Stefan Jungcurt

1
Non-coordinated Cooperation A Framework for
the Analysis of Decision-making processes in
International Regimes and their impacts on
International Biodiversity Policy

• Stefan Jungcurt
• Humboldt University, Berlin

2
Objective

• A framework to study the development of
  coordination among overlapping International
  Agreements and its impact on environmental
  objectives
• Interactions between international agreements
• Interactions between domestic and international
  processes of decision-making

3
Outline

• Overlapping International Agreements on PGRFA
  Management
• Theories of International Cooperation
• International Negotiations as Nested Games
• Outlook - Applying the Framework

4
International Regulation of PGRFA Management

• Provision of PGRFA - Genetic Erosion
• Coordination of conservation measures
• Responsibilities and obligations for conservation
• Distribution of costs - compensation and
  efficiency
• Use of PGRFA - Plant Breeding
• International transfer of PGRFA and related
  property rights and entitlements
• IP protection of biotechnological innovations
• Relation between conservation and use of PGRFA

5
Supply and Demand-related Agreements

• Supply-related agreements
• Rights of Suppliers
• CBD
• Conservation and sustainable use
• National sovereignty
• ITPGRFA
• Multilateral system for access and benefit
  sharing
• ITPGRFA was aligned with CBD before adoption

• Demand related agreements
• Rights of Users
• TRIPS
• Harmonization of IPRs
• UPOV
• Plant variety protection
• WIPO
• World patent system
• UPOV 91 in line with TRIPS
• Agreement between WTI and WIPO on IPRs

6
Consequences of Uncoordinated Overlap

• Biopiracy conflicts - PRs and entitlements are
  not clear on the international level
• Legislative dilemmas - priorities, uncertainty,
  coherence
• Complex legislation
• Overlap causes costs (conflict, complexity,
  uncertainty) that erode gains from cooperation
• Trade off between interdependent objectives
• Coordination is a question of efficient
  international cooperation
• Determinants and conditions of coordination among
  overlapping international agreements

7
International Agreements as Institutions

• IA supply rules that guide and restrict states
  behavior
• Interactions among states (trade, transfers,
  coalitions etc.)
• National activities with external impacts
  (pollution, global public goods etc.
• Legally binding contracts specifying rules on
• Rights and obligations (substantive aspects)
• Rules and agendas for negotiations (procedural
  aspects)
• Declarations on intended future cooperation
  (symbolic aspects)

8
Analyzing Coordination

• Relationships and interactions between agreements
• Communication
• Coordination/cooperation
• Coherence
• Relationships and interactions on the national
  level
• Decision making processes
• Mandates and Negotiators
• Awareness of incoherence and problems
• Reflection

9
Theories of International Cooperation - 1.
International Relations Theories (IRT)

• Systemic theory - analysis of the whole system of
  interactions on a single level of analysis
  (international, domestic or individual)
• International level States react to incentives
  by the international system
• Domestic level Foreign policy of states
  constitutes the international system
• Dominance of international approaches
• International regimes are a consequence of
  cooperation

10
The Level-of-Analysis Problem

• Domestic characteristics of states are excluded
  as explanatory factors and treated as constant
  across states (preferences, decision making,
  resources)
• But often domestic factors are included in order
  to explain residual variance and empirical
  anomalies
• Leading to ad hoc (intuitive) interpretations
  rather than explicit theories
• No systematic approach to include domestic
  variables or interactions between different levels

11
Theories of International Cooperation - 2.
Economic Theories (ETIC)

• Study of self-enforcing, re-negotiation proof
  agreements in the absence of an enforcing
  authority
• Game theoretical modeling of cooperation
• Similar assumptions as regime theory
• Cannot account systematically for variances in
  domestic factors

12
Different Applications of Game Theory

• As metaphor (IRT)
• Explorative research and to illustrate
  descriptive studies
• Limited as theory that can be empirically tested
• As deductive theory that makes testable
  predictions (ETIC)
• Theoretically sound analysis, for greater
  richness of explanation
• Requires assumptions about fundamental aspects of
  the game, which restrict the modifications
  possible to account for other factors
• State of research determines application -
  metaphor, correspondence, model or theory (Snidal
  1985)

13
Building the Framework - Objectives

• Establish a systematic link between international
  and domestic explanatory factors
• Include interdependencies among different regimes
  as international factor
• Provide for adequate applications of game theory

14
International Negotiations as Two-Level Games
(Putnam 1989)

• The statesman is involved in simultaneous games
  at the domestic and international level
• International negotiation of mutually beneficial
  agreements
• Domestic Ratification by constituency
• Determinants of the payoffs of the statesman
• Political costs and benefits on the domestic
  level Support of the constituency
• International interests
• Preferences of the statesman

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Two-level games II

• The statesmans decision space is restricted
• by the solutions the domestic constituency will
  ratify - win-set (ratifiable outcomes)
• by the win-sets of the opponents (negotiable
  outcomes)
• Within these constraints the statesman negotiates
  autonomously
• The win-set is the conceptional link between
  domestic and international decision making
  procedures

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Two-level games III

• Determinants of the win-set
• Power, preferences and coalitions among domestic
  constituents
• Domestic political institutions
• Strategies of the negotiator on the international
  level
• Solves level-of-analysis problem
• Applies Game Theory as metaphor
• Does not account for interdependencies among
  regimes

17
International Negotiations as Nested Games

• Objective provide an empirically accurate, and
  theoretically coherent account of apparently
  sub-optimal choices (Tsebelis 1990)
• Apparently sub-optimal choices are cases of
  disagreement between the actor and the observer
• The observer focuses on one game, while the actor
  is involved in a whole network of games,
  therefore the actor makes choices that appear to
  be sub-optimal (or irrational) to the observer

18
Nested Games II Types of NG

• Games in Multiple Arenas (GMA) variable payoffs
• The payoffs in the principal arena are contingent
  on the actors choice in another arena
• Contextual factors of a decision
• Games in Institutional Design (GID) variable
  rules
• The rules of the game are contingent on the
  actors choice in a higher level game, where a
  choice between different sets of rules can be
  made
• Factors of institutional design and institutional
  change

19
Nested Games III

• Full theoretical treatment of GMA under
  conventional assumptions of Game Theory
  (individual rationality, payoffs, strategies)
• GID can be used to explore the processes and
  conditions of institutional design using Games as
  metaphor
• The phenomena can be differentiated and analyzed
  separately, each with the appropriate application
  of Game Theory

20
Building the Framework - Propositions

• Interdependencies between different international
  arenas are exclusively Games in Multiple Arenas
• Formal rules in International Regimes are fixed
  or can be changed only by its members
• The effects of a given win-set are exclusively
  Games in Multiple Arenas
• The common win set (overlap) determines the joint
  payoffs, the relative size of the win set
  determines their distribution
• Variations in the size of the win-set can be
  clearly differentiated as either GMA or GID
• A game can vary either in rules (actors and
  strategies) or payoffs, not both

21
The Framework
A II Contextual Arena
A I Principal Arena
Principal Arena (International CBD, WTO...)
Contextual Arena (International CBD, WTO...)
L I International Level
GMA (A)
GMA (B)
GID (C,D)
Domestic Arena (member countries)
L II Domestic Level
Win-Set
Prefernces and Coalitions
Political Institutions
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Types of Games
Principal Arena Contextual Arena Win-Set Rules Payoffs
Games in Multiple international Arenas (A) International International --- Fixed P Varaible C. Fix./Var.
Two-Level-Games (B) International Domestic Fixed Fixed Int. Variable Dom. Var.
Games in international Institutional Design (C) International Domestic Variable Int. Variable Dom. Fixed Fixed
Games in domestic institutional Design (D) Domestic International Variable Int. Fixed Dom.Variable Fixed
23
Applying the Framework

• Characteristics of the Actor
• Statesman or Negotiator
• Individual or corporate actor
• Preferences (Dove, Agent, Hawk)
• Determinants of the win-set
• Institutions (ratification procedure, voting
  rules, party discipline, autonomy of
  government...)
• Interest Groups (power, influence, coalitions,
  affectedness)

24
Summary - Outlook

• Coordination among overlapping agreements on
  PGRFA management is a question of effective
  international regulation
• Study of Coordination requires systematically
  accounting for international and domestic factors
• Nested games framework
• Provides conceptual link between international
  and domestic factors
• Guides adequate application of game-theoretical
  modeling
• Linking the framework to Political Economic
  Theory can provide guidance for the selection of
  variables