Sanctions, Leniency and Settlement

1
Sanctions, Leniency and Settlement
WHAT MAKES COMPETITION POLICY WORK?
Stefano Macchi di Cellere 3rd Lear Conference on
the Economics of Competition Law Rome, June 26,
2009
2
EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONSEU-US DETERRENCE

• DETERRENT EFFECT
• Proportionality vs. Predictability of Sanctions
• Fines vs. Damages
• Administrative vs. Criminal Sanctions

Stefano Macchi di Cellere 3rd Lear Conference on
the Economics of Competition Law Rome, June 26,
2009
3
LENIENCY PROGRAMMES

• STRENGHTS
• Cartelist fine reduction or immunity
• Competition Authority time and cost savings
  efficiencies
• Consumers augmented discovery of cartels
• ISSUES
• Confidentiality and Certainty
• Private Damages - Amount of Sanctions Balance
• Multiple Jurisdictions Protection

Stefano Macchi di Cellere 3rd Lear Conference on
the Economics of Competition Law Rome, June 26,
2009
4
EU SETTLEMENT / US PLEA BARGAINING

• TRANSPARENCY
• While the Commission enjoys a broad discretion
  in the proceeding, the DoJ has to evaluate the
  case in light of established principle
• CERTAINTY
• The EU program lacks predictability as to the
  possible outcome of the negotiations, while the
  US program places great emphasis on the
  possibility for the parties to predict the
  outcome of the case
• CONFIDENTIALITY
• Both jurisdictions grant confidentiality to the
  parties that decide to lodge a settlement
  submission
• AWARDING OF REDUCTIONS
• The Commission can apply only a fixed 10
  reduction of the total fine, while the DoJ takes
  into account the specific circumstances of the
  case to decide the amount of the reduction

Stefano Macchi di Cellere 3rd Lear Conference on
the Economics of Competition Law Rome, June 26,
2009