A HETEROGENEITY ANALYSIS OF THE BOLSA FAM

1
A HETEROGENEITY ANALYSISOF THE BOLSA
FAMÍLIAPROGRAMME EFFECT ON MENAND WOMENS WORK
SUPPLY

• Clarissa Gondim Teixeira

2
Introduction

• Bolsa Família Program the Brazilian CCT
• Origin PBF starded in 2003 as a result of the
  fusion of existing cash transfer programs
• Motivation
• Achieve the MDGs short-run poverty reduction
  (cash transfer)
• Universal policies failure to provide access to
  basic services increase demand for education
  and health (conditionality)
• Breaking intergenerational poverty cicle
  investment in humam capital (conditionality)

3
Introduction

• PBF positive effects
• Increase in food consumption and educational
  expenditures (CEDEPLAR, 2005) (IFPRI, 2010).
• Reduction in inequality and poverty rates (Chein,
  Andrade and Ribas, 2006)
• Increase in school attendance but no consensus on
  child labor effects (Cardoso y Souza, 2004),
  (Cacciamali, Tatei y Batista, 2008), (Pedrozo,
  2007), (IFPRI, 2010).

4
Introduction

• Frequent criticism concerning negative effects on
  labor supply
• No change in income question the effectiveness
  of the program
• Generates dependency concern with exit doors

5
Introduction

• Objectives of the paper are
• Identify the existence of PBFs impact on men and
  womens participation rate and journey
• Through the disaggregated analysis by sex, type
  of occupation and dose-effect
• Explain the relation of receiving cash transfers
  and labor supply
• Identify and characterise the individuals whose
  labour supply are the most elastic.

6
Literature review

• Time allocation theory (Becker, 1965)
• Income and subsititution effects (Parker and
  Skoufias, 2000)
• Multiplier effects (Martínez, 2004)
• Informal work and production function (Cardoso,
  1999)
• Additional worker (Stephens, 2001)
• Collective approach of intrahousehold resource
  allocation (Chiappori, 1992)

7
Literature review

• Individual level
• Increase in participation rate greater for women-
  Cedeplar (2005)
• Increase in participation rate - IFPRI (2010)
• Decrease in participation rate and labor hours
  for mothers -Tavares (2008)
• No effect participation rate, decrease in labor
  hours, increase for rural women - Ferro Nicollela
  (2007)
• Municipal level
• No effect - Foguel Barros (2008)
• Participation rate increase rural, decrease
  urban Ribas, Soares, Soares (2010)

8
Bolsa Família Programme (PBF)

• Elegibility criteria extremely poor families and
  poor families with children.
• Targeting
• Self-declared income verified by cross checking
  with formal work data
• Analysis of Single Registry information
• Inclusion and exclusion errors

9
Bolsa Família Programme(PBF)

• Cash Transfers
• Variable transfer of US7.00 per child or nursing
  mother maximun of 3 per familiy (avoid incentive
  to childbearing)
• Fixed transfer of US23.00 only for extremely
  poor families with or without children.

Monthly per capita income Transfer values (2006)
Below extreme poverty line (US 23.00 ) US 44.00
Below extreme poverty line (US 23.00 ) US 37.00
Below extreme poverty line (US 23.00 ) US 30.00
Below extreme poverty line (US 23.00 ) US 23.00
Between extreme poverty line (US 23.00) and poverty line (US 46.00) US 21.00
Between extreme poverty line (US 23.00) and poverty line (US 46.00) US 14.00
Between extreme poverty line (US 23.00) and poverty line (US 46.00) US 7.00
10
Bolsa Família Programme (PBF)

• Conditionalities
• 85 of school attendance
• Vaccination for children under 6 years old
• Pre and pos natal care for women.

11
Bolsa Família Programme (PBF)

• Exit doors
• Age of child (does not punish progression)
• Family per capita income above eligibility
  single registriy updated every 2 years
  (vulnerability )

12
Labor market of the poor
Source PNAD 2006. Own calculation.
13
Labor market of the poor
Men Women
Source PNAD 2006. Own calculation.
14
Labor market of the poor

• AIBF 82 Urban - PNAD 67 Urban

Men Women
Source AIBF 2005 and PNAD 2006. Own calculation.
15
Evaluation estrategy

• Cross section using annual household data PNAD
  2006
• Cash transfer supplement
• Quasi-experimental design
• Propensity Score
• Re-weighted multivariable regression
• Cluster in the household level

16
Empirical Investigation
Source PNAD 2006. Own calculation Source
PNAD 2006. Own calculation
17
Results

• The average effect on the probability of working
  is not significant for men or women.

18
Results

• PBF does not cause a large work discouragement
• Women are more sensitive to an income shock

19
Results
Work hours Men Women Men Women
Rural -1.08 -0.34 Agricultural -0.81 -0.67
0.39 0.52 0.37 0.57
Urban -0.35 -1.31 Non-agricultural -0.53 -0.95
  0.28 0.57   0.29 0.51
Source PNAD 2006. Own calculation.
20
Results
Work hours Men Women   Men Women
Formal worker 0.16 -0.70      
0.29 0.84
Rural -0.62 -1.00 Agricultural -0.12 -4.41
0.71 2.24 0.70 3.10
Urban 0.30 -0.58 Non-agricultural 0.15 0.00
  0.32 0.82   0.31 0.78
Informal worker -0.88 -0.81
0.29 0.42
Rural -1.14 -0.30 Agricultural -0.92 -0.56
0.42 0.56 0.40 0.60
Urban -0.63 -1.38 Non-agricultural -0.83 -1.06
  0.39 0.62   0.41 0.58
Source PNAD 2006. Own calculation.
21
Results
Work hours Men Women   Men Women
Self-employed -0.35 -1.16      
0.41 0.61
Rural -0.26 0.19 Agricultural -0.31 -0.85
0.58 0.64 0.53 0.77
Urban -0.44 -3.23 Non-agricultural -0.40 -1.60
  0.56 1.13   0.61 1.02
Paid worker -0.84 -0.82
0.28 0.48
Rural -1.77 -0.93 Agricultural -1.22 -0.66
0.52 0.78 0.49 0.86
Urban -0.24 -0.73 Non-agricultural -0.54 -0.89
  0.32 0.61   0.32 0.57
Source PNAD 2006. Own calculation.
22
Results
Cost of labor hour (Minimal wage) Men Women
0 -3.87 -0.76
0.90 0.51
1 -0.93 -0.80
1.21 1.60
2 0.30 0.29
  0.59 0.94
Source PNAD 2006. Own calculation.
23
Results

• Formal work is found to be the least elastic due
  to workers rights and income stability
• Urban self-employed women are the most sensitive
  to the PBF transfer
• Informal paid rural jobs are the most sensitive
  for men.
• Unpaid workers reduce their labor hours in
  contrast with those earning one or two minimal
  wage

24
Results
Transfer Value (R) Men   Women  
15 0.04 -0.46
0.41 0.66
30 -0.32 -0.53
0.45 0.81
45 -0.22 -0.95
0.53 0.82
50 -1.49 -1.15
0.58 0.75
65 -0.20 -0.10
0.38 0.57
80 -0.77 -1.23
0.36 0.58
95 -1.07 -1.13
  0.35 0.57
25
Conclusion

• One cannot affirm that PBF is responsible for
  generating dependence on account of income
  transfers
• The results also confirm that the elasticity of
  labor supply varies according to sex and type of
  work.
• Higher effects were found for greater income
  shock intensities