The

1
The Few and the Many RAF Spitfire and
Luftwaffe Bf 109 Fighters in the Battle of
BritainDavid Isby

• MARYLAND MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY
• CURTIS B. VICKERY ROUND TABLE OF AMERICAN
  MILITARY HISTORY
• 20 December 2012

2
The Decisive Duel Spitfire vs 109

• Dual biography of the two Second World War
  fighter aircraft.
• Best known for their decisive roles in the Battle
  of Britain.
• Before the Battle, three key races, affecting the
  European balance of power.
• Race to design and fly the first modern fighter.
• Race to produce and deploy modern fighters.
• Race to integrate these fighters into effective
  war-fighting organizations.
• The first race starts in 1933. The last does not
  finish until the opening stages of the Battle of
  Britain.

3
May 1940 Ability of Fighters to Exert Strategic
Impact Demonstrated

• The Luftwaffes Bf 109s won the war on 13-14 May
  1940 over France.
• No one but the German fighter pilots noticed it.
• On 13 May, control of the air over the Meuse
  crossings allowed Luftwaffe to provide bombing
  that enabled advance.
• On 14 May, defended bridges over the Meuse from
  air attack.
• Showed how fighters could win a war, by enabling
  other forces (in this case the panzer divisions).
  Most air arms considered that only bombing could
  be decisive.
• RAF, emphasizing strategic bombing, did not see
  how airpower could be decisive by enabling ground
  forces.
• Germans were unable to convert this to a final
  success either militarily (Dunkirk) or
  diplomatically (no peace).

4
Dunkirk, 1940

• RAF Fighter Command commits home defense forces
  in large number out of reach of UK-based radar
  (part of IADS).
• All but three squadrons of Fighter Command
  committed, provides needed combat experience (but
  losses of experienced pilots irreplaceable).
• First large-scale battles between Spitfires and
  Bf 109s. RAF has to defeat escorted bombers, not
  considered much pre-war.
• RAF has to chose between operating in squadrons
  (assuring coverage) or wings (assuring
  concentration).
• Choice becomes more important when Battle of
  Britain opens (and the time to form up the wing
  means will not be able to intercept before the
  bombers hit targets s. of London).

5
The Messerschmitt Bf 109E and the Jagdwaffe

• Bf 109 was originally designed for air defense
  against bombers.
• Role changed with German offensive strategy.
• Spanish Civil War experience showed other
  missions needed to perform.
• Twin-engine Bf 110 designed for offensive
  operations (longer range, HF radio, armament).
  Potentially highly lethal, used ineffective
  tactics.
• LW had advantage of superior tactics, good
  training, but way fighters used prevented them
  from using their strengths and made limitations
  (short range, no external tanks) key.
• Numerical superiority undercut by lack of spares,
  inability to rotate pilots.

6
The Supermarine Spitfire RAF Fighter Command

• Spitfire was doing what it was designed for,
  daylight air defense as part of Fighter Command,
  part of an integrated air defense system (IADS).
• Intended to defeat unescorted bombers.
• Fortunate that Hawker Hurricane had been in
  service a year before Spitfire.
• RAF learned how to fly modern fighters on the
  Hurricane just before Spitfire arrived.
• Hurricane has older design (high drag, slower
  speed though same engine as Spitfire) but some
  older structural elements helps for
  production/repair.
• Combat experience shows that the side with the
  best fighter can inflict large losses on
  numerically superior but less performing
  opponents like Hurricanes without Spitfires.

7
Building the Spitfire and 109

• September 40 Britain produces 470 single-engine
  fighters, Germany produces 178.
• Britain cuts production of spares to 6 pct of
  output short-term surge.
• Germans have multiple factories for 109 (Erla,
  Fiesler, Arado, AGO). UK 1 .
• German mobilization goes ahead, but inefficient,
  committed to early victory.
• WW2 in air underlines importance of industry
  operational capability.
• Second Spitfire factory (Castle Bromwich.
  Designed for assembly line) coming on line in
  summer 1940, building Spitfire II.
• Spitfire production centred at Southampton,
  bombed out in late September, importance of
  second line, Hurricane production.

8
Setting up the Battle

• After Dunkirk, Britain surges industrial
  production, adds pilots (foreign), improves
  existing aircraft (100 0ctane fuel, armour, some
  self-sealing fuel tanks, constant speed
  propellers) absent before.
• Operates at prewar bases, near factories.
• LW in constant action since 10/5/40, no rotation
  of pilots, short on munitions, fuel, spare parts.
  (Limiting numbers of airplanes they can put up
  in Battle).
• Operates from improvised fields in France, at end
  of long and non-responsive supply lines.
• LW had looked at potential of having to wage air
  war through bombing (though a 38 kriegsspiel
  showed the best way to win was hit ports in
  conjunction with U-boats).
• But both sides largely improvise.

9
10 July 8 August Opening Stages

• 10 July-8 August. Opening stage. Attacks on
  Channel shipping, try and draw RAF into air
  battles where LW numbers will prevail.
• RAF fights limited liability battles,
  concentrates on preparing for main battle.
• Germans plan for and prepare invasion, though
  Hitler does not take a hands-on role. Fuhrer War
  Directive 16, 16/7, orders preparations. Offers
  final demand for peace.
• But LW leadership does not come up with a viable
  way to defeat RAF in limited time (October latest
  possible invasion)
• 13 August start of offensive against RAF.
  Failure to prevail sets next phase of Battle.

10
15 August Black Thursday

• 15 August was to be Alder Tag.
• Shows importance of weather.
• Improvised after failures of 13 August.
• Show vulnerability of Bf 110, unescorted bombers
  over Britain.
• Powerful blows against radars, aircraft
  factories, airfields largely wasted because
  Germans could not assess, did not know when
  needed to repeat, or what was important to
  winning the Battle (did not focus on fighter
  fields or factories)
• Show bombers could not survive without escorts.
• Therefore, key limit is number of fighters (NOT
  bombers ) that can be put in air.
• Short range of Bf 109 could cover invasion
  beaches but defeating RAF problematic.

11
8 August 6 September Attacks on Airfields,
Aircraft Industries

• Most intense attacks on RAF targets.
• Last 10 days of August, RAF loses 126 fighter
  pilots (14 pct of total, 60 pct of them
  experienced and hence irreplaceable).
• Germans lack of intelligence, systematic
  targeting, effective doctrine.
• RAF short of pilots, but able to rotate squadrons
  to north.
• Germans continue buildup of invasion barges
  despite intense RAF bombing.
• Importance of intelligence, ULTRA, photo recon,
  to British.

12
15 September The Decisive Day?

• 15 September Battle of Britain Day.
• Germans send two escorted mass daylight raids
  against London.
• Neither does well.
• Map shows the afternoon raid as it heads for
  London over a massive frontage.
• Gets hit by 11 Group squadron forward en route
  and 12 Group big wing over London
• While RAF claims massively exaggerated, evident
  to Germans that they remain strong.
• Hitler orders invasion postponed 17 September,
  though had been leaning towards that before.

13
Transition From the Battle to the Blitz,
September 1940 May 1941

• LW has to improvise an independent air war at
  night after daylight attacks fail.
• Something they had invested in, why have KG 100
  and navigation aids (RAF, which embraced
  independent air war, lacks).
• Germans reluctant to shift to night operations
  until after RAF bombs Berlin .
• Shift to night bombing plays to LW strength, RAF
  weakness (Fighter Command IADS day-only).
• British have to improvise night air defenses,
  only start to become effective as the Blitz is
  ending. Continue to refine defenses.
• 1944 Baby Blitz utter failure.
• Germans cannot counter Allied bomber offensives
  (V-1/2).

14
The Battle in History

• British tend to see it as climactic action, end
  of March of Conquest that started in Rhineland,
  sent message to US, Soviets. Saving of western
  civilization.
• Germans see it as part of March of Conquest that
  ended at Stalingrad, see the daylight (8-9/40)
  offensive as the less successful opening stage of
  the (largely night) air offensive running to
  5/41. See invasion threat as not credible.
  Battle was a tactical adjustment in a battle they
  win.
• Germans point to losses suffered by RAF offensive
  operations against invasion ports. It would be
  1942 before RAF could achieve LW level of night
  bombing effectiveness.
• Difficulty/importance of narrative.
• The final race is to determine who wins.