefits 26
13
Difficulties of Trading in ES
  • Trading requires quantifiable observable
    commodities- it is not always feasible with ES
  • Quantification of output is difficult when ES are
    aesthetic values or bio-diversity.It is easier
    for soil carbon.
  • .When benefits are random (flood control) or
    unobservable directly (sequestration) agreements
    for estimation of benefits are needed. A critical
    element is establishing a bench mark- benefits
    are improvements
  • Monitoring enforcement are problematic-especiall
    y given that ES require large areas at remote
    locations
  • The ability to trade in ES improves with
    scientific knowledge- need to quantifymeasure
    benefits of wetlands, bio-diversity gains,reduced
    risks etc.

14
Distribution of ES Earnings
  • Cost of ES may be born by endogenous or local
    population- who may be constrained sometimes
    removed to attain conservation etc.
  • But they may not receive the earnings that may
    go to governments, NGOs, or legal owners
  • Even when they receive earnings they may not gain
    - they rarely participate in negotiations and
    their overall cost may exceed benefits
  • ES gains are not a panacea-soil carbon may result
    in gross gain of 150 per acre- with much lower
    net
  • Average Bio prospecting benefits/acre are likely
    to be very small- Bio knowledge is crucial to
    identify a priory location with high potential
    and target them.

15
Private Sector Regulations and ES
  • Permitting is major tool to regulate ES
    (especially wetland) use by private sector.
  • Criteria for optimal regulation of wetlands
  • Maximization of net public and private benefits
  • Private cost of regulations should be considered
    in policy design
  • A less ambitious objective
  • Minimize public private costs of wetland
    targets
  • Agencies may aim to maximize wetland provisions
    given the agency budget-
  • ignoring regulation costs leads to inefficiency

16
Institutional Setup for Various ES
  • A wetland with purely local benefit should be
    regulated by the local government.
  • Differences policy approaches between regions
    allow for choice given heterogeneity of
    preferences.
  • Decentralized solutions may be costly in terms
    of transaction and regulation costs
  • Regional cooperation can
  • Reduce fixed cost of research and
    managementdesign of restoration and conservation
    of wetlands
  • Reduce transaction cost of regulation
  • Address issues of spillover of benefit and
    costs

17
Division of Responsibilities in a Federalist
System
  • ES may provide a variety of benefits across
    constituencies-All benefits may be considered and
    compensated for in ES design and management
  • Funds for managing credits for provision of
    benefits to National and Global ES may be
    created. That will require international
    agreement or national policies, but will provide
    the right incentives
  • Activities that compromise ES(wetland
    modification) activities may be constrained to
    protect national and global amenities-or be
    taxed to pay the fund.

18
Regions with Vulnerable Isolated Wetlands(Duck
Unlimited study)
  • Vulnerability is the result of weak law high
    concentration of isolated wetlands
  • Great Basin(excluding California,Oregon
    Washington)-Wetlands occur on agricultural land
    in Nevada and Idaho
  • Prairie Pothole region( excluding Minnesota and
    Iowa)-Prairie Pothole Region is located on ag
    land, especially in Dakotas.
  • Southern Great Plains- The majority of playa
    lakes in Texas occur in intensively farmed region
    of the Panhandle
  • Gulf Coastal Prairie-,many wetlands occur on
    farmlands east of Houston,,
  • Mississippi Alluvial Valley(excluding Tennessee)
  • Great Lakes(excluding Michigan, Minnesota
    Wisconsin) Not much wetland on agricultural land

19
Wetlands in Agricultural Lands
  • In 5 of the regions isolated wet lands are
    agricultural lands entitled to CRP-There are 6
    millions of wetlands acres in agriculture
  • 46 millions of the U.S. 300- million acres of the
    U.S. farm lands are converted wetlands.
  • A large acreage of wetland occurs in rangelands
    (the Sandhill region of Nebraska) who are not
    part of commodity programs

20
Alternative Approaches to Wetland Protection
Land retirement Working lands
Carrot CRP, WRP EQIP
Stick Swampbuster
21
Conservation Reserve ProgramBackground
  • The CRP is a land retirement program. It aims to
    reduce farm acreage so to increase supply and to
    increase farm income.
  • The biggest program of U,S. agriculture is excess
    supply. Another problem has been soil erosion.
    Conservation programs traditionally paid farmers
    to take erosive land out of production
  • Conservation programs are Green policies, and
    are looked favorably by international trade
    agreements aimed to reduce farm support. They are
    likely to increase in importance.

22
CRP-Basic Features
  • CRP provides owners or operators with an annual
    per-acre rental payment and 1/2 the cost of
    establishing a permanent land cover for retiring
    cropland from production for 10- to 15-years.
  • Producers can offer land for competitive bidding
    based on an Environmental Benefits Index (EBI)
    during periodic signups.
  • Producers can automatically enroll more limited
    acreages in practices such as riparian buffers,
    field windbreaks, and grass strips on a
    continuous basis
  • Enrollees in selected practices program receive
    enhanced rental rates, 50-percent cost-sharing
    and a per-acre maintenance payment.

23
CRP Rents
24
CRP Historical Background
  • CRP Established in its current form in 1985 to be
    administered by USDAs Farm Services Agency (FSA)
    ad funded through Commodity credit corporation.
  • In 1996, CRP was reauthorized, limiting
    enrollment to 36.4 million acres at any time.
  • In 2000, enhanced incentives for continuous
    signup
  • A signing incentive payment of 100 to 150 per
    acre
  • A practice incentive payment equal to 40 percent
    of cost-sharing for all continuous signup
    practices
  • As of October 2001, about 1.5 million acres had
    been enrolled in the continuous signup,
  • The 2002 Farm Act increased the enrollment limit
    to 39 million acres.

25
The Wetland Reserve Program
  • WRP was authorized under the 1985 Farm Act.
  • Under the 2002 Farm Act, the acreage cap is
    increased from 1.075 million acres to 2.275
    million acres.
  • Objective is to enroll 250,000 acres per year
  • Options a permanent or30-year conservation
    easement or a 10-year cost-share restoration
    agreement
  • USDA pays 100 percent of restoration costs for
    permanent easements, and 75 percent for 30-year
    easements and restoration cost-share agreements.
  • Conservation vs . was around 1,300 per acre. The
    study also concludes that the WRP achieves
    restoration at around 600 per acre.

26
Retirement Program and Wetlands
  • The 2002 Act expands land retirement by 4 million
    acres, WRP enrollment cap more than doubles, from
    1.075 million acres to 2.275 million,. In the
    CRP, 500,000 acres could be used to enroll farmed
    wetlands and associated buffer acreage.
  • CRP serves to support farmers income-not
    environmental needs. Has limits as wetlands
    policy framework.

27
Working Land
  • Working land conservation programs can benefit
    wetlands mostly indirectly by reducing
    agricultural pollution.
  • 5.7 billion is available from 2002-2007 and 12
    billion from 2002-11 for the Environmental
    Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), Wildlife
    Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP), and
    Conservation Security Program (CSP).

28
The Environmental Quality Incentives Program EQIP
  • EQIP-Provides technical assistance, cost
  • sharing (up to 75 percent), and incentive
    payments to assist livestock and crop
  • producers with environmental improvements.
  • 60of EQIP's funding earmarked for livestock
    producers,
  • No size limits on livestock operations,
  • Payments are limited to a total of 450,000 per
    operation over the 6-year life of the Act.

29
Conservation Security Fund The Wildlife Habitat
Incentives Program
  • The Conservation Security Program will focus on
    land-based practices and specifically excludes
    livestock waste-handling facilities. Producers
    can participate at one of three tiers higher
    tiers require greater conservation effort and
    offer higher payments. The lowest cost practices
    that meet conservation standards must be used.
  • The Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program provides
    cost sharing to landowners and producers to
    develop and improve wildlife habitat.

30
Swampbuster Established 1985
  • . "Swampbuster" - farmers or ranchers lose
    eligibility for farm program benefits if they
    produce an agricultural commodity on a wetland
    converted after December 23, 1985, or if they
    convert a wetland after November 28, 1990,.
  • Swampbuster recognizes four categories of
    wetlands.
  • Wetlands, or areas that contain hydric soils
    which support mostly hydrophates
  • Converted wetlands, defined as areas drained or
    altered after December 23, 1985
  • Farmed wetlands, or areas partially drained or
    altered to produce a crop prior to Swampbuster,
    but which still retain some wetland
    characteristics
  • Prior converted wetlands, or areas that were used
    for farming prior to Swampbuster and which no
    longer exhibit any wetland characteristics.

31
Permitting vs. Voluntary Programs
  • Permitting cuts down on uncertainty. It can lead
    to a more accurate assessment of the inventory of
    wetlands. With incentive programs, more work is
    necessary to measure wetland gains and losses
  • In a permitting system, applicants must bear
    significant fixed application costs. With
    voluntary program, the government pays for
    targeting
  • Voluntary program may be captured.
  • Targeting criteria matters acreage maximization
    benefits farmers.Should target lands with highest
    benefit cost ratio.
  • Slippage-high commodity prices lead to reuse of
    marginal lands or wetlands-should be considered
    in design

32
Activities of Private Groups
  • Easements, Duck Unlimited DU rarely buys wetlands
    outright, but negotiates conservation easements.
    These agreements are for 10-years.
  • The nature conservancy has a diversified approach
  • Ownership Type Acres
  • Conservation Easement 1,400,453
  • Management Agreements 1,389,099
  • Leases 2,146,745
  • Owned by TNC 2,098,950
  • TOTAL 7,035,246

33
Conservation Partnerships
  • One such collaboration between DU and the federal
    government is the River CARE project in which DU
    and the NRCS have cooperated in implementing the
    WRP in the Mississippi Alluvial Valley (MAV).
    By 1998, more than 1,500 private landowners in
    the MAV were active partners with DU and WRP to
    provide and restore wildlife habitat on their
    lands.
  • TNCs Glacial Ridge Project, one of 12 habitats
    targeted in the Saving the Last Great Places
    campaign, received 1.6 million from NRCS as part
    of the USDAs WRP program for a partial easement
    payment to restore nearly 2,800 acres of
    previously drained wetland and 1,500 acres of
    tall grass prairie in Minnesota. Saving the Last
    Great Places,

34
Private vs. Public Approaches
  • Public sector is not forced to pay attention to
    factor prices. Private groups have better
    incentives to target the land with the highest
    level of environmental amenities per dollar
    spent.
  • Private investment in wetland conservation,
    includes land purchase expenditures and
    investment in improvement on wetland quality.
  • From the Corps perspective, the land has no
    opportunity cost, from a societal perspective the
    land is valuable in providing other services.
    This, there may be a tendency to over-regulate
    and acquire more land than is socially optimal.
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