Title: Environmental Services
1Environmental Services
- David Zilberman
- University of California Berkeley
2Categories of Environmental Services (ES)
- Pollution Prevention. Farmers may be paid to
modify environmental damaging activities and
engage in sustainable practices(farmers may have
implicit historical rights to pollute that have
to be bought). - Conservation. of natural resources, life styles,
ecosystems etc. Including forest resources and
wetland, agricultural communities ( slow urban
sprawl), traditional varieties and species, etc. - Amenity creation-restoration and built up of
natural resources Include clean up activities,
planting of forests, restoration of wetlands etc.
3Environmental Services Land Use
- Most ES are embodied in land use and management
- In situ conservation of crop bio-diversity
- Soil carbon sequestration through no tillage
- Provision of habitat in wetlands
- ES can be attained by
- Working land programs-promoting green practices
- Transition to IPM
- Conversion of lands to greener use
- From farming to forest
- prevention of land use conversions
- Controlling development
4The Multidimensionality of ES
- The same land may provide a multitude of ES
- No tillage sequesters carbon and reduced soil
erosion - A wetland may purify water and support wild life
- ES may be complementary or substitutes
- Growing Wetland acreage may areas with native
plants - Reduction in runoff may be accompanied in less
wind erosion - ES may provide regional, national global
benefits - Benefits of ES vary across individuals groups
- Bird watchers hunters benefit from better bird
habitat - All citizens gain from flood control-but the risk
reduction vary by location
5The Dimensions of Wetland Services
Local National International
Wildlife habitat Public Private Public Public
Flood control Public Private Public Private Public Private
Water purification Private Public Public Private
Aesthetic value Public Private Public Public
Recreation Private Private Private
Existence Public Public Public
6Public Private Sectors Wetland Management
- Responsibility and finance of wetland should
correspond to nature of their benefits - Government should concentrate on providing
public good aspects- utilized by many - No exclusion - e.g Existence value
- Private agencies have important role in
financing wetland aspects that benefit their
members-wildlife habitat. - Private action is indication of willingness to
pay for wetland services- it may be understated
because of public good aspects - There is a role for public-private cooperation
- Matching fund
- Tax credit
-
7Mechanism to Obtain ES
- Aggregate targets of ES with Tradable permits
- No reduction target led to wetlands banking in
U.S. - Kyoto targets may be attained by CO2
Sequestration - Purchasing Funds-target buy assets or pay for
ES - Nature conservancy buys lands development right
- USCRP pays for farmland use modification for a
period - Utilities pay for carbon sequestration in Costa
Rica Iowa - Incentives-payments for ES, penalties for damages
- Direct controls
- Zoning restricting land use to certain
activities - Permittingconditional approval of development
activities
8Institutional Setup to Create ES
- Private parties may invest in excludable amenity
creating ES (habitat to birds or fish,recreation
area) - NGOs may finance and control specialized ES
- National Local governments may
- Pay directly for or subsidize private provision
of amenity creating ES - Establish legal framework to require generation
of resource conserving or pollution preventing
ES - Global ES may be generated controlled by
- International agreements (Kyoto, Debt for nature)
- Voluntary agreements initiated by NGOs
9Management of Purchasing Fund
- Heterogeneity -ES benefit cost per acre vary
- Consider first the case with the No Scale
effects- - Suppose there are N locations, identified by
n1,N . - An Land of location n,
- Bn Benefits per acre of location n.
- Cn Costs per acre( value of land in
alternative use) - Targeting criteria
- Acreage maximization Buy the lands with the
lowest Cn (regardless of benefits) given the
budget - Benefits targeting Purchase the highest quality
lands (lands with highest Bn) within budget - Benefit /cost Targeting Purchase lands with the
highest Bn/Cn (highest benefit cost ratio) given
the budget
10Alternative Forms of Targeting
benefit targeting
Benefit per acre
Cost targeting
benefit cost targeting
Cost per acre
11Implication of Targeting Schemes
- Benefit cost targeting are optima,Maximizing ES
for budget - Cost targeting maximize acreage preferred by
land owners. - Benefit maximizing result in lowest acreage
reduction - The importance of correlation when low cost
lands has high ES (negative correlation of Bn and
Cn) the welfare loss of cost targeting is small.
It is big in case of positive correlation. - The Importance of variability Benefit targeting
is optimal when benefits are positively
correlated to costs variability of benefit is
much larger than of costs
Cn 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Budget 21 Bn1 1 3 5 7 9 12 15 18 20 24
28 Optimal policy-Buy Highest Q Bn2 1 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 Optimum
-Maximize Acreage (in particular n 6 )
12Scale Effects
- When ES/acre increases with size targeting may
radically change with budget -
When Budget is 8 Buy 2 units type 2
Benefits 12 When Budget is 10 Buy 2
units type 2 1type1 Benefits 14 When Budget is
12 Buy 1 unit type 3 Benefits
24 When budget is 15 buy 1 unit type 3 1
type 1 Benefits 26
13Difficulties of Trading in ES
- Trading requires quantifiable observable
commodities- it is not always feasible with ES - Quantification of output is difficult when ES are
aesthetic values or bio-diversity.It is easier
for soil carbon. - .When benefits are random (flood control) or
unobservable directly (sequestration) agreements
for estimation of benefits are needed. A critical
element is establishing a bench mark- benefits
are improvements - Monitoring enforcement are problematic-especiall
y given that ES require large areas at remote
locations - The ability to trade in ES improves with
scientific knowledge- need to quantifymeasure
benefits of wetlands, bio-diversity gains,reduced
risks etc.
14Distribution of ES Earnings
- Cost of ES may be born by endogenous or local
population- who may be constrained sometimes
removed to attain conservation etc. - But they may not receive the earnings that may
go to governments, NGOs, or legal owners - Even when they receive earnings they may not gain
- they rarely participate in negotiations and
their overall cost may exceed benefits - ES gains are not a panacea-soil carbon may result
in gross gain of 150 per acre- with much lower
net - Average Bio prospecting benefits/acre are likely
to be very small- Bio knowledge is crucial to
identify a priory location with high potential
and target them.
15Private Sector Regulations and ES
- Permitting is major tool to regulate ES
(especially wetland) use by private sector. - Criteria for optimal regulation of wetlands
- Maximization of net public and private benefits
- Private cost of regulations should be considered
in policy design - A less ambitious objective
- Minimize public private costs of wetland
targets - Agencies may aim to maximize wetland provisions
given the agency budget- - ignoring regulation costs leads to inefficiency
16Institutional Setup for Various ES
- A wetland with purely local benefit should be
regulated by the local government. - Differences policy approaches between regions
allow for choice given heterogeneity of
preferences. - Decentralized solutions may be costly in terms
of transaction and regulation costs - Regional cooperation can
- Reduce fixed cost of research and
managementdesign of restoration and conservation
of wetlands - Reduce transaction cost of regulation
- Address issues of spillover of benefit and
costs -
17Division of Responsibilities in a Federalist
System
- ES may provide a variety of benefits across
constituencies-All benefits may be considered and
compensated for in ES design and management - Funds for managing credits for provision of
benefits to National and Global ES may be
created. That will require international
agreement or national policies, but will provide
the right incentives - Activities that compromise ES(wetland
modification) activities may be constrained to
protect national and global amenities-or be
taxed to pay the fund.
18Regions with Vulnerable Isolated Wetlands(Duck
Unlimited study)
- Vulnerability is the result of weak law high
concentration of isolated wetlands - Great Basin(excluding California,Oregon
Washington)-Wetlands occur on agricultural land
in Nevada and Idaho - Prairie Pothole region( excluding Minnesota and
Iowa)-Prairie Pothole Region is located on ag
land, especially in Dakotas. - Southern Great Plains- The majority of playa
lakes in Texas occur in intensively farmed region
of the Panhandle - Gulf Coastal Prairie-,many wetlands occur on
farmlands east of Houston,, - Mississippi Alluvial Valley(excluding Tennessee)
- Great Lakes(excluding Michigan, Minnesota
Wisconsin) Not much wetland on agricultural land
19Wetlands in Agricultural Lands
- In 5 of the regions isolated wet lands are
agricultural lands entitled to CRP-There are 6
millions of wetlands acres in agriculture - 46 millions of the U.S. 300- million acres of the
U.S. farm lands are converted wetlands. - A large acreage of wetland occurs in rangelands
(the Sandhill region of Nebraska) who are not
part of commodity programs
20Alternative Approaches to Wetland Protection
Land retirement Working lands
Carrot CRP, WRP EQIP
Stick Swampbuster
21Conservation Reserve ProgramBackground
- The CRP is a land retirement program. It aims to
reduce farm acreage so to increase supply and to
increase farm income. - The biggest program of U,S. agriculture is excess
supply. Another problem has been soil erosion.
Conservation programs traditionally paid farmers
to take erosive land out of production - Conservation programs are Green policies, and
are looked favorably by international trade
agreements aimed to reduce farm support. They are
likely to increase in importance.
22CRP-Basic Features
- CRP provides owners or operators with an annual
per-acre rental payment and 1/2 the cost of
establishing a permanent land cover for retiring
cropland from production for 10- to 15-years. - Producers can offer land for competitive bidding
based on an Environmental Benefits Index (EBI)
during periodic signups. - Producers can automatically enroll more limited
acreages in practices such as riparian buffers,
field windbreaks, and grass strips on a
continuous basis - Enrollees in selected practices program receive
enhanced rental rates, 50-percent cost-sharing
and a per-acre maintenance payment.
23CRP Rents
24CRP Historical Background
- CRP Established in its current form in 1985 to be
administered by USDAs Farm Services Agency (FSA)
ad funded through Commodity credit corporation. - In 1996, CRP was reauthorized, limiting
enrollment to 36.4 million acres at any time. - In 2000, enhanced incentives for continuous
signup - A signing incentive payment of 100 to 150 per
acre - A practice incentive payment equal to 40 percent
of cost-sharing for all continuous signup
practices - As of October 2001, about 1.5 million acres had
been enrolled in the continuous signup, - The 2002 Farm Act increased the enrollment limit
to 39 million acres.
25The Wetland Reserve Program
- WRP was authorized under the 1985 Farm Act.
- Under the 2002 Farm Act, the acreage cap is
increased from 1.075 million acres to 2.275
million acres. - Objective is to enroll 250,000 acres per year
- Options a permanent or30-year conservation
easement or a 10-year cost-share restoration
agreement - USDA pays 100 percent of restoration costs for
permanent easements, and 75 percent for 30-year
easements and restoration cost-share agreements. - Conservation vs . was around 1,300 per acre. The
study also concludes that the WRP achieves
restoration at around 600 per acre.
26Retirement Program and Wetlands
- The 2002 Act expands land retirement by 4 million
acres, WRP enrollment cap more than doubles, from
1.075 million acres to 2.275 million,. In the
CRP, 500,000 acres could be used to enroll farmed
wetlands and associated buffer acreage. - CRP serves to support farmers income-not
environmental needs. Has limits as wetlands
policy framework.
27Working Land
- Working land conservation programs can benefit
wetlands mostly indirectly by reducing
agricultural pollution. - 5.7 billion is available from 2002-2007 and 12
billion from 2002-11 for the Environmental
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), Wildlife
Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP), and
Conservation Security Program (CSP).
28The Environmental Quality Incentives Program EQIP
- EQIP-Provides technical assistance, cost
- sharing (up to 75 percent), and incentive
payments to assist livestock and crop - producers with environmental improvements.
- 60of EQIP's funding earmarked for livestock
producers, - No size limits on livestock operations,
- Payments are limited to a total of 450,000 per
operation over the 6-year life of the Act.
29Conservation Security Fund The Wildlife Habitat
Incentives Program
- The Conservation Security Program will focus on
land-based practices and specifically excludes
livestock waste-handling facilities. Producers
can participate at one of three tiers higher
tiers require greater conservation effort and
offer higher payments. The lowest cost practices
that meet conservation standards must be used. - The Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program provides
cost sharing to landowners and producers to
develop and improve wildlife habitat.
30Swampbuster Established 1985
- . "Swampbuster" - farmers or ranchers lose
eligibility for farm program benefits if they
produce an agricultural commodity on a wetland
converted after December 23, 1985, or if they
convert a wetland after November 28, 1990,. - Swampbuster recognizes four categories of
wetlands. - Wetlands, or areas that contain hydric soils
which support mostly hydrophates - Converted wetlands, defined as areas drained or
altered after December 23, 1985 - Farmed wetlands, or areas partially drained or
altered to produce a crop prior to Swampbuster,
but which still retain some wetland
characteristics - Prior converted wetlands, or areas that were used
for farming prior to Swampbuster and which no
longer exhibit any wetland characteristics.
31Permitting vs. Voluntary Programs
- Permitting cuts down on uncertainty. It can lead
to a more accurate assessment of the inventory of
wetlands. With incentive programs, more work is
necessary to measure wetland gains and losses - In a permitting system, applicants must bear
significant fixed application costs. With
voluntary program, the government pays for
targeting - Voluntary program may be captured.
- Targeting criteria matters acreage maximization
benefits farmers.Should target lands with highest
benefit cost ratio. - Slippage-high commodity prices lead to reuse of
marginal lands or wetlands-should be considered
in design
32Activities of Private Groups
- Easements, Duck Unlimited DU rarely buys wetlands
outright, but negotiates conservation easements.
These agreements are for 10-years. - The nature conservancy has a diversified approach
- Ownership Type Acres
- Conservation Easement 1,400,453
- Management Agreements 1,389,099
- Leases 2,146,745
- Owned by TNC 2,098,950
- TOTAL 7,035,246
33Conservation Partnerships
- One such collaboration between DU and the federal
government is the River CARE project in which DU
and the NRCS have cooperated in implementing the
WRP in the Mississippi Alluvial Valley (MAV).
By 1998, more than 1,500 private landowners in
the MAV were active partners with DU and WRP to
provide and restore wildlife habitat on their
lands. - TNCs Glacial Ridge Project, one of 12 habitats
targeted in the Saving the Last Great Places
campaign, received 1.6 million from NRCS as part
of the USDAs WRP program for a partial easement
payment to restore nearly 2,800 acres of
previously drained wetland and 1,500 acres of
tall grass prairie in Minnesota. Saving the Last
Great Places,
34Private vs. Public Approaches
- Public sector is not forced to pay attention to
factor prices. Private groups have better
incentives to target the land with the highest
level of environmental amenities per dollar
spent. - Private investment in wetland conservation,
includes land purchase expenditures and
investment in improvement on wetland quality. - From the Corps perspective, the land has no
opportunity cost, from a societal perspective the
land is valuable in providing other services.
This, there may be a tendency to over-regulate
and acquire more land than is socially optimal.