Theoretical Issues in Psychology

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Theoretical Issues in Psychology
Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of
Mind for Psychologists
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Chapter 2 Kinds of explanations

• 3 kinds of explanations
• Reduction
• Levels of explanation
• Reasons and causes
• Explanatory pluralism

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Explanation

• Explanation is answering to a why question.
• Three kinds of explanations
• 1) Nomological explanation (D-N model) answers
  why by subsumption under a general law
  (covering law)
• sciences.
• 2) Hermeneutic understanding (Verstehen)
  answers why by reconstructing context,
  explicating meaning and experience
• humanities.
• 3) Functional explanation answers why by
  finding the function (what is it for)
  mechanistic explanation
• biology (engineering) biological psychology.

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Nomological explanation
law 1law n condition 1 condition n
event (fact)
explanans
explanandum

• Subsuming an event (fact) under a general law.
• Or deducing an explanandum from an explanans.
• Prediction logically equals explanation.
• Problem doesnt work for motives, reasons and
  actions.

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Nomological explanation

• Example
• L1 Frustration causes aggression
• L2 Football supporters whose club lost are
  frustrated
• C1 These supporters football club lost
• --------------------------------------------------
  --------
• E These football supporters are aggressive

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Hermeneutic understanding

• Understanding and explicating human behavior
  and texts.
• Describing meaningful relations in context.
• Interpreting individual cases (no laws).
• Motives and reasons (not causes).
• Actions (not movements).
• Hermeneutic circle of whole and parts.

Problem no objectivity, not verifiable or
falsifiable
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• Explaining
• Natural sc.
• Time-spatial events
• Causes
• Nomothetical
• Object / objectivism
• Method-oriented
• Generalising over
• objective facts
• Experimental,
• biological psychology

• Understanding
• Social sc./humanities
• Actions
• Reasons (motives)
• Idiographical
• Subject / subjectivism
• Meaning-oriented
• Unique events
• Persons experience
• Client-centered therapy,
• psychoanalysis

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Reasons and causes in social science

• Explaining or understanding behavior?
• Action (rational, goal-directed,
  meaningful,motivated). Or
• Movement (mechanical, causal, determined).
• Solution multiple levels of explanation,
  understanding and causal explanation can coexist.

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Functional explanations

• What an item does, what goal it serves not
  what it is (made of).
• Teleology (goal-directedness).
• The presence of a trait is explained by its
  function, e.g., mammals have a heart to pump
  blood.
• Characteristic for biology adaptive functions
  selected in evolution.
• Evolutionary psychology function of jealousy,
  cheater detection, etc. (see Ch. 9.2).

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Functional explanations

• The presence of a trait is explained by its
  function.
• Adaptation (not physical causation, not
  interpretation of meaning).
• How system works, its design and functioning
  (no laws, no causes, no predictions).

Problem danger of cheap, circular,
pseudo-explanation (adaptationism).
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Mechanistic explanation

• Extension of functional explanation.
• A phenomenon is explained by the orchestrated
  functioning of the component parts of a
  mechanism.
• E.g., heart (mechanism) pumping blood
  (phenomenon) by muscles and valves
  (components) together.
• Interlevel lower level of components explains
  higher level phenomenon.

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Function

• Etiological the trait is selected in the past
• for a specific effect
• ? evolutionary explanation.
• Causal role the contribution a trait makes
• to the capacity of the whole system
• ? systemic, engineering explanation.

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Functionalism
Is a materialistic notion of mind
Behaviorism no mental terms and things only
observables.
Mind-brain Identity theory mind is brain mental
terms have to be reduced to brain terms.
Functionalism materialism without reductionism.
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Functionalism

• A mental process is a functional organisation
  of a machine (e.g., brain), an abstract
  organisation, can be realised in different kinds
  of hardware.
• Token materialism every function is realised
  in something material.
• No type materialism realisation in different
  kinds of material objects (computers, brains).
• Therefore no reduction to neurophysiology.

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Materialism in history
Behaviorism (behavior) Identity theory
(mindbrain) Functionalism 1st cognitive
Revolution (cognition) 2nd cognitive
revolution (cognition, brain behavior)
1913 ca1950 ca 1950 1950 1985 1985
present
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Two forms of mind materialism
Type materialism of the Identity theory Im
afraid when typical brain cells are firing
Token materialism of functionalism Im afraid
when my cognitive system is in a certain
functional state
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Type and token
The tokens student A student B
The type, the class students
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Problems of type materialism (IT) according to
functionalists

• We have insufficient knowledge of brains.
• Autonomy of psychology, no reduction (identity)
  of psychological to neural processes.
• IT is too chauvinistic only human brains can
  show intelligence but how about a chess computer?

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Functionalism

• Mental states are functional states of
  physical systems.
• Functions have a causal role (cause other
  mental states and behavior).
• Functions are materially though multiply
  realised.
• Implementation is irrelevant for explanation.
• Liberalism computers, animals, aliens can
  show intelligence.

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Criticism of biologically-oriented Functionalists

• This is machine functionalism function is
  stripped of goal-directedness and adaptation.
• Therefore teleological functionalism
  biological functions, not abstracted from
  implementation or environment.

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Reduction and reductionism
Reduction explanatory strategy Explain complex
phenomena by reducing to elements chain of why
and because going down from everyday
macro-objects to elementary particles. Reduction
ism ideology Reality is nothing but matter in
motion (nothing buttery), e.g., pain is firing
of certain neurons e.g., altruism is nothing
but the blind instinct, programmed by a
selfish gene.
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Theory reduction
Theory reduction deducing a higher level theory
from more basic theories plus bridge laws
(extension of D-N explanation) e.g., deduce
thermodynamics (temperature and pressure) from
statistical mechanics (molecules). Bridge laws
connect theories, identifying terms (things)
across theories (e.g., temperature is average
kinetic energy of gas molecules) e.g.,
associative learning deduced from synaptic
potentiation Long Term and Short Term Memory
deduced from LTP (biochemistry) neural
alphabet (Kandel).
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Classical reduction

• Deducing higher level science from lower level
• requires connectability (bridge laws) and
  deducibility
• sociology ? psychology ? neurofysiology ?
  physics
• complex ? simple.
• Unified science (positivism) same kind of
  observations, same kind of explanations
  everywhere in science, ultimately ideal
  physics.
• Basic theory incorporates higher level theory
• e.g., Mendelian genetics subsumed under
  biochemistry (DNA).

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Classical reduction

• Deducing higher level science from lower level,
  connected by bridge laws smooth incorporation of
  reduced (old) in reducing (new) theory.
• Problem Old theory usually false, concepts do
  not refer.
• New theory corrects old, meaning of concepts
  changes.
• Therefore, no bridge laws, no deduction.
• Classical reduction fails as account of real
  scientific progress works.
• Then
• eliminativism drop old theory (and its world
  view)
• or functionalism non-reductive materialism,
  autonomy.

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Non-reductive materialism

• Multiple realisation classical reduction
  impossible in neuro-psychology no bridge laws
  (type identities) between mind and brain.
• Supervenience Mental processes determined by
  (dependent on) material processes. No change
  in mental states without change in neural process
  (i.e., no disembodied mind).
• Compatible with functionalism as theory about the
  mind
• autonomy for psychology, no reduction
• but also materialism, no dualism.

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Supervenience the mental and the neural
mental
mental

no reduction
determination
neural2
neural3
neural
neural1
Neural
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Reduction vs elimination
Reduction identification of higher level
phenomenon with lower level. Retains ontology
the reduced phenomenon really exists e.g., water
is H2O temperature is kinetic energy e.g.,
pain is (identical with) firing of certain
neurons. Problem old theory false, meaning
changes no bridge laws, no reduction. Eliminativ
ism replacing higher level entities and theories
by more fundamental ones. Replaces ontology
higher level entities do not really exist e.g.,
talk of neural processes replaces pain,
consciousness, meaning etc.
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New wave reductionism, eliminativism

• Responds to failure of classical reduction
  higher level eliminated.
• Old reduced theory is to some degree false,
  obsolete, or incomplete.
• Old reduced theory to some degree corrected or
  even entirely replaced by lower level reducing
  theory.
• Functional, psychological theories only
  approximate, coarse descriptions.
• Cognitive phenomena can better be explained by
  neuroscience.

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Reduction vs levels

• Reduction in D-N-model unification, psychology
  is neuroscience.
• Eliminativism psychology replaced by
  neuro-science
• these are one-level stories.
• Alternative multiple levels of explanation
• explanatory pluralism, co-evolution of theories
  at different levels.

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When classical reduction fails

• Autonomy (functionalism), or
• Elimination (more or less correction of the
  reduced theory), or
• Explanatory pluralism (McCauley) coexisting
  theories, mutually influencing each other
  top-down and bottom-up.

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Explanatory pluralism

• Multiple levels of explanation coexist and
  coevolve.
• No autonomous levels (unlike functionalism), but
  mutual selection pressure.
• No reduction or elimination.