STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

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Topic 4
Statutory interpretation
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When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said, in a
rather scornful tone, it means just what I
choose it to mean - neither more nor less. The
question is, said Alice, whether you can make
words mean so many different things. The
question is, said Humpty Dumpty, which is to be
master - thats all. Humpty Dumpty in Lewis
Carroll, Through the Looking Glass.
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• Write down your understanding of the following
  words
• Ambiguous?
• What does it mean?
• Round?
• What does it mean?

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• Did you know?
• Of the 500 most-used words in the English
  language, each has, on average, 23 different
  meanings
• The word round has 70 different meanings!

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Introduction to statutory interpretation
Many statutes are passed by Parliament each year.
The meaning of the law in these statutes should
be clear and explicit but this is not always
achieved Statutory interpretation concerns the
role of judges when trying to apply an Act of
Parliament to an actual case. The wording of the
Act may seem to be clear when it is drafted and
checked by Parliament, but it may become
problematic in the future.
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The courts must uphold the will of Parliament
and not try to usurp its powers, but sometimes it
necessary to try and understand what the words
used by the parliamentary draftsman mean.
The rules of interpretation

• There are two approaches to statutory
  interpretation the literal approach and the
  purposive approach.
• There are also three main rules of statutory
  interpretation that judges use to decide a case
• the literal rule
• the golden rule
• the mischief rule

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• TASK
• Cheeseman v Director of Public Prosecutions
  (1990)
• Question 4????
• Was this the correct decision?
• Why? Reasons?
• What else could/should the courts have done?

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Literal Approach versus Purposive Approach The
case of Cheeseman illustrates several of the
problems of stautory interpretation. It is an
example of the courts taking the words
literally. However, it can be argued that the
defendant was wilfully and indecently exposing
his person in a street and that he was caught
doing that. Is it important that the police
officers were passengers? Some people would
argue that the whole purpose of the Act was to
prevent this type of behaviour this is the
purposive approach to statutory interpretation
instead at looking at the precise meaning of each
word, a broader approach is taken
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• This conflict between the literal approach and
  the purposive approach is one of the major issues
  in statutory interpretation. Should judges
  examine each word and take the words literally or
  should it be accepted that an Act of Parliament
  cannot cover every situation and that the
  meanings of words cannot always be exact?
• In European law the purposive approach is taken.
• In English law the judges have not been able to
  agree on which approach should be used, but
  instead, over the years they have developed three
  different rules of interpretation. These are the
• Literal rule
• Golden rule
• Mischief rule

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Literal rule
The literal rule respects parliamentary
sovereignty. The judges take the ordinary and
natural meaning of the word and apply it, even if
doing so creates an absurd result. Lord Esher
said in 1892 The court has nothing to do with
the question of whether the legislature has
committed an absurdity.
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Golden rule
The golden rule is an extension of the literal
rule. If the literal rule gives an absurd result,
which is obviously not what Parliament intended,
the judge should alter the words in the statute
in order to produce a satisfactory result. Judges
may used the narrow approach or the broad
approach.
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Mischief rule
The mischief rule (or purposive approach) gives
judges the most flexibility when deciding what
mischief Parliament intended to stop. It was
established in Heydons Case (1584). When using
this rule, a judge should consider what the
common law was before the Act was passed, what
the problem was with that law, and what the
remedy was that Parliament was trying to provide.
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Smith v Hughes 1960. Section 1(1) of the Street
Offences Act 1959 said "it shall be an offence
for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a
street or public place for the purposes of
prostitution." The court considered appeals by
six different women who had been on a balcony or
at the windows of ground floor rooms. In each
case, the women were attracting men by calling to
them or tapping on a window. They argued they
were not guilty since they were not in the
street. Re Sigsworth (1935). A son had murdered
his mother. The mother had not made a will, but
in accord with rules set out in the
Administration of Justice Act 1925 her next of
kin would inherit (who was the son). Fisher v
Bell 1960 A shopkeeper displayed a flick-knife
in his window. The Restriction of Offensive
Weapons Act 1959 made it an offence to offer such
a knife for sale. The defendant argued that a
display of anything in a show window is simply an
offer to treat and this means that, under
contract law, it is the customer who makes the
offer to buy the knife. Task apply each of the
rules of statutory interpretation to each of the
above cases.
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Fisher v Bell (1961)
This case concerned a flick knife displayed in a
shop window. Lord Parker acquitted Bell under
the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959,
even though it was obvious that this was exactly
the sort of behaviour that Parliament intended to
stop. He justified his decision because the
draftsmen knew the legal term invitation to
treat (which would have been applicable in this
case) but failed to include it.To respect
Parliaments sovereignty he had to infer that
they had left it out on purpose.
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Smith v Hughes (1960)
The defendants were charged with soliciting in a
street or public place for the purposes of
prostitution contrary to the Street Offences Act
1959. They were soliciting from upstairs
windows. Lord Parker used the mischief rule to
convict, as he believed that the mischief that
Parliament had intended to stop was people in the
street being bothered by prostitutes.
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Re Sigsworth (1935) Re Sigsworth (1935) is an
example of the broad approach of the golden
rule. A son had murdered his mother. The mother
had not made a will, but in accord with rules set
out in the Administration of Justice Act 1925 her
next of kin would inherit (who was the son).
There was no ambiguity in the wording of the
Act, but the court was not prepared to let a
murderer benefit from his crime. So it was held
that the literal rule should not apply, the
golden rule being used to prevent a repugnant
situation.
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R v Allen (1872)
R v Allen is an example of the narrow approach of
the golden rule. The wording of the Offences
Against the Person Act 1861 had to be given a
different interpretation for the crime of bigamy,
because the way it was written meant that the
crime could never be committed. The court used
the golden rule and held that marry meant to
go through a marriage ceremony.
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Extra cases
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Purposive Approach Royal College of Nursing v
DHSS (1980).  The court had to decide if nurses
could lawfully continue an abortion started by a
registered medical practitioner (a doctor). 
Although Lord Diplock referred to the mischief of
illegal abortions, Lord Keith referred to the
purpose of the Abortion Act 1967, which was to
ensure that socially acceptable abortions were
carried out in safe conditions.  The House of
Lords held that the procedure was lawful.
Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd (1997).  The
complainant suffered racial abuse at work, which
he claimed amounted to racial discrimination for
which the employers were liable under s32 of the
Race Relations Act 1976.  The CA applied the
purposive approach and held that the acts of
discrimination were committed in the course of
employment.  Any other interpretation ran
counter to the whole legislative scheme and
underlying policy of s32.
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Mischief Rule Corkery v Carpenter (1951).  A
person could be arrested if found drunk in charge
of a carriage on the highway.  The defendant
had been arrested for being drunk in charge of a
bicycle on the highway.  The court held that a
bicycle was a carriage for the purposes of the
Act because the mischief aimed at was drunken
persons on the highway in charge of some form of
transport, and so the defendant was properly
arrested.
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Case examples of the literal rule
include Whiteley v Chappell (1868).  The
defendant pretended to be someone who had
recently died in order to use that persons
vote.  It was an offence to personate any person
entitled to vote.  As dead people cannot vote,
the defendant was held not to have committed an
offence. London North Eastern Railway v
Berriman (1946).  The claimants husband was
killed while oiling points along a railway line. 
Compensation was only payable if he had been
relaying or repairing the line.  The House of
Lords held oiling points was maintaining the line
and not relaying or repairing.
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Golden Rule Adler v George (1964).  It was an
offence to obstruct HM Forces in the vicinity of
a prohibited place.  The defendants had
obstructed HM Forces in a prohibited place (an
army base) and argued that they were not liable. 
The court found them guilty as in the vicinity
of meant near or in the place.
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• TASK
• Which of the three approaches to statutory
  approach do you think is best?
• Why?

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Other aids to interpretation

• intrinsic aids
• extrinsic aids
• presumptions
• Latin rules of language

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INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AIDS There is a wide range
of material that may be considered by a judge
when interpreting statutes.  Some of these aids
may be found within the statute in question,
others are external to the statute.  They are
also known as intrinsic and extrinsic aids.
Intrinsic aids
Intrinsic aids are sources within the Act
(internal aids). In order to determine the
meaning of a section of an Act of Parliament, the
judge may wish to look at other sections in the
Act
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INTERNAL 1. Other enacting wordsAn examination
of the whole of a statute, or relevant Parts, may
indicate the overall purpose of the legislation. 
It may show that a particular interpretation of
that provision will lead to absurdity when taken
with another section. 2. Long TitleThe long
title should be read as part of the context, as
the plainest of all the guides to the general
objectives of a statute (Lord Simon in The
Black-Clawson Case).  For example, Lord Diplock
referred to the long title of the Abortion Act
1967. 3. PreambleWhen there is a preamble it is
will generally state the mischief to be remedied
and the scope of the Act.  It is therefore
clearly permissible to use it as an aid to
construing the enacting provisions. 4. Headings,
side-notes and punctuationHeadings, side-notes
and punctuation may be considered as part of the
context.  However, they may not have been
discussed in Parliament.
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Extrinsic aids

• Extrinsic aids are sources outside the Act
  (external aids). Examples include
• dictionary
• Hansard
• Human Rights Act 1998
• legal textbooks
• Interpretation Act 1978
• explanatory notes

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EXTERNAL 1. Dictionaries and other literary
sourcesDictionaries are commonly consulted as a
guide to the meaning of statutory words. 
Textbooks may also be consulted. 2. PracticeThe
practice followed in the past may be a guide to
interpretation.  For example, the practice of
eminent conveyancers where the technical meaning
of a word or phrase used in conveyancing is in
issue. 3. Other Statutes in Pari MateriaRelated
statutes dealing with the same subject matter as
the provision in question may be considered both
as part of the context and to resolve
ambiguities.  A statute may provide expressly
that it should be read as one with an earlier
statute(s). 4. Official ReportsLegislation may
be preceded by a report of a Royal Commission,
the Law Commissions or some other official
advisory committee.  These reports may be
considered as evidence of the pre-existing state
of the law and the mischief with which the
legislation was intended to deal.  However, it
has been held that the recommendations contained
in them may not be regarded as evidence of
Parliamentary intention as Parliament may not
have accepted the recommendations and acted upon
them (The Black-Clawson Case).
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5. Treaties and International ConventionsThere
is a presumption that Parliament does not
legislate in such a way that the UK would be in
breach of its international obligations. 6.
Parliamentary Materials/HansardIn Pepper
(Inspector of Taxes) v Hart, the House of Lords
relaxed the general prohibition (in Davis v
Johnson) that a court may not refer to
Parliamentary materials, such as reports of
debates in the House and in committee (Hansard)
and the explanatory memoranda attached to Bills,
when interpreting statutes.  They may now be used
where (a) legislation is ambiguous or obscure,
or leads to an absurdity (b) the material relied
on consists of one or more statements by a
minister or other promoter of the Bill together
if necessary with such other parliamentary
material as is necessary to understand such
statements and their effect and (c) the
statements relied on are clear.  However, using
Hansard results in three problems the research
adds to cost of a case it may not be of
assistance or confirms the view already taken by
the court. 7. Explanatory NotesSince 1998,
Bills are presented with Explanatory Notes,
written in clear and simple English.  They are
updated as a Bill goes through Parliament and
changes its wording and meaning.
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Presumptions

• Judges make presumptions about the wording of a
  statute. They know that
• the common law has not been changed unless the
  Act
• clearly states to the contrary
• a criminal offence requires mens rea (a guilty
  mind)
• the law should not act retrospectively

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Latin rules of language

• There are also Latin rules of language that aid
  interpretation
• ejusdem generis (of the same kind Beswick v
  Beswick)
• expressio unius est exclusio alterius (known
  from associates Tempest v Kilner)
• noscitur a sociis (the express mention of one
  thing is the exclusion of another Powell v
  Kempton Park Racecourse)

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(a) Ejusdem generis (of the same kind) General
words following particular words will be
interpreted in the light of the particular ones. 
For example Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse
(1899).  It was an offence to use a house,
office, room or other place for betting.  The
defendant was operating from a place outdoors. 
The court held that other place had to refer to
other indoor places because the words in the list
were indoor places and so he was not guilty.
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(b) Noscitur a sociis (known from associates) A
word will be interpreted in the context of
surrounding words.  For example Muir v Keay
(1875).  All houses kept open at night for
public refreshment, resort and entertainment
had to be licensed.  The defendant argued that
his café did not need a licence because he did
not provide entertainment.  The court held that
entertainment did not mean musical
entertainment but the reception and accommodation
of people, so the defendant was guilty.
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(c) Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the
express mention of one thing is the exclusion of
another) The express mention of things in a list
excludes those things not mentioned.  For
example Tempest v Kilner (1846).  A statute
required that contracts for the sale of goods,
wares and merchandise of 10 or more had to be
evidenced in writing.  The court had to decide if
this applied to a contract for the sale of stocks
and shares.  The court held that the statute did
not apply because stocks and shares were not
mentioned.