MOSCOW TRADE ORGANIZATIONS

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MOSCOW TRADE ORGANIZATIONS

• IN THE BREZHNEV ERA
• 1964-1982

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MOSCOW ADMIINISTRATION OF TRADE(TORG)(5000
stores 300000 employees)
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MOSCOW ADMIINISTRATION OF TRADE(TORG)(5000
stores 300000 employees)
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INCREASE OF INFLUENCE

• FACTORS
• MORE FOOD, MORE STORES,ETC
• STABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT, TRADE MANAGERS STAY AT
  THEIR POSITIONS, THEIR JOB IS SAFE

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CAUSES OF CORRUPTION

• SOVIET VALUES, NO ACCUMULATION, NO PROFIT
• SHORTAGE OF PRODUCTS IN STORES
• MONOPOLY OF STATE-OWNED STORES, THE MANAGER HAS
  NO COMPETITOR
• LOW QUALITY PRODUCTS
• DIFFICULTY OF CONTROL OF THE FOOD
• PRODUCTS.

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TRADES INCREASE OF INFLUENCE BY CORRUPTION

• CORRUPTIONACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL
• A MEANS OF ILLEGAL REALLOCATION OF FOOD PRODUCTS
  
• A MEANS OF ILLEGAL REALLOCATION FOR PERSONAL AND
  CORPORATE INTERESTS

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USE OF RESOURCES-OBJECTIVES

• TO TRANSFORM ECONOMIC POWER INTO POLITICAL POWER
• TO GET SUPPORT IN JUDICIARY ORGANS AND POLITICAL
  ORGANS

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USE OF RESOURCES-HOW

• TO BRIBETO BUY
• TO BRIBE PARTY OFFICIALS
• TO BRIBE MVD(POLICE) LEADERS
• TO BRIBE SOME MINISTRY LEADERS
• TO BRIBE MOSCOW CITY SOVIET LEADERS

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CONTROL OF TRADE NETWORK

• MOSCOW SOVIET, MOSCOW PARTY COMMITTEE
• STATE PRICE COMMITTEE
• TRADE INSPECTION
• POPULAR CONTROL COMMITTEE
• LAW ENFORCMENT AGENCIES

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DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL RELATIONS IN TRADE
ORGANIZATIONS

• NEPOTISM
• LIVE AT THE SAME PLACE
• WORKPLACE, OCCUPY LONGTIMES THE SAME POSITIONS,
  HOLIDAYS, CELEBRATION, WEEK- ENDS AND VOLONTARY
  WORK
• TRAVEL AND VACATION

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PERSONAL RELATIONS AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

1. BUILD TRUST
2. ENFORCE COHESION
3. PROMOTE MUTUAL HELP
4. IN SUMMARY ALL THESE CREATE NETWORKS

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COMMITTMENT TO THE REGIME OR TO THE LEADER

1. REGIME UNIVERSAL RULES
2. SUPPLY ACCORDING TO THE PLAN
3. NO PROFIT
4. MANPOWER, PRICE DECIDED BY STATE

1. LEADER-PERSONALIZATION
2. DEPENDANT ON RELATIONS WITH THE MANAGER
3. HAS THE MANAGERS CONFIDENCE

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REGIME OF UNIVERSAL RULES

• THE SUPREMACY OF IMPERSONAL RULES, HOLDERS OF THE
  AUTHORITY ARE SUBMITTED TO THE LAW
• ASSUME FUNCTIONS SPECIFIED AND LIMITED BY THE LAW
• APPOINTMENT AND PROMOTION IN THE BUREAUCRACY ARE
  DECIDED BY MERIT AND PERFORMANCE.

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SOCIAL GROUPS IN MTN(Moscow Trade Network)

• MAJORITY RUSSIANS AND VETERANS (Second World
  War)
• REWARD FOR HEROIC PAST
• GOOD IMAGE OF TRADE NETWORK

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SOCIAL GROUPS IN MTN

• DOMINANT GROUPCAUCASIA, MINORITIES IN SOUTH OF
  RUSSIA
• MUTUAL HELP
• INACCESSIBLE SOUTH, REFUGE
• TRANSNATIONAL FORCE AZERIS, ARMENIANS,
  CHECHENS
• THE MOST INCLINED TO CORRUPTION, THE BEST
  ORGANIZED

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MAP OF CAUCASIA
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SOCIAL GROUPS IN MTN(Moscow Trade Network)

• PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS
• HIGH RISK OCCUPATIONS(like airport)
• HIGHEST REVENUE
• MOST GENEROUS BRIBE GIVERS
• MAFIA CONNECTION

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HEROES AND STARS OF THE TRADE NETWORK

• HEROES
• TWO EXAMPLES TWO MANAGERS MODELS
• KARAKANOV ORGANIZE RECEPTIONS OF THE ELITE
• AMBARTSYMYAN(NEW METHODS OF MANAGEMENT) ORGANIZE
  RECEPTIONS OF THE ELITE
• CHARISMATIC LEADERS CHARMING, SOCIABLE,
  COMMUNICATIVE

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POLITICS OF INCLUSION OF MTN

• UNDER BREZHNEV, MTN IS A MODEL ORGANIZATION
• ITS STAFF RECEIVES HONOURS AND REWARDS
• SUPPORT FROM KEY OFFICIALS
• MTN TAKES CARE OF THE NOMENKLATURA, ORGANIZE HIS
  RECEPTIONS, CELEBRATIONS

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HEROES AND STARS OF THE ILLEGAL ECONOMY

• INNOVATIVE IN THE WAYS OF STEALING
• THOSE WHO HAVE NOT BEEN SUITED OR WHO HAVE
  STOLEN ONLY ONE TIME ROGANOV HAS BEEN CAUGHT
  ONE TIME IN 44 YEARS
• THOSE WHO HAVE MADE CORRUPTION IN THE WORST
  CONDITIONS SWW THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN VICTIMS OF
  RÉPRESSION
• THOSE WHO HAVE THE BEST-BUY WITH BRIBERY
  SOKOLOV, AMBARTSUMYAN, ETC

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STORES MANAGER GIVE PRODUCTS TO WHOM?

• SOLD LEGALLY TO CUSTOMERS AT OFFICIAL PRICE
• ILLEGALLY TO THE SUPPLIERS FOR TO RECEIVE BETTER
  PRODUCTS.
• ILLEGALLY TO THE PROTECTORS, TO POLICE OFFICERS,
  THE PARTY SECRETARIES, THE SOVIET PRESIDENT, TO
  MOSCOW PARTY OFFICIALS
• TO BLACK-MARKETEERS (SPECULATORS)

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TRADE EXECUTIVESS POSITIONS ARE PRECARIOUS

1. PRIVATIZATION WOULD CONSTITUTE A DECISIVE STEP IN
   THE CONSOLIDATION OF THEIR POSITIONS
2. SECURITY, IMMUNITY
3. TRANSMISSION OF THEIR ASSETS TO THEIR CHILDREN

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BUT RENT-SEEKING IN MTN

1. PROFIT LIMITED BY EXTORTION OF MONEY
2. INCREASING EXTORTION, A HIGH COST
3. LIMITS IN THE POSSIBILITY OF BUYING AND
   ACQUIRING, A LOT OF MONEY THAT CANNOT BE USED
4. NO GARANTEE AGAINST REPRESSION, CORRUPTION IS
   TOLERATED, BUT ILLEGAL AND ONE DAY...

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MTN A THREAT TO THE SOVIET SYSTEM 1

• CORRUPTION SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE NORMS OF
  THE SOVIET SYSTEM
• SOME SOVIET LEADERS ARE WORRIED OF THE INCREASING
  INFLUENCE OF THE TRADE ORGANIZATIONS.
• SOME POLITICAL LEADERS WANT IN 1981-1982 TO
  ATTACK THE TRADE ORGANIZATIONS, TO ATTACK
  CORRUPTION

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MTN A THREAT TO THE SOVIET SYSTEM 11

• THE BULK OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
  ARE HONEST AND WANT AN END TO CORRUPTION
• CORRUPTION THE IMAGE OF USSR ABROAD
  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
• IT IS VIEWED BY WESTERN MEDIA AS A SERIOUS
  DISEASE OF THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM
• IT IS A FACTOR THAT WEAKEN THE POSTION OF THE
  USSR IN HIS RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

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BUT TO ATTACK MTN IS TO TAKE A BIG RISK 1

• MOST OF THE TRADE STAFF IS INVOLVED IN CORRUPTION
• ALMOST ALL LEADERS IN MTN ARE COMPROMISED
• MTN MANAGERS SINCE 20 YEARS ARE THERE AND HAVE
  THE REPUTATION TO BE PERFORMANT
• TO ATTACK THEM IS TO ATTACK THOSE WHO HAVE
  ACCEPTED THEIR BRIBES OR GIFTS

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TO ATTACK MTN EMPLOYEES IS TO TAKE A BIG RISK 11

• TO ATTACK TRADE EMPLOYEES WOULD BE TO ATTACK
  THOSE WHO HAVE PROMOTED THEM
• TO ATTACK THEM WOULD BE TO ATTACK THOSE WHO WERE
  REWARDED BY THEM
• TO ATTACK THEM WOULD BE TO ATTACK THEIR RELATIVES

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TO ATTACK MTN EMPLOYEES IS TO TAKE A BIG RISK 111

• TO ATTACK THEM WOULD BE TO ATTACK THEIR NATIONS
• TO ATTACK THEM WOULD BE TO ATTACK THOSE WHO
  DISTRIBUTE THE CONSUMER GOODS IN THE SOCIETY

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• MOSCOW TRADE ORGANIZATIONS
• IN THE ANDROPOV ERA 1982-1984

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PROGRAM OF ANDROPOV

• LAW AND ORDER IN THE SOCIETY,
• MEAN RATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY
• SUPREMACY OF THE LAW

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LAW AND ORDER

• POLICE IN THE STREET DAY AND NIGHT WITH DOGS
• MANY CONTROL OF THE POPULATION
• THE LAW MORE SEVERE
• KGB PURGE IN THE POLICE. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
  VERY CORRUPTED

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1982-1983 REPRESSION IN MOSCOW TRADE NETWORK

• THOUSANDS MANAGERS ARRESTED
• STILL MORE SUSPECTED AND INTERROGATED
• MANY TOP TRADE EXECUTIVES BEHIND BARS
• CONVINCING EVIDENCE AGAINST MANY OF THEM

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KGB PLAN TO PUNISH THOSE WHO BREAK THE LAW

• FIRST STEP TO CHARGE ALL THOSE TRADE MANAGERS
  ACCUSED OF CORRUPTION
• SECOND STEP TO CHARGE ALL THEIR PROTECTORS IN
  THE PARTY AND THE GOUVERNMENT WHO ACCEPTED BRIBE
  FROM THEM

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THE SECOND STEP

• VERY DIFFICULT TO SUCCEED IN THE SECOND STEP
• WHY? BECAUSE IT MEAN TO ATTACK THE MOSCOW ELITE
• IT IMPLIES TO ATTACK THE MOST INFLUENT PEOPLE IN
  THE SOCIETY
• IT IMPLIES ALSO TO LAUNCH MASS REPRESSION

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THE REPRESSION AND ITS CONSEQUENCE

• NOVEMBER 1982 ANDROPOV NEW LEADER OF THE
  PARTY, THE ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN 2 REASONS1)
  A TACTIC TO ELIMINATE HIS FIRST RIVAL, GRISHIN,
  THE MOSCOW PARTY LEADER
• 2) CAMPAIGN POPULAR AMONG PEOPLE WHO DONT
  LIKE MTN STAFF ACCUSED OF TO EMPTY THE STORES
• BUT ANDROPOV DIED IN 1983

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MOSCOW TRADE ORGANIZATIONS

• IN THE GORBATCHEV ERA
• 1985-1991

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Ronald Reagan at his first meeting with former
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev / Photo Dennis
Paquin
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NEW LEADER GORBATCHEV

• CONTINUE THE POLITICS OF ANDROPOV,
• CONTINUE ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGN
• CONSERVATIVE IN THE ECONOMY
• AGAINST PRIVATE TRADE AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

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EVOLUTION OF GORBACHEV

• FAILURES OF HIS ECONOMIC REFORMS IN
  1985-1986-PERESTROIKA
• POPULARITY FALL IN THE SOCIETY
• INTELLIGENTSIA MORE AND MORE CRITICAL OF THE
  SITUATION
• OPPOSITION GROWS IN THE SOCIETY AGAINST THE RISE
  OF KGBS INFLUENCE

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GORBACHEV ADOPT POLITICAL REFORMS 1

• THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION MANY LOSERS IN
  THE SOCIETY THE ELITE, THE BUREAUCRACY
• WANT TO STOP IT
• NEW FOREIGN POLICY FAVORABLE TO THE WEST,
  CONCESSIONS TO THE WEST,
• WANT SUPPORT FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES MASSIVE
  ECONOMIC HELP

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GORBACHEV ADOPT POLITICAL REFORMS 11

• CONCESSIONS TO THE WEST
• AN ECONOMY NOT UNDER THE CONTROL BY THE STATE
  AND PARTY
• CITIZENS FREE FROM STATE PARTY
• MINORITIES NOT UNDER THE CONTROL OF RUSSIA
• REGIONS FREE FROM THE STATE AND THE PARTY

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GORBACHEV ADOPT POLITICAL REFORMS 111

• FREEDOM, OPEN THE BORDERS, NO CONTROL OF THE
  BORDER BY POLICE
• EFFECTS --a) PEOPLE CAN TRAVEL
• b) VERY FAVOURABLE TO
  CORRUPTION, BLACK MARKETERS CAN SELL THEIR
  PRODUCTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES AT A BETTER PRICE, TO
  SELL CULTURAL OBJECTS AND ARTS PAINTING

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MTN A DOMINANT FORCE

• CARDS OF THE TRADE EMPLOYEES
• THE NUMBER 300,000 EMPLOYEES IN MOSCOW,
• THE SPEECH LINKED PRIVATE ECONOMY AND
  DEMOCRACY, SOVIET TRADE WITH TOTALITARISM
• ARRESTED TRADE LEADERS WITH VICTIMS OF
  TOTALITARISM
• NETWORK SUPPORTERS IN CERTAIN MEDIAS
• THE MONEY (ONE PART OF THE MONEY COME FROM OTHER
  COUNTRIES) FOR TO CHANGE THE LAW, PAY THE
  JOURNALISTS

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POLITICAL REFORMS AND CORRUPTION

• HOW POLITICAL REFORMS HELP MTN
• REFORM MEAN ELECTION OF LEADERS
• MONEY FIRST WEAPON IN ELECTION
• TRADE NETWORK HAS A LOT OF MONEY
• 1) FINANCING OF CANDIDATES
• 2) FINANCING OF NEWSPAPERS
• 3) FINANCING OF ORGANIZATIONS

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WHY GORBACHEV AGAINST ECONOMIC REFORMS?

• DO NOT WANT TO FOLLOW CHINESE SOCIALISM,
  NATIONALISM THEY THINK THEY HAVE NOTHING TO
  LEARN FROM THE CHINESES
• GORBACHEV BELIEVES IN SOVIET TRADE
• BUSINESSMEN ARE ASSOCIATED WITH CRIMINALS AND
  CORRUPTION
• ECONOMIC REFORMS WOULD MEAN MORE POWER TO THE
  MINORITIES

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THE SOVIET BUSINESSMAN

• MANY ARE REPRESSED DURING THE 80s
• HAVE MADE MONEY IN THE SHADOW ECONOMY
• THOSE EMPRISONED WANT REHABILITATION AND
  COMPENSATION
• ONE PART OF THEM ARE CRIMINALS
• ARE NOT USED TO PAY TAXES, DO NOT WANT, ARE
  HOSTILE TO THE STATE

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MOSCOW TRADE STAFF FIGHT BACK THE KGB1986-1991 1

• MANY COMPLAINTS ARISE IN THE SOCIETY ABOUT PEOPLE
  ARRESTED WITHOUT EVIDENCE
• ABOUT HARSH TREATMENT BY THE POLICE
• MANY TOP OFFICIALS ARE NOT ARRESTED, BUT ARE
  AFRAID TO BE
• A LOT OF MONEY FOR TO HELP THOSE ARRESTED

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MOSCOW TRADE STAFF FIGHT BACK THE KGB1986-1991 11

• ECONOMIC REFORMS IMPLEMENTED EVEN IF KGB AND
  GORBACHEV ARE AGAINST
• TURNING POINT 1987 CREATION OF PRIVATE
  COOPERATIVE
• FIRST PRIVATE ENTERPRISE LEGALIZED. THIS MEASURE
  IS ADOPTED OFFICIALLY BECAUSE MTN HAVE GIVEN
  BRIBE-20 MILLIONS RUBLES OR 5 MILLIONS us- TO
  MOSCOW SOVIET LEADERS.

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KGBS DECLINE DURING PERESTROIKA 1988-1991

• A LACK OF LÉGITIMACY, HISTORY OF ABUSES,
  EXAMPLES
• YOU CANNOT TRAVEL ABROAD
• YOU CANNOT SPEAK TO FOREIGNERS
• KGBS ATTACKS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS , WEAKEN
  POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
• CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION IN TRADE IS
  ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL

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KGB AS THE MAIN TARGET OF CRITICS DURING
PERESTROIKA

• THE VICTIMS OF THE KGB
• THE VICTIMS OF KGB IN THE HISTORY
• THE VICTIMS OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ALCOOLISM
  1985-1986
• VICTIMS OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION
• VICTIMS MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE, FALSES
  ACCCUSATIONS BY KGB

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THE PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION CHANGE

1. AFTER 1986 TRADE EXECUTIVES ARE NO LONGER
   CONSIDERED AS RESPONSIBLE FOR CORRUPTION
2. THEY ARE CONSIDERATED VICTIMS OF THE SOVIET
   SYSTEM
3. THOSE REALLY RESPONSIBLE ARE INSITTUTIONS SOVIET
   TRADE, SOVIET SYSTEM

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COMMUNIST PARTY CULPRIT 1

• CAMPAIGN OF REHABILITATION OF CORRUPT TRADE
  MANAGERS
• TRADE EXECUTIVES WANT TO STOP REPRESSION AND
  LIBERATE THOSE EMPRISONED
• NEED CULPRITS IT WILL BE SOVIET SYSTEM
• IN FACT PARTY OFFICIALS FEW HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN
  CORRUPTION, THEY TAKE GIFTS RATHER THAN BRIBES

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COMMUNIST PARTY CULPRIT 11

• BUT PARTY OFFICIALS HAVE TOLERATED CORRUPTION
• THEY WERE OF A LOW MORAL
• THIS DEGENERESCENCE COME FROM KHROUCHTCHEV PERIOD

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SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY AND CORRUPTION

• TO TACKLE CORRUPTION WITH POLICE, ARBITRARY
  METHODS
• DO NOT GIVE INITIATIVE TO THE PEOPLE
• PEOPLE LACK OF TRUST TOWARDS PARTY OFFICIALS, HAS
  TRUST UNTIL KHROUCHTCHEV, THAN LOST IT.

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NEW ECONOMY

• SPEECH NEW ECONOMY MORE EFFICIENCY, MORE JUSTICE
• TRUST AND SUPPORT OF THE POPULATION FOR A NEW
  ECONOMY
• THE ECONOMY IS NO MORE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE
  STATE
• THE POLICE HAS NOT TO INTERFERE IN THE ECONOMY

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NEW ECONOMY 1

• NEW ECONOMY IS NEW, MANY WANT TO GO IN BUSINESS,
  EVERYONE THINK HE WILL SUCCEED-ENTHOUSIASM
• EVEN IN THE POLICE MANY WANT TO GO THERE, CREATE
  PRIVATE POLICE AGENCIES
• CERTAIN ARE MORE PREPARED TO JUMP IN

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NEW ECONOMY 11

• THOSE OF THE MTN HAVE THE CONNECTIONS, HELP EACH
  OTHER
• CHECHENS RETURN IN FORCE IN MOSCOW
• SOME LEADERS OF THE KOMSOMOLSSOME HIGH OFFICIALS
  OF THE MOSCOW CITY SOVIETS LIKE LUJKOV
• SOME HIGH OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT, MINISTRY
  OF TRADE

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HOW TO MAKE A BILLION DOLLARS?

• http//www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/moscow/b
  illionaires.html

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Photo Dmitry Azarov
Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov (left) and his wife, busnesswoman Elena Baturina
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APPARATCHIK, CORRUPTED AND RICH

• Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
• LEADER OF THE KOMSOMOL, IN 1987 SOLD
  COMPUTERS WITH HIS COOPERATIVE. IN 1990 HE
  FOUNDED SOME BANKS.

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HIGHLY EDUCATED, SON OF THE NOMENKLATURA AND RICH

• Vladimir Potanin,
• COMES FROM THE NOMENKLATURA, STUDIES
  AT THE PRESTIGIOUS INSTITUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
  RELATIONS. HE WORKED AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
  TRADE LIKE HIS FATHER

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STUDENT,CORRUPTED AND RICH

• Oleg Deripaska,
• IN 1991 STUDENT AT THE MOSCOW UNIVERSITY HE
  BEGAN TO BE INVOLVED IN BUSINESS, HIS RISE LED
  HIM TO ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT BUSINESSMAN
  TODAY IN RUSSIA. HAS COMMITTED MANY INFRACTIONS
  TO THE LAW LIKE THE OTHERS. VERY INVOLVED IN
  CORRUPTION

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ARTIST, CORRUPTED AND RICH

• Vladimir Gusinksy,
• . ARTIST AND SPECULATOR

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COLLAPSE OF THE USSR AUGUST-SEPTEMBER1991

• COLLAPSE IS EFFECTUATED EASILY
• CONTRIBUTION OF TRADE LEADERS TO LINK PLURALISM
  TO PRIVATE ECONOMY
• MANY KOMSOMOL, ÉCONOMIC, SOVIETS LEADERS WANT
  POLITICAL CHANGES FOR TO IMPROVE THEIR MATERIAL
  INTERESTS
• NOMENKLATURA ASSUMES SHE WILL LIVE BETTER WITH
  CAPITALISM, DEMOCRACY AND WITHOUT THE SOCIALIST
  SYSTEM.

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MTN AND THE STATE OF LAW

• DURING PERESTROIKA 1985-1991
• MTN HAS CREATED ITS OWN INDEPENDANT ASSOCIATIONS
  FOR TO DEFEND HIS INTERESTS
• MTN HAS CREATED ITS OWN PUBLICATIONS
• MTN HAS ITS OWN LAWYERS TO DEFEND ITS RIGHTS
• STATE OF LAW SEEMS GOOD FOR MTN

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REVIEW OF FIRST LECTURE 1

• BRIBE ONE FORM OF CORRUPTION
• AIRPORT DANGEROUS PLACES BECAUSE MANY POLICEMAN
• FRUITS AND VEGETABLES WHY? EASIER TO EMBEZZLE,
  HIGH QUALITY, MIDDLE QUALITY, LOW QUALITY- ROOTEN
• PRICE MARKET AND STORE
• CPSU

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REVIEW OF FIRST LECTURE 11

• GLAVTORG IT IS WHAT?
• DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION, BRIBE ONE PART OF
  CORRUPTION
• WHAT IS BRIBERY?
• INSUFFICIENCIES OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
• TABLES TO EXPLAIN

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BRIBERY

• YOU GIVE BRIBE TO WHO?, IF YOU ARE STORE
  MANAGERS, YOU GIVE BRIBES TO THE HEAD OF THE
  BOROUGH TRADE ORGANIZATIONS, IT HAS BEEN PROVEN,
  AND TO MOSCOW DISTRICT PARTY COMMITTEE, IT HAS
  NOT BEEN PROVEN.
• LEADERS OF DISTRCT TRADE ORGANIZATIONS GIVE TO
  MOSCOW TRADE LEADERS

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KGB AS ANTI-VIRUS

• VIRUS CORRUPTION
• CORRUPTION HAS INVADED THE TRADE NETWORK
• THEN, CORRUPTION SPREAD AT ALL SECTOR OF THE
  SOCIETY
• ONLY ONE EXCEPTION KGB
• ANTI-VIRUS KGB

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KGB COMME ALTERNATIVE AU PARTI

• KGB INCARNE LINTÉGRITÉ, LE PARTI DISCRÉDITÉ PAR
  CORRUPTION
• KGB COMME CENTRE DE LEXCELLENCE, SES EXPERTS ONT
  DES SOLUTIONS
• POLICIERS ET LEADERS POLITIQUES
• INTELLECTUELS RÉFORMISTES DANS KGB
• POLITOLOGUES AVEC ANDROPOV arbatov, burlatski,
  etc

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DZERZHINSKI

• POLITICAL REPRESSION,
• BUT ALSO WANT SOME REFORMS, ESPECIALLY IN
  ECONOMY, IN THE AGRICULTURE,
• PRIVATE LAND AND A MARKET ECONOMY, STALIN AGAINST
  IT.

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ANDROPOV

• VERY HONEST MAN
• THE MOST HONEST POLITICAL LEADER IN USSR IN 1982
• DO NOT ACEPT BRIBES AND EVEN GIFTS
• TRADITION AT BREHNEV TIME TO GIVE GIFTS TO
  POLITICAL LEADERS
• PARTICULARLY GIFTS FROM CENTRAL ASIA

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ANDROPOVS PROGRAM

• PRIORITY WAR ON CORRUPTION
• DISMISS ALL CIVIL SERVANTS ACCUSED OF CORRUPTION
• TO CHANGE CORRUPTED LEADERS FOR HONEST LEADERS,
• TO CHANGE CORRUPTED LEADERS FOR COMPETENT LEADERS

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FEDORCHUK NEW KGB LEADER

• VERY HONEST LIKE ANDROPOV
• HE SENDS IN JAIL HIS SON ACCUSED OF CORRUPTION,
  FINALLY THE SON COMMITED SUICIDE
• HE IS OBSESSED BY CORRUPTION, SEE CORRUPTION
  EVERYWHERE

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OLEINIK

• MY FRIEND OLEINIK

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KGBS AS A POLITICAL FORCE

• SUPPORT FROM THE ARMY
• EXHAUSTIVE INFORMATION ON THE THREAT OF
  CORRUPTION
• EXHAUSTIVE INFORMATION ON THE ELITE
• CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION, OCCASION TO CHANGE
  THE POLITICAL ELITE

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CHANGE OF STAFF KGB 1980-1982

• RECRUIT SPECIALISTS IN EVERY SECTOR
• MANY YOUNGS ENTER IN KGB
• RECRUIT THE BEST STUDENTS
• KGB HAS A GOOD REPUTATION CAN TRAVEL ABROAD,
  GOOD APPARTMENTS
• KGB REPRESENT JUSTICE, PROFESSIONNALISM AND
  PATRIOTISM

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CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION

• KGB POPULAR IN THE PEOPLE
• PEOPLE COLLABORATES WITH KGB
• PEOPLE WITH KGB AGAINST CORRUPTION
• KGB ASKS RUSSIANS TO DENOUNCE CORRUPTION,
  DENOUNCE CORRUPTED
• LEADERS, THE PRIVILEDGES OF THE ELITE

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PERESTROIKA CAMPAIGN AGAINST KGB

• FORCES CONTRE KGB
• DISSIDENTS, LIBERALS, INTELLECTUALS
• KGB ITS PAST
• SHOW THE DARK SIDES OF THE KGB IN THE HISTORY

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IAGODA
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IEJOV
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One labour camp in the 1930s
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BERIA

• WHEN STALIN DIED 1953
• BERAI PROPOSES POLITICAL REFORMS, INTERNAL LEVEL
  DECENTRALIZATION, END OF TERROR, MORE FREEDOM,
  MORE RIGHTS TO MINORITIES
• INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, REUNIFICATION OF THE TWO
  GERMANY, IMMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

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BERIA I

• ECONOMIC REFORMS MORE CONSUMER GOODS TO THE
  POPULATION
• LESS MONEY FOR THE MILITARY FORCES

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KGB BECOMES FSB AFTER 1991

• DURING ELTSINS PERIOD FSB A LOSER

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TOUGH YEARS 1990s

• FSB DECLINE IS ACCENTUATED IN THE EARLY 1990s
• ONE PART JOIN NEW REGIME

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FSB AGENTS AND MOTIVATIONS

• RATIONAL APPROACH
• MOTIVATION MATERIAL INTEREST
• MOTIVATION MAINLY POLITICAL POWER AND
  PRESTIGE

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ILLUSTRATIONS

• JUDGE DEMIDOV, IMPORTANT PROMOTION JUDGE SUPREME
  COURT, PROCUROR OLEINIK BECOMES POLITICIAN, THEN
  JUDGE CONSTITUTIONNAL COURT
• FEDORTCHUK, DIRECTOR KGB IN UKRAINE, THEN,
  DIRECTOR SOVIET UNION KGB

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ONE PART IN THE OPPOSITION

• MOST FSB LEADERS AGAINST ELTSIN
• THE CASE OF STERLIGOV
• NOT SUCCESSFULL, QUIT THE POLITICS FOR THE
  BUSINESS WHERE HE IS SUCCESSFULL

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MOST LEADERS AGAINST ELTSIN

• THE CASE OF STERLIGOV, HIGH OFFICIALS IN KGB
• ATTEMPTS TO CREATE A POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO
  ELTSIN, FINALLY HE FAILS
• BECOME A MORTICIAN

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VIOLENT ATTACKS AGAINST ELTSINS TEAM

• ONE CASE ATTEMPT TO MURDER A LIEUTENANT OF
  ELTSIN, CHUBAIS BY A FSB AGENT
• BUT IT IS NOT PLOT, IT IS AN ISOLATED CASE, IT IS
  NOT FREQUENT

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Vladimir Kvachkov / Photo from Novaya Gazeta
newspaperSuspect of Attack on Russian Energy
Chief Registered as Candidate to
ParliamentCreated 20.10.2005
107
ONE PART IN POLICE PRIVATE AGENCIES

• SEVERAL OF KGB AGENTS IN POLICE PRIVATE AGENCIES
• TO INSURE PROTECTION TO BUSINESSMEN
• A LOT OF MONEY TO MAKE

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TROFIMOV

• EX LEADER OF KGB IN BREZHNEV AND ANDROPOV ERA
• THEN LEADER OF FSB IN MOSCOW UNDER ELTSIN
• DISMISSED, HE HEADS A POLICE PRIVATE AGENCY AFTER
  1996,
• OTHER POLICE OFFICERS KILLED IN SUCH
  CIRCUMSTANCES, HIGH RISKS TO WORK IN PRIVATE
  POLICE AGENCIES

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POLICE PRIVATE AGENCIES IN ELTSIN TIME

• LEGAL SYSTEM IS POWERLESS
• 3 TYPES OF PRIVATE PROTECTION
• 1) KGB KRISHA
• 2) MVD KRISHA
• 3) BANDITESKAYA KRISHA
• HARSH COMPETITION BETWEEN THEM, VIOLENCE IS
  USED FREQUENTLY, VERY LUCRATIVE BUT
  VERY DANGEROUS

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KGBS LEADERS IN BUSINESS

• THE CASE OF TROFIMOV, HIGH PROFIL OFFICIALS IN
  KGB, THEN IN FSB
• DIRECTOR OF PRIVATE POLICE AGENCIES
• PROTECTION OF BUSINESSMEN
• HE IS KILLED WITH HIS WIFE IN JULY 2004,

113
REBUILDING THE SECURITY FORCES

• INVISIBLE AND DISCRET FSB MORE THAN NEVER BEFORE
• NO PROOF OF INVOLVMENT IN CORRUPTION
• NO PROOF OF INVOLVMENT IN POLITICAL BATTLES
• SECURITY FORCES HANDICAPED BY ITS PAST, CONTINUE
  TO HAUNT HIM.

114
BUT SOME EVOLUTION FAVOURABLE TO HIM

• ELTSIN LESS AND LESS POPULAR, MORE SENSITIVE TO
  SUPPORT IN LEA
• WAR in CHECHENYA 1995-1996
• NATIONALIST OPPOSITION SUPPORTS ARMY AND SECURITY
  FORCES
• BUT THE PHENOMENON OF CORRUPTION
• DEVELOP, ACCUSATIONS OF CORRUPTION PROLIFERATE
  AGAINST ELTSIN CLIQUE

115
ELTSIN CALL TO THE SECURITY AGENCIES

• NOT TO RESTORE THE INFLUENCE OF THE SECURITY
  AGENCIES
• SECURITY AGENCIES STILL WEAK
• HIS FORMER ATTRIBUTES IN FOREIGN AFFAIRES ARE NOT
  RESTORED
• BUT SECURITY AGENCIES REPUTATION RISE IN THE
  POPULATION AS AN HONEST FORCES

116
KGB WITH NEW FACES

• ELTSIN NEW LOOK FOR KGB
• CHANGE THE NAME FOR FSB
• CHOOSE NEW LEADERS, FORMER KGF OFFICERS
• NO RETURN TO THE GOOD OLD TIMES
• IN FACT, ELTSIN CLIQUE USE FSB TO DEFEND HIS
  DOMINATION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.
• TO DEFEND AGAINST CORRUPTION

117
Nickolay Patrushev / Image by MosNews

• Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB)
  Nikolai Patrushev in an interview with Interfax
  on the eve of the Defenders of Fatherland Day
  (formerly the Soviet Army Day) spoke of the
  special interest shown by foreign intelligence
  services in Russian military secrets. For
  instance, he described British intelligence
  operations in Russia and FSB actions to protect
  the Russian state.

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www.oligarchy.trj.ru

• about the oligarks
• http//www.mosnews.com/news/2005/10/20/kvachkov.sh
  tml