The Special Challenges of Cruise Missile Proliferation

1
The Special Challenges of Cruise Missile
Proliferation

• Dennis M. Gormley
• Senior Fellow
• Monterey Institutes Center for Nonproliferation
  Studies

2
Definition Cruise Missile

• A cruise missile is essentially a small unmanned
  aircraft designed for offensive missions
• Like an airplane it generates lift by airflow
  over aerodynamic surfaces and is propelled by a
  small jet engine
• The focus of this discussion will be on cruise
  missiles for land attack and unmanned air
  vehicles capable of being turned into
  weapons-carrying cruise missiles
• However, many jet-propelled anti-ship cruise
  missiles have essentially the same design, and
  while they are optimized for attacking ships at
  sea, they potentially could be converted to
  land-attack roles

3
The Context

• Obsessive focus on ballistic-missile
  proliferation as cruise-missile use increases
• Cruise missile proliferation seen as lesser
  included case
• National Intelligence Estimates emphasize that
  other means, including cruise missiles, are
  more likely ways of attacking the US homeland
• Quantum leap in enabling technologies for
  land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)
• Slow but steady increase in LACM manufacturers
• Strategic consequences for viable force
  projection and possible threats to homeland
• Slowly reacting defense preparedness and serious
  loopholes in non-proliferation policy

4
Key Points

• Threat uncertainty has led to either careless
  exaggeration ormore the caseneglect and an
  excessively singular focus on the
  ballistic-missile threat
• Multiple paths to cruise-missile acquisition,
  pace of technological change, and weak export
  controls, mean that the cruise-missile threat
  could emerge suddenlybefore minimal defense
  preparedness measures are in place
• Unfolding threat demands hedging strategies
  encompassing both improved non-proliferation
  policy and investments in technology readiness
  programs
• Technological change challenges governments to
  keep nonproliferation policy up to date

5
Outline

• Technological challenges of acquiring LACMs
• Alternative ways to acquire LACMs
• Defending against LACMs
• Strengthening non-proliferation policy

6
Technological Challenges of Acquiring LACMs

• Key enabling technologyfrom TERCOM and DSMAC to
  GPS/INS
• Small aerospace firms now provide variable
  autonomy flight management systems
• Commercial satellite imagery for fixed targets
  and GPS-aided mission planning
• Advanced propulsion systems for gt1000 kilometer
  ranges still remain tightly held
• But propulsion workarounds abound civil systems,
  reciprocating engines

7
Knowledge and Skill Requirements

• Aeronautical, electrical, computer,
  mechanical/machining, and testing skills
• Systems-integration skills needed for complex
  weapon-system development
• Two primary drivers scope and sophistication of
  indigenous skills and level and quality of
  foreign assistance
• True autarky is mythical

8
Alternative Ways to Acquire LACMs

• Converting anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) into
  LACMs
• Converting unarmed UAVs into LACMs
• Converting very light manned aircraft into armed
  UAVs (viz., LACMs)
• Acquiring LACMs from industrial suppliers

9
Converting ASCMs

• From pool of 75,000 ASCMs, potential conversion
  candidates are likely to be a small fraction
• Modern designs offer little space (physical
  volume) for longer-range conversions (additional
  fuel)
• Silkworm-class ASCMs offer attractive potential
• Developing modern land-attack navigation system
  is biggest barrier finding suitable propulsion
  is next
• Several years to achieve full capability to
  manufacture and effectively deploy converted
  ASCMs (cut in half with substantial foreign
  assistance)

10
Notional Extended-Range HY-4
Role Length Body Diameter Wingspan Launch
Weight Range Warhead Guidance Propulsion Fuel

Land attack 8.48 m 0.76 m 2.41 m 2,221 kg 708
km 500 kg HE GPS-IMU Turbojet 855 kg
Cruise Altitude Maximum Speed Launchers Modific
ations Installation of Land-Attack
Navigation System Installation of fuel
plugs Fuel system modifications
100 to 200 m 0.68 (Mach) Ship, truck/trailer,
aircraft
11
Hypothetical Tularemia Attack on San Diego
A land-attack Silkworm variant, moving southward
offshore, releases 120 kg of liquid BW agent. The
colored bands represent the probability of
infection (yellow gt90 percent, green gt50 percent,
pink gt10 percent).
12
Converting Unarmed UAVs

• Major market growth expected in both military and
  civilian sectors by 2005
• 40 nations produce UAVs, of which half are not
  MTCR members
• Some already come with GPS/INS systems
• Several examples (India, South Africa, Israel,
  Italy) already demonstrate conversion potential
• True range potential of UAVs not apparentrecent
  study reveals that nearly 80 percent of 600 UAVs
  examined have ranges gt300km

13
gt75 of the UAVs Have Range Greater Than 300 km
14
Converting Very Light Aircraft

• Appeal represented by low cost, ease of
  conversion, and challenges posed to advanced air
  defenses
• Many well-tested designs with ranges to 1000km,
  payloads of 150kg, take-off distances of
  100-200m, cruise speeds of 120kts (stall speeds
  lt80kts)
• UAV flight control systemspermitting conversion
  from manned to unmanned flightmake conversion
  much easier
• Poor mans strategic arsenal or terrorists
  weapon of choice?

15
Quest for WMD

• Interest in aerial balloon delivery for
  dispersing biological or chemical agents
• Crop duster airplanes investigated by at least
  two of the September 11 plotters
• 43 recorded cases involving 14 terrorist groups
  in which remote-control delivery systems either
  threatened, developed, or actually utilized
• Aerodynamic delivery (airplanes, UAVs, cruise
  missiles) most effective method of delivering
  biological and chemical agents
• Suicide appeal is compelling but effectiveness
  probably drives choice of delivery means

16
Simply Buying LACMs

• Expanding number of LACM producers with strong
  export motivations to reduce unit costs
• European manufacturers have leapt to top rung of
  world producers
• Russia and China could choose to exploit MCTR
  deficiencies regarding cruise missiles

17
Marketing Brochure for Russias Kh-65SE
18
Cruise Missile Defense Challenges

• Detecting another class of air targets featuring
• Reduced signatures
• Terrain masking
• Use of simple endgame countermeasures
• 360 degree route of attack
• Need for high clutter rejection
• Saturation attacks with cheap UAVs
• Fratricide or identifying friend from foe (IFF)
  problems

19
The Limits of Defense Preparedness

• Despite huge investments in air defenses, notable
  shortcomingssome on display during Operation
  Iraqi Freedomexist in defending against LACMs
• Limited connectivity among services in C3 and
  combat ID
• Each service procures equipment and develops
  procedures unique to its own vision of LACM
  defense
• Only a handful of manned interceptors supported
  by limited ground-based radars comprise
  continental air defenses
• Virtually no detection capability below 3000 feet
  over the US homeland
• Poor mans arsenal of low-cost cruise missiles
  threatens to make both ballistic- and
  cruise-missile defenses problematical
• Yet, however difficult the challenge, there is
  something to build upon, which is less the case
  with ballistic missile defense

20
The Effect of RCS Reduction on AWACS
Performance(Target Speed 800 km/hr)
7 square meter aircraft 0.1 square meter cruise missile 0.0001 square meter cruise missile
Detection range 370 km Detection range 130 km Detection range lt 25 km
Reaction time 28 minutes Reaction time 10 minutes Reaction time lt 2 minutes
21
Implementing Joint Cruise Missile Defenses

• Congressional support began in earnest with
  Cruise Missile Defense Initiative FY96 Defense
  Authorization Act
• Very uneven technology development program thus
  farAir Force only service making some progress
• Several years of technology development needed to
  position DOD to implement Defense Planning
  Guidance on CMD
• Homeland defense requires both external and
  internal focus
• Cruise missile defense remains weak sister to BMD
  programs

22
Four LACM Defense Priorities

1. Providing a single integrated air picture with
   greatly improved combat ID
2. Improving the performance of airborne
   surveillance radars and missile seekers against
   low cross-section cruise missiles and linking
   elevated sensors to ground- and air-based
   shooters to create a wide-area defense
3. Lowering the cost of air-defense interceptors to
   cope with large, low-cost raids of LACMs
4. Exploiting improvements in theater cruise missile
   defense to consider homeland defense options

23
Nonproliferation Policy Options

• 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime
• Seeks member adherence to agreed list of
  export-policy guidelines controlling transfer of
  ballistic, cruise, UAVs having range of 300km and
  payload of 500kg (nuclear)
• 1993 modification to include systems capable of
  delivering chemical/biological payloads
• Wide range of dual-use technologies subjected to
  case-by-case review
• Membersnow 33unilaterally implement export
  controls

24
MTCR Successes The Glass Half Full

• Dismantling of the Condor ballistic missile
  program
• Hundreds of blocked transfers of components,
  technologies, and production capabilities
• Strong consensus on ballistic missile transfers
• Need to capitalize on recent MTCR attention to
  UAVs/cruise missiles

25
Antiterrorism Proposal

• MTCR Warsaw Plenary 2002 examine ways of
  limiting the risk that controlled items and their
  technologies could fall into the hands of
  terrorist groups
• Terrorist capabilities trail ambitions therefore
  make the long pole in the tent (flight
  management) even longer
• U.S. anti-terrorism proposal to Wassenaar
  Arrangement reflects concern about kit airplanes
  as terrorist weapons, but it failed to elicit
  support because of lack of specificity
• Changes to the MTCR technology annex (Item 10)
  covering flight controls are needed to impose
  case-by-case reviews of UAV flight management
  system
• Advantage over Wassenaar because of MTCRs
  no-undercut provisions

26
Strengthening Non-proliferation Policy Top
Priorities

• Creating a uniform set of ground rules for
  determining LACM/UAV range and payload--Accomplish
  ed
• Close existing loophole on flight management
  systems--Attempted in Wassenaar Agreement (needs
  reformulation and consideration in MTCR, too)
• Implementing tighter controls on stealthy cruise
  missiles--Attempted but stalled by lack of
  consensus
• Implementing tighter controls on countermeasure
  technologies specially designed for LACM
  penetration
• Broadening current MTCR parameters governing
  controls on jet engines--Accomplished