Human rights in European Courts

1
Human rights in European Courts

• Barbara Havelková
• Dubrovnik 2010

2
Content

• Human rights before European Courts
• Human rights before the CJ EU
• Relationship between CJ EU and ECtHR
• Human rights before more courts?
• Regional-EU (Bosphorus)
• National-international (Solange I and II)
• EU-international (Kadi)

3
Court of Justice

• How do human rights cases arise (who can be in
  breach)?
• Challenges to EU action
• Challenges to MSs action

4
Challenges to EU action

• Legislation (Nold, Bosphorus mostly
  unsuccessful but Kadi)
• Administrative acts
• Institutions as an employer
• Commission as competition authority (Hoechst)

5
Challenges to MSs action

• Implementation or enforcement of EU law (MSs as
  agents)
• Regulation (Wachauf)
• Directive (Lindqvist)
• Action within the scope of EU law (ERT,
  Familiapress, Carpenter)
• Its not ever expanding - there were rulings that
  issues fell outside the scope (Kremzow, Vajnai)

6
Court of Justice 2

• As what can they serve?
• Standard of review of EU or MSs action (Kadi,
  Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, ERT)
• Justification of action otherwise in breach of
  freedoms of movement (Schmidberger, Omega)
• Basis interpretive guidance and beyond
  (Johnston, Mangold)
• Competence?
• Opinion 2/94 Charter Art. 51(2)

7
Lisbon

• Art. 51 The provision of this Charter are
  addressed to the MSs only when implementing
  Union law
• Does that mean drafters wanted to limit to scope
  of review?
• Would you?
• Explanatory memorandum

8
EU Council of Europe

• Accession
• Opinion 2/94
• Lisbon Art. 6(2) TEU
• Why is it still desirable?
• Bias toward market rights
• The CJ should concentrate on EU stuff
• The CJ is too deferential to MSs
• Possibility of conflict between the courts
• Direct review of EU acts

9
EU Council of Europe

• Can the ECtHR currently review EUs acts?
• Respondent?
• Matthews, Emesa Sugar, Bosphorus (one MS)
• Senator Lines (all MSs)
• Types?
• Room for implementation single state (Matthews)
• No discretion (Bosphorus)
• An EU level act directly (Senator Lines, Emesa
  Sugar)

10
Strasbourg-Luxembourg

• Possible jurisdictional overlaps?
• Sionaidh Douglas-Scott A tale of Two Courts
  Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European
  Human Rights Acquis (2006) 43 CMLRev 629
• Strasbourg decides cases involving violations of
  the ECHR by Member States, in which there is no
  EU law component (no problem)
• The CJ decides cases involving breaches of human
  rights by EU institutions (this might give an
  applicant a remedy they wouldnt otherwise have
  Kadi)
• The CJ decides cases involving breaches by Member
  States when implementing or within the scope EU
  law (overlap ERT)
• Strasbourg jurisdiction over actions involving
  the EU (Matthews,Bosphorus,)

11
Strasbourg on Luxembourg

• Rare
• Mainly deferential (discrimination in pensions,
  borrowing definitions of public service,
  procedural)
• Sometimes less so
• Sometimes it does not comment or avoids decision
  (issue of business premises and the right to
  privacy the right to comment on AGs opinion in
  Emesa Sugar)

12
Luxembourg on Strasbourg

• Chronologically (first AGs then CJ)
• Citations of ECHR
• Citations of ECtHRs case law (FamiliaPress,
  Carpenter, Akrich, Pupino)
• Mostly to the benefit of the applicant
• Deference following rather than just refering
• Sometimes after adjustments business premises
  self-incrimination
• CJ Hoechst and Orkem
• ECtHR Niemietz and Funke
• CJ Roquette Frere

13
Conclusions

• Transnational judicial dialogue about human
  rights
• Inchoate borrowings (lack of comparative law
  methodology lack of doctrine of the status of
  ECtHR case-law before the CJEU)
• Do we want a final arbiter?
• An example of legal pluralism
• Contemplation - collective deliberation produces
  better solutions than single
• Rawlsian "overlapping consensus"
• But possible inefficient for individuals

14
ECtHR CJ EU

• Bosphorus case
• Predecessors (M Co v. Germany, Matthews)
• The ECtHR develops a doctrine of presumption of
  compliance

15
Bosphorus

• 155.  In the Court's view, State action taken in
  compliance with such legal obligations is
  justified as long as the relevant organisation is
  considered to protect fundamental rights, as
  regards both the substantive guarantees offered
  and the mechanisms controlling their observance,
  in a manner which can be considered at least
  equivalent to that for which the Convention
  provides (). By equivalent the Court means
  comparable any requirement that the
  organisation's protection be identical could
  run counter to the interest of international
  cooperation pursued (). However, any such
  finding of equivalence could not be final and
  would be susceptible to review in the light of
  any relevant change in fundamental rights
  protection.

16
Bosporus 2

• 156.  If such equivalent protection is considered
  to be provided by the organisation, the
  presumption will be that a State has not departed
  from the requirements of the Convention when it
  does no more than implement legal obligations
  flowing from its membership of the organisation.
• However, any such presumption can be rebutted if,
  in the circumstances of a particular case, it is
  considered that the protection of Convention
  rights was manifestly deficient. In such cases,
  the interest of international cooperation would
  be outweighed by the Convention's role as a
  constitutional instrument of European public
  order in the field of human rights ().

17
BVerfGE - CJEU

• 1974 Solange I. (as long as)
• 1979 Vielleicht-Beschluss (The may-be decision)
• 1986 Solange II. (180 degree turn)
• 1993 Maastricht (clarification)
• 1994 Bananas (only application)
• 2005 Arrest Warrant (did not turn on fundamental
  rights review)
• 2009 Lisbon (did not turn on fundamental rights
  review)

18
Solange I.

• The BVerfGE retains control
• solange der Integrationsprozess der Gemeinschaft
  nicht so weit fortgeschritten ist, dass das
  Gemeinschaftsrecht auch einen von einem Parlament
  beschlossenen und in Geltung stehenden Katalog
  von Grundrechten enthält, der dem
  Grundrechtskatalog der deutschen Verfassung bis
  ins Detail adäquat ist.

19
Solange II.

• Solange die EG, insbesondere die Rechtsprechung
  des Gerichtshofs der Gemeinschaften, einen
  wirksamen Schutz der Grundrechte gegenüber der
  Hoheitsgewalt der Gemeinschaften generell
  gewährleisten, der dem vom Grundgesetz als
  unabdingbar gebotenen Grundrechtsschutz im
  wesentlichen gleichzuachten ist, zumal den
  Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte generell verbürgt,
  wird das Bundesverfassungsgericht seine
  Gerichtsbarkeit über die Anwendbarkeit von
  abgeleitetem Gemeinschaftsrecht, das als
  Rechtsgrundlage für ein Verhalten deutscher
  Gerichte oder Behörden ... in Anspruch genommen
  wird, nicht mehr ausüben und dieses Recht mithin
  nicht mehr am Maßstab der Grundrechte des
  Grundgesetzes überprüfen.

20
Maastricht

• Das Bundesverfassungsgericht übt seine
  Rechtsprechung über die Anwendbarkeit von
  abgeleitetem Gemeinschaftsrecht in Deutschland in
  einem Kooperationsverhältnis zum EuGH aus, indem
  der Europäische Gerichtshof den Grundrechtschutz
  in jedem Einzelfall für das gesamte Gebiet der
  Europäischen Gemeinschaft garantiert, das
  Bundesverfassungsgericht sich deshalb auf eine
  generelle Gewährleistung der unabdingbaren
  Grundrechtsstandards beschränken kann.

21
Bananenmarktverordnungentscheidung

• Verfassungsbeschwerden und Vorlagen von
  Gerichten, die eine Verletzung von Grundrechten
  des Grundgesetzes durch sekundäres
  Gemeinschaftsrecht geltend machen, sind von
  vornherein unzulässig, wenn ihre Begründung nicht
  darlegt, dass die europäische Rechtsentwicklung
  einschließlich der Rechtsprechung des EuGH nach
  Ergehen der Solange II-Entscheidung ... unter
  den erforderlichen Grundrechtsstandard abgesunken
  sei. Deshalb muss die Begründung der Vorlage
  oder einer Verfassungsbeschwerde im Einzelnen
  darlegen, dass der jeweils als unabdingbar
  gebotene Grundrechtsschutz generell nicht
  gewährleistet ist.

22
Control and trust

• What are the important issues in these judgments?
• Finding of deficiency (Solange I.)
• Presumption when does control kick in?
• Bosphorus presumption of equivalent protection
  exists it can be rebutted in an individual case
  BUT a manifest deficiency is required
• BVerfGE presumption of equivalence essential
  content and equal regard but can be rebutted
  by proof that the general level sank below
  required standard (indispensable level)
• Individual protection vs. general protection
• Seriousness of deficiency
• Required level (floor?)
• Increase in burden of proof for claimants
• Requirement of substantive guarantee as well as
  enforcement mechanism
• Temporariness of any presumption

23
Control and trust 2

• Direct review or indirect review
• EU acts directly (Bananas)
• As implemented by a member state (Bosphorus)

24
Three main questions

• Forum (Who decides?)
• Standard (Against whose and what standard?)
• Object (What do you review anyway?)

25
Kadi

• Similar in that it concerns the relationship
  between two legal orders (their relationship and
  hierarchy), questions of forum, standard and
  object of inquiry
• Different in that there was no judicial structure
  available for the case (while all the above cases
  had a supremacy/competence element here it comes
  to the fore, as an institutional counterpart in
  international law is missing)

26
Kadi - General Court (CFI)

• EC had no autonomous discretion in implementing
  the UN SC Resolution
• A review of EC measure implementing SC Resolution
  would amount to its indirect review and is in
  principle precluded
• Exception is a review of alleged breaches of ius
  cogens of the UN SC Resolution (international
  standard)
• It accepts the gap in judicial protection
• It reviewed inhuman or degrading treatment,
  property rights and due process and found no
  breach
• It accepts the supremacy (primacy) of
  international law over EU law

27
Kadis appeal argumenation

• So long as the United Nations do not provide a
  mechanism of independent judicial review that
  guarantees compliance with fundamental rights of
  decisions taken by the Security Council and the
  Sanctions Committee, the Community Courts should
  review measures adopted by the Community
  institutions with a view to implementing those
  decisions for their conformity with fundamental
  rights as recognised in the Community legal order
  (citing Bosphorus)
• (as summarised by AG Maduro)

28
Kadi - AG

• Concentrates on the regulation only
• EC is an autonomous legal order
• in the final analysis, the Community Courts
  determine the effect of international obligations
  within the Community legal order by reference to
  conditions set by Community law
• The Court seeks, first and foremost, to preserve
  the constitutional framework created by the
  Treaty
• Is there any basis in the Treaty for holding
  that the contested regulation is exempt from the
  constitutional constraints normally imposed by
  Community law, since it implements a sanctions
  regime imposed by Security Council resolutions?
  NO

29
Kadi AG 2

• What should the intensity of review be
  (standard)?
• UK less stringent criteria
• Maduro disagrees (highlights the security vs.
  liberty debate and the political vs. legal
  debate)
• Suggests the CJ find a breach of the right to be
  heard, the right to judicial review, and the
  right to property

30
Kadi - CJEU

• Direct review is impossible
• Full indirect review
• The Community is based on the rule of law,
  inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its
  institutions can avoid review of the conformity
  of their acts with the basic constitutional
  charter, the EC Treaty, which established a
  complete system of legal remedies and procedures
  designed to enable the Court of Justice to review
  the legality of acts of the institutions . . . .
  It is also to be recalled that an international
  agreement cannot affect the allocation of powers
  fixed by the Treaties or, consequently, the
  autonomy of the Community legal system,
  observance of which is ensured by the Court by
  virtue of the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on
  it by Article 220 EC, jurisdiction that the Court
  has, moreover, already held to form part of the
  very foundations of the Community

31
Kadi CJEU 2

• Criticizes the immunity from jurisdiction a
  lack of EU level review would cause
• 326    It follows from the foregoing that the
  Community judicature must, in accordance with the
  powers conferred on it by the EC Treaty, ensure
  the review, in principle the full review, of the
  lawfulness of all Community acts in the light of
  the fundamental rights forming an integral part
  of the general principles of Community law,
  including review of Community measures which,
  like the contested regulation, are designed to
  give effect to the resolutions adopted by the
  Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter
  of the United Nations.
• Follows Maduro in result as well as reasoning

32
Three questions

• Forum (Who decides?)
• CFI - it considered its jurisdiction structurally
  impossible and considered lack of alternative
  unproblematic
• AG CJEU EU level jurisdiction BUT only for EU
  level acts
• Standard (Against whose and what standard?)
• CFI the standard should be international ius
  cogens
• AG CJEU the standard is EU fundamental rights
  in full intensity
• Object (What do you review anyway?)
• CFI the Security Council resolution
• AG CJEU only Community measures

33
Parallels between Bosphorus, Solange and Kadi?

• Yes, BUT the Kadi model is not based on
  presumptions, because there is no judicial
  protection to speak of at international level,
  its more a question of relationship between
  legal orders than of levels of protection
  guaranteed by courts