Corruption, Human Rights and Development

1

• Corruption, Human Rights and Development
  the case of the PSAM in South Africa
• United Nations Conference on Anti-Corruption
  Measures, Good Governance and Human Rights
• Warsaw, Poland, 8/9 November 2006

2
The Context of the Eastern Cape

• PSAM dedicated to promoting the effective use of
  public resources and the realisation of
  socio-economic rights in South Africa,
  particularly in its Eastern Cape province
• South African constitution contains commitment to
  progressively realise socio-economic rights
  within available resources, has excellent
  enabling legislation to ensure effective use of
  resources and to combat corruption

3
Excellent legislative framework but weak
implementation

• Lack of separation between implementation and
  oversight arms of government the executive and
  legislature
• Tendency to rely on ex-struggle loyalties and to
  treat accountability as personal favour
• Failure by CSOs to use constitutional
  legislative provisions to participate in
  governance processes
• Tendency to concentrate on macro/policy level and
  to neglect practical issues at site of service
  delivery
• Resulted in widespread acts of corruption,
  conflicts of interest and instances of failed
  service delivery (particularly in provinces)

4
Realisation of Socio-Economic Rights Eastern
Cape

• Since 1994 there has been an increase in access
  to basic services (water, electricity, housing
  etc) for majority of population
• BUT many socio-economic challenges remain
• 72 of EC population continue to live in poverty
  HSRC 2004
• 42 of EC citizens are illiterate EC Treasury
  2005
• Infant mortality rate has increased from 61
  deaths per 1000 live births in 1998 to 72 deaths
  per 1000 births in 2002 (highest rate in South
  Africa) HST 2002

5
Why focus on sub-national expenditure?

• Provinces are the site of service delivery and
  administer the bulk of public expenditure in
  South Africa
• Available expenditure (2006/07) - R 396 billion
• Provincial govt. - R229.3 billion (57.9).
• National govt. - R146.8 billion (37.1).
• Local govt. R 19.7 billion (5).

6
PSAM expands rights-based approach to include
right to social accountability

• Social accountability defined as the right to
  obtain justifications and explanations for the
  use of public resources from those entrusted with
  their management (whether government officials or
  private service providers).
• Those responsible for public resources have an
  obligation to explain/justify how
  decisions/actions have contributed to the
  progressive realisation of citizens
  (socio-economic) rights and to take steps to
  correct ineffective use/abuse of resources
• Corruption (defined as misuse of public power and
  resources for private benefit) breaches the
  accountability obligation and results in the
  violation of socio-economic rights

7
PSAM Initial Focus - Monitoring of Corruption

• Survey of Officials Experiences and Perceptions
  of corruption in 2001
• 48 of officials believed it was understandable
  to accept gifts in response for doing their jobs
• Monitored Eastern Cape government between 1999
  and 2005
• Tracked a total of 691 cases of misconduct,
  corruption, maladministration and conflicts of
  interest. Only 72 (10) resolved
• Total amount involved for all cases R6.9
  billion
• Amount recovered / properly accounted for R325
  million (5)

8
Shift of focus - monitoring accountability
systems

9
Methodology for monitoring social accountability
systems

10
PSAM Monitoring Results

• Conducted detailed monitoring of the performance
  and realisation of rights by Eastern Cape
  Departments of Health, Education, Welfare and
  Housing between 2000 and 2006.
• Evaluation of following 5 accountability
  systems
• Planning and resource allocation system
• Expenditure management system
• Performance management system
• Integrity system
• Oversight system
• Will provide snapshot of findings

11
System 1. Planning Resource Allocation

• None of the 4 departments strategic plans or
  budget documents
• Included an accurate analysis of citizens needs
  (including epidemiological trends, number of
  people without housing, access to clinics,
  schools, nutrition, social grants etc)
• Included accurate information on the departments
  own organisational challenges and operational
  capacity
• Examples
• The Dept of Health failed to produce business
  plans for almost 40 of its HIV/AIDS budget
  between 2000-2004.
• The Dept of Housing failed to identify the number
  and location of citizens requiring housing
  between 1996 and 2006
• The Dept of Education failed to plan for the
  salaries of its excess staff (of an average of 11
  000, mostly teachers) between 2000-2005

12
System 2. Expenditure Management

• The lack of effective planning resulted in the
  inability of the 4 Depts to report effectively
  against plans. As a result their managers, the
  Treasury and oversight bodies were unable to
  monitor their spending effectively
• This resulted in over/under-spending
• Examples
• The Dept of Health failed to account for 73 of
  its (provincial) HIV/AIDS budget between 2000
  2003 (R90.2 m), 26 of budget was unspent (R33
  m).
• The Dept of Housing failed to spend R928 million
  or 29 of its housing budget between 2000 2004
• The Dept of Education overspent its budget by
  R1.1 billion between 2000 - 2004

13
System 3. Performance management

• All 4 Departments
• Failed to maintain proper risk management and
  internal audit systems
• Example
• The EC Dept of Housing has consistently failed to
  monitor quality of new houses built the AG
  found in 2002/2003 that 90 of houses he
  inspected did not conform to national norms and
  standards

System 4. Integrity system

• All 4 Departments
• Lacked effective systems to monitor and enforce
  disciplinary proceedings including adequately
  staffed disciplinary units, the appointment of
  presiding officers and proper maintenance of
  disciplinary databases

14
System 5. Oversight

• All 4 Departments displayed an inability and/or
  unwillingness to address problems raised by the
  Auditor-General (AG)
• Each year since 1996 the AG has raised the same
  issues relating to poor financial controls
• In 2002 the AG pointed out that not a single
  Public Accounts Committee resolution had been
  implemented between 1995 2002
• AG issued disclaimer audit opinion for 77 of
  the total EC budget between 1996 2006
• Disclaimer issued when there is a lack of
  accurate financial records and failure to
  properly record all financial transactions.
• Whilst this does not mean these amounts were
  lost/stolen the province could not properly
  account for the use of R174 billion out of R225
  billion.
• In this context it is impossible to establish
  whether these funds resulted in effective service
  delivery.

15
System 5.Oversight (Cont)
Auditor-Generals Audit Opinions on EC budget
between 1996 2006
Financial Year Amount (R 000s) Disclaimer amount (R 000s) Number of Departments Disclaimed Percentage of budget unaccounted for
1996/1997 16,740,919 16,705,685 10 out of 12 99.8
1997/1998 16,478,201 16,446,118 12 out of 13 99.8
1998/1999 15,622,907 15,571,041 11 out of 13 99.7
1999/2000 16,307,310 16,154,030 10 out of 13 99
2000/2001 18,162,161 17,398,103 8 out of 13 95.8
2001/2002 21,193,288 17,462,395 4 out of 13 82.4
2002/2003 25,031,028 10,334,903 2 out of 13 41.3
2003/2004 29,349,609 16,396,832 3 out of 12 55.9
2004/2005 30,946,019 16,829,917 3 out of 13 54.4
2005/2006 34,880,483 30,209,864 5 out of 13 86.6
Total  224,711,925 173,508,888 77.2
16
PSAM Impact

• Sustained advocacy has contributed to
• Increased public oversight committee awareness
  of importance of accurate financial reporting by
  government departments in EC especially around
  audit disclaimers
• Establishment of a declarations of interest
  register for the EC executive and Legislature in
  2004
• Creation of disciplinary databases in key EC
  service delivery departments in 2005 Health,
  Education
• Improved civil society participation in EC
  governance processes eg established a Human
  Rights Working Group (which meets quarterly)
• Strengthened parliamentary oversight committees
  briefings (with findings recommendations) to
  committee members

17
Lesson need multiple approaches to rights-based
monitoring corresponding advocacy strategies

• Macro level - Policy Monitoring Analysis
  (national/international)- focus on development of
  constitutional provisions, legislation policies
  eg finance regulations, trade policies,
  macro-budget allocations Advocacy strategy
  lobbying policy-makers
• Meso level - Accountability Systems Monitoring
  (sub-national) focus on implementation of
  accountability service delivery systems at site
  of oversight of delivery Advocacy strategy high
  profile (critical) engagement on system
  implementation
• Micro level - Social auditing (local) focus on
  verifying project implementation eg building of
  health centre or school in village Advocacy
  strategy engagement with officials and service
  providers

18
Recommendations

• Balance support for supply and demand aspects of
  accountability. Strengthen capacity of
  duty-bearers to produce requisite information,
  explanations justifications and strengthen
  power of rights-holders to demand, access
  analyse this information
• Provide support for dissemination of
  evidence-based monitoring tools to ensure
  practical policy implementation
• Provide more support for meso-level monitoring of
  accountability systems in LDCs

19
Recommendations (Cont)

• Expand rights-based approach by recognising
  social accountability as a fundamental right to
  obtain explanations and justifications for the
  use of public resources
• Entrench an ethic of justification by elaborating
  clear criteria to justify decisions relating to
  use of public resources long term goal to build
  a society in which the right to social
  accountability justiciable
• Examples of criteria
• Decision-makers should consider all serious
  objections/alternatives to decisions taken and
  have plausible answers to objections and reasons
  for discarding alternatives
• Decision-makers should be able to demonstrate a
  rational connection between the argument,
  evidence and information informing their
  decisions and the decision taken