6 The Sense/Reference Distinction Revisited

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6The Sense/Reference Distinction Revisited
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Sense qua Identifying Descriptions

• See Donnellan, 1970 Speaking of Nothing and
  Kripke, 1972 Naming and Necessity
• General assumption
• The sense of a proper name corresponds to a
  (several) identifying definite description(s).

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• Russell proper names are disguised definite
  descriptions.
• Frege the sense of a name is an identifying
  description.

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• In the case of genuinely proper names like
  Aristotle opinions as regard their sense
  diverge. As such may, e.g., be suggested Platos
  disciple and the teacher of Alexander the Great.
  Whoever accepts this sense will interpret the
  meaning of the statement Aristotle was born in
  Stagira, differently from one who interpreted
  the sense of Aristotle as the Stagirite teacher
  of Alexander the Great. As long a the nominatum
  remains the same, these fluctuations in sense are
  tolerable. But they should be avoided in a
  perfect language. (Frege Sinn und Bedeutung)

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Principle of Identifying Descriptions

• See Donnellan 1970
• What we associate with the name cannot be a
  single description.
• For, if Aristotle meant the teacher of A. the
  Great, then saying Aristotle was the teacher of
  A. the G. would be a mere tautology. But this is
  something we could discover to be false.
• So, being the teacher of Alexander the Great
  cannot be part of the sense of the name.

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The Cluster Theory

• What we associate with the name is a family of
  descriptions (cf. Wittgenstein, Strawson, Searle)
• Since it is possible that one or some
  descriptions associated with a name turn out to
  be false, we have to introduce some vague notions
  such as sufficient number of descriptions, etc.
  (Cf. Wittgenstein on Moses PI 79)

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• The cluster of descriptions is both
• (1) what determines reference, and
• (2) what is synonymous with the associated name
• Frege should be criticized for using the term
  sense in two senses. For he takes the sense of
  a designator to be its meaning and he also takes
  it to be the way the reference is determined.
  (Kripke 1972 59)

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• The principle of identifying descriptions is a
  two-stages thesis the second stage depends on
  the first.
• 1. The speaker must be able to supply a set of
  no question-begging descriptions.
• E.g. the item I have in mind, the individual I
  intend to refer to, ... are question-begging
  descriptions.

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• 2. The referent of the name the speaker uses,
  if any, must satisfy the set of descriptions.
• One can endorse 2 without endorsing 1.
• The relevant descriptions may be the ones the
  experts furnish (cf. Dummetts public sense).

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Arguments in favor of identifying descriptions

• See Kripke 1972 64-71
• (1) To every name or designating expression X,
  there corresponds a cluster of properties,
  namely the family of those properties ? such
  that A believes ?X.

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• (2) One of the properties, or some conjointly,
  are believed by A to pick out some individual
  uniquely.
• (3) If most, or a weighted most, of the ?s are
  satisfied by one unique object y, then y is the
  referent of X.

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• (4) If the vote yields no unique object, X does
  not refer.
• (5) The statement, If X exists, then X has most
  of the ?s is known a priori by the speaker.
• (6) The statement, If X exists, then X has most
  of the ?s expresses a necessary truth (in the
  idiolect of the speaker).

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• Conclusion
• For any successful theory, the account must not
  be circular. The properties which are used in the
  vote must not themselves involve the notion of
  reference in such a way that it is ultimately
  impossible to eliminate.

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The case from examples

• See Donnellan 1970
• 1. Whether the relevant descriptions are the
  ones associated by the speaker or by a
  community of speakers, the referent ought to
  satisfy them.

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• If so, it may turn out that Plato does not
  refer to Plato if we discover that he does not
  satisfy the descriptions we commonly associate
  with Plato.
• It could also be that the name Plato refers to
  someone else who happens to satisfy the relevant
  descriptions.

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• 2. One can refer to someone even if she is
  unable to furnish identifying descriptions.
• So, thesis (5) is false.
• (5) The statement, If X exists, then X has
  most of the ?s is known a priori by the
  speaker.

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• Imagine ... a conversation ... in which the
  student relates what happened at the party. He
  might begin by saying, Last night I met J.L.
  Aston-Martin and talked to him for almost an
  hour. To whom does he refer at this point? I
  strongly believe the answer should be, to the
  famous philosopher and not, to the man he met
  at the party. What the student says is simply
  false a friend in the know would be justified
  in replying that he did not meet J.L.
  Aston-Martin, but someone who had the same name
  and no more philosopher than Milton Berle.
  (Donnellan 1970 350

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• See also Kripke Gell-Man-Feynman story
• One can use these names to refer to the relevant
  individuals even if one is unable to furnish
  identifying descriptions of them.

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The Modal Argument

• See Kripke 1972
• Rigid designators
• The designate the same object in all possible
  worlds (or counterfactual situations) where it
  exists.
• If the object exits in all possible worlds (it
  is a necessary existent), the designator is
  strongly rigid.

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• Non-rigid (accidental) designators
• They may change reference across possible
  worlds.

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• Proper names are rigid designators, while
  definite descriptions are non-rigid designators.
• Unless a description picks out an essential
  property (e.g. mathematical descriptions such as
  the successor of 3 which designates 4 in all
  possible worlds).

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• Reference cannot be explained in terms of
  identifying descriptions.
• for
• An individual, in a given possible world, may
  fail to possess the property(ies) picked out by
  the description(s) (unless the latter pick(s) out
  essential property(ies) of that individual)
  associated with the name (rigid designator).

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• E.g.
• Aristotle may not have been the teacher of A.
  the Great, Gödel may not have been the discoverer
  of the incompleteness of arithmetic, etc.

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• Fixing the reference vs. determining the
  reference
• Descriptions may be used to fix the reference
  and not, pace Frege, to give the meaning of the
  name.
• E.g. Lets call Jack, the man who committed
  all the murders. Being the murderer, though, is
  not an essential property of Jack.

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• E.g.
• Hitler might have spent all his days quiet in
  Linz. In that case we would not say that then
  this man would not have been Hitler, for we use
  of the name Hitler just as the name of that
  man, even in describing other possible worlds.
  (cf. Kripke 1972 75)

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• Moral thesis (6) is also false.
• The statement, If X exists, then X has most of
  the ?s expresses a necessary truth (in the
  idiolect of the speaker).
• General Moral
• Sense cannot be equated with identifying
  descriptions.

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Direct Reference

• Or Causal theory of reference, Millianism (Cf.
  J-S. Mill, A system of Logic)
• J.-S. Mill names have denotation but not
  connotation.

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• E.g.
• Dartmouth is called Dartmouth because it lies
  at the mouth of the Dart, but even if the river
  changed its course so that Dartmouth no longer
  lays at the mouth of the Dart, we could still
  properly call this place Dartmouth. It is no
  part of the meaning of Dartmouth that the
  referent lies at Darts mouth.