Teaching Diverse Representations of the 1917 Russian Revolution:

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Teaching Diverse Representations of the 1917
Russian Revolution The Role of
Leadership Joseph Zajda Associate
Professor Faculty of Education, Australian
Catholic University (Melbourne Campus) John
Whitehouse Lecturer in History /
Humanities Melbourne Graduate School of
Education The University of Melbourne
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(Whitehouse, 2008)
3
Historical Thinking Concepts (Peter Seixas)
http//historybenchmarks.ca/
4
Historical Reasoning (van Drie van Boxtel)
(van Drie van Boxtel, 2008)
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Teaching History Theory into Practice History
is a discipline with its own purpose, content and
modes of inquiry (Taylor and Young, 2003, Taylor,
2006, Zajda and Whitehouse, 2009). How does the
discipline produce knowledge? What are the issues
at work in this process? Teachers must present
the discipline as an exploration of the past
based on evidence. This means that students use
primary and secondary sources to form
understandings of the past. The implications of
including secondary sources in the history
classroom are profound. Historiography is central
to historical understanding, not some peripheral
aspect of the discipline. Leading students to
this understanding creates rich possibilities for
historical understanding. As a first step,
teachers need to examine key historical works on
the topics that they plan to teach. The questions
that historians pose about the past can shape
curriculum. Rigorous exploration of the past
requires distinctive, disciplinary thinking.
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The October Revolution - A Socialist
Perspective The course of the preparations
conducted by the Party in accordance with Lenins
plan showed that the rising would begin as a
massive, organised action by revolutionary
troops, as a resolute assault on the enemys key
installations and strong points The Great
October Socialist Revolution (Moscow Progress
Publishers, 1977), 163.
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The October Revolution - A Western Liberal
Perspective The Soviet Government, which
controls the bulk of the source materials and
dominates the historiography, derives its
legitimacy from the Revolution and wants it
treated in a manner supportive of its claims. By
single-mindedly shaping the image of the
Revolution over decades it has succeeded in
determining not only how the events are treated
but which of them are treated. Among the many
subjects that it has confined to historiographic
limbo are the role of liberals in the 1905 and
1917 revolutions the conspiratorial manner in
which the Bolsheviks seized power in October the
overwhelming rejection of Bolshevik rule half a
year after it came into being, by all classes,
including the workers Communist relations with
imperial Germany in 1917-18 the military
campaign of 1918 against the Russian village and
the famine of 1921, which claimed the lives of
five million people. Richard Pipes, The Russian
Revolution (London Collins Harvill, 1990), xxii.
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The October Revolution - A Revisionist
Perspective The October revolution in
Petrograd has often been viewed as a brilliantly
orchestrated military coup détat without popular
support carried out by a tightly knit band of
professional revolutionaries brilliantly led by
the fanatical Lenin and lavishly financed by the
Germans. This interpretation, which was
undermined by Western revisionist social
history in the 1970s and 1980s, was rejuvenated
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the
end of the Gorbachev era, in spite of the fact
that newly declassified Soviet archives
reinforced the findings of the revisionists. At
the other end of the political spectrum, for
nearly eighty years Soviet historians, bound by
strict historical canons designed to legitimate
the Soviet state and its leadership, depicted the
October revolution as a broadly popular uprising
of the revolutionary Russian masses. According to
them, this upheaval was rooted in Imperial
Russias historical development and shaped by the
universal laws of history as originally
formulated by Karl Marx and adapted by Lenin.
Alexander Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in
Power (Bloomington Indiana University Press,
2007). 12-13.
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The October Revolution - A Second Revisionist
Perspective By the afternoon of the 25th, the
coup was all but accomplished - except,
provokingly, for the taking of the Winter Palace,
which was still under siege with the Provisional
Government members inside. The Palace fell late
in the evening, in a rather confused assault
against a dwindling body of defenders. It was a
less heroic occasion than later Soviet accounts
suggest the battleship Aurora, moored opposite
the Palace in the River Neva, did not fire a
single live shot, and the occupying forces let
Kerensky slip out a side entrance and
successfully flee the city by car. It was also
slightly unsatisfactory in terms of political
drama, since the Congress of Soviets - having
delayed its first session for some hours, on
Bolshevik insistence - finally began proceedings
before the Palace fell, thus frustrating the
Bolsheviks wish to make a dramatic opening
announcement. Still, the basic fact remained the
February regime had been overthrown, and power
had passed to the victors of October.
10
Who were the victors of October? In urging the
Bolsheviks towards insurrection before the
Congress of Soviets, Lenin had evidently wanted
this title to go to the Bolsheviks. But the
Bolsheviks had in fact organized the uprising
through the Military-Revolutionary Committee of
the Petrograd Soviet and, by accident or design,
the Committee had procrastinated until the eve of
the meeting of the national Congress of Soviets.
(Trotsky later described this as a brilliant
strategy - presumably his own, since it was
clearly not Lenins - of using the soviets to
legitimate a Bolshevik seizure of power.) As the
news went out to the provinces, the most common
version was that the soviets had taken
power. Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian
Revolution (Oxford Oxford University Press,
2008), 64-5.
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The October Revolution - Further Reflection More
critically, the October Revolution would not have
commenced nor ended as it did without Kerenskys
decision on the 24th. It was Kerenskys attack on
the Bolshevik newspapers that forced the issue of
Soviet power before the congress met, galvanised
its supporters and gave Lenin the revolution
which he otherwise had little hope of getting.
Indeed, Kerenskys action had more to do with the
launching and outcome of the October Revolution
than did Lenins own unsuccessful attempt to plot
a Bolshevik seizure of power before the Congress
of Soviets. Kerenskys blunder provoked the armed
struggle that transferred power before the
congress met. This changed the nature of the
transfer of power and altered the role of the
Congress of Soviets and the essential character
of the revolution. It gave Lenin the seizure of
power before the congress that he had so long,
and unsuccessfully, demanded. Kerensky, not
Lenin, began the October Revolution. It allowed
Lenin to turn a revolution for Soviet power into
a Bolshevik Revolution. Rex A. Wade, The
Russian Revolution (Cambridge Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 302-303.
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Placemat Learning Activity
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Three-Level Study Guide
Adapted from Herbert (1978)
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Critique Compare Connect
Critique What do you know and believe? What might you expect to happen? What are all the factors involved? What are the gaps and silences? Whose view dominates? What are the strengths and weaknesses?
Compare What if you compare? What are the similarities between and ? What are the differences between and ?
Connect If you put all the factors together, what are the big ideas? What are the main ideas? What relationships can you make? What are some of the causes and consequences?
S. Godinho J. Wilson (2004)
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Question Quadrant
Textual
Open
Closed
Intellectual
Cam (2006)
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Question Quadrant
Source-Based
Open
Closed
General
Whitehouse (2008)
17
National Centre for History in the Schools (UCLA)
Standards in Historical Thinking
http//nchs.ucla.edu/standards/thinking5-12.html
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July Days - Secondary Source 1 (Christopher
Hill) On July 16th and 17th a series of
spontaneous demonstrations by half a million
workers and soldiers in Petrograd urged the
Central Executive Committee of the Soviets to
assume supreme power Take power, you son of a
bitch, when its given to you, an irate worker
shouted to the Socialist Revolutionary leader,
Chernov. The Bolsheviks were taken by surprise by
the scale of these demonstrations no less than
the Provisional Government, and did their best to
prevent the demonstrations turning into an armed
rising, since they felt that they had not yet
sufficient influence outside the capital to be
able to maintain themselves in power
19
The leaders of the majority parties in the
soviets did not accept the sole power thus thrown
at them. The government forcibly suppressed and
disarmed the Bolsheviks and their most active
supporters in Petrograd and at the front. Pravda
was smashed up and forbidden to resume
publication, and forged documents were published
alleging Bolshevik connections with the Germans.
Lenin had to go into hiding. A new government was
formed, which proclaimed its complete
independence of the soviets, although it still
contained representatives of the leading soviet
parties. In Lenins view the July Days marked
the end of dual power and the effective surrender
of the soviet leaders. He declared that all
hopes of a peaceful development of the Russian
Revolution have definitely vanished, and urged
the abandonment of the slogan all power to the
soviets. Christopher Hill, Lenin and the
Russian Revolution (London English Universities
Press, 1947), 116-7.
20
Secondary Source 2 (Richard Pipes) But in the
ultimate analysis the Bolshevik failure seems to
have been caused by factors other than inadequate
forces or bad planning contemporaries agree that
the city was theirs for the asking. Rather, it
was due to a last-minute failure of nerve on the
part of the commander in chief. Lenin simply
could not make up his mind according to
Zinoviev, who spent these hours by his side, he
kept wondering aloud whether this was or was not
the time to try, and in the end decided it was
not. For some reason he could not summon the
courage to make the leap possibly the dark cloud
which hung over him of government revelations
about dealings with the Germans held him back.
Later, when both of them sat in jail, Trotsky
told Raskolnikov, in what Raskolnikov took to be
a veiled criticism of Lenin Perhaps we made a
mistake. We should have tried to take
power. Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution
1899-1919 (New York Knopf, 1990), 431.
21
July Days - Secondary Source 3 (Sheila
Fitzpatrick) In one sense, the July Days were a
vindication of Lenins intransigent stand since
April, for they indicated strong popular
sentiment against the Provisional Government and
the dual power, impatience with the coalition
socialists, and eagerness on the part of the
Kronstadt sailors and others for violent
confrontation and probably insurrection. But in
another sense, the July Days were a disaster for
the Bolsheviks. Clearly Lenin and the Bolshevik
Central Committee had been caught off balance.
They had talked insurrection, in a general way,
but not planned it. The Kronstadt Bolsheviks,
responding to the sailors revolutionary mood,
had taken an initiative which, in effect, the
Bolshevik Central Committee had disowned. The
whole affair damaged Bolshevik morale and Lenins
credibility as a revolutionary leader. Sheila
Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution 3rd
Edition (Oxford Oxford University Press, 2008),
58.
22
July Days - Secondary Source 4 (Rex Wade) The
July Days have often been called a dress
rehearsal for the October Revolution. In reality
they were more like February than October. The
July Days, like the February Revolution, began as
popular demonstrations against the war, the
economic situation and a government that had lost
credibility. Like February, the political parties
were active in stimulating discontent but did not
plan the actual revolt. Rather, again like
February, socialist political leaders, in the
July case the Bolsheviks in particular, stepped
forward at the end to try to consolidate the
popular revolt in the streets (unsuccessfully
this time). The July Days and the February
Revolution (and the April Crisis), but not the
October Revolution, were characterised by massive
popular street demonstrations. Such
demonstrations were conspicuously absent in the
October Revolution, which began and concluded
very differently. The similarity with October
rested primarily with the popularity of the
demand that the Soviet take full power and create
a radical revolutionary government, and with the
prominent role played by Bolshevik, Left SR and
anarchist agitators it is in this demand for
Soviet power and the support from the radical
left that the July Days can be called a prelude
to October. Rex A. Wade, The Russian Revolution,
1917 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2000), 289-290.
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Teaching History and Learning National
Identity Recently, in a number of countries,
teaching and learning history, as a curriculum
discipline, has been characterised by political,
economic, cultural and ideological imperatives,
whose teleological goal is one of the
nation-building process and one of cultivating a
modern dimension of national identity in the
global culture (Macintyre and Clark, 2003
Baques, 2006 Nicholls, 2006 Taylor, 2006
Simpson and Halse, 2006 Janmaat and Vickers,
2007 and Zajda, 2007). In the USA, history
continues to be a staple of the American
curriculum in both elementary and secondary
schooling (Thornton, 2006, p. 15). Similarly, in
the Russian Federation, history lessons in
schools play a significant role in the
nation-building process, citizenship education,
patriotism, and values education, which is
closely monitored by the state (Zajda, 2007,
2009).
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Images of the October 1917 Revolution in Russian
School textbooks Many Russian contemporaries,
who lived at the time, already regarded the
October 1917 events as another political
perevorot, (coup), which temporarily brought to
the top one of the Russian parties, namely the
Bolsheviks, or the Majority Party (who were
actually the minority party in 1917, and did not
have the majority at the Congress of the Soviet).
The Bolsheviks won over the other parties by
arming itself with popular propaganda slogans for
the masses, and by using conspiratorial and
forceful military strategies The Bolsheviks
were quick to declare the October Revolution as
the socialist oneBut did this third revolution
bring in the end the creation of the socialist
society? We will find the answer when we analyse
further events in Russia (p. 116).
25
As we glance back to the October Revolution of
1917 in the section Shturm vlasti (the Attack on
the Government) this crucial moment in the world
history, which brought the Bolsheviks to power,
is now described as a low-key event, in radical
contrast to the accepted Soviet versions, which
typically portrayed it as one of momentous
significance. In contrast to Soviet pictorial
representations of the mass storming of the
Winter Palace, students now learn that in fact,
only small detachments, organised by the
Military-Revolutionary Committee (which was
directed by Trotsky, whose role is finally
acknowledged in the new generation textbooks,
published in the 1990s and after 2000) actually
seized the Winter Palace. The 1917 Provisional
Government, lead by Kerensky (who was not
present), simply ceased to exist and its
ministers were arrested. However, students are
not invited to reflect further on the reasons for
such different versions of the same event, or to
consider that while the coup itself was not a
mass event, it did set in train drastic and
far-reaching changes in the political, economic
and social structure and culture of Russian
society.
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Representation of the 1917 Revolution in Grade
10/11 (final years of secondary schooling)
Russian history textbooks The Role of Leadership
in the 1917 Revolution In Rossiia v XX veke
(Russia in the 20th Century), by Levandovski and
Shchetinov, one of the core textbooks for Year
11/12 history classes, with a circulation of
100,000 copies, (recommended by the Ministry of
Education), in the Theme 4 is Russia in the
revolutionary whirlwind of 1917 (pp. 88-117),
one of the Section reads The Bolsheviks assume
power, where the revolution of 1917 is described
as follows Lenins most convincing argument was
We have thousand of armed workers and
soldierswho are capable of taking the Winter
Palaceif we attack immediately and
suddenly Petrograd Soviet, lead by Trotsky,
establishes a Military-Revolutionary Committee
(MRC)From 24 October, the detachments of MRC,
consisting of read guard-workers, soldiers, and
sailors of the Baltic Fleet began to occupy
central buildings and places in the capital
railway stations, bridges, the central telegraph
office, and power stations. During the night of
26 of October, the rebels seized the Winter
Palace. The Provisional Government seized to
exist, and its ministers were arrested (p. 114).
27
The Role of Leadership At the end of 1916
Lenin, still in exile in Switzerland, in his
pessimistic appraisal thought that he will never
see the revolution in Russia.   A provisional
government set up in March 1917, which included
Kerensky, released political prisoners, among
them Iosif Dzugashvilli (now known as Stalin, or
his new name steel-like, from the Russian
stal or steel) in Siberia. In April Lenin
arrived in Russia in the infamous sealed train.
After Lenins inspiring April theses, the
Bolsheviks adopted the two winning
sloganspeace and land. The Provisional
Government under Kerensky had lost the
initiative. Although some progressive social
legislations were adopted, the major policy
issues remained unsolvedRussias participation
in the war, and the land reforms. Most
importantly, the Provisional Government lacked
the legitimacy in the eyes of the masses,
following the disappearance of the semi-divine
attributes of the Tsar. Having failed to launch
major reforms, which were expected, the
government lost the support of the masses. Its
socialist pretensions alienated the middle
classes and the military. (Nove 22). The time
was right for seizing power. The Bolsheviks
decided to act. Lenins hour had arrived.
28
The Role of Leadership On the eve of uprising,
the Central Committee (of the Bolsheviks Party)
voted on the resolution (10th October 1917) for
an armed uprising. Lenin, Sverdlov, Stalin,
Trotsky and others voted for it, and Kamenev,
Zinoviev, and others voted against it. They felt
that the revolution had insufficient forces, and
were in favour of waiting for the opening of the
Constituent Assembly (when the elections to this
Assembly were held, resulting in an
anti-Bolshevik majority, Lenin did not hesitate
to dissolve itJZ) and there decide the question
of governance (Zharova and Mishina 168).
Convinced that the forces defending the
Provisional Government were small, the two
leaders, responsible for the taking of the Winter
PalaceV. Antonov-Ovseenko and G. Chudnovski gave
the order to take the palace at 00.50AM on 26
October, 1917 (Zharova and Mishina 172). 
29
The Role of Leadership On the night of 25th
October, the revolutionary detachments occupied
various central buildingsrailway stations,
banks, central electricity station, and the
telephone exchange. In the words of Trotsky,
people were blissfully asleep, unaware that the
government was changing (Zharova and Mishina
171).   The Winter Palace, was defended by a
small force of volunteers. On October 26 (by the
old Julian calendar, then still in use, or 7th
November by the new calendar) after midnight, a
small group of the Red Guard entered the
Palacethe few defenders having surrendered, and
arrested the government. Antonov-Ovseenko, one of
the leaders, who arrived at the Winter Palace,
said to the Ministers I announce that in the
name of the Military-Revolutionary Committee you
are all under arrest, to which, A. Konovalov,
one of the Ministers, replied Provisional
Government yields to force and surrenders (p.
172).
30
The Role of Leadership On 26th October at the
2nd Congress of the Soviet, Trotsky (unlike
Lenin, had joined the Bolsheviks quite late, in
July 1917) addressing the representatives of all
right-wing socialist factions said We the
Bolsheviks have openly forged peoples will
towards the uprising. Our uprising has won. Now
you are proposing Renounce the victory, and
conclude the agreement. With whom? The pathetic
few? You are already bankrupt. Your role has been
played out. Go where you now belongin the dust
bin (sornaia korzina) of history (Zharova and
Mishina, p. 172).
31
In the section The coup or revolution there is
a brief evaluation of October 1917 as a temporary
change of government Many of the contemporaries
understood the October 1917 events as one of the
series of political coups, by a temporary in
power dominant party in RussiaFrom then onwards,
the term coup was firmly entrenched in the
tapestry of memory narratives and historical
narratives of the rivals of the Bolshevik
party We feel that we can draw on this
perception, but we need to remember, however,
that the October events were not simply one of
periodic political coups, but laid down the
foundations of the new great revolution, which
turned upside down social, economic, political
and cultural strata in Russia, and which shook
the whole world. Bolsheviks (to their credit-JZ)
swiftly proclaimed the October revolution as a
socialist one (p. 116).
32

• Evaluation
• It is now well-documented that the Bolsheviks
  were able to seize power and topple the
  governmentwith very small forces. While the
  Soviet textbooks persisted in a myth-making and
  nation-building narrative of storming of the
  Winter Palace (the seat of the government), the
  reality was very differenta relatively bloodless
  and peaceful change of government. The army stood
  by, indifferent and demoralised, and the only
  defenders of the government were small
  detachments, including a womens battalion.
• The October Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent
  Bolsheviks triumph was not, as the students now
  see, either inevitable or predestined. A series
  of major, and soon to be fatal, errors in
  politics during the 1916-1917 period had been
  committed
• the failure of foreign policy in conducting the
  increasingly unpopular war, which had strained
  the resources to the limit, and imposed an
  unimaginable hardship on the people
• the leadership weakness of Tsar Nicholas II in
  not addressing the issue of economic and social
  reforms and the continuation of Stolypins (Prime
  Minister, prior to his assassination in 1911)
  far-reaching land reforms, thus saving the
  monarchy and the Russian Empire from the collapse
• Kerenskys persona dramatis of the man for all
  seasons, which had resulted in the demise of the
  Provisional Government
• the timely presence of both Lenin (his tactical
  genius in seizing power at the crucial moment)
  and Trotsky, who establishes a Military-Revolution
  ary Committee (MRC). It provided the necessary
  leadership and military strategy for overthrowing
  the Provisional government.

33
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