Importance and Consequences of the Cold War

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Importance and Consequences of the Cold War

• Wars 1945-1990 150 conflicts, 23 million dead
• Superpower wars
• Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan
• Proxy Wars / Civil Wars
• Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Somalia,
  Cambodia, Guatemala, Mozambique, Ethiopia
• Risk of nuclear war
• Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
• Yom Kippur War 1973 (Egypt Syria vs. Israel)
• Reagan Second Cold War, 1980s

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On the brink

• US Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense, 1981 The
  United States could recover from an all-out
  nuclear war with the Soviet Union in just two to
  four years... If there are enough shovels to go
  around, everybodys going to make it. Dig a hole
  in the ground, cover with a couple of doors, and
  then cover the doors with three feet of dirt.
  Its the dirt that does it.
• T. K.
  Jones

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Importance and Consequences of the Cold War

• Risk of nuclear war
• US war plans, 1982 committed US to fighting and
  winning a nuclear war lasting up to six months
  A war in which the U.S. could prevail and force
  the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of
  hostilities on terms favorable to the United
  States.

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• How did humanity bring itself to the brink of
  self-inflicted catastrophe?
• How has disaster been avoided - what explains
  the peaceful end of the Cold War?

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The Cold WarKey Early Events
US dropping of atomic bombs, 1945 (?) US Marshall
Plan Soviet occupations in Eastern Europe -
Poland / Czech coup 1948
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Cold WarChurchills Iron Curtain speech, 1946
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The Cold WarKey Early Events
US dropping of atomic bombs, 1945 (?) US Marshall
Plan Soviet occupations in Eastern Europe Truman
Containment policy (1947)
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Cold WarTruman and Containment
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The Cold WarKey Early Events
US dropping of atomic bombs, 1945 (?) US Marshall
Plan Soviet occupations in Eastern Europe Truman
Containment policy (1947) Czech coup
1948 Berlin Blockade, 1948-9
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The Cold WarKey Early Events
US dropping of atomic bombs, 1945 (?) US Marshall
Plan Soviet occupations in Eastern Europe Berlin
Blockade, 1948-9 1st Soviet Atomic bomb test,
1949 NSC-68, 1950
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Cold WarNSC-68 Korea, 1950
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The Cold WarKey Early Events
US dropping of atomic bombs, 1945 (?) US Marshall
Plan Soviet occupations in Eastern Europe -
Poland / Czech coup 1948 Berlin Blockade,
1948-9 1st Soviet Atomic bomb test, 1949 NSC-68,
1950 Korean War, 1950 US develops Hydrogen bomb
1952, Soviets 1953
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Soviet 50 MT Nuclear Weapon, 1961
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Nuclear Fireball Size Outer Red line Tsar Bomba
test, 1961 50 MT 4.6 km
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World nuclear tests
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Nuclear Scare 1950s
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Nuclear Scare 1950s
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Nuclear Scare 1950s
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Importance of the Cold War
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The Cold WarKey Early Events
US dropping of atomic bombs, 1945 (?) US Marshall
Plan Soviet occupations in Eastern Europe -
Poland / Czech coup 1948 Berlin Blockade, 1948-9
Korean War, 1950 NSC-68 US develops Hydrogen
bomb 1952, Soviets 1953 Soviets Build Berlin
Wall, 1961
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Cold WarKennedys ich bin ein Berliner speech,
1963
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Cold WarCuban Missile Crisis, 1962

• Consider What does the Cuban missile crisis
  demonstrate
• Nuclear deterrence works (implication go nuclear
  for own security)
• OR
• Unacceptable risk of nuclear war (implication
  disarmament)

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Cold WarCuban Missile Crisis, 1962
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Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962Overview

• October 12, 1962
• Kennedy shown U-2 photos of Soviet missiles in
  Cuba
• October 22, 1962
• Kennedy speaks to the nation

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Cold WarCuban Missile Crisis,1962
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Cuban Missile CrisisOverview

• October 12, 1962
• Kennedy shown U-2 photos of Soviet missiles in
  Cuba
• October 22, 1962
• Kennedy speaks to the nation, announces blockade
• October 28, 1962
• Khrushchev announces missiles will be removed
• Kennedy believed chance of nuclear war between 1
  in 3 and even, McNamara 50-50

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Cuban Missile CrisisLessons

• Conventional Lesson Nuclear superiority and
  compellence prevailed (realism)
• Soviets blinked
• Implications
• Nuclear Superiority matters
• Nuclear Arms Race

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Cuban Missile CrisisLessons

• Conventional Lesson
• Nuclear superiority and compellence prevailed
  (realism)
• New Lessons
• Risk of nuclear war was higher than realized
• Misperceptions N readiness local launch
  authority in Cuba
• Bureaucracy Accidents / Loss of Control
• Compromise / cooperation / reassurance helped
  resolve crisis, rather than compellence
  (liberalism) US missiles in Turkey
• US nuclear superiority didnt matter
• Conclusions
• Minimum or existential deterrence worked, only
  a few N needed for mutual deterrence, arms race
  unnecessary
• nuclear weapons also cause of crisis in first
  place made each side more insecure raised
  risks
• If too terrible to use even one, why have them?
  Paradox of deterrence
• So, are they worth the risk?

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Cuban Missile Crisis Aftermath Consequences

• Soviet N superiority
• Crisis Management Hot-Line
• Era of Détente Arms Control
• Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963)
• Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968)
• SALT Treaties (1970s) / BTWC (1975)

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Final Exam

• Thursday December 10, 1200
• Wesbrook Building100

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Reagan the Second Cold War

• US President Reagan
• 1981 calls USSR evil empire and announces plans
  to leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of
  history
• 1983 Star Wars speech SDI
• 1984 (sound check for radio address) My fellow
  Americans. Im pleased to tell you today that
  Ive signed legislation that will outlaw Russia
  forever. We begin bombing in five minutes.

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Gorbachev and Reagan sign INF Treaty 1987
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Gorbachev and Bush sign START Treaty 1991
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End of the Berlin Wall Cold War Hammers, not
Tanks / Missiles
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End of the Cold War

• Learning objectives
• How did it end without major conflict?
• What lessons do we draw from this major change in
  the international system?
• Was it due to US military spending bleeding the
  Soviets dry?
• At stake implications for policy if above is
  correct

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End of the Cold WarExplanations

• System Level
• Balance of Power (Realist) Imperial Over-Stretch
• Problems What does this leave unexplained?
• 1) Why was it the USSR and not US that became
  overextended?
• 2) No great power war to change system anomaly
  for balance of power theory
• There is nothing in the character or tradition
  of the Russian state to suggest it could ever
  accept imperial decline gracefully. None of the
  over-extended empires ever retreated to their
  own ethnic base until they had been defeated in a
  Great Power war. Paul Kennedy, 1987
• Timing why 1989?

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Did Peace Through Strength Work?

• Reagans Peace Through Strength (Realist)
  Spend Soviets into the ground with SDI and
  massive military budget
• Problems
• Reagans policy change agreed to arms control
  agreements
• Made it almost impossible for Soviet reformers,
  legitimized hard-liners Arbatov
• End of Cold War came about despite US policies
• cf. Iranian reformers W. Bushs axis of evil
• Soviet reasons for policy changes
• Dobrynin It was not the strain of matching
  Reagans huge arms build-up that led to the
  collapse of the Soviet Empire. The troubles in
  our economy were the result of our own internal
  contradictions. (Marxist/Critical)

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End of the Cold WarExplanations

• Domestic Level
• Soviet Union
• Economic decay
• Dissent and challenges to ideological legitimacy
• Eastern Europe
• Civil Society People Power mobilizing
  dissident groups (bottom-up explanations)
• Berlin Wall
• Lech Walesa Solidarity, Poland
• Vaclav Havel Civic Forum, Czechoslovakia

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Civil Society People Power and the Velvet
Revolution, Czechoslovakia, 1989
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End of the Cold WarExplanations

• Domestic Level Soviet / European domestic
  factors
• People Power Civil Society in Eastern Europe,
  mobilizing dissident groups
• Puzzle Why werent these efforts crushed with
  force?

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Vaclav Havel and Czechoslovakia, 1989
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End of the Cold WarExplanations

• Individual level Gorbachev
• Domestic Reform Glasnost Perestroika
• Foreign policy
• Strategy
• Common security
• Reasonable Sufficiency
• Sinatra doctrine

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Gorbachev Initiatives

• Foreign policy
• 1987 INF Agreement / Test Ban Moratorium
• Unilateral reduction of 500,000 troops
• Announce withdrawal from Afghanistan Feb. 88,
  complete by Jan. 89
• May 89 Sino-Soviet summit
• 1990-91 Gulf War UN Security Council
  authorization
• May 91 established relations with Israel
• May 91 Cubans out of Angola

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Gorbachev effects

• Europe
• June 89 elections in Poland (1990 Walesa
  President)
• Feb. 89 independent parties in Hungary May 89
  border barricades w/Austria removed EGermans
  flee to WGer via Hungary Sept. 89 elections
  Mar/Apr. 90
• Oct. 6 89 Gorbachev visits East Germany
  Policies which affect the GDR are decided not in
  Moscow but in Berlin.
• Nov. 9, 89 Berlin Wall falls
• Gorbachev accepts principle of reunification Jan.
  90 elections Mar. 90 Oct. 3, 90 German
  unification Warsaw Pact dead by Mar. 91
• Havel elected President of Czechoslovakia Dec.
  89
• Communist leader Ceausescu overthrown by force in
  Romania, Dec. 89 elections May 90 won by
  Illiescus National Salvation Front
• Internal Soviet empire
• 1989-91 fifteen Soviet republics declare
  sovereignty, then independence
• June 91 Yeltsin elected President of Russia
• Aug. 91 attempted coup Dec. 91 Gorbachev
  resigns (Nobel Peace Prize 1990)

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Power of Civil Society Failed Russian Coup 1991
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Power of Civil Society Failed Russian Coup 1991
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Lessons Implications of the End of the Cold
War

• Can major economic reform (towards capitalism)
  take place without accompanying political reform
  towards greater democracy?
• China
• Civil Society People Power Global spread of
  democratic ideas
• 1989-90 EEurope / Soviet Union

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Lessons Implications of the End of the Cold
War

• Civil Society People Power
• 1989-90 EEurope / Soviet Union
• October Revolution Serbia 2000
• Orange Revolution Ukraine (Dec 2004)
• But

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Lessons Implications of the End of the Cold
War

• Civil Society People Power
• 1989-90 EEurope / Soviet Union
• October Revolution Serbia 2000
• Orange Revolution Ukraine (Dec 2004)
• But
• Saffron Revolution Burma 2007
• Iran election protests 2009
• Global spread of democratic ideas
• Transnational activist networks technology

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Lessons Implicatoins of the End of the Cold
War

• 3) Who won and why?
• US won / USSR lost
• Due to aggressive US policy of militarized
  containment (realism)
• Is this right in this case? Even if so, will it
  work to apply in other contexts?

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Lessons Implicatoins of the End of the Cold
War

• 3) Who won and why?
• US won / USSR lost
• Due to aggressive US policy of militarized
  containment (realism) OR
• Despite this strategy which prolonged the cold
  war and at unnecessary cost
• Ideas individual leadership (liberalism)
• Internal contradictions (critical theory)
• Inevitable superiority of capitalism democracy
  (liberalism)?
• End of History - Fukuyama

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Lessons of the Cold War

• The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 1947, Foreign
  Affairs
• X (George Kennan)
• it is clear that the main element of any US
  policy toward the USSR must be that of a
  long-term, patient but firm and vigilant
  containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It
  is importantthat such a policy has nothing to do
  with outward histrionics with threats or
  blustering or superfluous gestures of outward
  toughness.

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The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 1947X (George
Kennan)

• If anything were ever to disrupt the unity and
  efficacy of the Communist Party as a political
  instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed
  overnight from one of the strongest to one of the
  weakest and most pitiable of national societies
  Soviet powerbears within it the seeds of its own
  decay, and the sprouting of these seeds is well
  advanced.
• To avoid destruction, the US need only measure
  up to its own best traditions and prove itself
  worthy of preservation as a great nation

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Lessons of the Cold War

• Why was the Cold War not hot? Did nuclear
  weapons keep the peace?
• If so, would suggest the advantages of nuclear
  proliferation (implication obtain WMD).
• If not, their risks might outweigh their
  advantages (non-proliferation).
• Implications Do nuclear weapons other WMD
  provide security?
• Do they prevent (nuclear/conventional) war?
• Will they be used? Why or why not? Why havent
  WMD been used more often?
• Are they counterproductive for state security in
  an era of terrorism?
• Is the use / possession of nuclear weapons
  morally acceptable?

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A Nuclear Revolution?
We knew the world would not be the same ...I am
become death, the destroyer of worlds Robert
Oppenheimer
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Has there been a nuclear (WMD) revolution?

• "The unleashed power of the atom has changed
  everything save our modes of thinking, and thus
  we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.
• Albert Einstein, 1946
• Was he right?
• Or has humanity adapted and learned?

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Effects of nuclear weapons
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Effects of Nuclear Weapons
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The Power of Nuclear Weapons

• Hiroshima 15-20 kilotons (atomic bomb)
• Todays nuclear weapons
• 1 Ohio (Trident ) Submarine
• 24 Trident missiles 8475 kilotons (8 megatons)
  each
• Each sub 6,080 Hiroshima bombs
• US has 14 Trident subs

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The Effects of Nuclear Weapons
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One-megaton nuclear explosion

• Source Mansbach, Global Puzzle, 2nd edition, p.
  377

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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

• Nuclear / Radiological
• Chemical Weapons (CW)
• Biological Weapons (BW)

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Biological Weapons
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Use of WMD

• Nuclear Weapons
• Hiroshima Nagasaki, 1945
• Chemical Weapons
• WWI / Italy in Ethiopia 1937 / Iraq vs.
  Iran/Kurds 1980s
• Terrorist attempts
• Japan 1995 (Sarin)
• Biological Weapons
• Japan in Manchuria, 1930s
• Terrorist attempts
• US anthrax 2001

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Puzzles Why WMD Restraint?

• Why havent nuclear, chemical and biological
  weapons been used more frequently?

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Explaining the Non-Use of WMD

• Realism
• Deterrence Fear of Retaliation
• Interests (utility) Only useless weapons
  restrained / technical obstacles
• Cicero inter arma silent leges'

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Laws of War
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Laws of War
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Explaining the Non-Use of WMD

• Realism Problems
• Why no WMD use when WMD state in war vs. non-WMD
  state?
• Why no US nuclear use in Korea, Vietnam, Gulf
  War, Iraq when faced no nuclear retaliation? UK
  Falklands / USSR Afghanistan. No mutual
  deterrence, but still no use.
• Why no CW use by US in Vietnam? By USSR in
  Afghanistan?
• Questionable Utility/technical limitations
• Best for BW
• False for CW/N
• E.g, WWI used massively / modern CW
• US assessment of CW utility vs. Japan 1945

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Explaining WMD Restraint

• Neo-liberalism (rationalism) Cooperation
  Compliance with treaties.
• Self-interest and Reciprocity
• Treaty Verification and Compliance (to overcome
  cheating)
• Geneva Protocol 1925 / Chemical Weapons
  Convention (CWC 1997)
• Biological Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC 1975)

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Compliance and International Law USSR
Biological Weapons Convention
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Explaining WMD Restraint

• Realism Deterrence (fear of retaliation)
• Problem Many cases of non-use with no fear of
  retaliation
• Neo-liberalism (rationalism) Treaties
• Verification and Compliance
• CWC, BTWC, NPT
• Problems
• Cheating (realism)
• USSR and BTWC
• Iraq, Iran, North Korea and NPT
• Non-parties - Pakistan, India, Israel, NKorea
  withdrew 2003
• BUT even non-parties and cheaters on possession
  have mostly not used their WMD
• There is no international treaty prohibiting the
  use of nuclear weapons Nuclear Weapons
  Convention Global Zero?

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Explaining WMD Restraint

• Constructivism Power of Moral Norms and Identity
• Personal belief
• I / we just dont do that kind of thing
• International / domestic costs of breaking taboos
  
• Reputation (social power, not material)

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Moral Norm vs. CW

• WWII
• US President Roosevelt I have been loath to
  believe that any nation could be willing to loose
  upon mankind such terrible and inhumane weapons.
  . . I state categorically that we shall under no
  circumstances resort to the first use of such
  weapons...
• British Major-General Henderson such a
  deplorable departure from our principles and
  traditions would make us wonder if it mattered
  which side won.

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Moral Norm vs. Nuclear Weapons

• Korea
• General Ridgway N as the ultimate in
  immorality
• Truman I could not bring myself to order the
  slaughter of 25 million
• Vietnam - Sec. of State Rusk We never seriously
  considered using nuclear weapons
• Iraq, 1991 - Colin Powell Lets not even think
  about nukes. You know were not going to let
  that genie loose.

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Explaining WMD Restraint

• (Liberal) Constructivism Power of Moral Norms
  and Identity
• Problems
• While states and decision-makers are socialized
  by norms or abide by them for their own
  interests, (suicidal) terrorists not constrained
  by norms.

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Implications of WMD

• So where to from here? Should / can the
  proliferation of nuclear weapons be stopped? If
  so, how? What are the implications for dealing
  with terrorism?
• Realism Spread of nuclear weapons is
• Inevitable

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• Wouldnt you know it? Now the Hendersons have the
  bomb.

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The Davy Crockett

• smallest nuclear device ever deployed
• 76 lbs.
• 1.25 to 2.5 mile range
• variable yield (10 to 20 tons TNT)
• deployed 1961-71

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Implications of WMD

• Realism - Spread of WMD is
• Inevitable
• Desirable (Mearsheimer) Cold War -gt India
  Pakistan
• Con
• Not inevitable
• Only 9 nuclear states (due to treaty verification
  / power of nuclear taboo)
• Many states reversed nuclear arsenals and
  programs
• Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, South Africa /
  Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, etc.
• Not desirable Risks
• Assumes rationality
• Risk of accidental nuclear war / loss of control
  (Bureaucracies / Organizational Theory /
  Misperceptions)
• Human or technical error -gt accidental /
  unauthorized detonation

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• Hey! What does that clown think hes doing?

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Dangers of Nuclear Proliferation

• Organizational Theory (Domestic level,
  bureaucracy) Individual level
• Pro-proliferation argument assumes rationality
• Risk of accidental nuclear war / loss of control
• Human or technical error
• Accidental detonation
• False alerts

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Threat of Nuclear AccidentsNorwegian Rocket
Incident, 1995
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Dangers of Nuclear Proliferation

• Organizational Theory (Domestic level,
  bureaucracy) individual level
• Proliferation as stability argument assumes
  rationality
• Risk of accidental nuclear war
• Human or technical error -
• accidental detonation
• false alerts
• Loss of control Command and control
• Smuggling, theft, loss of materials or weapons -gt
  use by terrorists
• 1500 incidents 1993-2008, 30 occurred 1993-95

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Significant cases of nuclear smuggling 1992-95

• 1992 1.5 kg of highly enriched (90) uranium
  stolen in Podolsk, Russia
• July 1993 1.8 kg of enriched (36) uranium
  stolen from naval base in Andreeva Guba, Russia
• November 1993 4.5 kg of enriched (20) uranium
  from naval base in Severomorsk, Russia
• May 1994 6.15 g of highly purified (99.75)
  plutonium discovered by German police in garage
  of a businessman in Tengen, Germany
• June 1994 800 mg of highly enriched (87.7)
  uranium powder bought by undercover agents in
  Landshut, Germany
• August 1994 363 g of weapons-grade plutonium
  and 200 g of lithium seized in suitcase in Munich
  airport
• December 1994 2.72 kg of highly enriched
  (87.7) uranium discovered in back seat of a car
  in Prague, Czech Republic
• June 1995 2 kg enriched (2-4) uranium to be
  bought in sting operation in Moscow shootout
  prevents seizure or arrests
• November 1995 Chechen rebels place small amount
  of Cesium-137 in Ismailovsky Park, Moscow

Source Frontline, Loose Nukes
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Dangers of WMD ProliferationSuitcase bombs
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Implications of WMD

• Can or should proliferation of WMD be stopped?
• Realism Proliferation of N inevitable /
  desirable
• Critics Not inevitable / Risks of proliferation
• Human / Technical Error
• Loss of Control
• Smuggling / Terrorism
• Implications and Prescriptions of dangers of
  proliferation
• Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs / G-8
  Global Partnership Against the Spread of WMD
• 20 billion over 10 years to secure Russian
  nuclear materials (Canada pledged 650 million)

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What kind of world ought we strive to live in?
Is that world possible?