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Implications of

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Title: PowerPoint Presentation Author: Angel Gidak Last modified by: Kevin Wolf Created Date: 4/11/2002 10:29:57 PM Document presentation format: Letter Paper (8.5x11 in) – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Implications of


1
Implications of QRS-11 Cases
  • American Conference Institute
  • December 5, 2006
  • Kevin Wolf
  • Partner, Bryan Cave LLP
  • kwolf_at_bryancave.com
  • 202-508-6113

2
Opening Remarks
  • As an attorney involved in the investigation and
    the settlement, I will neither praise nor
    criticize the (March 2006) settlement. A
    settlement is a settlement is a settlement.
  • Draft Charging Letters (DCLs) are at
    http//pmddtc.state.gov/consent_agreements.htm
  • There are, however, many DDTC statements in the
    DCLs that exporters and manufacturers should take
    to heart. The principle behind the QRS-11 cases
    is not limited just to the export of QRS-11
    chips.
  • Standing request for export control humor in
    addition to the four jokes and the eight
    Dilbert cartoons that already exist.

3
Quick Background -- The QRS-11
  • The QRS11 is a MEMS technology solid-state gyro
    on a chip.
  • http//www.systron.com/pro_QRS11.asp
  • http//chinameasurement.com/engshowpro.asp?id388

Chip is about the size of a quarter
4
QRS-11 Basics from DCL
  • Technology developed in 1980s. DCL 10.
  • Chip was a component in Commercial Standby
    Instrument Systems (CSISs or ISFDs) built
    overseas in late 1990s. DCL 10.
  • CSISs are FAA-approved back-up instruments to
    provide altitude, attitude and airspeed
    information to pilots if their primary flight
    instrument systems fail.

5
QRS-11 Basics from DCL cont.
  • DDTC transferred jurisdictional control over
    CSISs to BIS in early 1990s. DCL 27.
  • Boeing never purchased or exported the chips, but
    beginning in 2000, purchased and installed many
    CSISs containing QRS-11s for use in its
    commercial aircraft, many of which were exported.
    DCL 21.
  • DDTC had declared the chips to be
    ITAR-controlled. DCL 7.

6
Jurisdictional Status of QRS-11s Today
  • In January 2004 -- after issue arose in fall
    2003 -- DDTC amended USML to remove QRS-11s when
    integrated into and included as an integral part
    of a CSIS for use on a civil aircraft or
    exported solely for integration into such
    systems. 69 Fed. Reg. 873 (Jan. 7, 2004) and 69
    Fed. Reg. 5928 (Feb. 9. 2004).
  • QRS-11s remain ITAR-controlled if used in (i)
    military aircraft or military other end-items or
    (ii) simulators for civilian or military
    aircraft. USML Cats. VIII(e) and XII(d), (e)
    (2006)

7
See Through Rule
  • DDTC does not use the term.
  • Characterization is that parts and components
    that are ITAR-controlled do not cease to be
    ITAR-controlled by virtue of their incorporation
    into items specifically designed for and used in
    civilian end-uses. DCL 28.
  • Paragraph 5 of Consent Agreement (see next page)

8
Paragraph 5 of Consent Agreement
  • EO 11958 and the AECA authorize DDTC to
    designate what is a defense article or a defense
    service and the ITAR require written
    authorization before such articles are exported
    regardless of whether the underlying defense
    article is used in a commercial system or
    product.
  • The ITAR, through the Commodity Jurisdiction
    (120.4) process, is the only official mechanism
    by which questions regarding jurisdiction and
    categorization may be addressed.

9
Clearing Up Two Misconceptions
  1. DDTC did not declare the commercial aircraft or
    the commercial navigation devices exported to be
    ITAR-controlled. Rather, the chip inside of the
    devices was ITAR-controlled and the chip was what
    required a DDTC license to export or reexport.
  2. Paragraph 5 does not mean exporters cannot make
    self-determinations about whether something is or
    isnt ITAR-controlled. BUT if something was (i)
    specifically designed or modified for military
    end-items or (2) declared by DDTC to be
    ITAR-controlled, then only DDTC can declare it to
    be EAR-controlled through the CJ process.

10
Principal Implications
  • Anything (i) specifically designed or modified
    for a military or spacecraft-related end-item or
    (ii) otherwise declared by DDTC to be
    ITAR-controlled is always ITAR-controlled until
    and unless DDTC declares otherwise in a CJ
    determination, regardless of
  • Incorporation into civilian end-item (foreign or
    domestic) (Compare to EARs Interpretation No. 2)
  • Size or percentage of value in end-item (no de
    minimis rule in ITAR)
  • Age (no statute of limitations in ITAR)
  • Level of sophistication (even if more
    sophisticated civilian items exist)
  • Foreign or domestic availability
  • Specific identification on EARs CCL

11
EARs Interpretation No. 2
  • Rule is almost exactly the opposite of the EARs
    Interpretation 2 regarding the classification
    of parts of machinery, equipment, or other
    items.
  • In instances where one or more assembled
    machines or units of equipment are being
    exported, the individual component parts that are
    physically incorporated into the machine or
    equipment do not require a license. The license
    or general exception under which the complete
    machine or unit of equipment is exported will
    also cover its component parts, provided that the
    parts are normal and usual components of the
    machine or equipment being exported, or that the
    physical incorporation is not used as a device to
    evade the requirement for a license. 15 C.F.R.
     770.1(b)(1).

12
Implication Reaches Far Down
  • Every USML subcategory controls components,
    parts, and accessories specifically designed
    or modified for a defense article listed
    elsewhere in that category.
  • Examples of parts cited in the ITAR are
    rivets, wire, bolts, etc. ITAR 121.8(d)
  • An example of an accessory is special paint.
    ITAR 121.8(c)
  • To repeat The QRS-11 principle reaches deep
    into far less sophisticated widgets until and
    unless DDTC is willing to declare otherwise.

13
Industry Impacts
  1. ITAR-Free Certifications
  2. ITAR-Free Compliance Clauses in Purchase/Sale
    Contracts
  3. Difficult jurisdictional reviews of ancient parts
    or components
  4. Imposition of screens between military and
    civilian sides of shops
  5. Foreign purchaser decisions to exclude US
    suppliers

14
More Industry Impacts
  1. Re-engineering end-items to develop components
    with a completely civilian pedigree
  2. More caution and clarity in contracts for
    development of new parts and components
  3. Reminder that DDTC jurisdictional determinations
    are not judicially reviewable

15
Impact 1 ITAR-Free Certifications
  • Supplier hereby represents and warrants that all
    end-items (including their parts, components,
    accessories, and attachments), software,
    firmware, systems, materials, and/or technical
    data (collectively Items) that it has sold to
    or otherwise provided Purchaser are not subject
    to the jurisdiction of the International Traffic
    in Arms Regulations (ITAR) at 22 C.F.R. pts.
    120-130. In particular, Supplier represents and
    warrants that it has not sold to or otherwise
    provided Purchaser with Items that were defense
    articles identified on the ITARs United States
    Munitions List at 22 C.F.R. 121.1 or otherwise
    specifically designed, developed, configured,
    adapted or modified in any way for a military
    application, military end-item, or a commercial
    satellite, spacecraft or launch application.

16
Impact 2 ITAR Clauses in POs
  • Each Party represents that (i) the Items, and
    the parts and components thereof, it is providing
    under this Agreement are not defense articles
    as that term is defined in 22 C.F.R. 120.6.
    The Parties acknowledge that this representation
    means that an official capable of binding the
    Party providing such Items knows or has otherwise
    determined that such Items, and the parts and
    components thereof, are not on the ITARs
    Munitions List at 22 C.F.R. 121.1. Each Party
    agrees to reasonably cooperate with the other in
    providing, upon request of the other Party,
    documentation or other information that supports
    or confirms this representation.
  • To the extent that such Items, or any parts or
    components thereof, were specifically designed or
    modified for a military end-item or application
    or civilian spacecraft- or satellite-related
    application, the Party providing such Items shall
    notify the other Party of this fact and shall
    also provide the other Party with written
    confirmation from the United States Department of
    State that such Items, and all such parts or
    components thereof, are not subject to the
    jurisdiction of the ITAR.

17
Impact 3 Difficult Jurisdictional Reviews
  • Parts/components may have designed years or
    decades ago
  • Companies are bought and sold
  • Engineers retire, resign, move on, forget
  • Records and business plans unclear about the
    intent behind why a part or component was
    originally designed for military and later
    civilian applications discovered? Always for
    both? Predominant military?
  • DDTCs presumption is that it is ITAR-controlled
    if you say I dont know in CJ request

18
Impact 4 Internal Screens
  • Creation of screens so that widgets originally
    designed or modified for a military end-items do
    not find their way in to civilian end-items being
    created
  • Forces the re-invention of widgets for civilian
    applications without benefit of past RD
  • Forces difficult re-consideration of all data
    directly related to original widget even when
    there is little difference between widget used in
    civilian end-item

19
Impact 5 Exclusion of US Suppliers
  • Unlike the EAR and the OFAC sanctions
    regulations, the ITAR does not contain a de
    minimis rule.
  • Thus, foreign and domestic manufacturers do not
    want to buy ITAR-controlled parts that will
    effectively taint their civilian end-items.
  • Remember ITAR requires foreign persons to get
    DDTC licenses to re-export defense articles, even
    if a component in a foreign-made civilian
    end-item. ITAR 127(a)(3).

20
Impact 6 Re-engineering
  • Instead of subjecting a part arguably
    specifically designed for a military end-item
    that is now useful for a civilian application to
    DDTC licensing, companies will simply re-invent
    the same part specifically for a civilian
    end-item without any reference to data related to
    original part.
  • Often considered quicker to abandon use of old
    parts and re-engineer than to prepare a CJ and
    wait for result.
  • Irony is that newly designed part is often better
    than original part.

21
Impact 7 Contract Clarity
  • The intent behind why a part or component is
    being designed or modified is set forth more
    clearly in contracts to avoid any future doubts
    as to whether it is ITAR- or EAR-controlled
    particularly in USG contracts.
  • Internal jurisdictional determination records are
    becoming more explicit in explaining the
    corporate intent behind why a widget was designed
    and developed. Duel-use business plans are being
    written more precisely.

22
Impact 8 No Judicial Review
  • DDTC has complete discretion in determining what
    is and is not a defense article. Indeed, other
    than in criminal cases, judicial review of DDTCs
    jurisdictional determinations is prohibited by
    law. (22 U.S.C.  2778(h)). In other words,
    there is no authority to sue DDTC if you believe
    it is not applying the USML as written (although
    there is room to try).
  • Thus, when doing a jurisdictional analysis, one
    must not only consider the ITARs words but also
    any DDTC interpretations of or positions
    regarding the words. (See Law and Lore Chart)

23
Two Other Comments on DCL
  • No scienter requirement in Part 127 they are
    strict liability provisions. That is, there is
    no need to find a knowing or a willful
    violation to violate most sections of Part 127.
  • DDTC expectation that one who sells a civilian
    end-item containing an ITAR-controlled component
    must notify the domestic buyers that the
    component in the civilian end-item will require a
    DDTC license to export. DCL 14 and 33 and L-3
    DCL 44.

24
Goodrich/L-3 DCL and Materiality
  • Company submitted a CJ Request that was drafted
    by outside counsel. It described the
    capabilities of the CSIS, but did not state that
    the devices contained QRS-11s. DCL 53.
  • DDTC said that this was a material omission.
  • For a statement to be material, it must have a
    natural tendency to influence, or be capable of
    influencing, the decision.
  • Not necessary that Government was actually
    influenced by statement.
  • Keep these two points in mind in all
    correspondence with US Government.

25
Aiding and Abetting Amendment
  • Outside counsel was not charged, but nonetheless
    alleged to have aided and abetted the making of
    the material omission. DCL 53.
  • On April 21, 2006, DDTC amended the ITAR
    127.1(d) to prohibit anyone from knowingly (in
    addition to then-existing willfully) aiding,
    abetting, causing, counseling, permitting (etc.)
    an ITAR violation. 71 Fed. Reg. 20534.
  • Suggests DDTC willing to prosecute civilly anyone
    who assists in (or causes, counsels, or
    permits) an act of another person that DDTC
    believes constitute an ITAR violation even if
    there was no bad (willful) intent to violate
    the ITAR when the assistance was provided. One
    could violate the ITAR without even knowing it!
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