Students

1
Students Understanding of Human Nature An
Analogical Approach
R. BROCK FROST AND ERIC AMSEL Weber State
University

• Abstract
• Psychology, Science and Humanities students were
  interviewed to assess their judgments of how
  human beings, animals (great apes), and machines
  (computers) were alike. Science students were
  more likely than others to judge that human
  beings and animals were similar, but Psychology
  students were more likely to justify their
  judgments with relational analogies than literal
  similarities.

• Methods
• Participants
• Students were initially screened to assess their
  academic background. Those with appropriate
  backgrounds were then contacted and offered 5.00
  to participate in the study. The sample consisted
  of 30 (15M and 15F) seniors or juniors who were
  majoring in Psychology (N10), Natural Science
  (N10 3 Physics, 3 Microbiology, and 4 Zoology),
  or Arts and Humanities (N10 8 English, 1
  History, and 1 Communication).
• Interview
• Participants judgments and justifications of the
  similarity of humans and animals and humans and
  machines were assessed in an interview format.
  The interview began with general questions
  regarding the similarity between humans and
  animals or machines. Other questions were also
  posed, but only the results from the general
  questions are reported. Participants were asked,
  To what extent are human beings similar to
  animals (e.g., great apes)/machines (e.g.,
  computers)? Participants recorded their ratings
  on a 7-point scale, anchored by Not at all
  Similar (1), A Little Similar (2), Somewhat Alike
  (3) Moderately Similar (4), A Good Deal Alike
  (5), Very Alike (6), Identical (7).
• Participants were probed about their ratings of
  entity similarity with follow-up questions such
  as, Why do you say that they are _________?,
  What makes them ______?, and What exactly are
  you saying is alike about humans and _______?
  The probes were designed to elicit justifications
  for participants similarity ratings. The
  justifications were coded as literal similarity
  (elements of one entity are also found in the
  other) or relational analogy (relations between
  elements in one entity are also found in another)
  based on Gentner Woolf (2000). An intermediate
  code was also established for cases with elements
  of each justification (partial analogy).
• There were two orders of presenting the
  interview. Half the participants in each group
  were first posed questions addressing
  human/animal similarities and the other half were
  posed questions addressing human/machine
  similarities.

• Results
• Justifications were coded on an interval scale,
  with Literal Similarity coded as 1, Partial
  Analogy as 2, and Relational Analogy as 3 (see
  Table 1). Inter-rater reliability based on all
  the responses of 30 of the participants was 96.
• Two analyses tested the prediction that
  Psychology students would be more likely than
  others to judge commonalities between entities
  based on relational analogies.
• The first analysis was a 3 (Groups) by 2
  (Entities) ANCOVA on similarity ratings with sex
  and order as covariates. There was a main Groups
  effect which approached significance,
  F(2,25)3.17, p.059. Science students (M4.77)
  judged greater overall similarity between
  entities than did Humanities students (M3.43),
  with Psychology students (M3.95) no different
  from the other groups. The main effect was
  modulated by a Groups by Entity interaction
  effect which also approached significance,
  F(2,25)2.85, p.076. As shown in Table 2,
  Science students judged greater similarity than
  Humanities and Psychology students in the Animal
  condition, F(2,25)6.58, plt.01, but there was no
  Groups difference in the Machine condition,
  F(2,25).33, ns.
• The second analysis was a 3 (Groups) by 2
  (Entity) ANCOVA on justification responses with
  sex and order as covariates. There was a main
  Group effect, F(2,25)6.75, plt.01. Psychology
  students (M2.10) had higher justification
  responses than did Humanities students (M1.31),
  with Science students (M1.89) no different from
  the other groups. There was a significant Group
  by Entity interaction effect, F(2,25) 6.31,
  plt.01 (see Table 3). Psychology students had
  higher justification responses than Humanities
  and Science students in the Animal condition,
  F(2,25)10.94, plt.001. Psychology and Science
  students had higher justifications responses
  compared to Humanities students, in the Machine
  Condition, an effect which approached
  significance F(2,25)3.03, p.066

• Discussion
• It was predicted that compared to others,
  Psychology students would be more likely to judge
  commonalities between humans, animals, and
  machines based on relational analogies than
  literal similarities.
• The prediction was confirmed most strongly for
  Human/Animal comparisons. Although, compared to
  Science students, Psychology students judged less
  similarity between Animals and Humans, they
  justified their similarity judgments with
  relational analogies more so than others.
• Such a pattern may reflect Amsel et al.s (2005)
  claim that Psychology majors continue to hold
  onto the tenets of Folk psychology, with its
  assumption of the uniqueness of human beings,
  despite adopting those of Scientific psychology
  with its relationally-based continuity between
  human beings, animals, and computers. We are
  continuing to collect data freshmen and
  sophomores motivated to major in Psychology to
  confirm this analysis. We predict that would-be
  psychology majors will be less inclined than
  advanced Psychology students to judge humans and
  animals as similar and justify their judgments
  with relational analogies.

Table 1 Justifications of Similarity Ratings 1.
Literal Similaritya. Animals and humans are both
bipedal, have hands.b. Humans and computers
dont work the way they are supposed to. 2.
Partial Analogya. Both humans and computers
solve problems, a machine uses a set....mechanism
while a human just tries different stuffb. Both
have gone through evolution, have opposable
thumbs, and similar social systems. 3.
Relational Analogya. The brain is
compartmentalized, different areas do different
stuff, kinda like computer programs.b. Humans
and apes have anatomical structures with similar
functions.
Introduction University students enter
psychology classes with an intuitive theory about
the nature of the discipline (Amsel et al.,
2005). This intuitive theory (called Folk
Psychology) is an inherently unscientific account
of behavior in terms of conscious mental states
(DAndrade, 1987). Folk Psychology is
inconsistent with Scientific Psychology, which is
an account of behavior based on the influence of
genetic, biological, cognitive, and sociocultural
forces. Amsel et al. (2005) found that Psychology
students more strongly distinguish between the
two theories than do others, embracing the tenets
of Scientific Psychology without rejecting those
of Folk Psychology. They propose that the two
forms of explanation conceptually coexist.
Following up on the previous work, the present
study explores how Psychology and other students
think about how human beings are like animals
(i.e., great apes) and machines (i.e.,
computers). In Scientific Psychology such
commonalties are based more on relational
analogies than literal similarities. For example,
beyond any literal similarity, human beings, like
computers, are thought to compute, store, and
retrieve information. Similarly, humans, like
animals, are thought to evolve species-specific
behavior which may not be literally similar. It
was hypothesized that compared to others,
Psychology students would be more likely to judge
commonalities between humans, animals, and
machines based on relational analogies than
literal similarities.

• References
• Amsel, E., Anderson, C., Corbin, P. (April,
  2005). Conceptual change in psychology
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  presented at RMPA, Phoenix AZ.
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• D'Andrade, R. G. (1987). A folk model of the
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• Gentner, D. Wolff, P. (2000). Metaphor and
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