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Lessons Learned from Accident Investigation of Longer, Heavier Trains

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Title: Lessons Learned from Accident Investigation of Longer, Heavier Trains


1
Lessons Learned fromAccident Investigation
ofLonger, Heavier Trains
  • International Heavy Haul Association
  • Jonathan Seymour, Board MemberTransportation
    Safety Board of Canada
  • Calgary, AlbertaJune 20, 2011

2
Outline
  • TSB mandate
  • Watchlist Critical Safety Issues
  • 2 Case Studies
  • Other investigation findings
  • Lessons learned
  • Progress
  • Looking ahead

3
About the TSB
  • Mandate To advance transportation safety in
    the air, marine, rail, and pipeline modes of
    transportation that are under federal
    jurisdiction by
  • conducting independent investigations
  • identifying safety deficiencies
  • identifying causes and contributing factors
  • making recommendations
  • publishing reports

4
  • Fishing vessel safety
  • Emergency preparedness on ferries
  • Passenger trains colliding with vehicles
  • Operation of longer,heavier trains
  • Risk of collisions on runways
  • Controlled flight into terrain
  • Landing accidents and runway overruns
  • Safety Management Systems
  • Data recorders

WATCHLIST
5
Watchlist (contd)
  • Nine Watchlist issues underpinned by
  • 41 recommendations
  • Many investigation findings
  • Inappropriate handling and marshalling can
    compromise the operation of longer, heavier
    trains.

6
Why This Is An Issue
Aerial photo of derailed cars, Cobourg. ON
7
Case Study 1 Brighton
  • Eastbound Train
  • 137 cars (11 845 tons, 8850 feet)
  • 3 head-end locomotives
  • Over 50 cars loads
  • Majority of loads marshalled on rear
  • Territory
  • Undulating terrain
  • Multi-track passenger and freight trains

8
Brighton Train/Track Profile
9
Brighton Findings
  • Broken knuckle at 107th car emergency
  • Rear collided with head-end portion
  • Resultant in-train forces led to derailment
  • Bail-off of independent brake did not reduce
    forces to a safe level
  • Simulation Different marshalling would have led
    to significantly reduced forces

10
Case Study 2 Drummondville
  • Eastbound Train
  • 105 cars (10 815 tons, 7006 feet)
  • 5 head-end locomotives
  • 50-car block of loaded grain cars on rear end
  • Broken knuckle at 75th car
  • Territory
  • Single track
  • Freight and passenger train operations daily

11
Drummondville Train Profile
12
Drummondville Findings
  • Marshalling was a factor
  • Front portion was on ascending grade
  • Rear portion was on relatively flat segment
  • high buff forces from heavy rear marshalling plus
    late bail off of independent brake
  • Simulation Reverse marshalling would have meant
    minor buff forces.

13
Other Investigation Findings
  • Inappropriate throttle, dynamic and automatic
    brake use
  • Emergency braking initiated from head end only
  • Non-alignment control couplers
  • Long Short car combinations
  • Use of distributed power
  • Technology can mitigate risks

14
Lessons Learned
  • Size and tonnage not sole factors
  • Key Lesson
  • Need to effectively manage in-train forces and
    how train interacts with track
  • Systemic approach needed by operators

15
Progress by Industry
  • Both major players taking action
  • Computerized marshalling management systems
  • Enhancement to train braking system
  • Greater use of distributed power
  • Enhanced training and job aids for locomotive
    engineers
  • Growth in use of technology

16
Progress Regulator
  • Transport Canada
  • Expressed support for TSB views
  • Sponsored research (Train separation on Kingston
    Subdivision)
  • Sponsored research (How to improve handling
    longer trains)

17
Progress a TSB Perspective
  • Many safety communications, including
  • 2004 Recommendation to TC
  • 2007 Board Concern communicated
  • 2010 TSB Watchlist
  • 2011 Significant advances

18
Whats Next?
  • Operators responsible for managing safety
  • Regulators responsible for overseeing safety
  • TSB will continue to
  • monitor progress
  • investigate occurrences
  • publish our findings
  • make appropriate recommendations
  • advocate for necessary changes

19
Summary
  • TSB Watchlist, concerns about LHT
  • Key Lesson from Brighton, Drummondville
  • Need to effectively manage in-train forces and
    how train interacts with track
  • Additional investigation findings
  • Progress
  • major players are taking action
  • TC supports our views
  • TSB will monitor, report publically, advocate for
    change to address safety deficiencies

20
Questions?
21
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