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That Ol

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Title: Buy vs. Build, Background Subject: PKI04 Author: Kenneth J. Klingenstein Last modified by: Colleen Keller Created Date: 8/20/1995 7:29:49 PM – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: That Ol


1
That Ol STP Stuff (Security, Trust,
Privacy)Kenneth J. Klingenstein and Mark A.
Luker
2
Topics
  • Shibboleth
  • Shib in the News
  • Substance
  • Shib Basics
  • Comparisons to WS-Fed and Liberty likely
    outcomes
  • Federations, InCommon, etc
  • USHER and some PKI initiatives
  • Other Security, Privacy, Trust stuff
  • Whats important
  • Leverage
  • Integration
  • Understanding the new privacy
  • P2P trust

3
Unified field theory of Trust
  • Bridged, global hierarchies of identification-orie
    nted, often government based trust laws,
    identity tokens, etc.
  • Passports, drivers licenses
  • Future is typically PKI oriented
  • Federated enterprise-based leverages ones
    security domain often role-based
  • Enterprise does authentication and attributes
  • Federations of enterprises exchange assertions
    (identity and attributes
  • Peer to peer trust ad hoc, small locus personal
    trust
  • A large part of our non-networked lives
  • New technology approaches to bring this into the
    electronic world.
  • Distinguishing P2P apps arch from P2P trust
  • Virtual organizations cross-stitch across one of
    the above

4
The Udell column 7/23/04
  •  http//www.infoworld.com/article/04/07/23/30OPstr
    ategic_1.html
  • COLUMN   Strategic DeveloperFederating
    identityWeb sites ask for too much information.
    Instead, federated sites should share just
    enough By  Jon Udell July 23, 2004 
  • In last weeks column, I suggested that
    individuals and corporations should be the
    authoritative sources of basic information about
    themselves. That way, if an application needs my
    name, address, and phone number, I can refer it
    to a source that I control and guarantee to be
    correct. But how many applications really need my
    name, address, and phone number? Capturing the
    identity of individuals, along with personal
    information about them, has become a habit. In a
    climate of increasing concern about privacy, its
    a bad habit we must learn to resist.

5
Udell, continued
  • Consider a transaction at a liquor store. To
    prove your age, you present your drivers license
    the all-purpose credential. The card displays
    two items the clerk requires your picture
    (biometric proof of identity) and your birth date
    (proof of age). It also displays facts that the
    clerk doesnt need to know your name and
    address. A printed card cant selectively
    disclose only the required facts. But an
    electronic identity token can.
  • Last week, at a PKI summit hosted by Dartmouth
    College, I heard quite a lot about Shibboleth, an
    approach to federation of identity thats rooted
    in the idea of selective disclosure. Little-known
    in the commercial world, Shibboleth a project
    of the Internet2 consortiums Middleware
    Architecture Committee for Education is gaining
    real traction in the realm of higher education.
    The most widely publicized deployment enables
    students at Penn State University to use their
    home credentials to log in to Napster.

6
Udell, continued
  • Shibboleths protocols overlap in many respects
    with those of the Liberty Alliance Project. And
    in the latest round of specs, Liberty moves
    closer to the Shibboleth philosophy that users
    should control the release of their attributes.
  • How do they differ, then? The Shibboleth model is
    simpler because access to resources is granted by
    institutional role, not by individual identity.
    .
  • Its true that we often need to establish
    individual identity. But beyond cross-university
    resource sharing, there are plenty of cases where
    role-based access, certified by a remote
    authority, will suffice. Look for them, because
    the best way to sidestep liability for collecting
    too much information is to avoid capturing it in
    the first place.

7
Global Justice Information Sharing
InitiativeSecurity Architecture Committee
(SAC)August 18, 2004
  • 830 a.m. 845 a.m. Introductions, Welcoming
    Remarks, and Recap From Last Meeting Gerry
    Coleman Chair
  • 845 a.m. 900 a.m. The National Criminal
    Intelligence Sharing Plan Update Chief Daniel
    Oates Global Intelligence Working Groups (GIWG)
    Connectivity/Systems Committee Chairman
  • 900 a.m. 930 a.m. E-Authentication
    Terminology Briefing John WandeltGeorgia Tech
    Research Institute
  • 930 a.m. 1000 a.m .Discussion Topic There
    are intelligence information sharing systems
    already in place. What is architecture in
    these real-life examples? Do different
    implementations share a common architecture?
  • Group Discussion 1000 a.m. 1100 a.m. Burton
    Group Briefing Dan Blum Research Director, Burton
    Group Doug Moench Senior Consultant, Burton Group
  • 1100 a.m. 1200 Noon Shibboleth and OpenSAML
    Briefing Scott Cantor Ohio State University
  • 1200 Noon 100 p.m. Question and Answer
    Working Lunch Scott Cantor and Burton Group

8
PESC Assembly on the State of E-Authentication
8/20/04
  • Topics to be discussed include
  •        Federal Government to e-Authentication
           Electronic Authentication Partnership
           Shibboleth        Liberty Alliance
           Transitive Trust        Project Meteor
           SAML and OpenSAML        PKI, Digital
    Certificates and NSC Services

9
PESC
  • State of e-Authentication in Higher Education
    Assembly
  • In continuing its focus on standardizing student
    authentication, the Postsecondary Electronic
    Standards Council (PESC) is pleased to announce
    its Assembly on the State of e-Authentication in
    Higher Education. In hosting this Assembly on
    e-Authentication, PESC is bringing together
    various leaders and experts within the higher
    education and technology communities. Over the
    coming year, higher education institutions,
    service providers, systems vendors, state and
    federal agencies, and all supporting suppliers to
    higher education will be making serious
    investments and commitments to online services.
    With the number of emerging technologies,
    standards, specifications, and frameworks, PESC
    is looking to ensure that information is shared
    and communicated so that decision makers have
    solid, reliable information on which to make
    informed decisions. Speakers for the State of
    e-Authentication in Higher Education include
  • David Temoshok Director of Identity Policy
    and Management, U.S. General Services
    Administration who will provide an update on
    the various federal government activities and
    initiatives related to e-Authentication. As Mr.
    Temoshok is Co-Chair of the Electronic
    Authentication Partnership (EAP), he will also
    provide an overview and update on activities
    related to the EAP.
  • - David Yakimaschak Chief Technology Officer,
    JSTOR who will discuss the general state of
    authentication and JSTOR's implementation of
    various authentication protocols, and introduce
    attendees to the newly formed federation called
    InCommon.
  • Howard Gilbert Senior Research Programmer,
    Yale University who will discuss portal
    authentication issues, activities, and
    authentication implementation at Yale University.
  • Robert Morley Associate Registrar, University
    of Southern California, and Board of Directors
    member of both AACRAO and PESC who will discuss
    authentication from the admissions and registrar
    perspective.
  • Scott Cantor Senior Systems Developer, Ohio
    State University and Shibboleth Architect and
    Core Developer, Internet2 who will discuss SAML
    and communicate the future roadmap for Shibboleth
    including relationships between various
    projects, how they might evolve over the next
    12-24 months, and the interoperability and/or
    certification work that Shibboleth will be
    initiating in order to raise the level of
    interoperability.
  • Adele Marsh Vice President, E-Commerce
    Initiatives, AES who will update attendees on
    the Meteor Network, the standards and processes
    it uses, and discuss the future enhancements to
    Meteor.
  • Mark Jones Vice President, Marketing and
    Business Development, National Student
    Clearinghouse who will address high level
    business issues related to PKI and some of the
    specific challenges for higher education.
  • Bernie Gleason Executive Consultant, IBM
    who will discuss the weakest portion of
    authentication security -- password security and
    poor user practices -- and explore ideas how to
    transition stronger authentication practices for
    all customers and all interactions across the
    entire institution. Included will be a look at
    the way in which security tokens and biometrics
    may be deployed in the future.
  • The Assembly on the State of e-Authentication in
    Higher Education is being held in partnership
    with the US Department of Educations Office of
    Federal Student Aid (FSA).

10
Eduserve News July 2004
  • Interoperability the catchword!
  • Eduserv Athens has confirmed its plans to develop
    full interoperability between its existing Athens
    services -
  • one of the largest federated access management
    systems in the world - and Shibboleth origins and
    targets.
  • In addition, Eduserv reiterates its commitment to
    common standards and to the development of Athens
    in
  • compliance with new standards and future user
    needs.
  • Eduserv CTO Ed Zedlewski commented, "We think the
    Shibboleth architecture is likely to become the
  • international standard for academia, and
    therefore we will be offering an access
    management service, both in
  • the UK and beyond, incorporating that
    architecture".

11
Federal government
  • Federal E-Authentication has a number of pilots
    under way. One of them is now Shib.
  • Phase 1 and Phase 2 efforts funded, with
    deliverables due over the next six months
  • Potential phase 3 and 4 would include working on
    a federal federation and peering with Higher Ed
    and other federations.

12
Phase 1 and 2 Deliverables
  • Phase 1 Deliverables
  • Analysis Doc on SAML profiles and futures for
    e-Auth and Shib
  • Analysis Doc comparing InCommon and e-Auth
    concepts, terminology, etc.
  • Proof of concept demonstration of a Shibboleth
    federation inter-operating with the
    E-Authentication architecture
  • Phase 2 Deliverables
  • A document that identifies how the Shibboleth
    demonstration was set up, including lessons
    learned
  • A white paper providing recommendations to both
    the E-Authentication PMO and U.S. Higher
    Education Shibboleth federations on continued
    policy convergence between the communities based
    on the findings of this pilot

13
Shibboleth AA Process
WAYF
Users Home Org
Resource Owner
Resource
14
Shibboleth Architecture
15
Shibboleth Architecture -- Managing Trust
  • Federation


Shib engine
Attribute Server
Target Web Server
Browser
Target Site
Origin Site
16
Milestones
  • Project formation - Feb 2000 Stone Soup
  • Process - began late summer 2000 with bi-weekly
    calls to develop scenario, requirements and
    architecture.
  • Linkages to SAML established Dec 2000
  • Architecture and protocol completion - Aug 2001
  • Design - Oct 2001
  • Coding began - Nov 2001
  • Alpha-1 release April 24, 2002
  • OpenSAML release July 15, 2002
  • v1.0 April 2003
  • v1.1 July 2003
  • V1.2 April 2004
  • V2.0 likely end of the major evolution

17
Shibboleth Status
  • Open source, privacy preserving federating
    software
  • Being very widely deployed in US and
    international universities
  • Target - works with Apache(1.3 and 2.0) and IIS
    targets Java origins for a variety of Unix
    platforms.
  • V2.0 likely to include portal support, identity
    linking, non web services (plumbing to
    GSSAPI,P2P, IM, video) etc.
  • Work underway on intuitive graphical interfaces
    for the powerful underlying Attribute Authority
    and resource protection
  • Likely to coexist well with Liberty Alliance and
    may work within the WS framework from Microsoft.
  • Growing development interest in several
    countries, providing resource manager tools,
    digital rights management, listprocs, etc.
  • http//shibboleth.internet2.edu/

18
GUIs to manage Shibboleth
19
SysPriv ARP GUI
  • A tool to help administrators (librarians,
    central IT sysadmins, etc) set attribute release
    policies enterprise-wide
  • For access to licensed content
  • For linking to outsourced service providers
  • Has implications for end-user attribute release
    manager (Autograph)
  • GUI design now actively underway, lead by
    Stanford
  • Plumbing to follow shortly

20
End-user attribute release manager(Autograph)
  • Intended to allow end-users to manage release
    policies themselves and, perhaps, understand the
    consequences of their decisions
  • Needs to be designed for everyone even though
    only 3 will use it beyond the defaults.
  • To scale, must ultimately include extrapolation
    on settings, exportable formats, etc.

21
Privacy Management Systems
22
Personal Resource Manager
23
Federating Software Comparison
  • Liberty Alliance
  • V 1.1 of their functional specs released 2.0
    under discussion
  • Federation itself is out of scope
  • Open source implementations not emphasized
  • Current work is linked identities
  • Shibboleth
  • V1.2 released 1.3 and 2.0 under development
  • Most standards-based pure open source in
    widening use
  • Current work is attribute release focused
    linking identities in 2.0.
  • WS-
  • Complex framework, consisting of 9 areas, which
    can form a whole cloth solution to the problem
    space, but which need to closely interact with
    each other to do so.
  • Standards process and IPR issues uncertain
  • Will need considerable convention and detail to
    resolve into a working instantiation

24
WS-Fed and Shib
  • Verbal agreements to build WS-Fed
    interoperability
  • Contract work commissioned by Microsoft, executed
    by Shib core development contracts executed by
    mid-September, but work likely not til Spring
  • Discussions broached, by Microsoft, in building
    Shib interoperabilty into WS-Fed
  • Devils in the details
  • Can WS-Fed-based SPs work in InCommon without
    having to muck up federation metadata with
    WS-Fed-specifics?
  • All the stuff besides WS-Fed in the WS- stack
  • The best way to do Shib over SOAP
  • etc

25
Liberty, SAML and Shib
  • Liberty is also SAML-based.
  • Liberty 1.1 has an open-source implementation
    by Ping-ID that is not quite open
  • SAML 2.0 extracts much of the best of Lib and the
    best of Shib. It leaves a lot of Shib (the
    privacy management) and not much of Liberty
  • Shib will be refactored
  • Does Liberty move on to the apps (calendaring,
    presence, etc) or declare victory and go home?

26
Shib Issues going forward
  • Doing OpenSAML 2.0
  • Refactoring Shib
  • Dealing with old code bases, security patches,
    etc.
  • Organizing a Shibboleth Project
  • International coordination on development
  • Moving more into the Shib-related development
    (versus the current Shib-core focus)
  • Promoting Shib-enhanced applications

27
Federations
  • Associations of enterprises that come together to
    exchange information about their users and
    resources in order to enable collaborations and
    transactions
  • Enroll and authenticate and attribute locally,
    act federally.
  • Uses federating software (e.g. Liberty Alliance,
    Shibboleth, WS-) common attributes (e.g.
    eduPerson), and a security and privacy set of
    understandings
  • Enterprises (and users) retain control over what
    attributes are released to a resource the
    resources retain control (though they may
    delegate) over the authorization decision.
  • Several federations now in construction or
    deployment

28
Business drivers - corporate
  • Need to link consumer identities among disparate
    service providers
  • Link corporate employees through a company portal
    to outsourced employee services transparently
  • Allow supply chain partners to access each others
    internal web sites with role based controls

29
Business drivers RE
  • Given the strong collaborations within the
    academic community, there is an urgent need to
    create inter-realm tools, so
  • Build consistent campus middleware infrastructure
    deployments, with outward facing objectclasses,
    service points, etc. and then
  • Federate (multilateral) those enterprise
    deployments with interrealm attribute transports,
    trust services, etc. and then
  • Leverage that federation to enable a variety of
    applications from network authentication to
    instant messaging, from video to web services,
    from p2p to virtual organizations, etc. while we
  • Be cautious about the limits of federations and
    look for alternative fabrics where appropriate.

30
Three Types of federation
  • Internal federations are occurring among the many
    subsidiaries of large companies, especially for
    those companies with more dynamic aggregations.
  • Private federations occur among enterprises,
    typically within a market sector, that want to
    facilitate a specific set of transactions and
    interactions. Many will be bi-lateral, short-term
    or otherwise constrained.
  • Public federations address more free-standing,
    long-term, general-purpose requirements, and need
    to be more open about rules of engagement. Public
    federations face significant scaling issues and
    may not be able to leverage contractual
    relationships that private federations can.

31
Requirements for federations
  • Federation operations
  • Federating software
  • Exchange assertions
  • Link and unlink identities
  • Federation data schema
  • Federation privacy and security requirements
  • Non web services can also leverage federations

32
Policy Basics for federations
  • Enterprises that participate need to establish a
    trusted relationship with the operator of the
    federation in small or bilateral federations,
    often one of the participants operates the
    federation
  • Participants need to establish trust with each
    other on a per use or per application basis,
    balancing risk with the level of trust
  • Participants need to agree on the syntax and
    semantics of the information to be shared
  • Privacy issues must be addressed at several
    layers
  • All this needs to be done on a scalable basis, as
    the number of participants grow and the number of
    federations grow

33
Federal guidelines of relevance
  • NIST Guideline on Risk Assessment Methodologies
  • NIST Guideline on Authentication Technologies and
    their strengths
  • Federal e-Authentication

34
US Shibboleth federations
  • InQueue
  • InCommon
  • Uses
  • Management
  • Policies
  • Shared schema
  • Club Shib
  • NSDL

35
InCommon federation
  • Federation operations Internet2
  • Federating software Shibboleth 1.1 and above
  • Federation data schema - eduPerson200210 or later
    and eduOrg200210 or later
  • Becomes fully operational August 15 or so, with
    several early entrants already in to help shape
    the policy issues.
  • Precursor federation, InQueue, has been in
    operation for about six months and will feed into
    InCommon
  • http//www.incommonfederation.org

36
InCommon Principles
  • Support the RE community in inter-institutional
    collaborations
  • InCommon itself operates at a high level of
    security and trustworthiness
  • InCommon requires its participants to post their
    relevant operational procedures on identity
    management, privacy, etc
  • InCommon will be constructive and help its
    participants move to higher levels of assurance
    as applications warrant
  • InCommon will work closely with other national
    and international federations

37
InCommon Uses
  • Institutional users acquiring content from
    popular providers (Napster) and academic
    providers (Elsevier, JSTOR, EBSCO, Pro-Quest,
    etc.)
  • Institutions working with outsourced service
    providers, e.g. grading services, scheduling
    systems
  • Inter-institutional collaborations, including
    shared courses and students, research computing
    sharing, etc.

38
InCommon Management
  • Operational services by I2
  • Member services
  • Backroom (CA, WAYF service, etc.)
  • Governance
  • Executive Committee - Carrie Regenstein - chair
    (Wisconsin), Jerry Campbell, (USC), Lev Gonick
    (CWRU), Clair Goldsmith (Texas System), Mark
    Luker (EDUCAUSE),Tracy Mitrano (Cornell), Susan
    Perry (Mellon), Mike Teetz, (OCLC), David
    Yakimischak (JSTOR).
  • Project manager Renee Frost (Internet2)
  • Membership open to .edu and affiliated business
    partners (Elsevier, OCLC, Napster, Diebold, etc)
  • Contractual and policy issues being defined now
  • Likely to take 501(c)3 status in the long term

39
InCommon participants
  • Two types of participants
  • Higher ed institutions - .edu-ish requirements
  • Service providers partners sponsored by higher
    ed institutions, e.g. content providers,
    outsourced service providers (WebAssign,
    Roomschedulers, etc)
  • Participants can function in roles of credential
    providers and resource providers
  • Higher ed institutions are primarily credential
    providers, with the potential for multiple
    resource providers on campus
  • Service providers are primarily offering a
    limited number of services, but can serve as
    credential providers for some of their employees
    as well

40
InCommon pricing
  • Goals
  • Cost recovery
  • Manage federation stress points
  • Prices
  • Application Fee 700 (largely enterprise I/A,
    db)
  • Yearly Fee
  • Higher Ed participant 1000 per identity
    management system
  • Sponsored participant 1000
  • All participants 20 Resourceproviderids
    included additional resourceproviderids
    available at 50 each per year, available in
    bundles of 20

41
Trust in InCommon - initial
  • Members trust the federated operators to perform
    its activities well
  • The operator (Internet2) posts its procedures,
    attempts to execute them faithfully, and makes no
    warranties
  • Enterprises read the procedures and decide if
    they want to become members
  • Origins and targets trust each other bilaterally
    in out-of-band or no-band arrangements
  • Origins trust targets dispose of attributes
    properly
  • Targets trust origins to provide attributes
    accurately
  • Risks and liabilities managed by end enterprises,
    in separate ways

42
InCommon Policy Framework
  • Federation-wide
  • Charter
  • Federation Operating Practices Statement (FOPS)
  • List of common attributes
  • The art of federation
  • Participant-specific
  • Submitting an application for participation
  • Participant agreement
  • Participant Operational Practices Statement (POPS)

43
InCommon Trust - ongoing
  • Use trust ?? Build trust cycle
  • Clearly need consensus levels of I/A
  • Multiple levels of I/A for different needs
  • Two factor for high-risk
  • Distinctive requirements (campus in Bejing or
    France, distance ed, mobility)
  • Standardized data definitions unclear
  • Audits unclear
  • International issues

44
Participant Agreement Highlights
  • Agree to post policies
  • Security
  • Basic identity management
  • Privacy
  • Inform InCommon on a timely basis of key
    compromise
  • Be responsible for ResourceProviderIds issued
  • Be responsible for adhering to their POPS
    statement
  • Shared idemnification

45
Participant Operational Practice Statement
  • Basic Campus identity management practices in a
    short, structured presentation
  • Identity proofing, credential delivery and
    repeated authn
  • Provisioning of enterprise-wide attributes,
    including entitlements and privileges
  • Basic privacy management policies
  • Standard privacy plus
  • Received attribute management and disposal

46
Trust pivot points in federations
  • In response to real business drivers and feasible
    technologies
  • increase the strengths of
  • Campus/enterprise identification, authentication
    practices
  • Federation operations, auditing thereof
  • Campus middleware infrastructure in support of
    Shib (including directories, attribute
    authorities and other Shib components) and
    auditing thereof
  • Relying party middleware infrastructure in
    support of Shib
  • Moving in general from self-certification to
    external certification

47
Balancing the operators trust load
  • InCommon CA
  • Identity proofing the enterprise
  • Issuing the enterprise signing keys (primary and
    spare)
  • Signing the metadata
  • Could be outsourced
  • InCommon Federation
  • Aggregating the metadata
  • Supporting campuses in posting their policies
  • Less easy to outsource, especially the organic
    aspects

48
FOPS 1InCommon Federation Operations
  • InCommon_Federation_Disaster_Recovery_Procedures
  • An outline of the procedures to be used if there
    is a disaster with the InCommon Federation.
  • Internet2_InCommon_Federation_Infrastructure_Techn
    ical_Reference
  • Document describing the federation
    infrastructure.
  • Internet2_InCommon_secure_physical_storage
  • List of the physical objects and logs that will
    be securely stored.
  • Internet2_InCommon_Technical_Operations_steps
  • This document lists the steps taken from the
    point of submitting CSR, Metadata, and CRL to
    issuing a signed cert, generation of signed
    metadata, and publishing the CRL.
  • Internet2_InCommon_Technical_Operation_Hours
  • Documentation of the proposed hours of
    operations.

49
FOPS 2InCommon CA Ops
  • CA_Disaster_Recovery_Procedure_ver_0.14
  • An outline of the procedures to be used if there
    is a disaster with the CA.
  • cspguide
  • Manual of the CA software planning to use.
  • InCommon_CA_Audit_Log_ver_0.31
  • Proposed details for logging related to the CA.
  • Internet2_InCommon_CA_Disaster_Recovery_from_root_
    key_compromise_ver_0.2
  • An outline of the procedures to be used if there
    is a root key compromise with the CA.
  • Internet2_InCommon_CA_PKI-Lite_CPS_ver_0.61
  • Draft of the PKI-Lite CPS.
  • Internet2_InCommon_CA_PKI-Lite_CP_ver_0.21
  • Draft of the PKI-Lite CP.
  • Internet2_InCommon_Certificate_Authority_for_the_I
    nCommon_Federation_System_Technical_Reference_ver_
    0.41
  • Document describing the CA.

50
FOPS 3 InCommon Key Signing Process
  • 2. Hardware descriptions         a. Hardware
    will be laptop and spare laptop with no network
    capabilities, thumb drive, CDRW drive, media for
    necessary software 3. Software descriptions
            a. OS, OpenSSL, CSP, Java tools for meta
    data 4. Log into computer 5. Generation of the
    CA Private Root key and self-signing 6.
    Generation of the Metadata signing key 7.
    Generate CSR for Internet2 origin 8. Signing of
    new metadata sites and trusts files 9. Backup
    copies of all private keys and other operational
    backup data are generated. 10. Verify CD's and
    MD5 checksum 11. Write down passphrase and put
    in envelopes and sign envelopes 12. Securely
    store CA hardware and contents of local safe in
    safe 13. Log that these actions occurred on the
    log in safe and then close and lock the safe 14.
    Put thumb drive into secure db and copy data onto
    secure db 15. Take private key password archive
    and other contents to Private Key Password safe
    deposit box and record in log that this was done.
    16. Take operational data archive to Operation
    Data safe deposit box and record in log that this
    was done.

51
FOPS 4 InCommon Process Tech Review
  • As a technical review group, we, the undersigned,
    reviewed the processes and the following
    components documenting the operations of
    InCommon, and discussed them with the Internet2
    Technical and Member Activities staff. To the
    best of our knowledge and experience, with no
    warranty implied, we believe the operational
    processes and procedures Internet2 provided are
    acceptable to begin the operations of InCommon.
  • Scott Cantor, OSU
  • Jim Jokl, UVa
  • RL Bob Morgan, UW
  • Jeff Schiller, MIT

52
The art of federation
  • Prudence in ResourceProviderIds
  • Use of targetedId (anonymous, persistent state)
  • Original warnings
  • Ability to request target amnesia/reset
  • Diagnostics of fine-grain access control
  • Overlapping and interacting federations

53
The Research and EducationFederation Space
Indiana
Slippery slope - Med Centers, etc
54
International federation peering
  • Shibboleth-based federations being established in
    the UK, Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland,
    Australia, Spain, and others
  • International peering meeting slated for October
    14-15 in Upper Slaughter, England
  • Issues include agreeing on policy framework,
    comparing policies, correlating app usage to
    trust level, aligning privacy needs, working with
    multinational service providers, scaling the WAYF
    function
  • Leading trust to Slaughter

55
Upper Slaughter, England
56
Next Steps
  • Federated software alignment and interoperability
  • Fully establishing persistent federations
  • End-user ARP management tools (Autograph)
  • Coordination of federation policy underpinnings
  • Escalating levels of trust

57
PKI Items
  • Multiple paths to trust
  • Libpkix is out, so is Steve Hanna, sigh
  • Digicert
  • USHER

58
Multiple Paths to Trust
  • NIST/NIH/Internet2 4th Annual PKI Conference
    April, 2005
  • Inclusive scope
  • Particular interest in overlap issues
  • GUI
  • Policy
  • Technical

59
USHER and a PKI initiative
  • USHER a progressive CA for
  • Business face
  • Technical Ops we hope Dartmouth
  • Policy - InCommon PMA, PKI-lite CP/CPS
  • An initiative
  • Campus application package (PKi)
  • A campus deployment approach with a business plan
  • An evolutionary approach to interrealm and
    bridged use
  • Consistency of profiles
  • Consistency of policies
  • Expression in InCommon attribute assertions
    (authncontext field)

60
Whats Important, in the long-term imho
  • If Shib/InCommon succeeds, how can it be
    leveraged to
  • Improve security, including PKI
  • Increase LOA
  • Simplification federated authn/authz
  • Application driven PKI
  • P2P trust and technologies
  • Better understandings of privacy
  • Anonymous non-trackable
  • Anonymous trackable (subpoenable)
  • Denial of privacy
  • EU directives

61
Peer to peer trust
  • A bedrock of human existence
  • Completely intuitive, sometimes contradictory and
    soft around the edges
  • Translation into technology is difficult
  • PGP and webs of trust most successful
  • X.509 Proxy Certs a new, odd option
  • Issues over transitivity, integration into
    applications, user management are hard
  • Some new technologies, embedded within MS
    Longhorn, present an option that will have a
    large embedded base
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