Nuclear Proliferation Challenges

1
Nuclear Proliferation Challenges

• Nuclear Proliferation and
• the Developing World
• Mark Fitzpatrick
• Senior Fellow for Non-ProliferationInternational
  Institute for Strategic Studies

9 September 2008
2
Introduction

• Nuclear weapons technologies continue to spread
  to unstable regions.
• Onward proliferation (or secondary
  proliferation) Transfer of nuclear items or
  technology from one proliferator to another.
• Historically, proliferation challenge was state
  to state (formal cooperation and espionage)
• USA ? Russia
• Russia ? China
• France ? Israel
• China ? Pakistan

3
Non-state actor A.Q. Khan Network

• 1987-2003 A.Q. Khan black market network sold
  nuclear weapons technology to Iran, North Korea
  and Libya and others?
• Revered as a hero in Pakistan for making nation a
  nuclear power.
• Turned his procurement network into export
  business.

4
Role of Pakistan in Khan network

• The Pakistan government role differed with each
  customer, along continuum of complicity
  initiated ? authorized ? allowed ? overlooked.
• Iran case COAS General Beg encouraged nuclear
  cooperation. But network?Iran
• North Korea case Pakistan received Nodong
  missiles in exchange, and surely knew of nuclear
  transfer. Khan/Pak.??NK
• Libya case network?Libya. But Pak govt. knew
  of aircraft deliveries.

5
Role of Pakistan - cont.

• Iraq case 1990 offer of A/B project.
• Fortunately Iraq was suspicious and did not
  accept.
• No known Pakistan government role.
• But officials learned in 1995 when IAEA
  discovered documents about the offer.

6
Pakistans nuclear weapons program

• Pakistan has about 60 nuclear weapons, and a
  growing capacity to produce more.
• Primary fissile material is HEU, which gave
  Pakistan a weapon capability 10 years after Khan
  in 1975 stole Urenco designs.
• Expanding pu production 2nd HW reactor at
  Khushab and reprocessing plant at Chasma.
• Not arms race, but an arms competition, in
  which India has greater potential.
• Shouldnt Pakistan want to stop the competition
  before it loses parity?
• .

7
Pakistan nuclear weapons security

• Pakistans nuclear arsenal is not at great risk
  of theft or diversion.
• Reform of command and control system.
• Army remains in firm control.
• Khan and associates are out of business.
• But no interviews with IAEA, CIA or SIS.
• Pakistan continues to rely on black market for
  its own nuclear weapons program.

8
Irans nuclear program - most problematic

• Iran seeks a nuclear weapons capability.
• 18 years of clandestine work and 14 kinds of
  safeguards violations.
• Khan network was not selling civil nuclear
  energy.
• Economic irrationality.
• Indigenous enrichment is not competitive with
  international market until 10 reactors are
  operating.
• Insufficient uranium ore means Iran cannot be
  self sufficient in nuclear fuel cycle.
• Fuel supply mechanisms under discussion (IAEA
  fuel bank, Russia Angarsk, etc.) will guarantee
  fuel supply.
• Iran cannot use its own LEU in Bushehr. Now it
  claims it needs to enrich for domestic reactor at
  Darkhovin.

9
Military and weapons indicators

• Military involvement in nuclear program and work
  involving weapons development.
• Military front company involved in uranium
  mining, UF4 conversion (green salt) and
  procurement experiments with Polonium-210
  possession of document from Khan network on
  uranium metal casting in hemisphere shape.
• Development and testing of high voltage
  detonator, underground testing, missile re-entry
  vehicle.
• Nov 2007 NIE Iran worked on weaponisation
  until 2003.
• Iran insists the IAEA work plan has been
  completed and safeguards should return to normal

10
Iran nuclear program - timelines

• 2009/2010 is earliest Iran could produce enough
  HEU for a weapon.
• Most likely scenario stockpile LEU for later
  breakout
• Time for diplomacy is running out, because of
  Iran mastery of enrichment process.
• 3450 centrifuges in place 6,000 next goal.
• Quality more important factor than quantity.
• 50 efficiency. Technical difficulties are being
  overcome.
• Political timeline democracy will come too
  late. (Up to Iranians to speed up reform clock.)

11
Irans Motivations

• Prestige
• National pride and sovereignty
• Leadership in the Gulf region
• Survival of the Islamic regime
• Deterrence

12
Issue is not nuclear energy

• Iran claims US wants to deny it nuclear energy.
• President Bush, 13 Sept. 2005, (re Irans
  nuclear program) its a right of a government
  to want to have a civilian nuclear program.
• E33 June 2006 offer reaffirmed Irans right to
  nuclear energy and offers Western technology.
• UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan show that
  forgoing enrichment/reprocessing is best way to
  acquire state-of-art nuclear power.

13
Enrichment not denied forever

• E33 June 2006 package review enrichment
  moratorium when
• IAEA confirms all outstanding issues have been
  resolved
• international confidence in exclusively peaceful
  nature of Irans nuclear program is restored.
• 2008 re-packaged offer RD could continue as
  confidence was gradually restored

14
Grand Bargain with Iran?

• Engagement yes, but what cards to bring to the
  table?
• Need to create leverage.
• Security assurances
• e.g., 19 Sept 2005 US affirmed it had no
  intention to attack or invade the DPRK and two
  sides undertook to respect each others
  sovereignty
• Cooperation on areas of mutual interest
• -- Iraq and Afghanistan
• Does each side have the vision?

15
US-Iran Engagement

• Missed opportunities in the past.
• 2000 Iran missed 2003 US missed.
• US engagement in 2009 is likely
• Change of policy in 2005 US joined E3 engagement
  strategy
• US joined June 2006 offer of incentives.
• Larijani 2006 offer to talk broke a taboo.
• Squabbles over who and where
• US has talked to Iran in Baghdad.
• July 2008 U/S W. Burns at Geneva mtg.
• Iran today is not serious about negotiating.
  Waiting for new US president.,

16
Since 2006, at least 13 countries in the Middle
East announced plans to explore civilian nuclear
energy.
17
Regional repercussions

• Notwithstanding legitimate energy and economic
  motivations, political factors also play a role,
  as countries seek to match Irans capabilities.
• If Tehrans nuclear programme is unchecked, it
  could in time prompt a regional cascade of
  proliferation among Irans neighbours.

18
Saudi Arabia?

• For Saudi Arabia, a nuclear-armed Iran would
  present a direct and dire threat.
• Lacks technical and personnel infrastructure.
• Would it seek to buy a nuclear deterrent?
• More likely a nuclear umbrella.

19
Egypt?

• For Egypt and Turkey, the threat is indirect, and
  tied to concerns about the balance of power and
  loss of relative status.
• If any country in the region were to follow Iran
  in developing a latent nuclear-weapons
  capability, Egypt is most likely.
• Its civil nuclear program is far more advanced
  than any other Arab state.
• It has sought nuclear weapons in the past.
• It seems to be keeping its options open.

20
Turkey?

• Turkey is not likely to be the country most
  threatened by Iranian nuclear weapons, but it is
  the Muslim neighbour most able technically to
  respond in kind.
• A hardening EU mood against Turkish accession is
  adding to a growing alienation from the West in
  Turkey, and could give Turkey more reason to
  consider its own deterrent.

21
Regional repercussions - Israel

• A nuclear-armed Iran would erase Israels nuclear
  monopoly, which has served for 40 years as a
  national insurance policy.
• Israels leaders say they will do everything
  possible to prevent the advent of a nuclear Iran.
• Israel may need to make fateful decisions as to
  whether and how it can live with a
  nuclear-capable Iran.

22
Regional cascade?

• If any one of Irans neighbours were to seek to
  acquire nuclear weapons in response, this would
  put additional pressure on others to do the same.
• A proliferation cascade would become more likely
  if Israel changed its doctrine of nuclear
  ambiguity.
• This would increase the pressure on Egypt and
  perhaps other Arab states to seek their own
  nuclear deterrents.

23
Regional cascade? cont.

• So far, none of the new nuclear aspirants in the
  region has yet been known to talk even privately
  about seeking nuclear weapons.
• They want the human and technical infrastructure
  associated with nuclear-energy in order to
  provide a counterbalance to Iran.
• This lays the ground for a possible future
  security hedge and bestows national prestige in
  the context of historic rivalries.

24
Preventing a regional cascade

• The danger of a proliferation cascade in the
  Middle East, while real, is not imminent.
• Although some countries may be positioning
  themselves to be able eventually to produce
  fissile material, no country is believed to be
  pursuing a nuclear-weapons programme as a result
  of Irans activities.
• The question is how to keep interest in nuclear
  energy confined to purely civilian nuclear
  programmes.

25
Preventing a regional cascade - 2

• The introduction of nuclear energy into the
  Middle East should not be seen as a foregone
  conclusion.
• No commercial contracts have been signed no
  irreversible decisions have been made, and most
  of the national plans have been limited to
  feasibility studies.
• There is time to put in place policies and
  practices that can serve as a bulwark against a
  proliferation cascade.
•  

26
Preventing a regional cascade - 3

• The proliferation risks of nuclear energy are
  manageable as long as countries
• Accept full transparency with enforceable
  verification and
• Concentrate on the technologies they really need,
  while staying away from the sensitive parts of
  the fuel cycle.

27
Libya non-proliferation success

• In Dec. 2003, Gadhafi announced Libya was giving
  up its pursuit of nuclear weapons, as well as
  other non-conventional capabilities.
• In 2004,US removed 1,000 tons of nuclear
  missile-related equipment.
• Enrichment equipment supplied by companies
  associates in 20 countries.
• Libya cooperated fully with IAEA, which may issue
  final report this year.

28
North Korea Libya nuclear link

• In 2000 or 2001, Khan Network supplied Libya with
  1.75 tons of UF6.
• US testing of containers determined with near
  certainty that the material had originated in
  North Korea.
• UF6 did not match any known samples (e.g. from
  Pakistan, China).
• Bank records connect Libyan payments with North
  Korean receipt of similar amount.
• North Korea not known to have a UF6 line, but
  experts judge it not difficult to do.

29
Nuclear weapons design

• Khan network sold Libya the designs for a
  Chinese-origin10 kt implosion weapon weighing
  about 500 kg. 95 complete.
• Libya said it did nothing with the designs.
• But Urs Tinner made copies.
• Swiss government in Dec. 2007 destroyed the
  weapons designs in Tinners safe.
• Where are the other copies?

30
Pakistan-North Korea connection

• In late 1990s, Khan gave North Korea about 20 P-1
  and P-2 centrifuges, along with associated
  material and assistance.
• North Korea then sought to procure other parts on
  its own, using Khans supplier list.
• In Nov. 2002, CIA concluded NK was constructing
  a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade
  uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year
  when fully operational.

31
Pakistan North Korea

• CIA assesses with moderate confidence North
  Korea has an ongoing enrichment program, but
  there is no public evidence.
• North Korea showed tubes in non-nuclear work, and
  allowed sampling, which showed uranium
  contamination.

32
North Korean plutonium program

• NK declared it separated 37kg of plutonium and
  used 6-7kg in its October 2006 test.
• CIA estimated 40-60kg and assessed that NK
  reprocessed 8-9kg before 1992. NK said 90 g.
  Same issue that led to 1st crisis.
• 18,000 pages of operating records from the 5
  MW(e) reactor and reprocessing plant from 1986
  must be verified.
• Disagreement over verification process led US to
  postpone removing NK from terrorism list and
  Trading with Enemy Act.

33
North Korea declaration

• North Korea has not agreed to declare weapons
  assembly or testing, nor the weapons.
• Removal of plutonium and dismantlement of weapons
  are goals for Phase III of Six Party Talks.
• Verification also in Phase III, but process has
  to be agreed upon.
• Accounting for nuclear assistance to Syria was
  also postponed.

34
North Korea - Syria

• 24 April briefing compelling evidence that the
  Syrian facility Israel bombed on 6 September was
  a plutonium-production reactor, similar to 5MW(e)
  reactor at Yongbyon.
• It almost surely has a military purpose, although
  there was no reprocessing plant.
• Maybe Syria planned to acquire that later, or to
  reprocess elsewhere.
• Syrias deception efforts tricked many people,
  including IAEA DG ElBaradei.

35
North Korea - Syria

• The CIA did not conclusively prove North Korean
  involvement, but the briefing said
• Multiple visits by Yongbyon officials to Syria
  before al-Kibar construction began in 2001
• DPRK procurement in 2002 of a reactor component
  for Syria
• 2006 DPRK and Syrian nuclear officials involved
  in a cargo transfer to Syria and
• Presence of North Korean officials in region in
  early 2007 and after the bombing.

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Conclusions - 1

• The Syria case demonstrates the difficulty of
  detecting and deterring proliferation.
• It also underscores the proliferation danger of
  research reactors.
• Amidst attention given to non-state actors,
  state-to-state proliferation remains of serious
  concern.
• UNSCR 1540 proliferation to non-state actors
  must be criminalized.

37
Recommendations

• All non-proliferation tools must be strengthened
• Transparency Additional Protocol must be
  required.
• Verification IAEA inspection tools (e.g.
  wide-area monitoring) and rights (anytime,
  anywhere access).
• Enforcement UNSCRs re Iran 1540 standards of
  compliance penalties for NPT withdrawal. PSI.
• Regulate enrichment reprocessing best if
  voluntary.
• Conditions of supply require intl purchase of
  sensitive fuel services. (Waste storage is
  problem.)
• Regional arms control dialogue on conditions
  for ME NWFZ moratorium on enrichment/reprocessing
  .
• Deterrence and reassurance.

38
Disarmament complementary

• Disarmament steps also contribute to
  strengthening of non-proliferation norms.
• Complementary steps to strengthen disarmament and
  non-proliferation norms can produce a virtuous
  cycle.
• IISS Adelphi Paper explores the challenges to the
  complete abolition of nuclear weapons and what
  states can start doing to overcome them.