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Internet2 DNSSEC Pilot

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Title: Internet2 DNSSEC Pilot


1
Internet2 DNSSEC Pilot
  • Shumon Huque
  • University of Pennsylvania
  • ESCC/Internet2 Joint Techs Workshop
  • Minneapolis, Minnesota, U.S.A., Feb 14th 2007

2
Description of the Pilot
  • http//www.dnssec-deployment.org/internet2/
  • Deploy DNSSEC
  • Gain Operational experience
  • Does it work (does it catch anything?)
  • Test DNSSEC aware applications
  • Participants sign at least one of their zones
  • Exchange keys (trust anchors) that will allow
    them to mutually validate DNS data

3
What is DNSSEC?
  • A system to verify the authenticity of DNS data
  • RFC 4033, 4034, 4035
  • Helps detect spoofing, misdirection, cache
    poisoning
  • Some secondary benefits appear
  • You could store keying material in DNS
  • DKIM, SSHFP, IPSECKEY, etc

4
A little background ..
  • Feb 06 DNSSEC Workshop held at Albuquerque
    Joint Techs
  • Mar 06 dnssec_at_internet2 mailing list
  • Apr 06 Internet2 Spring Member meeting
  • Advisory group formed and plans for a pilot
    project formulated
  • May 06 Pilot group began
  • Bi-weekly conference calls and progress reports

5
Co-ordination
  • Internet2
  • Shinkuro ????
  • Partner in DNSSEC Deployment Initiative
  • http//www.dnssec-deployment.org/
  • Some funding from US government

6
DNSSEC Deployment Efforts so far
  • MAGPI GigaPoP
  • All zones magpi.net,org 15 reverse zones
  • https//rosetta.upenn.edu/magpi/dnssec.html
  • MERIT
  • radb.net
  • nanog.org
  • http//www.merit.edu/networkresearch/dnssec.html
  • NYSERNet - test zone
  • nyserlab.org

7
Others considering or planning deployment
  • University of Pennsylvania
  • University of California - Berkeley
  • University of California - Los Angeles
  • University of Massachusetts - Amherst
  • Internet2

8
DLV (DNSSEC Lookaside Validation)
  • A mechanism to securely locate DNSSEC trust
    anchors off-path
  • An early deployment aid until top-down deployment
    of DNSSEC happens
  • Pilot group is in talks to make use of ISCs DLV
    registry
  • http//www.isc.org/index.pl?/ops/dlv/
  • More on this at a later date ..

9
More participants welcome!
  • (participation not restricted to Internet2)
  • Join mailing list
  • Participate in conference calls

10
Thoughts on deployment obstacles (1)
  • A Chicken Egg problem
  • Marginal benefits, until much more deployment
  • Why should I go first?
  • We had (have?) the same problem with other
    technologies (IPv6 etc)
  • Some folks will need to take the lead, if there
    is hope for wider adoption
  • Good way to find out how well it works

11
Thoughts on deployment obstacles (2)
  • Operational stability
  • More complicated software infrastructure
  • New processes for
  • Zone changes
  • Secure delegations
  • Security (protection of crypto keys)
  • Key rollover and maintenance
  • Integration w/ existing DNS management software
  • What is the experience of the pilot?

12
Thoughts on deployment obstacles (3)
  • Additional system requirements
  • Authoritative servers memory
  • Resolvers memory CPU
  • Memory use can be calculated
  • Probably not a big issue (unless youre .COM!)
  • CPU
  • Not too much of an issue today (dearth of signed
    data that needs validation)
  • Caveat some potential DoS attacks could hit CPU

13
Thoughts on deployment obstacles (4)
  • Key distribution in islands of trust
  • Why is there no top down deployment?
  • Work on signing root and (many) TLDs and
    in-addr.arpa is in progress
  • .SE, RIPE reverse done
  • .EDU work in motion
  • Interim mechanisms like DLV exist
  • Manual key exchange (unscalable)

14
Thoughts on deployment obstacles (5)
  • Stub resolver security (e2e security)
  • An area of neglect in my opinion
  • Push DNSSEC validation to endstations?
  • Secure path from stub resolver to recursive
    resolver
  • Possibilities SIG(0), TSIG, IPSEC

15
Thoughts on deployment obstacles (6)
  • Application layer feedback
  • Coming gradually
  • DNSSEC aware resolution APIs and applications
    enhanced to use them
  • DNSSEC aware applications
  • See http//www.dnssec-tools.org/
  • Note some folks think it might be nice to
    protect DNSSEC oblivious applications silently as
    an interim step

16
Thoughts on deployment obstacles (7)
  • Zone enumeration threat
  • See NSEC3 record (spec almost done)
  • draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec3-09.txt

17
References
  • Internet2 DNSSEC Pilot
  • http//www.dnssec-deployment.org/internet2/
  • http//rosetta.upenn.edu/magpi/dnssec.html
  • Mailing list dnssec_at_internet2.edu
  • https//mail.internet2.edu/wws/info/dnssec
  • Internet2 DNSSEC Workshop
  • http//events.internet2.edu/2006/jt-albuquerque/se
    ssionDetails.cfm?session2491event243

18
References (2)
  • DNSSEC(bis) technical specs
  • RFC 4033, 4034, 4035
  • Related
  • DNSSEC HOWTO
  • http//www.nlnetlabs.nl/dnssec_howto/
  • Threat analysis of the DNS RFC 3833
  • Operational practices RFC 4641
  • NSEC3 draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec3-09
  • DLV draft-weiler-dnssec-dlv-01
  • draft-hubert-dns-anti-spoofing-00

19
Questions?
  • Shumon Huque
  • shuque -at- isc.upenn.edu
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