THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT

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THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT
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CONTEXT

• Rise of China
• Autonomy for Latin America
• Breakdown of ideological consensus
• Securitizing U.S.-Latin American relations
• Source Domínguez, Changes in the International
  System

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THE EVOLVING WORLD ORDER

• Unipolar?
• Multipolar?
• Flat?
• Pyramid?
• Source Smith, Prisms of Power, CR 4

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THE PINK TIDE ORIGINS

• Economiclack of growth (through 2003), poverty
  and inequality, frustration with Washington
  Consensus
• Politicalweakness of representative
  institutions, inattention to poor, persistence of
  corruption
• Internationalwar in Iraq, opposition to Bush
  policies and growing distaste for American
  society

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THE PINK TIDE MEMBERSHIP

• Hugo Chávez, Venezuela (1998, 2004, 2006)
• Lula, Brazil (2002, 2006) and Delma Rousseff
  (2010)
• Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández, Argentina
  (2003, 2007)
• Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005, 2009)
• Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua (2006)
• Rafael Correa, Ecuador (2006, 2010)
• Fernando Lugo, Paraguay (2008)
• Mauricio Funes, El Salvador (2009)
• Near-Misses
• Ollanta Humala, Peru (2006)
• Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico (2006)

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CLARIFICATION 1

• Differentiation right/center/left
• Contending leaders in/for Latin America
• Felipe Calderón (Mexico)
• Lula (Brazil)
• Hugo Chávez (Venezuela)

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CLARIFICATION 2

• Disenchanted masses in Latin America ?
• Voters for pink tide candidates ?
• Leftist candidates for office ?
• Leftist winners of presidential elections ?
• Pro-Chávez chief executives ?
• Hugo Chávez
• Notes
• Tidal swell is spontaneous, not organized
• Rivalries and defections

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THE PINK TIDE GOALS

• Domesticwinning power, rearranging electoral
  alignments overturning status quo, possibly
  through institutional reform changing policy
  direction
• Hemisphericgaining support throughout Latin
  America (invoking Bolivarian dream), reducing
  U.S. hegemony
• Globalchallenging international order, forging
  alliances with developing world and non-aligned
  nations

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THE PROBLEM WITH HUGO

• Uses language of the street (including the Arab
  street)e.g., the devil speech
• Sits atop petroleum
• Puts money where his mouth is
• Breaks established rules of the game
• Plays off resentment of Bush, U.S. power
• Challenges Washington Consensus and FTAA
• Goes for high stakes
• Seeks rearrangement of prevailing world order

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THE ODD COUPLE HUGO AND JORGE

• Georges gifts to Hugo
• discourse on democracy (e.g., Second Inaugural)
• caricature of ugly American
• unpopularity of foreign policies
• inattention to Latin America
• And Hugos reciprocation
• exaggerated rhetoric
• potential threats to neighboring countries
• authoritarian tendencies
• Q1 What would Hugo do without George?
• Q2 What about oil?

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CHALLENGING AMERICAN MYTHS

• The Cherished Assumptionfreely elected leaders
  will support U.S. policy
• The Western Hemisphere ideathe new world is
  distinct from old, will forge common front in
  international arena
• Democracy rationale for regime changefree
  elections as protective shield
• The hegemonic presumptionthe United States can
  dictate political life in Latin America

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GWB AND THE PINK TIDE

• Strategy of inoculation
• Circumvention through FTAs
• Cultivation (and cooptation?) of Lula

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VISIONS FOR LATIN AMERICAGWB AND USA

• Democraticwith tilt to right or center-right
• Prosperouswith commitment to free-market
  policies and ties to United States
• Unifiedunder U.S. leadership
• Peacefulin view of unanimity
• Deferentialfollowing U.S. lead in global arena

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REALITY CHECK 1

• Democracy broad ideological spectrum, from
  left to right
• Prosperity mixed economies rejection of
  Washington Consensus, FTAs, and FTAA
• Ideology diversity rather than unity
• Outlooks anti-U.S. attitudes strong and growing
  among large share of population
• Alliances rejection of U.S. leadership and
  rules of the game

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REALITY CHECK 2

• Not everyone wants the same thing!

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GWB and Latin America Comparative and Historical
Perspective _________Latin America as
Priority___________ ______ Low _______
_______ High _____ Operational Mode for
U.S. ____ Unilateral Ad hoc
Systematic imposition
intervention (Bush 2001-04)
(Reagan 1981-89) _______ _________________
__________________
Intermittent, Consistent, Multilateral
low-level high-level
diplomacy engagement (Clinton
1993-2000) (Kennedy 1961-63)
__________________________________________________
__________
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Rank-Order Preferences for U.S. Policy
___Partners___
__Targets___ U.S. Policy
(Mexico, (Cuba, __Rivals___
___Bystanders__ __Configuration__ _Bush
II__ __Colombia)__ __Venezuela)__
__(Brazil?)__ ___(Others)____ Low priority
1 4 2 1
4 Unilateral Low priority
2 3 1 2 2
Multilateral High priority 3 1
4 4 3
Unilateral High priority 4 2
3 3 1
Multilateral Note As presented here,
ordinal rankings mean that 1 stands for the
first-place (most preferable) choice, 2 for the
second-place choice, 3 for the third-place
choice, and 4 for the fourth-place (least
preferable) choice.
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The End.