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Veto Players and Referendums

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Title: Veto Players and Referendums


1
Veto Players and Referendums
The mere possibility of the referendum introduces
the preferences of the population in the policy
making process. What are the main
characteristics? ? introduction of the new
veto player ? policy stability in principle
increases ? outcomes that prevail approximate
better the preferences of the public ?
agenda control
2
Agenda Control
  • ? who asks the question
  • ? who triggers the referendum
  • If both parts of the agenda are controlled by the
    same player, this player will use referendums in
    order to eliminate all other veto players.
  • If agenda setting process is delegated through a
    competitive process, then the preferences of the
    public will be better approximated

3
Direct and Representative Democracy (1)
  • What difference does it make if outcomes are
    selected by the people or indirectly by the
    peoples representatives in parliament?

  • Rousseau Outcomes selected by a referendum are
    real laws as they are the content of the general
    will
  • Tsebelis
  • a)Outcomes selected by Parliament are preferred
    over the status quo by a majority in parliament
  • b)Outcomes selected by a referendum are preferred
    over the status quo by a majority of the
    population

4
(a) Median voter preferences in referendums
  • winset of the SQ is located between two circles
    (Y, d2r and Y, d-2r)
  • since the yolk is decreasing with the number of
    people that go to vote ? the winset of SQ is
    located between two cricles that differ little
    from each other
  • for a large population the median voter may not
    exist but all median lines pass through very
    small area (of radius r) so an as if median can
    be very well approximated by the center Y of the
    yolk of the population)

5
Direct and Mediated Democracy
  • A,B,C,D,E parliamentary actors
  • Ycentroid (center od the yolk) in parliamentary
    arena Y centroid in population
  • Y ? Y
  • difference between direct (W(SQ)) and mediated
    (W(SQ)) democracy
  • no guarantee that the two processes will lead to
    the same outcome ?
  • How can we locate these two different
    outcomes?

6
Advantages and disadvantages of the referendums
  • PROPONENTS
  • - the outcomes fit more closely with
    peoples preferences
  • - education of citizens to democratic
    values
  • CRITICS
  • - does the average citizen have information
    and expertise to
  • judge what best advances collective
    interests ?
  • Tsebelis what are the effects of differences for
    decision making? the outcome has to be located
    in the intersection of the parliamentary and the
    popular winsets ? referendums create an
    additional veto player the people

7
Institutions regulating referendums (1)
  • CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENDUMS BY DIFFERENT
    AUTHORS
  • Smith (1975) two criteria to elaborate
    referendums control and
  • hegemonic effect
  • Butler and Ranney (1978) government controlled
    referendums,
  • b) constitutionally required referendums, c)
    referendums by
  • popular petition, d) popular initiatives
  • recently the strategic aspects of referendums
    (agenda control)

8
Institutions regulating referendums (2)
  • Tsebelis uses the classification similar to the
    one used by
  • Hug (1999)
  • Are the referendums required?
  • Are they active or passive (initiative by the
    people or not)?
  • Who controls the agenda (the government or the
    opposition)?
  • Tsebelis upgrades Hugs classification
  • whether or not there will be a referendum or not
    triggering
  • the exact wording of the question

9
Institutions regulating referendums (3)

10
Institutions regulating referendums (4)
  • Required referendums
  • - the government is obliged to submit a
    policy to the voters
  • - no referendum initiative is undertaken
  • - a particular document has to be
    ratified by the people in
  • order to be enacted (often applies to
    constitutional changes)
  • Veto player referendums
  • - referendum is not required
  • - decision belongs to one of the
    existing VP
  • Popular veto
  • - existing VP formulates the question,
    BUT
  • - the triggering is prerogative of a
    different agent
  • (e.g. Population)
  • Popular initiative
  • - initiative does not come from the
    existing VP
  • - initiative derives from e.g. political
    group that collected the
  • required signatures (state level in the
    USA, Switzerland)

11
Veto Players Referendums (1)
  • Decision making
  • Under which conditions
  • possible an A.S. would call for
    referendum?
  • stable coalition of A,B,C (parliamentary
    government)
  • any possible coalition between A,B,C,D,E is
    possible (presidential system)
  • two possible agenda setters A and E

12
Veto Players Referendums (1)
  • Decision making
  • Under which conditions
  • possible an A.S. would call for
    referendum?
  • stable coalition of A,B,C (parliamentary
    government)
  • any possible coalition between A,B,C,D,E is
    possible (presidential system)
  • two possible agenda setters A and E
  • A and E the best outcomes the two A.S. can
    achieve by referendums

A
A
E
13
Veto Players Referendum (2)
  • A as the agenda setter
  • winset of A instead of W (SQ) player A can
    introduce referendum and obtain A as an outcome
  • ? presidential system only coalition A,D,E can
    approve points inside (A,AA) circle A has to
    select this outcome in order to get the preferred
    outcome
  • parliamentary system coalition A,B,C (but
    there is no point that all three prefer to A
    because A is in the unanimity core of A,B,C

SQ
14
Veto Players Referendums (3)
  • E as the agenda setter
  • winset of E instead of W (SQ) player E can
    introduce the referendum and obtain E as a
    result
  • three possible coalitions ABE, ADE, CDE
  • presidential system E will select ADE
  • parliamentary system E ? the advantage of
    referendum A.S. to negotiate different government
    (if the parties want to stick together ? E
    triggers referendum ? government looses

15
Popular initiatives, Popular veto
  • Required referendums and Veto players referendums
  • are the referendums where the agenda setter
    enjoys
  • monopoly power while
  • Popular initiatives and Popular
    veto
  • are different kinds of
    referendums
  • (the triggering not in their
    domain).

16
? Popular initiatives
  • if different groups can become agenda setters in
    a referendum by winning the right to present
    their question to the electorate (signature
    collection), the legislative outcome will depend
    on how competitive the process is
  • we should focus on the process of selection of
    the agenda setter (e.g. volunteers,
    professionals).

17
? Popular vetoes
  • non VP will select a referendum if the government
    proposed result is not inside the winset of the
    median voter
  • BUT it can happen that a triggering actor can
    force the referendum without real success since
    the existing VP can postpone it so the balance of
    force will be in their power or modify the SQ so
    that the referendum will be either cancelled or
    postponed further (Italian divorce example).

18
Conclusions
  • referendums significantly alter the rules and the
    outcomes of the legislative process
  • introduction of additional VP the median voter
    of the population
  • if the same VP is able to trigger the referendum
    and ask the question ? traditional VPs are
    eliminated
  • the differences among referendums depend on WHO
    controls the agenda
  • existing VP strengthens him at the expense of
    others
  • popular initiative it favors the groups that can
    affect the agenda
  • competitive agenda setting process benefits the
    median voter
  • Median voter preferences results will be better
    approximated in the following order
  • Popular initiative
  • Popular veto
  • VP referundum or mandatory referendum

19
Federalism, Bicameralism and Qualified
Majorities
  • Definition of the term federal by Riker (1964)
  • Two levels of government rule the same land and
    people
  • Each level has at least one area of jurisdiction
    in which it is autonomous
  • There is some guarantee of the autonomy of each
    government in its own sphere
  • Tsebelis observes two different features of
    federal governments
  • - bicameralism (with the second chamber
    having an effective veto)
  • - use of qualified majorities in policy
    making
  • Tsebelis argues that each one of these
    structures generates more VPs ?
  • federal countries have ceteris paribus more
    VPs than unitary ones

20
Federalism (1)
  • FISCAL FEDERALISM
  • Two important differences between federal and
    unitary countries
  • Hayek (1939) local governments and consumers
    have better
  • information about local conditions and
    preferences therefore they will make better
    decisions than national governments
  • Tiebout (1956) focused on the effects of the
    competition among jurisdictions since people can
    vote with their feet and argues that federalism
    provide people with the choice among different
    menus of public good.

21
  • Previous two approaches ignored the question of
    incentives of politicians to provide PUBLIC GOODS
    and PRESERVE MARKETS
  • Weingast (1995) focused on the fact that markets
    need protection and government strong enough to
    be able to resist the threats state strong
    enough to protect private markets is strong
    enough to confiscate the wealth of its citizens
  • DIFFERENT MECHANISMS enabling strong but limited
    governments by different authors
  • Przeworski stable democracy
  • Weingast the rule of law

22
Federalism (2)
  • (2) THE INSTITUTIONS OF FEDERALISM
  • Hicks (1978) upgrades Rikers definition of
    federalism in order to
  • point out the importance of the study of the
    institutions of
  • federalism.
  • ? federal system has the dual purpose of creating
    a nation and preserving the identity of its units
  • The Constitution in a federal system will
    provide for
  • a probably large Assembly representative of all
    citizens and chosen from the units (or States),
    most likely in proportion to their relative
    populations
  • a House of States or Senate, considerably
    smaller but normally
  • providing strictly equal representation of
    all States.

23
Federalism (3)
  • six players form two groups (upper and lower
    chamber)
  • ? U1,U2,U3 and L1,L2,L3
  • the requirement for the replacement of the SQ is
    congruent majority in the two houses ( which
    means that some of the previous majorities (like
    L3, U1, U2, U3) are now invalidated, because they
    do not represent majorities in both houses)

24
Federalism (4)
  • for QM similar argument as for bicameralism
  • let us consider the case of a 5/6 qualified
    majority
  • winset of the SQ is empty (there is no coalition
    including 5/6 players that agrees to a
    replacement of the SQ)

25
Bicameralism (1)
  • BICAMERAL AND MULTICAMERAL DIVERSITY
  • the power of the second chamber varies (sometimes
    the agreement of the upper chamber is necessary
    for the adoption of legislation, sometimes not)
  • the chambers may have a different policy position
    (elected from different constituencies ? one
    represents the population and the other the
    states or with different electoral system or
    they may simply have different decisionmaking
    rules ? Senates filibuster rule which does not
    exist in the House) BUT even when the two
    chambers are almost the same, it does not follow
    that differences are eliminated (e.g. Italian
    case violenza sessuale)
  • bicameral legislatures may therefore introduce a
    second institutional VP (if the second chamber
    has the possibility to veto legislation) ? what
    Tsebelis focuses on

26
Bicameralism (2)
  • HOWEVER, while we are speaking of bicameralism
    from Tsebelis point of view, it is easy to
    generalize to any number of chambers
  • For example
  • the American political system requires the
    agreement of three VPs (president, House, Senate)
  • EU (European Commission, European Parliament,
    Council of Ministers)

27
(2) Strong bicameralism with weak parties
  • the two chambers are drawn in two dimensions
    (away from each other) ? any coalition in each
    one of them is possible (congruent majorities)
  • bicameral core LU (it cannot be defeated by this
    decision-making rule)
  • position of SQ (calculation performed in two
    different ways exactly and by approximation)
  • ? the closer the SQ to the bicameral core,
    the smaller the winset of SQ (policy stability
    increases)

28
Bicameralism (3)
  • addresses the issue of agenda setting process
  • usually if one chamber makes a proposal to the
    other, they select the point closest to them from
    the W (SQ)
  • most countries adopted more complicated system
    called navette system (the bill shuttles from
    one chamber to the other until agreement is
    reached or until some other stopping rule is
    applied)
  • Tsebelis and Money impatience of each chamber
    as an additional variable

29
Bicameralism (4)
  • (3) QUALIFIED MAJORITIES
  • How can qualified majorities increase policy
    stability?
  • How pervasive qualified majorities are even if
    not explicitly specified by formal institutions?

30
(1) Core and winset of qualified majorities
  • consider the pentagon composed of any 5 points
    (the unanimity core) ? any point inside this area
    cannot be defeated by a unanimous agreement of
    the 5 players
  • select all possible combinations of 5 players,
    with the intersection of their unanimity cores ?
    any point in this area cannot be defeated by any
    5/7 QM
  • ? unanimity core more frequent than the bicameral
    core

31
Bicameralism (4)
  • Joseph Greenberg (1979)
  • such a core always exists if q gt n / (n1) where
    q is the required majority and n is the
    dimensionality of the policy space
  • unanimity core always exists (n points define at
    most (n-1) dimensional space
  • for points outside the core the winset of the SQ
    is not empty
  • IF the QM core exists and the SQ approaches it,
    the winset of the SQ shrinks (policy stability
    increases)
  • a comparison indicates that the bicameral core is
    a single dimensional object and QM is in general
    in n dimensions (the shape of the core, affects
    the size of the winset of SQ political
    stability)

32
Bicameralism (5)
  • (2) PERVASIVNESS OF QUALIFIED MAJORITIES
  • as already seen QM impose additional restrictions
    on the W (SQ)
  • as the required QM threshold increases, the W
    (SQ) shrinks
  • unlike the majority W (SQ) which is almost never
    empty, the
  • QM W (SQ) may be empty
  • q-cohesion of the collective player is of an
    extreme
  • importance for the size of the QM winset of
    (SQ) (policy stability
  • decreases when q-cohesion increases)

33
Bicameralism (6)
  • (4) BICAMERALISM AND QUALIFIED MAJORITIES
    COMBINED
  • What happens if bicameralism is combined with
    qualified majorities such that one chamber
    decides by simple majority but the other decides
    by qualified majority?

34
Bicameralism (7)
  • upper chamber unanimity
  • consequences a) policy stability increases
    (W(SQ)) shrinks, b) outcomes shift in the favor
    of the less flexible chamber (only one point L
    U survives)
  • in one dimensional space the core of the
    bicameral system expands ? more difficult to
    upset the SQ (points between U1 and U3 that
    could be modified under congruent majority are
    now invulnerable

35
Bicameralism (8)
  • Keith Krehbiel (1998) in Pivotal Politics
  • for pivotal politics the policy space is one
    dimensional

36
Bicameralism (9)
  • Tsebelis adds another dimension
  • Depending on where the alternative proposal is,
    the pivotal player might change (PA?A)
  • If one increases the dimensions and the
    alternatives to the SQ almost anyone of a
    particular group of players will become pivotal

37
Conclusion II
  • there is no direct way of translating existing
    institutions into the number and distances of VPs
  • some institutions have similar effects
    (federalism increases the number of VPs), while
    others alter their effect on VPs on the basis of
    specific institutional provisions (who controls
    the agenda of referendums)
  • results of VP analysis depend on the ideological
    positions of VPs some of them may be absorbed
    (even if they are not absorbed they may converge
    or diverge which will have serious implications
    on policy stability)
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