Title: Today
1Todays Lecture
- Preliminary comments on epistemology
- Epistemology and our knowledge of the external
world - some preliminary considerations. - René Descartes
2Writing a philosophy paper
- There are a few simple rules to writing a good
philosophy paper. - (1) Make sure that you properly understand the
position advocated by the philosopher you are
examining. - (2) Make sure your account of this philosophers
position is accurate. - (3) Do not make any claims for which you offer no
defense.
3Writing a philosophy paper
- (4) Only make claims for which you offer evidence
that can be plausibly regarded as adequate. - (5) Do not conclude more than your evidence will
justify. - (6) Do not try to prove your thesis.
4Writing a philosophy paper
- (7) Avoid broad sweeping (or categorical) claims
or conclusions. - (8) Always consider objections to your thesis.
5Preliminary comments on Knowledge
- There are three traditional aims of epistemology
(1) To provide an analysis of knowledge, (2) tell
us the scope or extent of our knowledge, and (3)
rebut or refute the epistemological skeptic. - Epistemological skepticism is marked by a refusal
to make positive claims of knowledge about
ourselves, the world, abstract objects or the
realm of the supernatural. - The or in the previous sentence is inclusive.
This is to accommodate the fact that
epistemological skepticism comes in degrees.
6Preliminary comments on Knowledge
- Three distinctions are useful when doing
epistemology (at least in the so-called Western
tradition) Foundationalism versus coherentism,
internalism versus externalism, and a priori
versus a posteriori knowledge.
7Preliminary comments on Knowledge
- Both foundationalism and coherentism are theories
about justification, or the epistemic relations
that must hold between beliefs if they are to be
properly regarded as justified. - Think of the justificatory structure of beliefs
according to foundationalism as if it were a
house. - On the bottom you have a foundation. Then you
have the walls and the roof. Without a good
foundation the house will not be stable.
8Preliminary comments on Knowledge
- Foundational beliefs are known as basic beliefs.
The non-foundational beliefs that make up the
rest of the structure of your belief system are
non-basic beliefs. - Basic beliefs are those beliefs in our belief
system that are regarded as justified without any
reference to other beliefs. Non-basic beliefs
receive their justification from either other
non-basic beliefs or basic beliefs. - The justification of all our non-basic beliefs
ultimately rests on our basic beliefs.
9Preliminary comments on Knowledge
- Foundationslists disagree over what basic beliefs
are properly basic. Properly basic beliefs are
beliefs that are justified without any reference
to other beliefs. - One set of criteria for proper basicality you can
find in the literature is A belief that p is
properly basic if and only if it is self-evident,
incorrigible or evident to the senses.
10Preliminary comments on Knowledge
- Think of the justificatory structure of beliefs
according to coherentism as if it were a huge
circle of distinct points or a web. - According to coherentism there are no beliefs
that are justified independently of other
beliefs. Coherentists deny the existence of
properly basic beliefs.
11Preliminary comments on Knowledge
- Beliefs are justified (in large part) by their
relations with other beliefs. - You can think of the justificatory structure as
if it were a circle with p being justified by q,
which is justified by r, which is justified by s,
and so on until we get to a belief n that is
justified by p again.
12Preliminary comments on Knowledge
- Alternatively, you can think of the justificatory
structure as if it were a web with no one belief
gaining its epistemic strength solely from itself
or a non-belief. Rather, each belief
epistemically supports and is supported by other
beliefs.
13Preliminary comments on Knowledge
- Take care not to confuse these theories of
justification with psychological theories about
how our beliefs are actually related to each
other (in our head) or to experience. - You could be a coherentist about justification
and still believe that we have basic beliefs that
arise directly from our experience and, in turn,
give rise to other beliefs that would not arise
were it not for the appearance of these basic
beliefs.
14Preliminary comments on Knowledge
- Internalism is basically the view that our
beliefs do not possess positive epistemic value
unless they are justified by evidence that is (1)
within our ability to find and (2) and which we
can relate to these beliefs as justifiers (even
if we actually do not).
15Preliminary comments on Knowledge
- Externalism is basically the view that our
beliefs can possess positive epistemic value if
we stand in a right relationship to the relevant
states of affairs (which our beliefs are about)
or if our belief forming mechanisms or processes
are reliable (produce substantially more true
than false beliefs when used in those
circumstances for which they were designed).
16Preliminary comments on Knowledge
- Remember that positive epistemic value comes in a
spectrum with knowledge at one extreme (being
those beliefs that possess the most positive
epistemic value) and (merely) rational beliefs at
the other extreme (being those beliefs that
possess the least positive epistemic status
without losing value or becoming negatively
valued.) - Justified beliefs and warranted beliefs fall
somewhere along the spectrum.
17Preliminary comments on Knowledge
- A priori knowledge is knowledge that is acquired
before experience. - A posteriori knowledge is knowledge that is
acquired after experience.
18Epistemology and our knowledge of the external
world - some preliminary considerations.
- Consider the following problem.
- Our beliefs about the external world are
(largely) grounded in experiences that we believe
to be the effect of objects out in the world
impacting our senses. - Our beliefs about objects in the external world,
then, are primarily informed by experiences that
are not themselves the objects in question.
19Epistemology and our knowledge of the external
world - some preliminary considerations.
- The truth value of these beliefs depends on their
accuracy. - Can we get beyond, or behind, our experiences to
compare our beliefs to the objects-in-themselves?
20René Descartes Preliminary comments
- He was born in 1596 and died before his time in
1850. - He not only engaged in what we understand as
philosophy, but also in the science of optics,
physics, psychology and mathematics.
21René Descartes Preliminary comments
- Descartes is associated with a movement known as
Continental Rationalism. - There are a number of features of Rationalism
associated, rightly or wrongly, with Descartes
epistemology. - (1) Reason is privileged over the senses as a
source of knowledge about ourselves and the
world. (Knowledge derived from reason alone
enjoys a higher status than knowledge derived
from the senses alone.)
22René Descartes Preliminary comments
- (2) This is largely because the senses are
regarded as a less reliable source of knowledge
(about ourselves and the world) than reason. - (3) The senses are an acceptable source of
knowledge (about ourselves and the world) when
corrected and constrained by reason.
23René Descartes Preliminary comments
- Descartes epistemology is foundationalist.
- In the Meditations Descartes appears to use
self-evidency and indubitability as criteria for
regarding beliefs or (epistemic) principles as
properly basic.
24René Descartes Preliminary comments
- Descartes desires to have our beliefs about the
world formally derived from basic beliefs or the
application of principles that are themselves
free from reasonable doubt or are self-evidently
true, or from other non-basic beliefs that find
their own justification in such properly basic
beliefs or principles (or from yet more non-basic
beliefs so justified).
25René Descartes Preliminary comments
- Descartes is also internalist.
- The basic method of doubt suggested in the
Meditations points to the importance of
justifying our beliefs (at some point in our
life), or at some point ensuring that our beliefs
are properly grounded or secured against
reasonable doubt.
26René Descartes Preliminary comments
- Descartes is not an epistemological skeptic of
our knowledge of ourselves, the world or the
nature and existence of God.
27René Descartes Synposis of the following six
Meditations
- Some things to note in this synopsis.
- (1) The First Meditation proffers a method of
doubt which is to be used to help us abstract
ourselves away from our many preconceptions about
ourselves and the world, and to break our
dependence on the senses when talking of truths
about ourselves and the world (FP, p.145).
28René Descartes Synposis of the following six
Meditations
- (2) In the Second Meditation Descartes hopes to
show that (i) our most certain knowledge is not
derived from the senses (ii) and involves our own
existence. - Note that his discussion of the distinction
between the soul or mind and the body in this
Meditation is conceptual rather than
metaphysical. It is not until later (the Sixth
Meditation) that Descartes is going to suggest
that the mind is, actually, a distinct thing from
the body (FP, p.146).
29René Descartes Synposis of the following six
Meditations
- It is also important to note that Descartes does
not merely assume that what we can clearly and
distinctly conceive is true. This is a claim for
which he will argue (though not in the First or
Second Meditations). - This claim will be predicated, in large part,
upon the facts that God exists, is
omnibenevolent, omniscient and omnipotent and has
created us such that if we use our sense
faculties and faculty of reason carefully (i.e.
reflectively) we can acquire clear and distinct
ideas, which are, in turn, true.
30René Descartes The First Meditation
- There are two motivations for his method of doubt
that Descartes mentions in the first paragraph of
this Meditation (FP, p.147). - (1) He had believed many falsehoods in his
childhood, and this raised legitimate doubts
about the truth of the beliefs he now held (as
they were acquired cumulatively and taken to be
true in part because of their relation to his
earlier beliefs), and - (2) a stable and lasting science requires
foundations that are free of reasonable doubt.