Title: ISA 562 Information Systems Theory and Practice
1ISA 562Information Systems Theory and Practice
2PUBLIC-KEY CERTIFICATES-1
- What is a certificate?
- A statement claiming some binding of attribute
values - Why do we need them?
- Identifying entities outside of domain
- Distributed access control
- What do they do?
- Propagates claims
- Certifier makes a claim that can be checked for
authenticity and accepted if the recipient
believe the claimant to be truthful - Manages trust distributed trust management
3X.509v1 CERTIFICATE
VERSION SERIAL NUMBER SIGNATURE
ALGORIT ISSUER VALIDITY SUBJECT SUBJECT PUB KEY
INFO SIGNATURE
1 1234567891011121314 RSAMD5, 512 CUS, SVA,
OGMU, OUISE 9/9/99-1/1/1 CUS, SVA, OGMU,
OUISE, CNAlice RSA, 1024, xxxxxx SIGNATURE
4PUBLIC-KEY CERTIFICATES
- For public-key based encryption
- sender needs public key of receiver
- For public-key digital signatures
- receiver needs public key of sender
- To establish an agreement
- both need each others public keys
5CERTIFICATE TRUST
- Acquisition of public key of the issuer to verify
the signature - Go to through a certificate chain
- Whether or not to trust certificates signed by
the issuer for this subject
6PEM CERTIFICATION GRAPH
Internet Policy Registration Authority
IPRA
Policy Certification Authorities (PCAs)
PERSONA
RESIDENTIAL
MID-LEVEL ASSURANCE
HIGH ASSURANCE
Anonymous
MITRE
GMU
Virginia
Certification Authorities (CAs)
Abrams
LEO
Fairfax
CS
Subjects
Grover
Grover
7PUBLIC-KEY CERTIFICATES
- What is a certificate?
- A statement claiming some binding of attribute
values - Why do we need them?
- Identifying entities outside of domain
- Distributed access control
- What do they do?
- Propagate claims
- Certifier makes a claim that can be checked for
authenticity and accepted if the recipient
believe the claimant to be truthful - Manages trust distributed trust management
8SECURE ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS (SET) CA HIERARCHY
Root
Brand
Brand
Brand
Geo-Political
Bank
Acquirer
Customer
Merchant
9Certificate Revocation
- Sometimes, the issuer need to recant certificate
- The subjects attributes have changed
- The subject misused the certificate
- There are forged certificates
- Published in a certificate revocation list
10CRL FORMAT
SIGNATURE ALGORITHM ISSUER LAST UPDATE NEXT
UPDATE REVOKED CERTIFICATES SIGNATURE
SERIAL NUMBER REVOCATION DATE
11X.509 CERTIFICATES
- X.509v1
- basic
- X.509v2
- adds unique identifiers to prevent against reuse
of X.500 names - X.509v3
- adds many extensions
- can be further extended
12X.509v3 CERTIFICATE INNOVATIONS
- distinguish various certificates
- signature, encryption, key-agreement
- identification info in addition to X.500 name
- internet names email addresses, host names, URLs
- issuer can state policy and usage
- good enough for casual email but not for signing
checks - limits on use of signature keys for further
certification - extensible
- proprietary extensions can be defined and
registered - attribute certificates
- ongoing work
13X.509v2 CRL INNOVATIONS
- CRL distribution points
- indirect CRLs
- delta CRLs
- revocation reason
- push CRLs
14HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE
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15HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE WITH ADDED LINKS
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16TOP-DOWN HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE
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17FORREST OF HIERARCHIES
18MULTIPLE ROOT CAs INTERMEDIATE CAs MODEL
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19THE CERTIFICATE TRIANGLE
user
X.509 identity certificate
X.509 attribute certificate
attribute
public-key
SPKI certificate
202-WAY SSL HANDSHAKE WITH RSA
Handshake Protocol
Record Protocol
21SINGLE ROOT CA MODEL
Root CA
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Root CA
User
22SINGLE ROOT CAMULTIPLE RAs MODEL
Root CA
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Root CA
23MULTIPLE ROOT CAs MODEL
Root CA
Root CA
Root CA
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Root CA
User
Root CA
User
Root CA
User
24ROOT CA INTERMEDIATE CAs MODEL
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25MULTIPLE ROOT CAs PLUS INTERMEDIATE CAs MODEL
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26MULTIPLE ROOT CAs PLUS INTERMEDIATE CAs MODEL
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27MULTIPLE ROOT CAs PLUS INTERMEDIATE CAs MODEL
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28MULTIPLE ROOT CAs INTERMEDIATE CAs MODEL
- Essentially the model on the web today
- Deployed in server-side SSL mode
- Client-side SSL mode yet to happen
29SERVER-SIDE MASQUERADING
Bob Web browser
www.host.com Web server
Server-side SSL
Ultratrust Security Services
www.host.com
30SERVER-SIDE MASQUERADING
Bob Web browser
www.host.com Web server
Ultratrust Security Services
Server-side SSL
Server-side SSL
Mallorys Web server
www.host.com
BIMM Corporation
www.host.com
31SERVER-SIDE MASQUERADING
Bob Web browser
www.host.com Web server
Ultratrust Security Services
Server-side SSL
Server-side SSL
BIMM Corporation
Mallorys Web server
www.host.com
Ultratrust Security Services
www.host.com
32MAN IN THE MIDDLEMASQUERADING PREVENTED
Client Side SSL end-to-end
Ultratrust Security Services
Bob Web browser
www.host.com Web server
Bob
Ultratrust Security Services
Client-side SSL
Client-side SSL
BIMM Corporation
BIMM Corporation
www.host.com
Mallorys Web server
Ultratrust Security Services
Ultratrust Security Services
www.host.com
Bob
33ATTRIBUTE-BASED CLIENT SIDE MASQUERADING
Joe_at_anywhere Web browser
BIMM.com Web server
Client-side SSL
Ultratrust Security Services
Ultratrust Security Services
Joe_at_anywhere
BIMM.com
34ATTRIBUTE-BASED CLIENT SIDE MASQUERADING
Alice_at_SRPC Web browser
BIMM.com Web server
Client-side SSL
SRPC
Ultratrust Security Services
Alice_at_SRPC
BIMM.com
35ATTRIBUTE-BASED CLIENT SIDE MASQUERADING
Bob_at_PPC Web browser
BIMM.com Web server
Client-side SSL
PPC
Ultratrust Security Services
Bob_at_PPC
BIMM.com
36ATTRIBUTE-BASED CLIENT SIDE MASQUERADING
Alice_at_SRPC Web browser
BIMM.com Web server
Client-side SSL
SRPC
Ultratrust Security Services
BIMM.com
PPC
Bob_at_PPC