Marc Laroche

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The Trusted PKI

• Marc Laroche
• Manager, Product Evaluation
• marc.laroche_at_entrust.com
• [phone]

2
Agenda

• The Entrust PKI, an overview
• Evaluation approach
• Common Criteria Certification Functionality and
  assurance covered
• What is next? Entrust/PKI v5.0 evaluation
• Summary

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Entrust/PKI
The main components
Entrust/Authority
OS
CM
Database
LDAP
OS
X.500 Directory
4
Entrust/PKI
The main components
Entrust/Authority
OS
Entrust/RA
Admin API
CM
Database
CM
PKIX-CMP
OS
LDAP
OS
X.500 Directory
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Entrust/PKI
The main components
Entrust/Authority
OS
Entrust/RA
Admin API
CM
Database
CM
PKIX-CMP
OS
LDAP
Entrust-Ready Applications
OS
Other CAs
OS
CM
OS
X.500 Directory
Other Applications
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Evaluation Scope
Database
Entrust/Authority
Entrust/RA
ADM API
PKIX-CMP
Other Applications
CM
X.500 Directory
Entrust-Ready Applications
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Evaluation Scope
Database
Entrust/Authority
Entrust/RA
ADM API
PKIX-CMP
Non Entrust-Ready Applications
CM
X.500 Directory
Entrust-Ready Applications
8
Evaluation Scope
Database
Entrust/Authority
Entrust/RA
ADM API
PKIX-CMP
Non Entrust-Ready Applications
CM
X.500 Directory
Entrust-Ready Applications
9
Evaluation Scope
Database
Entrust/Authority
Entrust/RA
ADM API
PKIX-CMP
Non Entrust-Ready Applications
CM
X.500 Directory
Entrust-Ready Applications
10
Entrust/PKI 4.0a CertificationEvaluated
Functionality

• User identification and authentication

Entrust/Authority
Entrust/RA
ADM API
PKIX-CMP
End-Entities
Other CAs
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• User identification and authentication
• User IA before any action (FIA_UID.2 and
  FIA_UIA.2)
• Password rules (FIA_SOS.1)
• Single use authentication for user
  initialization, key recovery and enabling of CA
  cross-certification (FIA_UAU.4)
• Enforced re-authentication to complete sensitive
  operations and after session time-out has
  occurred (FIA_UAU.6)
• Protected authentication feedback (FIA_UAU.7)
• Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)

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• Access Control

Entrust/Authority
Entrust/RA
ADM API
PKIX-CMP
Data
Access Control Mediation
End-Entities
Other CAs
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• Access Control
• Complete access control on CA data objects (e.g.
  CA signing key, user privilege vector, policy,
  etc) and functions (FDP_ACC.2)
• Security attribute based access control (i.e.
  user id, role and permissions) (FDP_ACF.1)
• Secure management of security attributes,
  including access control and enforcement of
  secure values (FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3,
  FIA_ATD.1)
• Secure management of security enforcing data
  objects (e.g. integrity check rate, database
  encryption algorithm, CA signing algorithm,
  etc.), including access control and enforcement
  of secure values (FMT_MTD.1 and FMT_MTD.3)

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• Separation of duties

Security Officer
Entrust/Authority
Entrust/RA
Administrator
ADM API
Master User
PKIX-CMP
Auditor
Directory Administrator
End User
Others (Custom-defined)
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• Separation of duties
• Maintenance of roles and associations between
  users and roles (FMT_SMR.2)
• Management of security functions behavior
  restricted to distinct roles (FMT_MOF.1 and
  FMT_SAE.1)

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• Key Management

Database
Entrust/Authority
Entrust/RA
X.509v3 PKCS1,3 FIPS 140-1 FIPS 186-1 PKIX-CMP
ADM API
CM
X.500 Directory
End User
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• Key Management
• Certificate-based key management that meets the
  following standards X.509v3, PKCS1 and 3, FIPS
  140-1 and 186-1, LDAP, PKIX-CMP (FCS_CKM.2)
• User initialization, key update, key recovery and
  encryption key back-up IAW PKIX-CMP and FIPS
  140-1 (FCS_CKM.3)
• Use of secrets generated by a FIPS 140-1
  cryptographic module is enforced (FIA_SOS.2)

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• Audit
• Audit records are generated for a defined list of
  events each record includes log number, event
  description, severity level, user id, user type
  and state (FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2)
• Any modification to audit records is detected
  (FAU_STG.2)
• Privileged users are provided with the capability
  to read audit records and look for specific
  information based on user-defined search criteria
  (FAU_SAR.1 and FAU_SAR.3)

Database
Entrust/Authority
Entrust/RA
ADM API
X.500 Directory
PKIX-CMP
End Users
Other CAs
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• Trusted Path and Data Protection

Database
Entrust/Authority
Entrust/RA
ADM API
PKIX-CMP
CM
End Users
X.500 Directory
Other CAs
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• Trusted Path and Data Protection
• Communications with remote administrative users,
  end users and external CAs are authenticated and
  protected from modification and disclosure
  (FTP_TRP.1)
• Communications involved with automatic key
  management operations (e.g. key update) are
  protected from modification and disclosure
  (FTP_ITC.1)
• The access control policy is enforced when data
  is transmitted and received, and modification,
  deletion, insertion or replay is detected
  (FPT_ITI.1)
• Exchanged data is consistently interpreted
  (FPT_TDC.1)
• Generation of evidence of origin for CA
  certificates, user certificates, CRLs and ARLs is
  enforced, and the capability to verify the
  evidence of origin is provided (FCO_NRO.2)

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• Trusted Path and Data Protection (continued)
• Generation of evidence that can be used as a
  guarantee of the validity of CA certificates,
  user certificates, CRLs and ARLs is enforced, and
  the capability to verify evidence of the validity
  is provided (FDP_DAU.1)
• Data stored in the local database is monitored
  for integrity errors (FDP_SDI.1)

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• Non-bypassability
• Security enforcing functions are invoked and
  succeed before each function within the CA
  allowed to proceed (FPT_RVM.1)

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• Cryptographic services (Environmental)

Database
Entrust/Authority
Entrust/RA
ADM API
PKIX-CMP
CM
End-Users
X.500 Directory
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• Cryptographic services
• Key and secret generation is performed by a FIPS
  140-1 validated module (FCS_CKM.1 and
  FIA_SOS.2.1)
• All plaintext keys are zeroized by a FIPS 140-1
  validated cryptographic module (FCS_CKM.4)
• All cryptographic operations, including
  pseudo-random number generation, short term key
  storage, encryption/decryption, signature
  generation and verification, hashing and MAC
  generation and verification are performed by a
  FIPS 140-1 validated cryptographic module
  (FCS_COP.1)

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• Abstract Machine Services (Environmental)
• Reliable time stamps are provided for own use
  (FPT_STM.1)
• Audit records are protected against unauthorized
  deletion (FAU_STG.2.1)
• A security domain for own execution is
  maintained, which provides protection against
  interference and tampering by untrusted
  applications (FPT_SEP.1)

OS
OS
Entrust/Authority
Entrust/RA
Audit
ADM API
PKIX-CMP
Time
Time
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And what EAL3 means

• Internal development processes and systems were
  documented and reviewed.
• Configuration management (source code,
  documentation, test plans) evidence that CM is
  actually used measures that allow only
  authorized changes to configuration items.
• Security measures (physical, procedural,
  personnel and other used to protect the
  development environment).
• Flaw reporting procedures
• Problem tracking
• Product delivery
• Design was documented and reviewed for
  conformance with claimed functionality.
• Informal functional specification
• High-level design (description of security
  functions in terms of subsystems and relates
  subsystems to the functions that they provide
  description of the interfaces between these
  subsystems).

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Continued ...

• User documentation was reviewed
• Installation guidance
• Administrative guidance
• Informal correspondence demonstration was
  reviewed
• More abstract representation (claimed
  functionality) is correctly and completely
  refined in the less abstract representation (FS
  and HLS).
• Test plans, test procedures, expected test
  results and actual test results were submitted
  and reviewed
• Demonstrate that each security function was
  tested against the functional specification in a
  systematic manner.
• Demonstrate that the tests are sufficient to
  confirm that the security functions operate IAW
  the High-Level Design demonstrate that the
  internal interfaces are exercised.
• Vulnerability analysis was submitted and
  reviewed.
• Categorization report was submitted and
  reviewed.
• subcomponents are described as security enforcing
  or not.

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Entrust/PKI 5.0 evaluationAugmented from 4.0a

• Functionality
• Enforced proof of receipt - keys and certificate
  (FCO_NRR.2)
• Residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)
• Automated recovery of services (FPT_RCV.2)
• Replay detection - certificate request
  (FPT_RPL.1)
• Session locking (FTA_SSL.1 and FTA_SSL.2)
• Assurance - EAL-CS2
• ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
• AVA_MSU.2 Validation of analysis

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In summary

• The Entrust/PKI evaluations cover
• cryptographic services
• essential public key management functionality
• supportive security critical functionality
• The Common Criteria certification serves as a
  fundamental extension to the FIPS 140-1 process.
• The selected CC assurance components (EAL3)
  provide a maximum amount of confidence consistent
  with existing best practices for COTS
  development.

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Questions?
For more information http//www.entrust.com/entru
st/validation.htm E-mail marc.laroche_at_entrust.co
m Tel [phone]