Rational Choice Analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis

1
Rational Choice Analysis of the Cuban Missile
Crisis

• PO 326 American Foreign Policy

2
Questions About the Crisis

• Following from Allison and Zelikow, we will focus
  on how each theoretical perspective addresses
  these questions
• 1. Why did the USSR decide to place offensive
  missiles in Cuba?
• 2. Why did the US respond to the deployment
  with a blockade?
• 3. Why did the USSR withdraw the missiles?

3
Why Were Missiles Deployed?

• Recall tenets of rational choice theory (RCT)
• Most US officials firmly believed that the
  Soviets would not place missiles in Cuba based
  on rational analysis of Soviet actions, motives,
  and position
• Non-offensive weapon pledge by USSR
• Kents analysis Deployment would benefit USSR,
  but would constitute abnormal, extremely risky
  behavior
• Discovery came as shock, because it deviated from
  rational analysis

4
Why Were Missiles Deployed?

• After discovery, meetings generated four RCT
  hypotheses about reasons for deployment
• 1. Cuban Defense from US invasion
• 2. Political Maneuver (harm US global position by
  exploiting previous Kennedy weakness,
  rapprochement with China)
• 3. Rectify nuclear imbalance (counter US IRBMs in
  Europe, Turkey)
• 4. Force a favorable settlement of the Berlin
  crisis by springing surprise win, trade, or
  trap (election ploy)

5
Why Were Missiles Deployed?

• All RCT hypotheses are plausible, but there are
  reasons to believe that each may not be
  supported
• 1. Deterrence already accomplished less drastic
  means could have been employed to
  accomplish nuclear defense timeline of
  deployment inconsistent with defense
• 2. American strength concerning world politics
  likely reestablished too large to be a probe of
  US resolve deployment was in US stronghold
• 3. Could have waited for ICBM force to equalize
  balance with much less risk
• 4. Deployment seemed too slow and sloppy to
  present US with fait accompli regarding
  Berlin (no camouflage, U-2s allowed to spy
  despite SAM installations)

6
Why Were Missiles Deployed?

• In the end, the Berlin scenario was the one
  adopted by US as the working assumption
  concerning the reasons the missiles were
  deployed, but other factors (e.g. missile power)
  were considered important as well still
  maintained RCT view at outset

7
Why Blockade?

• ExComm deliberated for nearly two weeks about
  possible responses. There were several scenarios
  considered
• 1. Do Nothing
• 2. Diplomatic Track
• 3. Minimal Air Strikes to Remove Missiles
• 4. Large-Scale Air Strikes followed by Invasion
• 5. Secret Approach to Castro (disavow USSR or
  face invasion)
• 6. Blockade

8
Why Blockade?

• There were several benefits and drawbacks
  associated with each option
• 1. Doing nothing averted crisis (move may have
  been insignificant anyway), but steep domestic
  and international political costs
• 2. Diplomacy could avert nuclear war, but would
  concede point to USSR and compromise allies
• 3. Minimal air strikes would show resolve, but
  might not remove all missiles and would cause
  Soviet casualties, guaranteeing escalation (Cuba
  and Berlin)
• 4. Invasion would remove missiles and Castro, but
  at immense cost and certain escalation (Berlin)
• 5. Secret approach would avert war and embarrass
  Soviets, but Castro highly unlikely to go for it
• 6. Blockade would show resolve while diminishing
  risk of escalation, but would not remove missiles
  and would put US out of position

9
Why Blockade?

• In the end, Kennedy opted for the blockade as a
  first step (with the real possibility of
  escalation), as it would effectively signal US
  resolve and intentions while reducing the
  potential risks and costs in the short-term

10
Why Were the Missiles Removed?

• The fact that the blockade was only an initial
  step, and that Kennedy made this point clear,
  likely signaled to Moscow ample US resolve
• In essence, then, US resolve to utilize its
  nuclear superiority and conventional superiority
  in the region seem to be primary factors in the
  decision to back down
• Still, Khrushchev apparently sought to push the
  US toward a more favorable settlement (continued
  defiance, requesting immediate trade, shootdown
  of U-2) before finally settling for the non-quid
  pro quo Jupiter deal

11
Lessons from the Application of RCT to the Crisis

• RCT can often provide an accurate guide to
  explaining foreign policy actions (e.g.,
  blockade)
• However, using RCT to understand adversaries
  actions in a strategic setting is greatly
  complicated by uncertainty of their intentions
  (e.g., why the USSR deployed missiles)
• In this context, actions that may not be the
  result of rational, unitary calculation but
  that are seen as the result of such calculation
  by others may lead to disastrous reactions
  (e.g., U-2 shootdown)
• It is possible that other perspectives are
  necessary to fully understand foreign policy
  decision-making