Neocons and neolibs? Their edifice has crumbled.

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Neocons and neolibs?Their edifice has crumbled.

• Chet RichardsJ. Addams Partners, Inc.December
  2006

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Are we facing a new form of warfare?

• We dont know still being worked out. To be
  useful, it has to be something other than state
  military vs. state military or insurgency vs. a
  state. Possibilities include state vs. state
  (nonmilitary) and state vs. nonstate (other than
  classical insurgency).
• Major Issues
• Is it war? Is there anything wrong with calling
  it war?
• Regardless, how do we end these conflicts on
  favorable terms? Neocons and neolibs prescribe
  more military force. Is there an alternative?

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Is it war?

• Depends on what you mean.
• For a long time, people didnt want to call it
  war, using terms like low-intensity conflict
  and even military operations other than war
  (MOOTW).
• Others, while granting that it might be war,
  dont see anything different.
• Now, however, a growing group of observers use
  labels like fourth generation warfare and
  nontrinitarian warfare. Nothing wrong with
  this, so long as we are specific in what we mean.
• Is it important what we call it? Possibly,
  because how you view a situation may affect how
  you deal with it.

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What would be wrong with calling it war if it
really isnt?

• You might do counterproductive things. Like
• thinking the military is the solution and then
• outspending the rest of the world, combined
• in order to fight a rag-tag insurgency, militias,
  and criminal gangs.

Note the Journal does not mention that defense
spending even in inflation-adjusted dollars is
now higher than it was during the Vietnam War.
The percentage is lower because the economy has
grown so much.
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Lets go and fight us some insurgents

• Solutions to insurgencies are largely political,
  which is why insurgencies get going in the first
  place.
• In other words, an insurgency often arises as the
  solution to a larger problem.
• So why is our military budget equal to the rest
  of the worlds combined?
• Once things get so bad that a state has to ask
  for outside (read gringo, infidel, kaffir, etc.)
  help, is there any chance?
• And as a revolutionary state ourselves, shouldnt
  we be supporting the insurgency most of the time?

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Lets go and fight us some insurgents

• Solutions to insurgencies are largely political,
  which is why insurgencies get going in the first
  place.
• In other words, an insurgency often arises as the
  solution to a larger problem.
• So why is our military budget equal to the rest
  of the worlds combined?
• Once things get so bad that a state has to ask
  for outside (read gringo, infidel, kaffir, etc.)
  help, is there any chance?
• And as a revolutionary state ourselves, shouldnt
  we be supporting the insurgency most of the time?

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Perhaps we can glean something from
counter-guerrilla warfare

• Action
• Undermine guerrilla cause and destroy their
  cohesion by demonstrating integrity and
  competence of government to represent and serve
  needs of peoplerather than exploit and
  impoverish them for the benefit of a greedy
  elite.
• Take political initiative to root out and visibly
  punish corruption. Select new leaders with
  recognized competence as well as popular appeal.
  Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate
  grievances and connect government with grass
  roots.
• Infiltrate guerrilla movement as well as employ
  population for intelligence about guerrilla
  plans, operations, and organization.
• yadda, yadda,
• ___________
• If you cannot realize such a political program,
  you might consider changing sides!

Because its a lot more fun to be on the winning
side! John Boyd
John R. Boyd, Patterns of Conflict, Chart 108
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Think the first two bullets are easy?(a sample
from the new C/I manual)

• 1-118. Commanders and staffs must continually
  diagnose what they understand legitimacy to mean
  to the HN population. The populations
  expectations will influence all ensuing
  operations.
• 1-120. Military action can address the symptoms
  of a loss of legitimacy. In some cases, it can
  eliminate substantial numbers of insurgents.
  However, success in the form of a durable peace
  requires restoring legitimacy, which, in turn,
  requires the use of all instruments of national
  power. A COIN effort cannot achieve lasting
  success without the HN government achieving
  legitimacy. (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, pp. 1-21, 22).

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Conclusion Counterinsurgency is a losing lost
game.

• 1-118. Commanders and staffs must continually
  diagnose what they understand legitimacy to mean
  to the HN population. The populations
  expectations will influence all ensuing
  operations.
• 1-120. Military action can address the symptoms
  of a loss of legitimacy. In some cases, it can
  eliminate substantial numbers of insurgents.
  However, success in the form of a durable peace
  requires restoring legitimacy, which, in turn,
  requires the use of all instruments of national
  power. A COIN effort cannot achieve lasting
  success without the HN government achieving
  legitimacy. (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, pp. 1-21, 22).

• How does a foreign army of occupation restore
  legitimacy to a government?
• What do soldiers know about restoring legitimacy?
• What does anybody?
• How will locals feel about being the recipients
  of all instruments of US national power?
• Wouldnt it be better to be on the winning side,
  occasionally?
• If you cannot realize such a political program,
  you might consider changing sides!

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Neocons neolibs Use military force to make a
better world.

• Reality, though, intrudes
• Enemy military forces are the least of our
  problems.
• Occupations are unpredictable in result, but
  always expensive
• nationalism, tribalism, sectarianism, etc.
• resistance via guerrilla warfare is inevitable.
• We never fund reconstruction adequately.
• And then theres corruption.

If you invade and destroy an existing state,
nobody may be able to build it back. Bill Lind.
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However, nonmilitary offensives are possible

• Developed world must combine
• patience,
• judicious use of military force, primarily for
  containment and the occasional insurgency,
• police and intelligence initiatives,
• with strong preemptive incentives
• financial
• commercial
• political
• diplomatic
• personal

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Whats going to happen to armies?

• Distinctions between war and crime will break
  down (204) as will the difference between armed
  forces and civilians (194)
• Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings
  and massacres
• Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the
  civilian population, and extreme dispersion have
  become the norm (208) The problem of subversion
  is likely to be serious (211)
• Much of the task of defending society against
  nontrinitarian warfare/4GW will fall to private
  security companies, with a corresponding decrease
  in the utility, size, and technological
  complexity (cost) of military forces
• Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be
  replaced by police-like security forces on the
  one hand and armed gangs on the other (not that
  the difference is always clear, even today) (225)
• Van Creveld, Transformation of War

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Whats going to happen to armies?

• Distinctions between war and crime will break
  down (204) as will the difference between armed
  forces and civilians (194)
• Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings
  and massacres
• Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the
  civilian population, and extreme dispersion have
  become the norm (208) The problem of subversion
  is likely to be serious (211)
• Much of the task of defending society against
  non-trinitarian warfare/4GW will fall to private
  security companies, with a corresponding decrease
  in the utility, size, and technological
  complexity (cost) of military forces
• Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be
  replaced by police-like security forces on the
  one hand and armed gangs on the other (not that
  the difference is always clear, even today) (225)
• Van Creveld, Transformation of War

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Why privatize?

• Our (largely) public system isnt working.
• 500 BN/yr rest of world, combined
• cant suppress a pick-up insurgency/civil war in
  Iraq
• More of same will only produce more of same, but
  at higher cost.
• Our opponents are already privatized.
• non-state
• cellular, networked, distributed, global
• low cost of entry (and exit)
• Rate of evolutionary change is a function of the
  amount of variation present in the population
  (Fishers Law).

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Why privatize?

• Bankrupt organizations can go out of business.
• Markets unleash competition.
• variety, rapidity, initiative, creativity
• Privatization has a long military history.
• privateers mercenaries
• British East India Company(1600-1858)
• PMCs today
• Nothing less will force the amountof change that
  we need.
• As Van Creveld suggests, its goingto happen
  anyway.

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Obvious solution

• Because military force has limited (not to say
  no) utility,
• and we already have vastly more than we need,
• and we cannot afford what we have,
• and we are thereby shortchanging other elements
  of our national well-being,
• and transformation of large, non-competitive
  bureaucracies is impossible,
• therefore We must eliminate what we dont need,
  and we should privatize most of the rest.

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Sign-off sermonette

• It is far from clear whether good intentions
  plus stupidity or evil intentions plus
  intelligence have wrought more harm in the
  world.
• Dörner, The Logic of Failure, 8
• A great nation is like a great man When he makes
  a mistake, he realizes it. Having realized it,
  he admits it. Having admitted it, he corrects it
  He thinks of his enemy as the shadow that he
  himself casts.
• Tao Te Ching (Mitchell trans., 61)

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Questions?Comments?Accolades?
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