The Finnish Exploitation of D

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The Finnish Exploitation of Détente From the US
Perspective in the Early 1970sThe Case of the
CSCE

• Minna Starck
• April 4, 2005
• University of Helsinki
• Email minna.starck_at_helsinki.fi

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The topics that this lecture will cover are

• Détente in the early 1970s
• American-Soviet relations during détente
• European détente
• Finland and the United States
• Kekkonens visit to the White House in July 1970
• Historical background to the CSCE
• American attitude towards the CSCE
• Outcomes from the CSCE

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History of Détente

• A possible end to a post-war adjustment to the
  division of Europe.
• The beginning of a new phase in the Cold War
  characterized by ongoing dialogue e. g. SALT and
  CSCE.
• It accelerated the process of exchanges between
  East and West.

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The Rise of Détente

• SALT I
• Nixon-Brezhnev Summits
• Opening to China
• German Question
• Four-Power agreement

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What was this man thinking?
Czechoslovak crisis?
Finnish active neutrality policy?
East-West détente?
CSCE ?
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Finnish Neutrality

• After the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia,
  the Soviet Union ceased to refer to Finland as a
  neutral country in its official texts.
• It insisted on giving the 1948 Finnish-Soviet
  treaty priority.
• What followed was a long drawn-out battle of
  words.
• Finally a compromise was reached and both the
  1948 treaty and Finlands policy of neutrality
  were mentioned in a single paragraph.

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President Kekkonens trip to Washington in July
1970
We respect you in the field of foreign policy, a
policy of independence, and a policy of
neutrality
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Finland and the United States

• Much as from the 1940s onwards, in 1970 the U.S.
  policy formulation towards Finland consisted of
  three main elements
• 1. To maintain an independent and democratic
  Finland with the truly neutral foreign policy
• 2. the strengthening of Finlands ties with the
  West
• 3. Reduction of Finnish vulnerability to Soviet
  political and economic pressures

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Americas foreign policy
Richard Nixon came to power in January 1969
era of negotiations
Henry Kissinger was his closest advisor
Nixon and his successor Gerald Ford
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The American Conception of Détente

• Nixon in 1968 The United States must move away
  from confrontations in this nuclear age into a
  new era the era of negotiation

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AmericanSoviet Relations During Détente

• A turning point
• American domestic problems Watergate etc..
• Soviet view of American recognition of parity
  SALT etc

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Superpower relations continued

• Carrots and sticks?
• Unexpected outcomes?
• Misconceptions of strengths and weaknesses?

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European Détente

• Differences between European and superpower
  détente
• European détente dynamic process
• Independent European initiatives
• Peoples interest human rights agenda in the
  CSCE

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Historical Background of the CSCE

• Original proposals for a pan-European security
  conference
• Development of Warsaw Pact and NATO
• 1960s renewed interest in a multilateral
  security conference
• Inclusion of the North Americans
• Kekkonens invitation

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Facts about CSCE

• Ostpolitik
• Acceptance of the status quo
• Getting something back
• Low level of expectations

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Kissinger worked closely with Dobrynin from
Helsinki meeting Nov. 17, 1969 to Moscow summit
May 22-29, 1972
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American attitude towards the CSCE

• United States considers CSCE as a peripheral
  affair
• Focus of US diplomatic efforts elsewhere
• Mechanics of US diplomacy and CSCE
• A pragmatic approach

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Soviet interests in the CSCE

• To gain general acceptance of the territorial and
  political status quo in central and eastern
  Europe
• Enlarging on the bilateral West German agreements
  with the Soviet Union, Poland and East Europe
• To support reduction of interstate barriers to
  increased economic relations and to further the
  general process of East-West detente

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CSCE was a part of a broader diplomatic strategy

• CSCE- a diplomatic strategy to be used in dealing
  with the USSR
• -and a political necessity when viewed from the
  perspective of transatlantic relations
• But still the real decisions were made in
  bilateral context with the leaders of the Soviet
  Union
• A key point in this regard was the May 1972
  Moscow summit where Nixon and Brezhnev agreed on
  a linkage between CSCE and the Multilateral
  Balanced Forces Reduction talks (MBFR)

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Outcome of the CSCE

• Lack of interest but concessions made
• Soviet triumph????
• Implications of the Final Act

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Friends forever!...
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Soviet reaction to the Final Act

• Great deal, major triumph
• Highlight of European détente
• The existence of the two German states had
  finally been recognized by the whole world
• The Soviet leaders clearly believed the
  correlation of forces in the world had shifted
  decisively in their favour

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The Reaction to the Final Act in the United States

• Different from that in the SU and Western Europe
• Unknown to most Americans
• The growing disenchantment with détente and
  politicking in the upcoming presidential election
  in 1976 led to criticism of the CSCE and of
  President Fords journey to Helsinki to sign it

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European reaction

• CSCE Final Act was positive.
• Perception of a real relaxation of tensions
• Cynical commentators as well as those carried
  away by euphoria

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Effects for Finland

• Urho Kekkonens project
• Significance for Finnish neutrality and foreign
  policy
• Kekkonens moment in the sun

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Outcomes from the CSCE

• A shift in American attitudes the significance
  of human rights in criticism of the Soviet union
• Post-Helsinki popular action - Czechoslovakia,
  Poland and the Soviet Union itself.
• Legitimacy for dissidents
• The Helsinki review conferences

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Irony of the Soviet-American detente

• The Nixon-Kissinger détente doctrine promoted the
  eventual collapse of the USSR?
• Soviet over-stretch in the belief that the U.S.
  was weaker?

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Conclusion

• The Soviets desperately wanted the CSCE, they
  got it and it laid the foundations for the end of
  their empire. We resisted it for years, went
  grudgingly, Ford paid a terrible price for going
  perhaps re-election itself only to discover
  years later that CSCE had yielded benefits beyond
  our wildest imagination. Go figure.
• Robert Gates The Former Director of the CIA. In
  his book From the Shadows The Ultimate insiders
  Story of Five Presidents and How They Helped Win
  the Cold War, 1996.

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Some faces that mattered
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Henry Kissinger, Leonid Brezhnev, Gerald Ford,
and Andrei Gromyko during the Helsinki summit,
July 1975
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Further reading

• Henry Kissinger Diplomacy 1994.
• Raymond L.Garthoff Détente and Confrontation,
  American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan
  1985.
• Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches,
  Interpretations, Theory. Ed. Odd Arne Westad
  2000.
• Johan Lewis Gaddis We Know Now. Rethinking Cold
  War History 1997.