RISK MANAGEMENT FOR SMALL FLIGHT TEST TEAMS: LESSONS LEARNED SPINNING LIGHT AEROPLANES

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RISK MANAGEMENT FOR SMALL FLIGHT TEST TEAMS
LESSONS LEARNED SPINNING LIGHT AEROPLANES

• Robert Erdos MSc, PEng, DAR
• Chief Test Pilot
• Flight Research Laboratory
• National Research Council of Canada
• Ottawa, Canada

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At Issue

• FTSW often facilitates discussion of flight test
  safety practices and risk management principles.
• Most participants are from large organizations
  with large resources.
• But, what if
• You are the flight test team and
• The client has limited resources or experience.

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Presentation Outline

1. Outline an example of a small aircraft
   certification team
2. Review applicable risk management strategies
3. Relate an incident and
4. Discuss lessons learned.

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Flight Research Laboratory

• Part of the National Research Council of Canada
• Canadas agency for research, development and
  technology-based innovation
• Operates 9 specialized research aircraft
• Diverse program of research
• Commercial and government clients
• From fundamental research to product
  development/certification
• Fee-for-service work makes Labs personnel
  accessible to small companies
• Contracted by Ultravia Aero Intl in 1999.

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The ProjectCertification of the Ultravia Pelican

• Successful Canadian kitplane manufacturer
• Sought to certify under CAR 523-VLA
• Two-place single-engine high-wing trainer
• Rotax 912 engine
• Max. gross weight 1450 lb
• Design Vs0 43 KCAS
• Ultravia 5 full-time employees
• NRC provided consulting flight test services
• No one on the project had prior certification
  experience

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The ProjectCertification of the Ultravia Pelican

• Successful Canadian kitplane manufacturer
• Sought to certify under CAR 523-VLA
• Two-place single-engine high-wing trainer
• Rotax 912 engine
• Max. gross weight 1450 lb
• Ultravia 5 full-time employees
• NRC provided consulting flight test services
• No one on the project had prior certification
  experience.

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The Situation

• Very limited in-house resources
• Time constraints
• Financial constraints
• Desire to please the client

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Risk Management Resources Internal
Axiom 1 Murphys Law
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Risk Management Resources External

• Transition from military or research test flying
  to civil certification can present challenges
• Online resources present acceptable certification
  methodologies and lessons-learned
• A good working relationship with the regulatory
  authority is essential

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The Risk Management Contract

• It is far more productive to discuss risk than
  safety.
• The consulting test pilot can assume
  responsibility for the clients most valuable
  asset.
• Organizational cultures and expectations may
  vary.
• Risk management protocols need to be stated
  explicitly.
• A contract is the application of plan the
  flight, fly the plan.
• It may be wise to have the client sign it.

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The Risk Management Contract, Contd

• Following a partial power loss or non-critical
  malfunction indication, a contingency approach to
  the nearest prepared landing area will be
  initiated. An off-airport landing will not be
  executed unless imminent complete loss of power
  or danger of significant damage to the aircraft
  precludes a landing on a runway
• Following a complete loss of engine power, a
  force-landing will be executed to the most
  suitable available area
• In the event of an inability to recover from a
  spin, or entry into an unrecognizable flight
  regime, efforts will continue to recover the
  aircraft to controlled flight to a minimum
  altitude of 4000 feet AGL. Upon reaching 4000
  feet AGL, the test pilot will abandon the
  aircraft and
• Following a catastrophic structural failure,
  failure of the flight control system or
  uncontrollable fire, the test pilot will
  immediately abandon the aircraft.

Axiom 3 Common Sense Varies
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Spin Tests Spin Chute Installation, Yes?

• CAR 523-VLA certification for non-intentional
  spins requires recovery from a one-turn spin or
  a three-second spin, whichever takes longer, in
  not more than one additional turn after
  initiation of the first control action for
  recovery.
• Typically relies upon an airframe-mounted spin
  recovery parachute
• Small aircraft present WB challenges

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Pelican Weight and Balance Spin Chute
Installation, No.

• System includes chute, structure, deployment and
  jettison mechanisms, rocket motor and interface
• Prohibitively large mass at aft fuselage station.
• Need to test at 4 corners of WB
• Engine ballast offset prohibits light weights
• BRS considered
• Does not avoid considerable aircraft damage
• Bail-out chute the only practical option

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Sortie 71 One-Turn Spins, Revisited

• Sortie was a continuation of spins conducted
  Heavy-Forward CG
• Power ON spins repeatable with recovery after 1
  turn.
• Strong influence of power. Cant spin lt3000 RPM
• Recovery slightly slower in left spins
• Very rapid spin rates after 1 turn (240 deg/sec)
• Prior sortie repeated to ascertain recovery
  compliance
• Did not feel that recovery was in question

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Sortie 71 Spinning, spinning, spinning

• 10th repetition of the same test point
• Clean 1-turn erect spin to the right
• Recovery initiated after 1 turnno effect
• Prop stopped after 2-3 turns
• Counter-spin control inputs held firmly
• Accidentally discovered limited pitch rocking
  authority
• Recovered, restarted engine, went home

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Sober Second Thought

• A plane lacking the control power to spin may
  lack the control power to recover
• Rehearse all the recovery actions
• Full forward stick may not be helpful until after
  rotation stops

• Risk management for small test teams presents
  special challenges
• Spin testing of very light plans not yet
  adequately addressed

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Thank You
Robert Erdos MSc, PEng, DAR Chief Test
Pilot Flight Research Laboratory National
Research Council of Canada Ottawa,
Canada robert.erdos_at_nrc.ca 613-998-3180
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The Bail-Out Option Reconsidered

• Spin trajectory not vertical
• Descending helix determined by inertial and
  aerodynamic forces
• Highly wing-loaded airplanes will have a higher
  tangential velocity.

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The Bail-Out Option Reconsidered, Contd

• Lightly-loaded aircraft can have a very tight
  spin and a low tangential velocity
• Confidence in a manual bail-out may not be
  warranted.

Uh oh!