Crisis Management and Arms Control

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Crisis Management and Arms Control

• The Evolutions of Nuclear Strategy
• US Soviet Security Cooperation

Yi-Ren Chen Hist 5N May 4th, 2004
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The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy

• Problems
• Schelling, theory degenerates at one extreme if
  there is not scope for mutual accomodation it
  degenerates at the other extreme if there is no
  conflict at all and no problem in identifying and
  reaching common goals.
• Each claiming to be powerful enough to destroy
  the other and neither believing the others
  protestations of his peaceful intentions
• task to recognize when mutual interests
  conincide

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• Stable conflict
• Retaliation is not to win, but to prove to the
  attacker that his losses would be large
• Hurt social and economic structure
• Coercive bargaining coercion, intimidation and
  deterrence
• Best weapons are protected from a first strike
• Did the development of intercontinental missiles
  strengthen the concept of deterrence?
• What do you think about the analogy of the
  modern deterrence to the ancient institution of
  the exchange of hostages?
• Do you agree with the proposal that a nation
  should abstain from the most advanced weapons,
  while encouraging the enemy to improve his
  defenses?

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• Problem with arms control alien to military
  thinking, surprise attacks one needs more
  weapons so adversary cant wipe all out in first
  attack
• Arms control over disarmament
• From mid 1950s US negotiation position in UN
  changes how to live with the bomb
• Can nuclear weapons be confined to the role of
  arms control?

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• Nuclear pacifists
• tradition of civilized warfare
• Nuclear weapons violated any attempts to
  proportionate violence
• Accidents, ensured east-west conflict
• Arms race intermediate stop to disarmament
• Terror can be used to deter and keep
  international peace
• Act of threatening use of nuclear weapons
  immoral? Threats imply usage
• Does threatening to use nuclear weapons carry the
  same moral stigmas as actually using them?

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US Soviet Security Cooperation

• Close calls in Berlin, Korea, the Middle East,
  Cuba, South Asia
• Managing crisis over avoiding them
• Set standards and approach to dealing with
  management, but not avoidance

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• Crisis Management
• Operational requirements
• 1. top level political body maintain knowledge
  and informed control
• 2. coordinate movements of military with
  diplomatic strategy
• 3. slow down tempo of military movements
• Avoid military threats
• Military alerts and force movements undertaken to
  reduce vulnerability and readiness
• Select diplomatic proposals and define interest

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• Prudence
• Neither superpower shall initiate military action
  against the other
• Shall not exploit its advantage in a crisis
• Operate with great restraint in policies and
  actions
• Shall not permit a regional ally to drag into
  shooting war
• Accept intervention by the other power in a
  regional conflict if such intervention becomes
  necessary to prevent overwhelming defeat of ally,
  each shall accept responsibility for pressuring
  ally to stop sure of defeating opponent

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• Threats to Crisis Management
• Tension
• Temptation to exploit advantage
• Regional conflicts
• Crisis military movements
• Controlling own military
• Crisis induced stress

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• Crisis Avoidance
• How does the US Soviet conflict defer from
  other classical forms of power conflict and how
  much do you think this affected the course of
  events?
• Deterrence, alliance commitments, military, and
  economic aid
• Example Berlin airlift
• New opportunities emerged for reducing conflict,
  particularly in Europe where the vital interest
  of both sides were engaged
• Vital interests facilitate cooperation and crisis
  prevention

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• Was détente oversold in the Basic Principles
  Agreement, which included general principles that
  committed the US and Soviet union to avoid
  nuclear war and outbreaks?
• For Soviets peaceful coexistence means political
  equality with US
• The proposal put forward in 1983 by the American
  committee on the east west accord urges the US
  and the Soviet Union to negotiate a precise set
  of ground rules having to do with specific
  geography and specific ban on direct or indirect
  use of combat forces was such an agreement
  possible?
• Norms of competition lack institutionalized
  arrangements.

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• Powers should undertake case by case diplomatic
  conversations on various regions
• Trends of third world toward greater conflict
  will confront both superpowers with declining
  influence in those areas
• Pressures to reduce both superpowers
  involvements aboard might lead to mutual
  restraint and tacit cooperation

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• Bibliography
• - Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear
  Strategy (Macmillan 1981) pp. 190-207.
• - Alexander George, "U.S.-Soviet Efforts to
  Cooperate in Crisis Management and Crisis
  avoidance," in Alexander George, Philip J. Farley
  and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security
  Cooperation, (Oxford U.P., 1988) pp. 581-599.

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• End

Yi-Ren Chen Hist 5N May 4th, 2004